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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to study the evolution, 
structure, administration, effects and future prospects of 
the petroleum industry in Malaysia in the context of the 
changing ideas and concepts that are influencing the petroleum 
industry at present.
The discovery of petroleum deposits in the offshore 
areas of Malaysia in the early 1970'3 promises to act as a 
catalyst to future development. The production of crude 
petroleum has increased significantly and has emerged as one 
of the leading activities in Malaysia today.
¥e are proposing to examine several areas in the 
development of the petroleum industry - petroleum reserves 
and production, refinery capacity, crude oil pricing, product 
supplies and prices, government legislation and petroleum 
revenue contributions to the economy. It has been predicted 
that petroleum reserves are limited at present and would be 
depleted sometime in the beginning of 1990*s. With the 
increasing demand for local crude in refineries, the problem 
might become worse. By the end of 1970*3 > it i® predicted 
that there is a necessity to expand local refinery capacity 
to cope with the growth in demand for petroleum products.
Ever since the 1973 'Oil Crisis' and subsequent developments, 
the structure of the product prices in this country has changed 
with the increase in crude prices. This has led to 'under- 
recoveries' to oil companies, px’oduct shortages and hoarding. 
This has also led the Government to involve more and more 
intervention in the industry especially with the establishment 
of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), the National Oil 
Company.
We conclude the thesis by emphasising the necessity 
of instituting a programmed development (conservation) of our 
petroleum resources and local participation in investments in 
the upstream phase of the industry. The conservation measure 
would ensure sufficient supplies of crude petroleum for our 
future needs.1 A reasonable time—production function would 
enable PETRONAS to involve in exploration, refining and 
distribution functions and ensure reasonable price and adequate 
supply of petroleum products in the future. This is also 
reasonable in view of the problems involved in the recycling of 
"surplus" oil money accrued to the Government as a result of 
a rapid depletion of our oil resources.
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1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1 .1 Importance Of Study
There is no shortage of published works on the 
economics of the petroleum industry and works dealing with 
the major oil producing countries such as America, Mexico, 
Venezuela and the Middle East. The writings of such famous
1 2  3 4oil economists like Frankel , Adelman , Penrose , Cassady ,
5
Hartshorn and many others are well known in the oil and 
academic circles. Frankel* s pioneering works died back to 
1946 and dealt with the basic problems of the oil industry; 
a complete work on the structure of costs and prices of the 
world oil market was done by Adelman; Penrose has analysed the 
effect on some Middle Eastern economics of the presence of 
the international oil industry in the area and the interplay 
of the oil resources in the politics and economic development 
of these countries, as well as the role of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries or OPEC; Cassady*s work initiated 
in 19^9 by the American Petroleum Institute, explored the 
general understanding of the economic structure and the
1 Frankel, F.H. ESSENTIALS OF PETROLEUM - A Key to Oil
Economics, Frank Cass and Company Ltd. 2nd Edition, London I 969
2 Adelman, M. THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET, John Hopkins
Press, Baltimore 1971.
3 Penrose, E. THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL FIRM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES — The International Petroleum Industry, Allen and 
Unwin, London 1978 and THE GROWTH OF FIRMS, MIDDLE EAST OIL AND 
OTHER ESSAYS — Frank Cass and Company Ltd. London 1971*
4 Cassady, R. (J r .) PRICE MAKING AND PRICE BEHAVIOUR IN
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. Kennikat Press, New York, 1954.
5 Hartshorn, J.E. OIL COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS, Faber
and Faber, London I 967.
2behaviour of the petroleum industry especially in the areas 
of price making procedures in the American petroleum industry; 
and Hartshorn's study which concerned the relationship between 
oil companies and the Government of the producer countries 
serves the foundation stone for the changing relations between 
oil companies and governments in many less developed oil 
producing countries especially in the early 1970s * Almost all 
these credited work have, however been confined to the problems 
of the giant international firms and the major oil producing 
countries. The problems commonly facing the small oil 
producing countines as well as oil importing countries, 
particularly those which are not domiciles of the international 
oil corporations, have been largely overlooked. Howe.ver , the 
reality of these problems which came to light recently resulted
in a number of works by a^  number of economists in a number of
6 7 8 9
countries such as Nigeria , India , Indonesia , Iran and few
others. Although primarily based on the specific countries,
all the major issues presented by the various authors have been
discussed using the background of international events.
6 Schaltz, THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY OF NIGERIA, Oxford 
University Press London 1958, and Pearson, S.R. PETROLEUM AND 
THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY, Harvard University Press, 19^5.
7 Dasgupta, B. THE OIL INDUSTRY IN INDIA. Frank Cass, 
London 1971*
8 Sritua Arief, THE OIL INDUSTRY IN INDONESIA. The Manage 
ment of Resources in a Developing Economy, Sritua Arief Associai 
Djakarta 1976 and Oei, H.L. PETROLEUM RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT; A Comparative Study of Mexico and Indonesia, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis University of Texas, 196^.
9 Fesheraki, F. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY - 
International and Domestic Aspects, Praeger Publishers, New 
York 1976.
3The present research on the economic issues 
relating to the petroleum industry of Malaysia is the first 
of its kind undertaken at this level. It attempts to examine 
some of the major issues facing the oil industry particularly 
those relating to the production of crude oil, refining, 
distribution, marketing, prices and costs of curdes and 
petroleum products and finally the contributions of the industry 
to the fiscal revenue of the Government.
Essentially, there are four main reasons for the 
importance of this study and they are discussed below.
(•j.) In the immediate aftermath of the world wide^ inflation
of 1973-197^ ami the associated quadrupling of crude petroleum 
prices, the discoveries of petroleum deposits in the Malaysian 
sector of The South China Sea gave the promise of a vast new 
potential source of wealth. The Petroleum Economist in its 
November 197^- issue pointed out that "a succession of oil and 
gas discoveries mainly in 1973~197^ opens the prospect that, 
with the exception of tiny state of Brunei, Malaysia may by 
the end of the decade have the highest per capita export
10revenues from crude and LNG of any South East Asian nation".
( 2) The production of crude petroleum increased from being
insignificant to highly significant and has emerged as one of 
the leading activities in Malaysian resource development. With 
the anticipated increase in domestic production of crude 
petroleum, exports of crude and partly refined petroleum in
10 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST. Nov. 197^> P P • •
c
a
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1977 are expected to increase by about 2’J°/0 to 63.9 million
barrels per annum or 175*000 barrels per day. This will
raise the value of exports to about M$2,135 million (this
does not take into account the price increase since January
1977)* This will make petroleum the second highest foreign
11
exchange earner after rubber.
(3) Crude petroleum and natural gas represent virtually 
the only indigenous energy sources available in the country.
With the exception of minor coal deposits in Sabah and a 
negligible amount of hydro-electric power generation, Malaysia 
is entirely dependent on petroleum for its energy requirements. 
In 1975 Malaysia produced 37*25 million barrels of primary 
energy and consumed 32.08 million barrels giving an excess 
capacity of 5 million barrels. Out of this 90 percent of total 
production and consumption is provided by the petroleum sector. 
In 1970, petroleum provided Sh percent of energy needs and is
12expected to meet over 90 percent of the energy needs by I 985.
(4) Speculation about the existence of petroleum deposits 
occurred long before 1973* but it was only about this time that 
the potential importance of petroleum became a serious political 
consideration. The announcement by the late Prime Minister in 
Parliament in 197^ of flie establishment of PETRONAS (Petroleum 
Nasional Berhad), the National Petroleum Corporation Limited, 
changed the whole political atmosphere. Apathy was replaced by
11 See Government of Malaysia. ECONOMIC REPORT 1976/77,
Ministry of Finance, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur 1976 .
12 ASIA RESEARCH BULLETIN. December 31, 1976, Singapore
PP-272.
a feeling of euphoria but also by a concern that the newly
13found resource should be locally controlled.
The principal focus of this study is on the post 
1970 development of petroleum economy in Malaysia, partly 
because the development prior to 1970 was very limited and 
partly because of the highly significant events that have taken 
place in the past four years. It is during this period that 
the output of petroleum has expanded threefold from its pre— 70 
peak; its price has quadrupled since the 1973 oil * crisis1 , 
and PETRONAS was established through the Petroleum Development 
Act .
1 .2 Objectives Of The Study
In the aftermath of the I 969 riot, the Malaysian 
government announced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in their 
development plan objectives in the future. The overriding 
objectives of this new development policy is that of national 
unity. The NEP comprises two aims or prongs the first of which 
is to eradicate poverty amongst all M a % s i a n s  and secondly to 
restructure the multiracial, multicultural and multilingual 
Malaysian society so that the identification of race with 
economic function and geographical location is reduced and
14eventually eliminated. The Government believes that both
13 Adnan, M.A. ’'Critical Issues in Petroleum Development
in Malaysia” , a paper presented at a seminar organised by the 
Malaysian Economic Convention, May 19—21, I 977, Kuala Lumpur.
14 See Government of Malaysia, SECOND MALAYSIA PLAN,
Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur I 97O; MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE 
SECOND MALAYSIA PLAN 1971-1975, Government Printer, Kuala 
Lumpur 1973; and THIRD MALAYSIA. PLAN 1976-1980, Government 
Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1976.
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these objectives could be attained or realised through the 
rapid expansion of the economy over time.
The first prong of the NEP aims at improving the 
economic conditions and quality of life of all races by 
directly increasing their access to land, physical capital, 
training and other facilities, thus permitting them to share 
more equitably in the benefits of the economic growth. To 
ensure that the poor are provided with sufficient opportunities 
to participate in and benefit from the process of economic 
growth, the Government seeks through the second prong of the 
NEP a fairer distribution among the races of the opportunity 
to participate in the wide range of economic activity. Through 
the second prong, the Government aims at providing such 
assistance for all racial groups in the country to find 
employment, secure participation and acquire ownership and 
control in the various sectors of the economy. Subsequently, 
the distributional objectives of the NEP must depend on 
accelerated economic growth and mobilisation of the resources 
both natural and physical available in the country in order to 
eradicate poverty and facilitate the restructuring of society.
The NEP has been conceived by the Government as the 
agenda that will guide the nation for the next 20 years at 
least from 1970 1° 1990. Amongst the variables that had been 
emphasised, one of the driving forces is that of energy 
sector. Energy especially from petroleum resources is one of 
the key factors in the development process of any society.
The Malaysian society if it develops economically and socially 
at the tremendous rate as required by the NEP will need the
7(rapid development of the energy economy especially the 
petroleum resources sector. This should be centered around 
providing adequate amounts of this type of energy so that it 
could be adapted efficiently to the process of development 
and economic growth. Above all, the fiscal revenues from the 
petroleum resources found in the country could be utilised to 
achieve the objectives of the NEP earlier.
The discovery of oil in Sarawak (then Colony of the 
British Borneo) in 1911 has resulted in the production of crude 
oil which is mainly exported and currently at the rate of 
some three and half million barrels a year. Its effect on the 
Malaysian economy has been important ever since and yith 
further development and additional discoveries, the rate of 
production can be increased substantially during the decade.
And during the course of the search for oil, there have been 
very substantial discoveries of natural gas in the area. The 
crude oil and gas discovered could be utilised to further the 
economic development of the country.
To assess the development of the petroleum industry 
of Malaysia since 1911, an analysis of its history,economy, 
market structure and contributions to the overall development 
and growth in the country is made with specific attention given 
to the identification and evaluation of some of the forces 
contributing to the progress of the industry, particularly the 
economic influences leading to the importance of the industry 
in the future for the country, especially till the end of the 
century, which is concurrent with the terminal period of the 
NEP, i.e. 1990.
8Chapter 2 will trace the development of the
petroleum industry from the early kerosene trade in the late
19th Century leading to the first oil discovery in the
country in 1911 and its expansion until the late 1960s. This
historical development will give some background indication of 
the future trend of oil development.
The position of the oil resources in the energy 
structure of Malaysia will be dealt in Chapter 3* Based on 
the gross domestic product estimated for the next 15 years by 
the Third Malaysia Plan (197^ to I98O ) , the petroleum products 
required by Malaysia over the same period will be estimated.
This will provide an. estimate of the product needs and refinery 
capacities available or to be made available in the future.
The first step in estimating the supplies of crude 
oil available for refinery use will be the expected reserves 
and production forthcoming from the Malaysian offshore fields 
in the future. This will be done in Chapter ^ . And secondly, 
in order to assess the expected supplies of products (refined) 
from the refineries in the future, the available and expected 
refinery capacities in the country will be estimated so that 
surplus and deficit capacities could be located and corrected 
where and whenever necessary.
Having discussed the upstream and mid-stream 
operatiorB of the oil industry, the distributional and marketing 
aspects of crude oil and products will be looked into.
Chapter 6 will examine the distribution of crude and product 
supplies from outside and inside the country in terms of volume,
9,sources, and methods of transportation. The structure of 
the domestic oil market will be examined in the light of the 
multinational character of the companies in the market and 
the marketing practices adopted by them. This will be done in 
Chapter 7 .
Chapters 8 and 9 will discuss the pricing structure 
and practices of the crude oil and petroleum products in 
Malaysia, respectively. The structure of prices and costs 
of crude petroleum and petroleum products produced in Malaysia 
will be compared with other oil producing countries wherever 
possible. The effects of the oil crisis of 1973 and the 
subsequent oil price, hikes on the structure of product prices 
and the ensuring actions taken by the Government in the 
industry will also be discussed.
Chapter 10 will look into the rationale for the 
increasing intervention by the Government in the industry.
Areas considered will be the changing state of oil legislation 
in the country leading to the establishment of the state oil 
company, PETRONAS and the changing structure of fiscal revenues 
to the Government.
The last chapter summarises the major conclusions 
derived from the foregoing discussion and the policy impli­
cations thereof.
1 * 3 Limitations Of The Study
The cooperation of industry members and government
(Officials with, regard to the research in Malaysia was 
anything but uniform. It ranged from very poor to excellent. 
The absence of complete cooperation in some instances very 
likely handicapped the collection of data. Fortunately 
alternative sources of information usually were made available 
by considerate oil executives and government officials. The 
absence of uniformity in the cooperation provided by industry 
and government representatives may be significant in itself; 
this is precisely the type of behaviour one would expect .i;\ r, j 
in the oil industry, or any industry for that 
matter, which is comprised of independently operated units 
rather than of one organisation; the research was conducted 
during the period o f •negotiation and bargaining between the 
oil companies and the government as a result of the Petroleum 
Development Act and the production— sharing arrangement which 
resulted from i t . In many instances detailed information 
compiled from company records, especially monthly market 
reports from 1960s to the middle of I 97OS, were never given to 
anyone outside the company, let alone outside the industry. 
Despite the inherent difficulties of the research, it is felt 
that the study has obtained some unusually rewarding material, 
although much of it are used for background purposes only.
An obstacle to research in this field in developing 
countries is the lack of data. In Malaysia this is more so as 
the industry was not of great importance before 197° and was 
confined or localised in the state of Sarawak. The systematic 
and regular collection of statistics pertaining to oil in 
Malaysia only started with the establishment of PETRONAS and th 
requirements stipulated by the Government to oil companies in
11
their submissions for price increases. Many of the data 
available are of confidential nature and therefore are not 
readily available. Unless an important and useful purpose 
is served confidential data made available has to be referred 
to and a conscious attempt has been made to avoid identifying 
the sources as some of the information may be considered 
detrimental to the individual concerned or to the disadvantage 
of informants.
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CHAPTER 2
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS IN MALAYSIA
This chapter will examine or review 2 aspects of 
oil development in Malaysia: (i) The historical development
of oil trade in Malaysia and (ii) domestic crude oil 
production scenarios. These developments will help to throw 
some light on the future development of the industry which 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
2,1 Historical Development of Oil Trade In Malaysia
2,1.1. The Early Oil Trade In Malaysia (1886 to 1919)
The presence of oil in the East Indies is first 
known from Gerinis’ RESEARCH ON PTOLEMY’S GEOGRAPHY OF 
EASTERN ASIA, who states that its existence was known in 
95^ A.D. - long before stories of the very first Dutch 
voyage to The Far E a s t , when the explorer Jan Huggen van 
Lingchoien recorded his adventures. The latter described 
a well in Sumatra which produced "pure balm"^. Another 
account in Indonesian folklore mentioned that the King of 
Acheh used burning oil from a well in Deli (in Sumatra) to
1 Jan Hugen van Linchosten was the first Dutchman to
give an account of the wonders of the Far E a s t . He brought 
back from Goa in India a story concerning a well in Sumatra 
’from which a pure balm flows’ . This 'wonderous' substance 
which appeared in numerous passages in old journals mentioned 
its customary uses as medicaments and caulking boats in the 
old world were similarly used in the Far East. See First 
Dutch Report of The Occurance of Petroleum in Sumatra (159^) 
cited in Geeretson, THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL DUTCH, Vol.l., 
2nd ed., E.J. Brill, Leiden, I 958, p .20. See also A.L. Ter 
Braake, ’Mining In The East Indies’., Bulletin k of the 
Netherlands and Netherlands Council Of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, N. York, 1 9 ^ ,  pp. 66- 6 7 .
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attack Portuguese skips:
"  that in the 18th century people living by
the Straits of Malacca (Sumatra) were using earth 
oil for fuel. During the l6th century the fleet of 
the kingdom of Atjeh defeated a Portuguese armada 
under Alfonso D 1Alburquerque by the use of f i r e b a l l s 1 
- clumps of rags immersed in oil found in seepages 
in the Atjeh region lighted and catapulted at the 
empty ships which were thus set on fire - effective^ 
until the Europeans returned with long-range guns",
The story of this Deli well is further described as 
"oil that is deemed inextinguishable once it has been ignited 
and that burns upon the sea" .
In the first half of the seventeenth century, 
instructions were said to be repeakdLy sent to the Dutch East 
India Company1 s envoys at the court of the Sultan of Acheh 
to bring back with them, 'for the use of the "Council of 
Seventeen", a few pots of "Earth Oil" very esteemed and used 
to treat "stiffness in the l i m b s " I t  is this medicinal 
capacity that petroleum was prized in Holland at that period. 
The Dutch East India Company even then imported regular 
supplies of this "minyak tanah" (literally "oil of earth") 
which was sold all over Europe in competition with Modena and 
Tegernsee oil. However, from an unspecified source, "one of
2 Dubey, Oil Boom in Indonesia, in INSIGHT, No, 21, 1971
A similar version appears in THE STORY OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN
INDONESIA, published by P.N, Pertamina, 1970* P*7» See also
H.L. O e i , PETROLEUM RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. A 
comparative Study of Mexico and Indonesia, Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Texas, 1964.
3 Gerretson, op. cit . , p.20.
k Gerretson, ibid., p.20.
2.4
the earliest recorded mentions of oil in Indonesia
appears in the Annals of* the Chinese Court of 971 A.D.,
which relates that in that year some lamp oil was sent by
the Sumatran Emperor of Srividjaya to the Emperor of 
5
China” . However, the small oil fields in North Borneo 
and Sarawak were not described until the twentieth century. 
/The search and discovery of oil fields in these two areas 
will be described fully in Part 2 of this Chapter.
Although oil production in Malaysia did not begin 
till in the twentieth century, oil trade activities in 
Malaysia began in the late nineteenth century or perhaps 
earlier in the case of native trades in oil. Although 
statistical data before this period of time is not available, 
one can safely say that the first trade in oil (kerosene) 
that Malaysia (then Malaya) had entered into was in the 
early 1880s when the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company began 
importing into the country after pioneering the Suez Canal
for oil products with the first oil tanker on the Far
* 6 
Eastern run.
It was reported from various sources that by 1885
small consignments of Russian illuminating oil in cases were
7reaching the ports of India. With the arrival in February, 
1889> of the first cargo at Singapore, Russian illuminating
5 H.L. Oei, op.cit., p.7*
Please see Footnotes 6 and 7 3aext page.
15
oil shared the first place with, the American product.
g
In another report, it was mentioned that sometime in 
August, 1886, a cargo of petroleum arrived at the Port 
of Penang in Malaya and on examination found that the 
article came under the category of "dangerous substances-. 
Under the law at that time, there was no authority to land 
i t , and the ship was asked to leave to some other port.
The Government of the day did not have the power to permit 
dangerous petroleum to be landed and stored in some remote 
place from shipping and population. In order to permit 
the landing of such a dangerous product, the British 
Governor of Penang was given the power to make rules to 
provide the import of the product by passing the Petroleum 
Ordinance of 1886. (This will be discussed in Chapter 6 .)
During the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
the Par East was no longer dependent on kerosene supplies 
from Russia and the United States only. In 1889, the 
Burmah Oil Company Limited started operation and produced 
waxy crude which formed an important part of the world’s 
paraffin wax supply and its kerosene found a ready market 
in India and Malaya. In 1894, the first consignment of
6 Shell or the Anglo Saxon Petroleum Company, the 
firm of Marcus Samuel and C o ., was founded to carry on a 
general trade with the Par East. Amongst the articles 
imported were those of polished shells which the Victorian 
English decorate screens, little boxes and the various 
knick-knacks fashionaUes during the period besides cloth 
and manufactured goods. In return, Samuel brought tea, 
jute, rice and other materials for the households and 
factories of Great Britain.
7 Gerretson, F.C. HISTORY OF THE ROYAL DUTCH, Vol.l, 
p.214.
8 Proceedings of the Legislative Council of te Straits 
Settlements 1886, October 20, 1886, p. 153»
X6
Langkat oil from Sumatra produced by The Netherlandsche
Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij (N.K.P.M.) arrived in 
9Malaya. In 1901> the kerosene from crude oil m  Borneo 
was also sold along with other imported kerosene on the 
Far Eastern market.
During this period, there were three main 
companies supplying kerosene to Malaya. These were (l)
The Amalgamated Shell Transport and Trading Company and 
the Royal Dutch Oil Company with subsidiary companies 
forming what was known as the Asiatic Petroleum Company,
(2) The Standard Oil Company of New York and (3) The 
Shanghai Langkat (Sumatra) Company. Borneo, Sumatra and 
Russia were the fields of operations in the case of (l) 
earlier.
Despite the stiff competition amongst the three 
companies over the years - the lowering of prices and the 
fall in the turnover or sales due to the fall in the 
purchasing power of the population ~ there was an enormous 
growth of petroleum trade in the Far East since 1895* Some 
interesting figures are given in Table 2,1 with reference 
to the oil trade in Malaya. The trend of oil imports is 
graphed in Figure 2.1. During the’ years between 1886 and 
1891, the bulk of the imported oil from Malaya was shipped 
from America by the Standard Oil Company and from Russia
9 Earlier in April of 1892, Kessler, acting on behalf
of the NKPM introduced a small quantity of Langkat oil 
christianed as "Crown Oil" to Penang. He appointed Martjin 
and Company at Penang as their agents, and gave 2,500 cases 
every month to sell.
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/
by The Tank Syndicate or Shell. No reliable figures 
were obtained during this period but it was implied from 
various and scattered sources of information that each of 
them equally shared the market. However, the situation of 
oil trade in Malaya after 1891 was much clearer than the 
previous periods.
From 2.1, it can be seen that the imports of oil 
(kerosene) in cases increased from 826,000 cases in I892 
to 1 ,236,500 cases in 1894 before it went down again to 
845*000 cases in I896, The decline of 171*000 cases of 
petroleum imported from the 1895 figures was as a result cf 
the change in the system „of distributing Langkat or 
Sumatran oil after 1894. Xn that year, all kerosene were 
sent to Singapore to be stored there, and sold from that 
port, whereas in 1895 and to a great extent in I896 , the
7  C <■(:a I <
same vessles which loaded at Langkat in Sumatra merely 
passed through Singapore discharging a portion of their 
cargos when required, or sail direct to other places.
As has been said earlier, there were three major 
sources of supplies of oil during the period - America, 
Russia and Sumatra (Langkat) but a minor but increasing in 
importance was the supplier from Burma. During this period 
both the American and Russian case oils were declining in 
terms of volume of imports with competition from Langkat 
and Burmese oil. This prompted the East Asiatic Petroleum 
Company to change their strategy which resulted in them 
gaining possession of crude oil produced in the Far East 
itself. With the development of Telaga Said in Sumatra in
20
■1897 , ■fc*ie Company’s share in the Eastern market, especially 
in Malaya, in the ensuing- years after 1900 increased, as 
seen in the Table 2.1.
In the meantime, the new oil business from Sumatra-
Langkat - had increased considerably. The policy of the
Dutch government of Indonesia in not excluding the Malayan
silver currency in the east coast of Sumatra had helped to
establish a very promising oil trade even against such
10powerful rivals as Russia and America.
After 1895, the prominent feature of the petroleum 
trade in Malaya was the growth in the importation of oil 
from Burma. (Before 1899 Burmese imports were classified 
under "Others"). A small consignment of oil marketed by the 
Burmah Oil Company had been landed in the Malay Archipelago 
in the period I899 to I905, As shown in Table 2.1, at about 
the same time in 1899 petroleum imports of Russian and 
Burmese oils and particularly American oil yielded fair 
increases but Royal Dutch Sumatran production shared a 
falling off of 23,000 cases. However, for Sumatran oil of 
the Royal Dutch, a new brand ’Dragon’ entered the market 
during the year and had taken the place of * Crown’ brand 
which had rapidly fallen off in production while Burma oil 
more than doubled its previous record standing at 12^,000 
cases in I899 compared to 55,000 cases in I898.
The importation of petroleum into the country in 
1902, however, fell from aboi±2 .t- million cases in 1901 to 
10 PENANG ADMINISTRATION REPORT, 18 96.
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a little over 1*4- million cases, a decline of bk percent.
The outstanding fact in connection with this trade was the 
inability of Russian and American oils to compete owing 
to the cheapness of the Sumatran product. In the Table 2.1, 
while in 1895' 190^- 'the imported oils from America and
Russia supplied considerably more than half the market, from 
190^ onwards supplies from Russia fell off completely and 
supplies from America formed only about 20 to 30 percent of 
the trade,
There were 2 points which must be noted in connec­
tion with the Malaysian oil trade at this time and the 
ensuing years. Firstly,, the means of transport had, during 
the last few years, undergone a radical change. The bulk 
method of transport was superceeding the older system of 
transporting oil in cases or in tins. Secondly, for the 
ten years from I892 to 1901, it was seen that a greater 
portion of the oil trade in Malaya at that time was of trans­
shipment in nature. The oil imported in Malaya included 
considerable quantities for local use and the remainder was 
intended for other countries. However, they were sent for 
temporary storage in Malayan depots with supplies being 
drawn out from time to time on instructions from the head 
office of the different companies importing the oil.
The next forty years or so till the, beginning of the 
Second World War saw a great change in the development of 
the world petroleum industry which inevitably shaped the 
history of oil trade in Malaya as well. The crucial event
22
of shaping this development was sometime in 1901 when a
conference was held between the East Indian producers cf
crude oil and the Russian exporters of petroleum products
to discuss the possibilities of reaching an agreement
between them. . As result of this conference an alliance
was reached amongst the three producers and marketers of
The Royal Dutch, The Shell and Transport Company, and The 
11Rothchilds, And following from this, another agreement
between The Royal Dutch and The Shell Transport and Trading
Company was made in February 19^7 which resulted in the
emergence of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies. An
agreement between The Burmah Oil Company and The Asiatic
Petroleum Company — a subsidiary of Shell in 1905 prevented
further imports of Burma oil into Malaya and the neigh-
12bouring countries. However, there was a small but 
increasingly significant imports of petroleum products from 
Dutch Borneo since I9O3 . And from 1905 till 19^9? there 
were only 3 suppliers of oil products into Malaya namely 
America, Sumatra and Dutch Borneo,
11 At the time of the amalgamation, The Royal Dutch 
possessed crude oil and Shell and Transport Company did not 
have any crude sources.
12 The Burma Oil Company directed its Burmese oil 
exports more towards India - its 'natural* market. Its 
turnover in Malaya was around 100,000 cases and in the Far 
East 3 million cases. The chief stipulation of the 
Agreement was that the Royal Dutch guaranteed its turnover 
in India with the undertaking that the Burmese oil was 
allowed to market 100,000 cases per week before the Asiatic 
Petroleum Company sold anything.
23
2.1.2 The Changing: Structure Of Oil Trade After 1920
Up to the period of 1923 and beyond, the petroleum 
trade in Malaya showed a fluctuating trend with most times 
characterised by decreasing import volumes and values 
except for the years of 1917> 1918, 1922 and 1925 particu­
larly the latter two years. From 1922 onwards oils from 
Russia, Sarawak (for the first time) and o t h e r s 1 make an 
impact on the import trad© figures besides the big 
increases from sources such as Sumatra and Dutch Borneo, 
far more than compensating the declining of import volume 
and value from America,
One interesting feature of the petroleum trade 
after the 1920s till the.beginning of the Second World War 
was the changing product composition. At around 1920 or 
before that, kerosene ceased to be single predominant 
export item in oil trade and it began to be traded in terms 
of tons instead of in cases. In the case of Malaya, there 
were 4 main types of petroleum products that comprised 
export and import items in the trade — motor spirit, 
kerosene, fuel oil and lubricating oils. There were also 
others which included greases and paraffin or petroleum wax 
apart from crude oil exports of Sarawak.
In the trade volume figures shown in Table 2.2, 
fuel oil predominates over the other products after the 
1920s. This was followed by gasoline and kerosene. The 
trend of trade for the products over the 20 year period
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proved to be fluctuating as could be seen from the Table
2,2 earlier. The two most fluctuating years in the product 
history during this period were the times of the First 
World War 1925-26 and the World Economic Depression in 1931 
tilL 1933.
The volume in net figures of, exports ( + ) or
imports (-) shows a sharp drop in the net imports of the
three main products — motor—spirit, kerosene and lubricating 
oil in 19^-0 compared to their levels in 19^0, The net 
import of motor spirit in 19^0 was around ^00 long tons 
compared to about 8,200 long tons in 1920; in the case of
kerosene it was 227 long tons in 19^-0 compared to 19,800 in
1920. The net import of lubricating oil was registered at 
1880 long tons in 1920 and only 68.6 long tons in 19^+0. The 
decreases in these products were more pronounced during the 
War years from 1924 to 1925 and the Depression period from 
1931 to 1933* However, in the case of fuel oil it showed 
an increase of net import rising to 510,000 long tons in 
19^0 compared to 20,000 long tons in 1920 .
2.1.3 The Oil Trade After The Second World War
After the Second World War, the structure of the 
various petx’oleum products in the oil trade accounts in 
Malaya had shifted significantly. Besides the k main 
products mentioned earlier, 5 other products were added to 
the export and import figures. They were aviation spirit, 
aviation turbine fuel, gas and diesel oils, asphalt and
27
bitumen. Aviation spirit appeared in the trade account 
in 19^8 and aviation turbine fuel 7 years later in 1958•
Gas and diesel oil appeared in 19^-8.
In Table 2.3 the net import of motor spirit had 
advanced substantially since the end of the war — this 
indicated the increasing demand for -the product in the 
domestic market. The main reason for this probably was 
the increase in the number of motor vehicles imported into 
the country, especially after the Second World War. This 
occurred despite the activity of the Communist guerillas 
and the imposition of curfew throughout the country which 
put a very severe limit upon movement in Malaya at that 
time. After I 962, the structure of trade in this product 
showed a surplus of exports over imports i.e. net exports 
(+). This was the result of the establishment of 2 other 
refineries in Malaya at Port Dickson. The surplus was 
above and beyond the requirements in the country.
The net imports of kerosene widely used as an 
illuminant and for cooking represent demand increased by 
1 3 times from 19^-6 till 1962 before the establishment of 
the refineries. This to some extent reflects the increase 
in the standard of living at that time. This was also 
attributed to the liberal use of artificial lighting because 
of the high level of prosperity of smallholders' rubber 
plantations as a result of the Korean War boom (resulting 
in the increase in demand for rubber) and the good prices 
commanded by primary products.
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In the case of fuel oil, however, the product 
showed a fluctuating trend in the post war years. However, 
after I 96J+ there was a net surplus of px’oducts for export 
from domestic refineries. It is worth noting that as in 
some under-developed regions the demand for kerosene was 
nearly as large as for gas/diesel oils and fuel oils at 
that time. In Malaya, lighting in main centres was being 
increasingly provided by electricity generated by thermal 
power stations in large .towns and by diesel plants else­
where. This fact partly accounts for the country's quickly 
rising consumption of both gas/diesel oils and fuel oil 
which was further affected by the rising level of industrial 
developments after independence in 1957*
Another significant feature which occurred during 
the post-war period was the emergence of trade and 
consumption in aviation fuels — the aviation spirit or 
gasoline in 19^-8 and the aviation turbine fuel in 1956.
Thdr use had begun to take root and increased substantially 
over the years with the development of the air services in 
the country.
To trace out the trend of development of oil trade 
in Malaya between I 920 and 1963, Figures 2.2 (a) and 2.2 
(b) have been included here. The graphs show how erratic 
were the trend^during the years.
From the above discussion, it is concluded that 
the period before 19^3 was characterised mainly by trade in
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the form of transhipment (imports as re-exports to tlie 
neighbouring countries) . However, as we sliall see in 
later chapters, with the establishment of the refining 
industry in Peninsula Malaya, there is a reversal of trend 
in the structure of oil trade in Malaya. Surplus of 
production in most products from the refineries are exported 
mainly to the neighbouring countries, thus reversing the 
negative figures mentioned earlier.
Another significant development of oil trade in 
Malaysia was the emergence of the Malaysian State of 
Sarawak (then under the British Empire) into the world oil 
scene in 1911 with the production and export of crude oil 
from Miri Field, At that time Sarawak was one of the 2 
major oil producers in the British Empire (the other being 
Trinidad in 1908). This development will be traced and 
discussed in the following section.
2.2 Crude Oil Production Scenarios
2.2.1 The Beginning Of The Domestic Crude Oil Producing 
Industry
The petroleum industry of the East Indies, which
has now assumed considerable dimensions, 3HB==s6£=#e*Bpe5e™ettweifty
( t i _
rrcrmvt" "giiri'i'irHaa—  d a t b a c k  in the case of Indonesia and
Borneo to no earlier than 1897. in the case of Malaysia,
the early history of the industry is very sketchy and
incomplete. The story of oil in the Malaysian eastern
state of Sarawak can be said to be almost as old as the
35
inhabitants, since they had, from the earliest times,
realised the -value of this strange substance which appeared
13
in seepages in certain parts of the territory. According 
to observations made by A.H. Everett in the 1870s in the 
Miri area, "a small native industry flourished in the area, 
oil being obtained for local use from shallow surface well.'*' 
The oil might have seeped, over centuries, through the 
geological fissures from an underlying stratum of oil- 
bearing sand. It was also found that the bituminous residue 
or asphalt which was found at the seepages (the result of 
evaporation and oxidation) was also used by the natives for 
caulking their dugouts. Later the use for that purpose of 
damar, an indigenous resin, and the importation of kerosene 
oil combined to make the working of these seepages less 
advantageous, and interesb gradually lost in them.
The presence of oil seepages in the neighbourhood 
of Baram and Miri Rivers had been known for many years 
before active steps were taken to investigate the possibi­
lities of obtaining a commercial production for them. A 
series of more or less eight seepages, located a .little 
inland from the original Miri villages, were actually 
exploited in a primitive way by the Miri Malays. The 
procedure adopted by the locals was to dig pits above three 
feet deep in the zone of the seepages. Being in a swampy
13 F.W. Rowe, THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF SARAWAK,
Government Printer, Kuching, p.2k,
1^ 4 At that time there was a small population in and
around Miri; the trade of Miri was mostly jelutong wood, 
brassware, and preserved fish. The inhabitants knew little 
of the world beyond Miri,
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ground, these pits were filled with water on the surface
of which the oil floated. This was skimmed off by the
locals using gourds or coconut shells, and burnt for
lighting their huts in very primitive lamps, made from any
convenient vessel, such as an empty tin, a small gourd or
even a bottle, using a strip of cotton or cloth to serve 
1 ^as wick.
Indications of petroleum had been known in Borneo
and other islands of the East Indian Archipelago in various
16  17
journals. And as far back as I853, Motley 1 noticed oil
18
occurrences in the island of Labuan, In I863, Menten found
seepages in the island of Tarakan, on the east coast of
Borneo. In 1886 a very shallow well was drilled in Labuan
which gave a small .flow of oil fox’ 13 years at least.
I9
Collingwood in I867, described a petroleum spring in
British Borneo, and stated others were known. About I887,
three wells were in existence on the Klias Peninsula on the
north Borneo Bay, and these gave oil in large quantities.
20
According to some reports, J.H. Menten was certainly the 
pioneer of the industry in Borneo. In 1888, he obtained oil 
and coal concessions near the mouth of the Mahakan River and 
later obtained further concessions near Balik Papan, Fuhher
15 Cochrane, T.G. Empire Oil: The Progress of Sarawak\
Paper presented to the Royal Society of arts on March k f 
I92i| appeared in JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF ARTS . March 
28, 192^, pp 308-309.
16 Posewitz, BORNEO , Berlin, 1899 sited in J, Iiewley,
The Crude Oils of Borneo, in JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTION OF 
PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGISTS, Vol.VII, p.209,p t .27, July 1921,
17”2q De Crespigny in his diary in 1882 as told in Charles 
Hose, ROMANCE AND RESEARCH OR A JUNGLE WALLAH AT LARGE, 
Hutchinson Company, London 1927*
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indications were found in the Bolongan area of West
21
Borneo, Sarawak and elsewhere.
According to some reports, on the north coast of
Borneo, petroleum and its residue have long been collected
in hand dug pits for lighting and from seepages for
22
caulking of canoes. De Crespigny, in his diary,
reported that the inhabitants had used the oil mixed with
resin for caulking their boats and had attempted to use it
for lighting by employing an open wick as they did with
coconut oil, but the ‘Barth Oil* as they called it,
invariably caught fire, usually with disastrous results to
23their houses. Harper commented that the inflamatory 
nature of the oil soon earned for it a reputation. It was 
said to have a Hantu meaning ghost, which had an insatiable 
desire to burn down houses.
Other observations were made on this subject,
including one by Tate who wrote the following : "the uses
for oil were for lamps and the preservation of wood and
2 4
palm-leaf manuscript ,
21 Engler, Hofer Das Erdol, Vol.ii, p,535 cited in J 
Kewely, ibid., p.210.
22 De Cx’espigny in his diary in 1882 as told in Charles 
Hose, ROMANCE AND RESEARCH OR A JUNGLE WALLAH AT LARGE, 
Hutchinson Company, London, 1972,
23 Harpej? G, The Miri Field 1910-1972 in SARAWAK 
MUSEUM JOURNAL, January/December 1972, Government Printer, 
Kuching, p.21.
Zk T a t e , ,D.J.M , THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTHEAST A S I A ;
The European Conquest, Vol.l, Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 197^-*
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However, in the beginning of* the twentieth, 
century, a significant development occurred which 
transformed the Malaysian oil industry from its indigeneous 
character into a commercial and international one. The 
finding of Qil in Sarawak coincided with. the time when 
the demand for oil in the world was beginning to increase 
beyond all previous measures due to. the expansion of the 
motor industry. The application of western capital and 
technology to the indigeneous oil industry has transformed 
the character of the industry from a small, native non­
commercial undertaking to what is now a world—wide 
enterprise whose finance, technical know-how and management 
are provided by westerners. The change of event was made
2 5
possible by the advent of British rule in British Borneo.
As early in the 1870s oil shales had been located. 
The oil shales were found in belts of narrow wicth but of 
great length just below the border on both the east and 
west coasts. It was during the Chartered Company* s rule 
that oil pools were located in Sekutai, near Kudat in North 
Borneo. A man by the name of Frank Hutton also investi­
gated this spring and said that it would turn out 100
25 When James Brooke, the first Rajah of Sarawak, died
in 1868, Charles Brooke succeeded him. In 1888, Sarawak 
concluded an Agreement with the British Government which 
placed the State under the protection of the United Kingdom. 
After the Japanese occupation, the third Rajah, Six’ Charles 
Vyner Brooke, handed the country over the care of the 
British Crown. Finally, on 1 July 19^-6, Sarawak became a 
British Colony and 19 years later gained independence^ 
with North Borneo (Sabah) and since then joined the 
Federation of Malaysia.
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gallons (about 3 barrels) a day with proper machinery. 
Somehow, no boring operations were undertaken.
Officialdom first recognised the presence of oil 
seepages when they were reported in the diary of Claude ’ 
Champion de Crespigny, the Resident of Baram, in 1882. He 
took charge of Baram District in Sarawak when it was ceded 
to the Rajah (Ruler), Sir Charles Brooke, in June of that 
year.
De Crespigny recorded that 18 wells had been dug, 
by hand, some years previously. This was indicated in his 
diary for the month of M a y ‘, he suggested that the whole
27district should be ^thoroughly searched and reported on1 . 
But the Rajah probably never gave the recommendation as 
nothing was done. After all the year was 1882 and the 
demand for petroleum in Sarawak was nil.
26 The site first attracted attention in 1880, and 
was inspected by the Sarawak Government in I89I whose 
report was made by its engineer,
"the land more or less saturated with petroleum 
extends over an area of about a square mile ..........
at 10 feet below the surface oil and gas rose in large 
quantities but I found it impossible to sink further as 
water was coming in".
See Report by Consulting Engineers to the Governor, 
12 October 1891, cited in K G Tregonning, UNDER CHARTERED 
COMPANY RULE (North Borneo 1881-19^-6) , University of 
Malaya Press, 1958, p.100.
27 C Hose quoted De Crespigny* s diary the following,
" .......  the celebrated earth oil at Miri found in
about 18 wells which some people dug a few years ago in the 
hope of being purchased by possible buyers." See Charles 
Hose, op.cit, p232.
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Dr Cliarles Hose succeeded De Crespigny as the
Resident of the District of Baram in 1888. Sarawak's oil
28industry owed much to Him. And during the following 
years, Hose was fortunate in discovering many seepages 
when he visited the locality in addition to those. already 
known. These were reported to the government which secured 
the services of an English geologist to determine these 
findings. The geologist advised the Government that the 
oil could not be worked commercially. However in 1899, 
another geologist, C Schmidt, visited Labuan and the 
adjacent coast of the Klias Peninsula, Padas Bay and Brunei. 
In his report, he referred to several seepages and 
recommended a thorough survey of the area concern, 
especially the Miri and Baram rivers already described.
Hose was certain that, with proper management and 
skill, the oil could be worked commercially. Upon his 
recommendation, a few years later the Rajah granted 
permission to have some tests holes dug, but no great 
success attended the efforts. Despite the setbacks, C Hose 
began to prepare a map of the district and marked all the 
seepages and managed to locate some 28-30 indications on 
his map.
   — —    \
28 The tribute to Charles Hose's work was made by G
Howell in the JOURNAL OF OIL, ENGINEERING AND FINANCE,
March 1926 and as follows,
"... Dr Erb was accompanied by the real pioneer in 
establishing another portion of British territory as an oil 
producing zone, an unconditional thanks to the British 
people should be awarded to this far reaching administrator"
C Hose himself described the development of the oil 
resources of Sarawak as "some of the most satisfactory en­
terprise of the many which he was concerned during his 
life in Sarawak".
41
In the meantime during the period 1888 to I 9O7 
there was little reliable chronological record of the 
happenings in the Miri oil area. It is known that some 
drilling was undertaken by the Borneo Company Limited, 
permission being granted lor this purpose, and for the 
subsequent marketing of any oil produced, by Rajah Brooke.
/•
In I 9O7 » Dr C Hose asked the Rajah*s permission
to take his map and samples of the petroleum to the Shell
29Asiatic Petroleum Company in London. Upon Agreement,
later in 1909* the Rajah agreed to come to London to sign
the concession and lease made between the Government of
30Sarawak and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company. The 
lease was the Sarawak Oil Prospecting Licence and marked 
the cornerstone for the oil industry in Malaysia.
Dr E r b , the petroleum expert from the Anglo Saxon 
Petroleum Company carried out a general geological survey 
of a large part of north Sarawak and reported back ^ 9.
29 The formation of the Asiatic Petroleum Company
Limited arose from an Agreement in 1903 between the Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Company and the 'Shell* Transport and 
Trading Company Limited. The Asiatic Petroleum Company 
Limited was to act as joint marketing company in the East 
for Royal Dutch and Shell. Later in I 907,
30 The willingness of the Rajah both to encourage the
development of the oil wells and to allow capital in for 
the purpose was because of the revenues that Sarawak would 
benefit from the findj^he understanding that there would be 
no attempt to exploit his subjects. See Steven Runciman, 
THE WHITE RAJAHS - A history of Sarawak from 18*4-1 to 19*4-6 
Cambridge University Press, i 960.
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to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company in London confirming 
the numerous oil shows. At the Annual General Meeting of 
the Shell Oil Company in London in I 9O 9 , Sir Marcus Samuel 
reported the find of oil at Miri and the concession was 
granted without payment by the Rajah. The Sarawak Oil 
Company known as the Sarawak Oilfields financed by Shell 
with a capital of £500,000 moved in soon afterwards.
In the meantime various companies had searched for
oil in the northern part of the Borneo island since the
turn of the 20th century. In 1905? the British Borneo
Exploration Company was founded which acquired for a period
of 50 years the right to exploit all mineral resources in
North Borneo, with the exception of the coal deposits in
31the southern part of the country.
32In I 9O8 , the British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate 
came into being and took over the exclusive rights to 
prospect oil in British Borneo. The company sent out a
31 Interest in copper and iron-ore faded after the 
failure to find deposits by the Exploration Company and 
the Company was liquidated in 1916.
32 The British Borneo Exploration Company transferred 
their concession rights for petroleum prospecting to a 
subsidiary company - the British Borneo Petroleum Syndi­
cate Limited (B.BP.S). In accordance with the recommenda­
tions made by C Schmidt in his Report published in 190*4 on 
some of his observations on oil seepages made in I899, the 
northern part of the Klias Peninsula was explored 
intensively. The B.B.P.S. carried out deep drilling in the 
Mensian River area (Klias Peninsula) during which gas and 
traces of heavy oil were found. See Max Reinhard and 
Edward Wenk, GEOLOGY OF THE COLONY OF NORTH BORNEO, Bulle­
tin No.l, Geological Department of the British Territories 
in Borneo, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1951
p .4 .
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manager, a Shell Company man and began serious investiga­
tion. Under him, many attempts at drilling involving 
heavy expenses were made but without fruitful results.
In the same year, the first exploratory well was drilled 
at Jerudong in Brunei. In 1909> the Company changed its 
name to the Anglo Saxon Petroleum Company and in the same 
year a second well was drilled to 1,000 feet but no oil was 
discovered. The Syndicate soon ran out of capital through 
failure in finding oil in great quantities in the area-.
They soon diverted their attention to a. field near Brunei.
In 1912, the Syndicate handed over its rights in 
North Borneo to a Dutch firm, the Netherlandsche Koloniale 
Petroleum Maatschappij (the Netherlands Colonial Petroleum
o n
Company) , This Company carried out an extensive geolo­
gical survey of the country in 1913 hut did not locate
33 A circular was issued by the British Borneo
Petroleum Syndicate to its shareholders stating that an 
agreement had been entered into with the Nederlandsche 
Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij under which the Company 
undertook the expensive prospecting for petroleum of the
30,000 square miles in the British North Borneo over 
which the Syndicate held the exclusive petroleum rights, 
the immediate developments by drilling of the Klias 
Peninsula Oilfield which was held by the Syndicate on 
raining lease, and the similar development of all further 
oilfield in British North Borneo which might be located 
in the course of their prospecting operations. See 
THE PETROLEUM REVIEW August 10, 1912, Vol.27, No. 535-
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very many deposits, though, the Sebatik Island the Klias
34Peninsula seemed promising areas . This was examined on
behalf* of* the Royal Dutch Shell by M. Blumerthal and an 
exploration deep well was drilled, which met only traces 
of* oil. In I 9I8 , attempts were made by a subsidiary 
company of* the Anglo-Persian but again without much success. 
In 1920, D'Arcy Exploration Company, a subsidiary of* the 
Anglo Persian Company, prospected the Klias Peninsula but 
decided not to drill. In 1922, the Japanese Kuhara Company
began investigation. They were granted concessions to work
35the Sekutai and the Klias areas. Between 1924 and 1931»
34 From a scientific point of view, the geological 
exploration carried out on behalf of the N.K.P.M. in Borneo 
yielded very fruitful results;but no results whatever were 
obtained from economic point of view. Four wells in the 
proven oil bearing area of the Klias Peninsula were drilled 
to depths of 572 meters (well l ) , 390 meters (well 2), 897 
meters (well No 3) and 727 meters (well 4). They did not 
however, yield sufficient production, as the pronounced 
tectonic disturbances had already affected the occurrance of 
oil. Two wells on the island of Mangalum off the west 
coast, had to be abandoned at shallow depth (440 meters and 
354 meters) on account of technical difficulties. See Max 
Reinhard and Edward Wenk, op.cit. p.6 ,
35 The oil companies which were temporarily active at 
that time, and had agreements with the British Petroleum 
Syndicate that held the oil rights for the whole of North 
Borneo until 1930 were: Bombay-Burmah Petroleum Company 
(1897"~98); Burmah Petroleum Syndicate (1909-19H) jNederland- 
sche Koloniale Petroleum Mij(N.K.P,M. or Stanvac) (l912-16); 
Kuhara Mining Company (l 916—20 )^/As will be seen in the later 
section of this chapter, Japan made it apparent that she 
engaged in the war because of her ambitions to establish a 
sphere of influence in which she could command the raw 
materials necessary to sustain and increase her strength.
To achieve this objective, she needed adequate supply of oil 
resources which at that time she was lacking. It is no 
wonder that the effort made by the Kuhara Company in 1922 to 
acquire an oil base in South-East Asia in North Borneo 
alarmed the British Government. See Lionel Wigmore, THE 
JAPANESE THRUST, Australian War Memorial, Griffin Press, 
Adelaide, 1957__7i'j D ’Arcy Exploration Syndicate (1920-24) j 
the Singapore Oil Syndicate (mainly Chinese Capital)(1925— 
30). See Geological Department of British Borneo, THE GEO­
LOGY OF SARAWAK, BRUNEI AND THE WESTERN pART OF N. BORNEO,
KUCHING.
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the rights were acquired, by a syndicate of Singapore 
Ch-inese which, carried desultory operations there. Ten 
years later, between 1935 and 1939j a. large scale explora­
tion was conducted by geologists employed by the Royal 
Dutch Shell Group. The prime object of these explorations 
was the search for oil but tended to restrict field studies 
to those formations which appeared to be connected with 
the presence of oil.
2.2.2 The Miri Oilfields In Sarawak
The Miri oilfield, the first to be developed in
the region, is to the north of 'Sarawak near Lutong. The
first well drilled was sited on a hill, which mystified the
local population who had expected the drilling to take place
in the swamps about one hundred yards away where the see —
• 36pages were occunng.
36 The event was well described by G Harper thus,
"On the 10 August, 1910, a group of Miri inhabi­
tants watched with interest as a small party of oilmen, 
who had set up drilling equipment on a hill overlooking 
the town, began the slow and laborious task of drilling 
into the ground using the cable tool method little 
improved since its invention by the Chinese centuries 
before. For some of the spectators the interest was stimu­
lated with certain amount of apprehension. They knew that 
below the Miri Hill was a large cave in which lived two 
ferocious tigers, if the drillers penetrated into the cave, 
the tigers might well escape and ravage the countryside."
G Harper, op.cit., p. 3 0 .
4 6
The wooden derrick was erected and drilling1 into
the ground was made by the cable tool, a method little
improved since its invention by the Chinese centuries
before. The spudding-in of Miri No. 1 well was made on
August 10, 1910, and exactly two months later, oil was
struck at a depth of ^ 7  feet and the well produced ^ tons
of water-free oil per day. It was then deepened to 510
feet from which it produced 12 tons per day. At a depth
of 805 feet, the well yielded 90 barrels per day of oil
and by 1920 only about ’JO wells had been completed with an
average daily production of 2,200 barrels from sands down 
37to 1,700 feet. The mere capacity to produce oil itself 
was of no value commercially unless it can at any rate be 
stored as it is produced and, still more important, shipped 
to some market where it can be sold.
‘Following their earlier success of the Miri No, 1 
well, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company put down a second 
well, the Miri Well No. 2 in April I 9H  and production
37 The cable tool method is essentially a system of
pounding out a hole by repeated blows with a bit attached 
to heavy length of steel suspended from a wire rope. The 
drill stem provided the height to force the bit into the 
ground and the hole was kept empty except for a little 
later at the bottom. After drilling a few feet,'the bit 
was pulled out and the cuttings removed with a 'boiler1 - 
an open tube with a valve at the bottom. Steel pipes 
known as casing, of progressively small diameter were run 
from time to time to prevent the hole from caving and to 
keep back any water flow. This technique of well drilling 
dated back to ancient China which described wells drilled 
as early as the 3rd Century A , D . to tap underground 
strata of brine.
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reached 1275 barrels. Xn 1 9 1 2 , production reached 41,539 
barrels, in 1913 to 194,l6o barrels from 8 wells and in 
1914 it totalled kj2,$kS b a r r els.^ And in London, Sir 
Marcus Samuel announced that "the production of oil in 
Sarawak amounted to 200 tons per day. A small royalty was
39paid to the Sarawak Government for every ton" . Large 
and regular shipments of the oil took place and the oil 
was treated at the Shell Company* s refineries in Sumatra.
In 1924, the weekly production of the fields 
amounted to around 8 5 ,100 barrels. This placed Sarawak at 
that time on the list of oil producing countries included 
in the British Empire. .However, the Shell Company of 
Sarawak had deferred of a refinery until they had a large 
production. In the meantime the company were treating the 
oil obtained there at their refineries in Sumatra, and was 
making the first shipment of crude to Egypt.
The control of the sea and harbourage of the British 
warships was important, and when oil began to replace coal 
as a fuel for British warships, its value as an imperial
38 Harper, J. op. cit., p.38
3 9 Marcus Samuel's address to Annual General Meeting
of Shell In London in 1915.
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factor became important. The Rajah insisted, that a 
clause should be inserted in the Concession by -which a 
certain amount of oil should be stored for the use of the 
British Navy, the first political clause of its kind in. 
the history of the British Empire. The clause reads,
“The Company (concessionaire) hereby convenents 
that during the continuance of the licences hereby granted 
it will not export any of the said mineral products which 
can be safely used as a liquid fuel, so as to leave a 
quantity of less than a thousand English tons stored in 
the district aforesaid, and further stored that such 
quantity of ten thousand tons of liquid fuel shall be used 
only for the purpose of supplying the ships of the Navy 
of Great Britain or any other of her colonies11 . 41
The Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company in London saw the 
importance of the clause, and at once took steps to arrange 
for the installations of tanks for the proper storage of the 
oil. The only exceptions to this agreement have been that 
for a period during and after the War, with the consent of 
the Rajah and the Admiralty, fuel oil was stored at Singa­
pore instead of at Miri. The naval vessels of the Allies 
including the Japanese, were included those which could be
^0 "Oil has been a special position in British trade.
The Sterling Oil companies serve the economy of every part 
of the Commonwealth and made a big contribution to the
general strength of the sterling", according to an article
in Resources of the Colonial Empire VXX - Oilfields in Tri­
nidad and Borneo, THE TIMES BRITISH COLONIAL REVIEW T Winter 
1952, Quarterly No.8.
4l According to Charles Hose, this was the first
political clause of its kind in the history of the British
Empire. C Hose, op.cit. C Hose also commented, " . . . . for
a time Charles (Charles Brooke) believed that the new oil 
field at Miri might tempt the British Colonial Office to 
assume direct control of Sarawak, and this sharpened his 
conviction that the State would have to be strengthened to 
survive as an independent identity..." C Hose's letter to THE 
MORNING POST, November 7? 1912 and to Arnold White, Novem­
ber 20,1912 cited in Robert Pringle, RAJAH AND REBELS; The 
Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke Rul e ,1841-19^1t McMillan 
Company, I 97O. *
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supplied from that 10,000 tons of Sarawak oil. By the 
outbreak of the First World War, Miri had become esta­
blished and was recognised as a potential oil bearing 
field of importance. The production of oil had become
considerable, and a valuable quantity was at the disposal
1+2of His Majesty's navy amounting to two million barrels.
2.2.3 Production History Of The Miri Field Till World 
War IT
No reliable statistics on oil are available prior 
to 1911. Nevertheless between I 9H  and I 929, the amount 
of oil produced and exported from Sarawak increased more 
than two-fold and except from 1917 to 1919? there was a 
considerable year to year increase in crude oil production 
and export from Sarawak. This is shown in Table 2.4.
Although oil production shown in Table 2.4 had 
increased over the period the development of the field was 
slow mainly due to the slowness of the cable—tool method 
of drilling (to drill 100 feet in one month is an achieve­
ment !) . By 1920, only ^0 wells had been completed with an 
average daily production of 2,200 barrels and for the first 
time total yearly production reached the million mark and 
oil royalty in the hundred thousand figure. In 19^5 rotary 
drilling was introduced and the old cable-tool method was
42 During the Second World War not only British
warships, but the naval vessles of the British Allies - 
the Japanese, were supplied with Sarawak oil, see C Hose 
ibid.
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TABLE 2.4
MALAYSIA: PRE-WAR CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND
NATURAL CAS PRODUCTION AND ROYALTY PAYMENTS 1911-19*10
Year Crude
(in
Production
barrels)
Oil Royalty
(Mg)
Natural Gas 
(1000 cub Tt)
1911 1 275 5, 346.43
1912 41 539
1913 194 160 7 068.86 —
1914 472 948 25 541.28 -
1913 497 770 26 957.28 —
1916 655 248 35 179.21 -
1917 565 930 28 518.68 -
1918 513 782 23 783.21 _
1919 612 998 28 429.07 -
1920 1 061 190 118 125.88 _
1921 1 498 938 190 063.52 -
1922 3 025 450 4o6 161.29 -
1923 4 187 205 578 007.93 -
1924 4 424 646 612 554.81 _
1925 4 520 296 618 685.28
1926 5 248 439 718 956.59 52,790
I 927 5 236 602 710 045.66 55,684
1928 5 506 568 756 506.09 93,449
1929 5 552 177 791 148.48 106,183
1930 5 114 182 737 597.27 88,428
1931 3 891 027 557 565.82 61,313
1932 2 540 46o 359 236.83 37,411
1933 2 441 677 344 249.94 28,439
1934 2 085 279 297 903.02 21,778
1933 1 902 853 271 836.09 17,885
1936 1 668 390 238 314.45 15,678
1937 1 574 204 224 886.34 15,707
1938 1 498 901 214 128.74 17,300
1939 1 223 917 174 845.20 16,113
194-0 1 094 022 156 288 .85 12,580
1941 707 772 101 110.31 6,758
Source: Documents relating to Petroleum Resources
Development in Individual Countries of the ECAFE
Region: British Territories of Borneo by E.W. 
Rowe in Ecafe Document 1 & Nr 7p r 7 i
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replaced. Most of tlae oil accumulations had been found by 
the following year. Peak production of 5ir million barrels 
a year was reached in 19^9 with government revenue reaching 
$800,000. Then the deterioration of the economic conditions 
towards the end of the period retarded the drilling programme.
As oil production was increased towards the end of 
the period associated gas production either was flared or 
when possible was consumed internally within the petroleum 
indistry in producing and processing operations and in auxi­
liary installations.
Meanwhile from 19^7 till 1930 the coastal plains of 
North Borneo were examined by extensive gravity surveys. A 
few detailed investigations were still made in 1930 till 1931 
but the grave worldwide economic crisis in the early 1930s is 
reflected in greatly decreased activity between 1930 and 193 -^. 
In 1931 drilling activities were confined to deepening of 
existing wells. Drilling of new wells was resumed in 193^ 
and continued till 19^-1 when the field was shut down and some 
of the essential equipment were shipped to Singapore before 
the Japanese invasion. At the time of the shut down, 408 
wells out of a total of 597 were yielding a total of about
3,000 barrels of oil daily, all but 13 were pumping oils.
43 Unlike the cable tool method, the cutting bit at the
end of the drill in the rotary method is revolved by engine 
power. The rotary bit came in various sizes and usually have 
cutters that look like a cogwheel set at angles. The engine 
set a large turntable to rotate and this section would 
revolve the drill pipe and the drilling down into the ground.
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By the end. of 1940, the field had just produced over one 
million barrels during the year and the operators were less 
concerned with producing more oil than with shutting the
44
fields in case of enemy invasion.
Before the outbreak of the Second World War and the 
invasion of the Japanese, petroleum was produced in the 
Borneo States from three separate fields - the Miri field in 
Sarawak (Malaysia) operated by Sarawak Shell Oilfields Limi­
ted (formerly the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company Limited), the 
Seria and Jerudong Fields in Brunei operated by the Brunei 
Shell Petroleum Company Limited. Both were and still are 
associated companies of the Royal Dutch Shell Gi’oup. Refi­
ning and shipping operations were carried out by the Sarawak 
Shell Oilfields Limited at Lutong (near Miri) on the north­
east coast of Sarawak.
2.2.4 T h e .Petroleum Industry Production During The Second 
World War
When the production of crude oil in the Netherland 
Indies reached its record production in 1939 and 1940 at around 
8 million tons (at that time in Sarawak it was around 177,000 
tons after its peak production of 806,000 tons in I 929), the 
political climate of the world increasingly deteriorated.
During this period of rising tension, the demand for petroleum 
products became a crucial issue on the part of Japan,
44 BERITA SHELL (SHELL NEWS), Vol.2, No 7 October/
November 1974, Shell Company, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, '
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Th.rough.out the 1930s arid during the first part of the war,
Japan* s economy and military strategy were affected greatly
4 5by its lack of oil resources. Realising this the Japa­
nese Government in the early part of 1930s had made an early 
attempt to overcome the handicap by various measures which 
included governmental direct control, various incentives 
leading to the establishment of a synthetic fuel industry by
4 6conservation measures and rationing.
The above moves by the Japanese Government were 
successful for sometime but in 1940, the United states 
announced the cancellation of the Japanese-American Treaty 
of Commerce on the ground that Japan had allegedly strengthened
45 Japan ranked 22 nd -• amongst the oil producing 
nations at that time. Its output in 1941 was 1.9 million 
barrels of crude oil or less than 0 .1^ of the world*s total. 
The U.S. produced 1.4 billion barrels in 1941 over 7^0 
times that of Japan. Japan* s 1941 production from wells 
and synthetic plants was less than X2°/0 of her peacetime 
requirements. Cohen, J.B. JAPAN1S ECONOMY IN WAR AND RECOUSTR- 
U^TION, University of Minnisota Press, Minneapolis. 1949,p.133.
46 In 1934, the Japanese Government adopted rhe
Petroleum Industry Law whereby the Government stipulated 
the amount of crude oil and oil products that could be 
imported and x’efined and the price to be sold fixed by the 
government. This was administered by a Fuel Bureau which 
was set up in 1937* There were several laws enacted to 
stimulate the establishment of a synthetic fuel industry 
which included'a) The Synthetic Petroleum Production Law to 
encourage and' subsidise synthetic oil production;(b) The Im­
perial Fuel Development Company Law providing the establish­
ment of a national oil company known as the Imperial(Teikoku) 
Fuel Development Company established in 1938; (c) The Petrol
Excise Law exempting all synthetic oil from tax and (d) The 
Alcohol Monopoly and Compulsory Alcohol Admixture Laws which 
made production of alcohol a government monopoly;(e) Petro­
leum Resources Development Law (1938) to enable the govern­
ment to supervise and control drilling operations whereby 
the drilling of new wells was granted a government subsidy 
of about 66-j^  of cost; (f) Gasoline and Heavy Oil Sales 
Regulations(1938) whereby petrol was rationed by a voucher 
system and in 1938 the rationing of sales was administered by 
the Petroleum Distribution Company (Seikyu Haikyu Tosei KK) 
then by Imperial Oil Co. (Teikoku Sekiyu KK.) set up in 1941 
and even later this function was shared with another control 
control company called Tao Oil Company. See Cohen,J.B .,ibid.
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its imperialist expansion to Asian countries. Before the 
oil e m b a r g o ^  in 19^-0 Japan relied almost entirely on im- 
ported oil - four fiftlas or 80 percent of it from the 
United States, 10 percent from the Netherland Indies, and 
the rest from Latin America (Mexico), Middle East (Bahrain) 
and Eastern Europe (Roumania), In facing with this critical 
situation, there were 2 options open to the Japanese.
Firstly, they could build up their synthetic oil production 
to substantial proportions and secondly, she had to shift 
her sources of imports, Japan had been increasingly attrac­
ted to the great oil resources of the Netherlands East 
Indies, which geographically closest to Japan, which had enough 
capacity of oil supply to meet the Japanese need.
To overcome this critical situation various Japanese 
teams had already been sent earlier to the Indies to do
research on oil production. One of the delegation sent to
the Indies was to negotiate oil concessions in the Indies 
and further oil importation to Japan. Unfortunately, both
the Netherlands East Indies Government and the Japanese
delegation failed to reach any negotiation in June 19^1„
On July 28 of the same year, the Dutch East Indies Govern­
ment announced its intention to freeze all Japanese assets 
in the Indies, thus following the same measures taken by 
the Americans and British earlier. In retrospect, the 
Japan-East Indies oil negotiation became the last Tpeaceful1
^7 Because of the earlier strategy of stockpiling,
Japan was able to build up a large inventory before the out­
break of the war up to 50 million barrels of oil(crude and 
refined)in 1939 but, however, declined to -^3 million barrels 
by December 19^-1 due to United States, Dutch and British 
embargoes. See Cohen,J.B. , ibid.,p.134.
55
negotiation that Japan involved, before the war. This 
failure had led Japan to the Pacific War.
Before the Japanese occupied the Indies, the Bataa- 
fsche Petroleum Maatscha-ppij (BPM),the Nederlandsche Kola™ 
niale Petroleum Maatschappij (MKPM) and other oil companies 
had deliberately destroyed oil wells, pipelines, refineries 
and cfcher installations in order that the Japanese could not 
use them. Before the invasion, the Sarawak Oilfield 
Limited (SOL) belongong to Shell with their settlement at 
Miri and refinery at Lutong, and the British Malayan 
Petroleum Company Limited in Brunei, cleared oil stocks of 
gasoline and lubricating oil. The most important producing 
wells in Seria (Brunei) had already been rendered useless 
to the enemy by plugging i.e. by pumping cement at the 
bottom and top of the casings, Xn order to deny the 
Japanese the production of the less important wells, the 
supply of high pressure gas used to gas lift the oil was 
cut. Then some of the essential equipment was shipped to 
Singapore before the Japanese occupation. At the time of 
the shutdown of the Miri Oilfield in Sarawak, 408 wells out 
of a total of 597 were yielding a total of about 3 j000 
barrels of oil daily; all but 13 were pumping wells. By 
the end of 19^0 , the operators were less concerned with 
producing more oil than with shutting the oilfield in case 
of enemy invasion.
Soon after the war broke out on December 8 , 19^1, 
the oil corps or workers set up by the Japanese Government 
before the war quickly reached such areas as British Borneo,
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Dutch. Borneo, North, Central and South Sumatra where 
they started restoration as well as new drillings. A 
few months after the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, 
a large number of skilled and experienced oilfield workers, 
accompanied by a great deal of oilfield equipment and 
machinery landed at Miri. The Japanese had managed to find 
out exactly where in Singapore both men and machinery were 
hidden and had promptly brought them back to Miri. Ex­
company workers of Sarawak Oilfields Limited and the 
British Malayan Petroleum Company of Brunei found them­
selves working for the new Ryo Hai Kyu Sho or The Oil 
Supplying Service,^
Japan depended almost entirely on petroleum 
products from the captured East Indies fields for the 
prosecution of its wartime operations. Production of most 
fields was commenced early in ItykZ, despite the great 
destruction of installations with the evacuation by Allied 
forces. The production mostly came from 6 fields in 2 
districts in North Sumatra (Atjeh and East Coast), 4 fields 
from Middle Sumatran districts (Airmolek and Pekan Baru), 
l 6 fields from >4 districts of South Sumatra (Talangdjinar, 
Pendopo, Mengoendjaya and Djambi), 9 fields from Nether­
lands Borneo districts (Southeast Borneo and Northeast 
Borneo(Tarakan)), 1 field each from Ceram and .Netherlands 
New Guinea and 2 fields from Bx’itish Borneo (Sei’ia and 
Miri).
if-8 BERITA SHELL (SHELL NEWS), op.cit. p .9
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Table 2.5 gives the production from the various 
areas in the East Indies during the Japanese occupation 
19^1 to 19^5• About 17 million kiloliters (about IO6.9 
million barrels) of crude oil were extracted from the East 
Indies oilfields during the Japanese occupation. The 
success of the Japanese occupation had been that by the 
end of 19^-3 they had managed to restore oil output in the 
southern zone (Southeast Asia) to almost its pre-war level. 
As shown in the Table 2.5> crude oil production in the 
southern zone had totalled 65 million barrels in pre-war, 
then dropped to 26 millions in 19^2 , but was increased to 
wartime peak of ^7 million barrels in 19^-3 then dropped 
again to about 27.6 million barrels towards the end of the 
war. From this total, the two fields in the British Bor­
neo produced around ^10.8 barrels in 19^-2 rising to 792,300 
a year later plunging into 36^,000 in 19^ 1- before regis­
tering zero output towards the end of the year.
This increase in production of crude was followed 
by the increase in the production of petroleum products. 
During the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, the 
refineries in the area were quickly restored while
their capacity was always adequate for the purposes at 
hand. They had, however, some difficulty in continuous 
operation due to the need for spreading skilled personnel 
very thinly and the inability to obtain spare parts and 
replacement equipment from Japan.
Despite the rapid increase of oil production in
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the East Indies, Japan,however^suffered from a serious 
shortage of tankers due to their sinkings during the war.
As a result, the damage caused in terms of crude oil, 
heavy oil and gasoline lost during shipping from the East 
Indies to Japan became large. The Japanese then reversed 
their two year oil policy and tried once again to stimu­
late domestic output.
The drop in imported oil from the East Indies and 
the difficulty of increasing local production were the 
turning points of the Japanese fuel situation and affected 
her war economy and machinery greatly. The Allied denial 
of this source of oil imports from Southeast Asia to Japan 
during the war was one of the main causes that led to the 
downfall of the Japanese occupation in the East Indies in 
the middle of 19^-5 •
2.2.5 Post-War Production Of Miri Field
The Japanese invasion of Borneo at the beginning 
of 19^-2 and the subsequent invasion by the Australian forces 
(9th Division) on July 21, 19^5 led to an almost destruc­
tion of both the Seria and Miri fields. It was not until 
the following September that the Australian Army and the 
Shell Company5 s technicians completed the huge task of 
putting out 377 oil well fires.
Rehabilitation of the field went ahead rapidly 
inspite of many obstacles. The first post-war cargo of
6-1
crude oil was shipped to Australia in March. 1946. By 
August 19^-7, the immediate px’ogramme of4 post-war recons­
truction had been completed.
The post-war years witnessed the greatest oil
company effort. The magnitude can be appreciated fx-om
the fact that three companies of the Royal Dutch Shell
Group spent M£>117 million on oil investments between 1939
to 1948 or at an average of M$11.7 million per year. Of
this total about two thirds went into exploration and
drilling, one-fifth into geological surveys and one twen-
49tieth into field geological surveys.
During the post-war period, production of the Miri 
field never returned to the pre-war levels. As indicated 
in Table 2,6 it had been obvious that from the sharp drop 
in the figure between 19^9 an-d- 1935 from 5-g- million to 2 
million barrels that the pi’essures in reservoirs were 
running down. In the post-war years only once, i.e. in 
19-5J5 did production pass the half a million barrel mark.
At the beginning of 197^, only 90 wells of the 609 drilled 
during the history of the field were still pumping. Pro­
duction had fallen to 450 barrels a day and was dropping 
rapidly. And after 62 years of production, the oil reser­
ves on the Miri field were exhausted and Sarawak Shell had
5°
no alternative but to close it down. The production of
4-9 Geological Survey Department of British Borneo,
ANNUAL REPORT 1956, Kuching.
50 At the close down of the Miri field, it still
managed to produce 3 barrels of oil a day and when finally 
stopped had produced over 650 million barrels of oil.
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TABLE 2.6
MALAYSIA: POST WAR CRUDE PRODUCTION, OIL
ROYALTY AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
Year
Crude
Production 
(in barrels)
Oil Royalty 
(Mg)
Natural Gas
Production
(in 1000 cub.f t .)
War
Production
19^2 60 ,000° n.a .
19^3 60 ,000° n.a .
1944 710,200 60 ,000° n.a .
1945 60 ,000° n.a.
Post-War
Production
19^6 19,264 60 ,000 n.a.
19^7 179,569 69,250.53
1948 361,511 92,782.71
19^9 417,761 ' 103,662.60
1950 4l4,196 103 ,501.00
1931 372,780 98,252.00
1952 359,19^ 155,331.00 rti
1953 351,^84 262,775.00 r—
1954 503,429 387,122.00 ,U•H
1935 471,526 377,166.00 to. F
1956 508,781 438 ,201.00
n
r-f
1957 398,314 - CD
1958 398,31^ - ti
1959 382,928 - ti
i 960 416,094 - 0
1961 417,886 n.a.
•r
-P
1962 400,9I8 n.a. OD
1963 357,882 n.a. bfi
1964 337,701 n.a. ti
1965 338,875 n.a . ft
1966 345,700 n.a . ti
1967 328 ,300 n.a.
(u
£
1968 1 n.a. 4-:
1969 Dimini siting n.a . to
1970 Production n.a. Oft
1971 From Miri Field n.a.
Source : Documents relating to Petroleum Resources
Development in Individual Countries of the 
ECAFE Region: British Territories of Borneo, 
op.cit.
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crude oil from the Miri oilfields from 19fl till its 
closure/shut-down in 1973 is graphed in Figure 2.3
Xn the meantime in Sarawak between 195^- till 
1963 there were very few wells drilled that had oil. Xn 
1958? oil was found in wells and in 19^3 only 1 well 
drilled had oil as shown in Table 2.7. Throughout this 
period there had been a number of failures as shown by the 
number of dry wells . Many of these wells were dx*ied at 
the exploratory stage. The number of wells abandoned was 
even greater during this period. In I 96I , as much as 73 
production wells were abandoned. There were few explora­
tory wells drilled in Sabah and all of them ended in dry 
wells.
Over the period from 19^-7 to 1957 Shell Group
of Companies in Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei (the last 
is not a state in Malaysia) incurred 2 main types of expen­
ditures in their search for oil. The exploration expendi­
ture of over $168 million as shown in Table 2.8 represents 
capital spent in the search for oil, and included cost for 
topographic, geological and geophysical surveys, explora­
tion drilling on land and in recent years exploration 
drilling at sea; the money expanded is capital on which no 
return is obtained if oil is not found in commercial 
quantities. The capital expenditure of more than M£>668 
million represents the money which has to be invested after 
the oil has been found in order that it may be produced. 
Table 2.8 also gives some idea of the exploration e^endlturEs
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incurred by the Shell Companies of Sarawak and Sabah 
from 195^- to I 963 prior to striking oil. Sarawak Shell 
spent the largest amount of money in exploring for new 
oil reservoirs, especially since the Miri field was 
depleted and exhausted in its production then. In 1955> 
the biggest amount of expenditure in a single year was 
made, totalling M$l6 million. Throughout the 10 year per 
riod, from 195^ to 19^3 a- total of M$7^»8 million was 
spent in Sarawak out of a total of $102.8 million,* for 
Malaysia as a whole. And for Sabah, although exploratory 
drilling had not been carried out in some years (1955 to 
1957» i 960 and I 963) , there were expenses involved in geo­
logical survey. An average of M$2.8 million were spent 
over the period but without striking oil.
In the meantime, although a large proportion of 
the Peninsula or mainland Malaysia has not been thoroughly 
searched and surveyed, geologists believe that the prospect 
of there being large workable reserves of petr'oleum are 
very remote. This fact is based on the geological condi­
tions of the area which are not favourable for the
51
presence of petroleum. This is inspite of the fact that 
the mainlaind is surrounded by petroleum producing countries.
51 In one compiler report, Savage wrote that the
prospects of there being large workable reserves of petro­
leum at depth in Peninsula Malaysia were non—existent, See 
Savage, H.E.F. A note on Oil and Ga.s in Malaya: Report for 
the Organising Committee for the 20th Session of the Inter­
national Geological Congress(Mexico)l956(Unpublished)cited 
in A Renwick( Ed, ) FUEL RESOURCES — (Coal, Lignite and Pe­
troleum) IN MALAYA, Geological Survey Dept., Ministry of 
Lands and Mines, May 1966 p.100 still in 19^2 Alexander 
concluded that in a survey undertaken between 1956 and I 958 
covering approximately 16,000 square miles or nearly one- 
third of the Federation of Malaya, gave no indication of. ...
6i'8
From the above discussion, it is seen that 
over the span of time from its early discovery to its 
post-war development, the oil industry passed through a 
number of periods of rapid expansion, static and then 
declining production. It is not until in the early 1970s 
as a result of the various successes of oil exploration 
and drilling's in the offshore areas in Malaysia, that the 
oil industry regained its pre-war prominance once again 
with ever increasing production. This will be discussed 
in ‘Chapter 4 »\ ■
5 1 .. geological conditions favourable to the accumula­
tion of petroleum. See Alexander, J B. The Prospects for 
ECAFE Symposium on THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES 
OF ASIA AND THE FAR EAST (Published) cited in A Renwick, 
ibid, p. 1 0 0 ,
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CHAPTER 3
PETROLEUM IN THE ENERGY STRUCTURE OF MALAYSIA
3.1 Energy Use by Types
There are no data available Tor the consumption of 
energy in Malaysia prior to i960. Prom the sketch of the 
historical development of energy use (particularly from 
petroleum) highlighted in Chapter 1, it can be inferred 
that the consumption of energy in general and petroleum 
products in particular in Malaysia was relatively small 
before the war and the immediate post war years. However, 
since independence in 1957} the consumption of energy has 
shown a rapid increase. In Table 3®1> the consumption of 
energy has increased from 6308 trillion BTU in i960 to 
231 trillion BTU in 1975 or about k times in the last 15 
years 0
Perhaps the most significant aspect of energy 
consumption shown in Table 3*1 is 'the changing structure 
of the different types of energy use over the periods
Primary sources of energy such as oil^ charcoal, 
hydroelectric power, coal and firewood enter the consump­
tion points through trade channels and are therefore 
considered commercial forms of energy. In terms of
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volume, the consumption of oil showed the biggest increase 
from 5^ -. 72 trillion BTU in i960 to 20(^8^ trillion BTU in 
1975 registering a <7 fold increase. The second most 
important energy source is water power, which registered 
an increase to 18.52 trillion BTU in 1975 compared to 2.58 
trillion BTU in i960 or a 6 fold increase over the last 
15 years. The consumption of charcoal has remained static 
during the period at just below 5 trillion BTU. It was 
second in order of usage in i960 but gave way to water 
power in 1970. Goal and firewood showed declining 
importance, both totalling l e6 trillion BTU in i960 to 0.6 
trillion BTU in 1975.
Another interesting observation fx’om Table 3-1 is 
the percentage share of each of the energy types in over­
all energy consumption. Petroleum has remained the most 
dominant fuel over the last 15 years0 It increased its 
share from 86 percent in i960 to 90 percent in 1975. Water 
power increase was from ^-.05 percent to 8,02 percent while 
charcoal, coal and firewood showed decreases from 7 .^ 
percent to 2.2 percent, 1,5 percent to 0,2 percent, 1.0 
percent to 0,2 percent respectively. This type of 
development has been due to the imbalance in the various 
sources of energy in this country, Malaysia is endowed 
with petroleum resources and to a limited extent water 
power but as pointed out earlier, she lacks coal resources. 
Firewood and charcoal are mainly used in the rural sector
72
of the economy.
3.2 Energy Use by Sectors
Perhaps a more important aspect of the energy 
economy than the one discussed earlier'is the distribution 
of use of the different types of energy in the different 
economic sectors.
Table 3*2 shows the distribution of energy by 
economic sectors: (a) Industrial and Other Demand
(b) Electricity and Power. Generation (c) Transportation 
and (d) Household and Small Consumers,
The first category (a) registered the biggest use 
of energy in 1975 increasing by ^ fold from its i960 level 
of 18016 trillion B T U 0 The Transportation Sector which 
used to be the biggest consumer of energy in i960, gave 
way to the Industrial Sector in 1975 after having shown 
only an increase of two and half times to 55.2 trillion 
BTU in 1975. However, the Electricity and Power Genera­
tion Sector showed a substantial increase of about 50 
trillion BTU to 66 trillion BTU in 1975 while Household 
and Consumer increased by 10 trillion BTU to 1802 
trillion BTU in 1975.
Another interesting development in energy use by
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sectors is the changing share of energy use in the sectors, 
In i960, the Transportation Sector registered 31 percent 
(Oil) compared to Industrial and Other Demands 28.5 
percent (mostly Oil) and Electricity and Power Generation
25.5 percent (mostly Oil). However in 1975 } owing to the 
rapid expansion in industrial development in Malaysia 
after independence and the successive Malaya and Malaysia 
Plans, the Industrial and •’Other’ Sectors became the prime 
users of energy followed by Electricity and Power Genera­
tion as a result of the Industrial demand for power and 
rural electrification programme of the Government with the 
Transportation and Small Gonsumers constituting the 
remainder.
3•3 Pattern of Consumption of Petroleum Products in
Maiaysi a
The main aims of the rest of the sections are to 
examine (i) the consumption pattern of petroleum products 
from 1970 to 1975 and (ii) forecasts of growth and pattern 
of demand for petroleum products from 1976 to 1990. The 
various petroleum products that enter into the discussion 
are aviation fuels (aviation turbine fuels or ATP and 
aviation gasoline or AVGAS), motor spirit or motorgasoline 
or mogas, kerosene, diesel oils (automotive diesel oil or 
ADO and industrial diesel oil or IDO), fuel oil, marine 
diesel oil and liquified petroleum gas or LPG.
75
Table 3-3 shows Malaysia's consumption of petrol­
eum products from 1970 to 1975. The total consumption 
has been rising during the past 5 years of an average rate 
of 9*1 percent'per annum and currently the rate of 
consumption is about 100,000 barrels per day or more.
The growth rate of1 9.1 percent per annum mentioned earlier 
is about one hall times higher than the wide-wide estimated 
average increase of 5.9 percent per annum. And the 
consumption of 36.2 million barrels in 1975 represents a 
per capita consumption of 2 .9 -^ barrels per annum.
There are four categories of petroleum products 
which showed the highest rate of increase or growth per 
annum shown in Table 3*3* They are LPG-, ATP, Premium 
Mogas and Fuel Oil in that order.
The rate of growth of 20o5 percent over the period 
gives LPG the highest annual rate of growth amongst the 
petroleum products. The highest rate of growth achieved 
by LPG was due to the shift from the consumption of 
kerosene and solid fuels brought about by the increase in 
the standard of living and income of the population and 
the rapid rate of urbanisation where a cleaner fuel is 
preferred. The restriction in the supply of kerosene by 
the oil companies during this period as a result of price 
control imposed on this product by the Government and the 
availability of more LPG made by the oil companies (there
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is no price control on LPG) , leads to an increase in bPG 
consumption over the years. The high growth rate of* 14.2 
percent per annum of Avtur over the period reflects the 
expansion programme of the Malaysian Airlines System (MAS), 
the national flag carrier, and the increasing preference 
for air transportation brought about by the economic 
activities and the level of income especially after 
independence (1957) and the formation of Malaysia (1967) 
and the increased aerial operations against the Communists 
by the military forces along the Thai-Malays!an border to 
the north. The high rate of increase for Mogas (13.2 
percent) during this period, comes mainly from Premium 
Mogas category. The rate of growth in the motor gasoline 
consumption is consistent with the rate of increase of 
motor vehicle population which is almost 11 percent per 
annum. And fuel oil increase of 11 percent per annum is 
due to the vast expansion programme of rural electrifica­
tion under the successive 5 Year Plans of the Government 
and more intensive power consumption in the process of 
independence since industrialisation.
In terms of distribution shown in Table 3 • ^  > Gas/ 
Diesel Oils and Fuel Oil shares which together account for 
66.8 percent show the most significant share in total 
product distribution. However, fuel oil share has shown 
to increase at the expense of gas/diesel oils over the 
period from 31.4 percent in 1970 to 3^*3 percent in 1975*
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3•^ Energy Consumption in Relation to Gross National
Product
The significance of the contribution of primary 
energy sources to civilisation is undeniable. Yet, many 
countries in the world which are endowed with abundant 
energy resources rank low on the international scale when 
measured by income. Others with virtual dependence on 
imported fuels because they lack such resources (e0g, 
Denmark) may be amongst the most prosperous„ This is 
because in the case of the former^ education, technology 
and other natural resources ax’e a necessary condition of 
growth; in the case of the latter, they can acquire the 
needed fuel supplies through international trade provided 
that they have the facilities to utilise the imports for 
exports. In short, energy consumption and overall 
economic development are related.
A prominent characteristic of per capita consump­
tion of commercial energy forms is its systematic and 
close association with indicators of general economic 
development meansured by per capita Gross National Product 
(GNP). That is to say the higher the nation’s income or 
output on the current international scale, the higher, in 
general, is its level of energy consumption. And when 
national energy consumption and GNP (both per capita) are 
plotted against each other, the resulting scatter of points
80
falls within a fairly narrow band along an upward sloping 
regression line. In a study on 23 selected countries with, 
varied economic background by Darmstadter and others, it 
was found that the close association is reflected in a 
correlation coefficient of 0 ,8 7 . Of the 23 top railing 
nations in terms of per capita GNP in the study, 15 are 
also amongst the top 20 in terms of energy consumption per 
capita, of the 10 lowest in GNP per capita, 8 are among the 
lowest in energy consumption. The conclusion drawn from 
the study is that in general, the energy GNP ratio is likely 
to be lower in predominantly agricultural economies and 
higher in highly industrialised countries.
Another study on the relationship between the level
of income and development and energy demand was by Mikdashi.
In Mikdashi’s study on 5 countries - United States, Northern
Europe, Southern Europe, Japan and Latin America — for I 960-
1966 on the correlationship between GNP and per capita energy
consumption, he obtained a linear relationship of GNP per
capita, Y = 0.14, energy consumption per capita, X = - 2.5 and
2 2correlation coefficient, r~ = 0 .996 . In a recent study by
Fesharaki on the Iranian economy between i 960 and 1982, he
found that there was a strong and direct correlation between
the rate of economic growth and the consumption of the 4 main
petroleum products (gasoline, kerosene, gas oil and fuel oil)
for l957-'75 showed a regression line of D = - 164.58 + 6.55 
2 3
GDP with r - 0.99 » all these studies it was seen that
1 Darmstadter , J w Teitelbaura,P , f ^nd Pol^ch., J\G, ENERGY-
IN THE .WORLD ECONOMY: A Statistical Review of Trendy ih Output, 
Trade and Consumption since =1925,J.KOpkins Press, B^ltfjaerer= 3,973
See Next Page for 2 and 3*
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there existed a direct relationship between the rate of 
growth of GNP and the rate of growth of demand for energy.
The relevant study for Malaysia is shown in Table 3.5 »
In the Table, the growth of energy demand exceeded 
that of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) except in 197 3. This 
indicates rapid economic progress and the greater utilisation 
of energy resources. This is the general characteristics of 
many developing countries in their "take off" stage before 
reaching the stage of "sustained* growth. It can be argued 
here too that there is a very strong and direct correlation 
between the rate of economic growth and the consumption of 
petroleum products in Malaysia in the past. This trend is 
expected to continue into the future,
3 .5 Forecasts of Petroleum Products Consumption 197&
to 1990
3.5.1 Methodology
There are a host of methods of estimating demand 
for petroleum products but none of them is entirely 
satisfactory. The usefulness of any one particular method 
rests on the nature of the problem in question, the 
availability of data, considerations of time and resources. 
Owing to the constraints of data in Malaysia, there are
2 Z Misiashi, THE COMMUNITY OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES
Allen & Unwin, London, 197^ pp 120-21.
3 F Fesharaki, DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY
International and Domestic Aspects, Praeger Press,
1976 pp 2J+3~^.
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probably three suitable approaches for forecasting of 
petroleum products consumption, Tbe three methods to be 
considered here are: (i) Extrapolation of past trends,
(ii) Micro-approach and end-use analysis and (iii) Macro- 
approach,
a) Extrapolation of Past Trends .
This is the most common method but it has limited 
usefulness and provides a convenient first approximation.
This method assumes that there have not been any 
severe structural changes in the economy and that influences 
in the past will continue to be valid in the future. Since 
Malaysia is undergoing structural shift from agricultural to 
industrial production, the trending of past data, will not be 
applicable for forecasting. However, the trend of the 
average annual growth rate of per capita energy consumption 
(petroleum products in Malaysia) is fairly stable in the 
long run and this can be used as an indication of the highest 
projected figure.
b) Micro-approach or End-use Analysis
In many ways end-use analysis is the most satisfac­
tory approach to projection of petroleum products consumption. 
This method seeks to project the future consumption of the 
different sectors of the economy and thus taking into account 
the different growth rates of the various sectors. However,
84
currently there is insufficient statistical data by 
end-use by product for Malaysia made available. Therefore 
further collection of data by end—use by product needs to 
be done before any analysis using this method is possible. 
This could perhaps be taken up in the second round of 
attempt or research.
c ) Macro-approach
As a first attempt at long-term forecasting of 
Malaysian consumption of petroleum products by product by 
year, this method is the most suitable one.
The macro-approach involves the correlation of 
consumption with an independent variable such as Gross 
Domestic Pxnoduct (GDP) or industrial production. It 
requires, however, reliable statistical data both for past 
petroleum products consumption and the behaviour of the 
economy as a whole. Past studies of energy consumption 
indicates a very significant correlation with GDP. As 
petroleum fuels accounted for over 90 percent of total 
energy consumption in Malaysia, this approach is used in 
the following forecasting,
d) A ssumptions
1. The projections given in the subsequent section
assume that basically the present composition of energy
85
consumption of Malaysia will continue to be unchanged.
Xt is however, assumed that economic development will 
continue rapidly and thus, given its natural wealth and 
the competitive thrust and commercial instincts associated 
with its diversified natural stock, the economy will 
experience in time more diversified development and 
industrial growth.
2. The average annual growth rate of petroleum demand
is expected to be similar to the average annual growth rate 
for energy as a whole in the period 1976 to 1990- This 
would imply that the contributions of other forms of energy 
such as solid fuels, hydro and nuclear plants to total 
energy consumption will be insignificant within the 
prescribed period. The development of the Cameron Highlands 
hydro-electric potential has been allowed for and the 
consumption of solid fuels is expected to remain very small 
as in the pastQ At present, the introduction of nuclear 
power on a large scale cannot be foreseen, at least before 
1 9 8 5 o S o  far as natural gas is concerned, the position 
could, but would not necessarily change if indigenous 
natural gas were found in Malaysia. Failing this, however, 
the significant use of liquefied natural gas cannot be 
foreseen unless demand for gas as a premium fuel were much 
higher than it appears to be at present. Thus, there will 
be no significant substitution of various forms of 
primary energy.
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3. The correlation coefficients between total petrOl~
eum product consumption and gross domestic product (at 
constant 1970 prices) for the period 1970 to 1975 will be 
stable for the forecasting period 197^ to I 99O.
4^-. The target growth rates of GDP for the three periods
1976 *k° 1980, I 98I to 1985 and I 986 to. 1990 as outlined 
in the Third Malaysia Plan is envisioned.
5. Consumer preference for comfort and convenience in 
using petroleum products makes them competitive in the face 
of an increase in cost relative to other forms of energy 
within the prescribed period. Since the main oil crisis
of 1973 and the successive crises, the retail prices of 
main petroleum fuels - mogas, kerosene, diesel oil and 
LPG — have been controlled by the Government. Since the 
demand for most if not all petroleum products are price- 
inelastic, price has a small influence in our demand 
projection.
6 . The concepts of consumption, quantity demanded and 
domestic sales are used interchangeably. This assumes
that all sales are demanded and consumed and the change 
of stock (stock at the beginning and stock at the end) is 
either zero or negligible in the long-run.
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3 •6 Estimations of Consumption Demand from
1976 to 1990
The estimations of the I 976 to 199° figures are 
obtained by: (i) using linear least-square method to
determine the significance of each petroleum product with 
an independent variable such as Gross Domestic Product at 
factor cost or industrial growth at factor cost and then 
choosing the most suitable linear equation, and (ii) 
substituting the projected values of the independent 
variable in the best linear equation to obtain the projected 
values of the petroleum product.
The most significant independent variable for 
each petroleum product is Gross Domestic Product at factor 
cost. The main reason is due to the fact that no data is 
made available on end-use of each petroleum product in 
Malaysia made either by oil companies or government agencies 
and thus no correspondence can be made with each sector of 
the gross domestic product.
88
The equations using linear least square estimates are 
shown-.in Appv3Banci the estimated values are tabulated in 
Table 3*6.
3-7 The Estimated Consumption Pattern of Petroleum
Products from 1976 to 1990
Prom Table 3*6? Malaysia is estimated to consume an 
average of 1.56,000 barrels of petroleum products per day in 
1980, 236,000 barrels per day in 1985 and 355*000 barrels 
per day in 1990. The average annual rate of* growth for the 
first 5 year period from 1976 to I98O is 9*5 percent. Then 
the rate decreases to 8.7 percent from 1981 to 1985 and 8 .2+ 
percent in 1986 to 1990. The main reason of the decline is 
the estimated decline in the growth rate of the Malaysian 
gross domestic product at factor cost (see Appendix 3A).
In terms of per capita consumption, however, the estimated 
increase is from 2 0 9 -^ barrels per annum in 1975 to ^#06 
barrels per annum in 1980o This increase of 7 percent per 
annum in the next 5 years could indicate firstly the shift 
from primary to manufacturing industries under the aegis of 
the Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980, which are more energy 
intensive, and secondly, the increase in transport services 
and facilities which grow faster at this stage of develop­
ment o
In Table 3 *6 , the estimated growth in consumption 
for all petroleum products is expected to range between
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19.0 percent to ^b,0 percent in the next 15 years from 1976 
to 1990o One of the most significant changes in the future 
as indicated in the Table is the competition between 
kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas especially for domestic 
burning and lighting. Kerosene is expected to show a 
decrease from 5.5 percent in I98O to 5.1 percent in 1990 
while L P G  is expected to increase from 3*0 percent in I98O 
to 3,6 percent in 199°* This is so in view of the expected 
rise in income and general urban drift which would bring 
about a substitution of kerosene for L P G o
In Table 3°7j which, shows the expected share of 
distribution of petroleum products consumption over the 
.next 15 years, the share of diesel oil category is expected 
to decrease further from 29®7 percent in 1980 to 26„2 percent 
in 1990* Gas/diesel oils are mainly used in the transport 
and mining industries and these two sectors especially the 
Malaysian Railways and tin-mining are expected to have lower 
growth due to competition from road transport and the slow 
rate of new commercial tin-ore discoveries. However, in 
the case of fuel oil, its share of consumption is expected 
to increase from 3600 percent in I98O to 38 .0 percent in 
1990* Out of the expected increase, electricity generation 
generally accounts for about 70 percent of the total fuel 
consumption. In the Third Malaysia Plan (TMP), the demand 
for power is expected to increase by about 12 percent per 
annunu Since not all electricity generation is by thermal 
facilities, the expected growth rate for fuel oil
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consumption by the electricity boards is expected to be 
around 10 percent per annum. This leads to about 2 percent 
increase from I98O to 1990 for total fuel oil consumption 
in the percentage distribution of total petroleum products 
consumption0
3 o 8 Limitations of Forecasts or Projections
There are 3 main limitations of the forecasts for 
petroleum product consumption for the next 15 years from 
1976 to 1990:
Firstly, the projections are dependent on the 
target rates of growth of the Gross Domestic Product at 
factor cost of the Third Malaysia Plan. As such, the 
projected consumption figures should be viewed as targets 
rather than actuals.
Secondly, as has been indicated earlier in our 
assumption of projection, no account has been taken in the 
I98O to 1990 projections as far as natural gas is concerned.
Thirdly, in making forecasts or projections of this 
nature, especially forecasts for a number of years ahead, 
they are likely to prove unreliable in practice since it 
is not possible to foresee the more distant future in 
sufficient detail. To mitigate this problem and to bring
94
it in line with best possible expected forecast under 
the prevailing background and knowledge, it has been 
suggested to consider future oil demand as lying within 
a range of possibilities. We have considered this in 
the study, and have simplified the task by taking the 
Medium-Level - midway between High and Low levels 
Forecasting. Even then we must admit, projections further 
ahead than 1985 should be treated with great caution.
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CHAPTER 4
POST-WAR CRUDE-0IE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Scenario of Crude Oil Exploration
The first major phase of petroleum exploration 
activity in Malaysia and elsewhere in East Asia after the 
Second World War began in l9|l+6. This lasted for the next 
decade till 19^3 when the major activity was mainly directed 
towards the re-establishing onshore production facilities 
damaged and destroyed during the war and modest onshore 
exploration efforts. Hartley called this particular stage of 
oil development the Post-War "Rehabilitation" period'*'. The 
onshore areas of Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei and other 
East Asian countries were actively explored. In Malaysian 
areas of Sarawak and Nox’th Borneo, explorations were mainly 
conducted by the Royal Dutch Shell Group of Companies which 
had been active in this part of the world before the World War
I I .
It is also during this period that the scenarios of 
oil development have taken the form of a shift from onshore tod-offsh 
areas in Malaysia. This changing or shifting of interest on 
to the offshore areas was brought by the fact that (as) the 
coastline of West Borneo Island cuts obliquely across the 
geosynclinal basin and (b) prospective oil basin lie offshore 
as a continuity of major producing fields, Seria in Brunei 
and Miri in Sarawak, which lie on the coast and partly under 
the sea and (c) geologists have long known that East Asia’s
continental shelf including that of the Brunei coast was that
1 Hartley, A.G. "Offshore Petroleum Exploration in East Asia
-An Overview", OSEA Conference, Singapore, 1976L Also in Petroleum 
News Southeast Asia, 1976.
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rich, sediments carried to sea by rivers had left thick
"Tertiary" and "Cretaceous" deposits beneath the seabed, dating
back some 100 million years - a good sign of the presence of 
2
oil.
The large amount of exploration work to be done in the 
pre-war period and immediate post-war years coupled with 
rehabilitation efforts after World War XX kept Shell fully 
occupied at the beginning. Shell Group of Companies then 
began to shift their interest bo offshore oil possibilities. 
However, it was not until the early 1950’s that large scale 
offshore exploration with its difficulties in terms of 
technology and high cost began to be considered as a practical 
possibility. This has been brought about strongly by (i) ex­
ploration on land had resulted in no new oil discoveries, (ii) 
practical successes achieved by offshore exploration in the 
Gulf Coast of United States, Lake Maracaibo and the Persian 
Gulf where major oil companies mastered drilling in shallow 
water (which began in Gulf of Mexico in the late T30s) and 
were well on their way to developing the technology in deep 
water drilling, and (iii) the major technical breakthroughs 
in the post-war years where by the time Shell began offshore 
exploration along the Borneo coast in the late AUs, seismic 
technology (developed in the mid-30s) were able to map the 
configuration and thickness of offshore sediments, thus giving 
the geophysists a reading of the probability of finding oil 
and other hydrocarbons j, the development of radio location
systems and improvement in cffshore drilling and production 
3
installations .______________________      .
2-3 "Offshore Oil Fever :East Asia's Continental Shelf—The 3 Main 
Offshore Oil Basins", in PACIFIC BASIN ' REPORTS,San Fransisco, Feb* 
1971, p.42.
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4
According to Hartley, the second major exploration 
and development activity after the post-war rehabilitation 
period in East Asia was brought about by political and economic 
events, internal and external to the region. These events have 
the effect of reducing the exploration activity in this part of 
the world between 196^ till mid~1967. Five factors contributed 
to this development. Firstly, major exploration efforts and/or 
successful discoveries being made outside of East Asia (in 
Libya, North Sea (Dutch Sector), West Africa and Latin America), 
which drew industry efforts and funds away from most of this 
region. Secondly, the political and/or economic uncertainty of 
investments in oil in East Asia because of the instability of 
politics and policies. Thirdly, lack of any real commercial 
success in exploration drilling in many of the countries in 
East Asia. Fourthly, oil production was in the state of 
surplus throughout the world. Fifthly, the erosion in oil 
prices worldwide began in the early 1960s. However, these 
factors found exception in the case of Sarawak, North Borneo 
and Brunei. In these countries, both political stability and 
special exploration incentives (Shell Group of Companies being 
British and those three states were then British Colonies 
(Brunei- is still a British colony))coupled with the discovery 
of several major oilfields from late 19^3 through the early 
1970s helped maintain a continuous oil activity in these areas. 
Unlike many other areas during this period, the relationship 
between oil companies and most governments has been "good" 
since these countries then were not yet affected by the new 
wave of "nationalistic" laws and policies, which swept through 
the region during this time. Tt is also during this period
4. Hartley, A.G., op.cit., p.42.
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that the importance of offshore oil reserves and the oil 
industry’s newly developed technical ability to explore and 
produce these major reserves begin to be fully recognised.
The greatest impact of this being shown in Brunei in I 963 
when the Royal Dutch Shell made its offshore discovery after 
initiating its offshore exploration prograra-ne in 1953. This 
initial success spurred the interest of oilmen to turn to 
these areas where both offshore production had been established 
and where large but relatively shallow continental shelf 
existed.
However, detailed exploration and development of these
offshore basin by international oil companies awaited further
a more congenial political situation, further development of
offshore drilling technology and a realignment of supply and
5
demand factors within the oil industry. Until as recent as 
1972, political factors wore retarding oil development in East 
Asia offshore. This instability was hardly a propitious 
circumstance for British and American companies to develop 
offshore oil. Secondly, the main factor was that of 
international oil demand — supply situation. This results 
primarily from unstable political and economic conditions in 
the Middle East, at a time of rapid.growth in total world oil 
demand. The closure of the Suez Canal in 1966 combined with 
the sabotage and closure of Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE), 
the Arab-Israeli War, oil price hikes and embargoes by the 
Arab producing governments in 1973 worried the main consuming 
countries of the West. This is especially so in Western 
Europe , which relies 011 the Middle East and North Africa for
5. PACIFIC BASIN ■ REPORTS, op.cit., p,43*
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more than. 80 perceht of its oil, and Japan, which gets 87 
percent of its crude from the Middle East. Significantly,
South East Asia* s share of Japanese oil imports has already 
risen to 12 percent and should go higher. Thirdly, as a 
result of heightened demand coupled with threats to control 
of existing supply sources, the oil companies have launched a 
massive search for new petroleum sources in North America, 
(Alaska1s North Slope and Canada's Artie), Europe (North Sea 
off Britain and Holland), Africa, Latin America, Australia as 
well as the Far E a s t „ A large part of this (if not the 
greater part) is concentrated on continental shelf exploration. 
This reflects tremendous advance in offshore oil drilling 
technology over the last 20 years. And fifthly, the sudden 
interest in East Asian oil was the public clamour to reduce 
industrial pollution particularly in Japan and United States. 
This is because oil found in the continental shelf (and on 
Alaska's North Slope) is low in sulphur content. Oil from the 
Middle East particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the other 
hand, is mostly high in sulphur content (the comparison 
between Malaysian and Middle Eastern crudes will be discussed 
in Chapter 5 )• This tends to pollute the air both in its 
refining and its ultimate combustion. Import-dependent Japan, 
where oil consumption is expected to quadruple in 15 years, 
securing a stable oil supply not only near the home islands 
but low in sulphur is top priority. Similarly, "Fx’eigh.t-plus- 
Quality Advantages" exists for East Asian crudes in other 
western rim Pacific Basin markets, as well as on the United 
States' West Coast, , ■> t
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Following from tlie above development , tire Malaysian
petroleum industry entered into another major phase from 19^7
6
to 1974. According to Hartley, this period has been the most 
productive in Bast Asian oil development,. With the develop­
ment of mor© advanced offshore exploration equipment, knowhow 
and techniques, new offshore exploration areas were acquired 
and commenced to be developed in the late 1960s and early IS'JQ's. 
Discoveries were also made during this period in offshore 
Malaysia although several of these ’discoveries’ have yet to 
be developed.
The world development traced earlier had left its 
imprint on the pattern of oil exploration and development in 
Malaysia in the post-war years, in terms of areas explored, 
number of wells drilled and brought into production, and the 
number of companies involved in oil exploration and development,
9,2 Post-War Oil Exploration in Malaysia
In the course of an intensive geological and geophysi­
cal investigation both on onshore and offshore areas of 
Sarawak since 1911 up to 196 5 , the Royal Dutch Shell Group of 
Companies have drilled some 50 exploration wells on land, 30 
of the wells were drilled before tho Second World War and the
rest after the war. They drilled 15 wells offshore as well
7
sxnce 1957 when the effort first began._______________  •_____
6 Hartley, A.G., op cit.
7 Geological Department of British Borneo, THE GEOLOGY OF
SARAWAK, BRUNEI AND THE WESTERN PART OF NORTH BORNEO? ,Kuxzhing.
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Tlie country’s first offshore rights went to Royal
Dutch Shell Group of Companies after World War II as
extensions of their North Borneo concessions in Sabah, Sarawak 
8
and Brunei. In fact, Shell became East As i a ’s first offshore
drilling operator in 1956, when it began drilling on the
North Borneo Shelf, and later became the region’s first
offshore producer in 19^5 when the Lutong field was brought
into production. Significantly, these early offshore efforts
were confined to the British .controlled States of North Borneo
were probably the most ’’politically stable" areas of East
Asia at that time (as opposed to earlier conception of
political instability in the region due to the Vietnam War and
9
Communist subversion in all the countries in the region),
Since 1959 the Dutch-she11 Group of Companies
concentrated their drilling efforts 011 the offshore area as
none of the exploration wells onshore was successful. The
two offshore wells drilled by the company in 1957 were from a
fixed marine drilling platform. Then in I 96I, the Shell
Group of Companies employed the Orient Explorer, a mobile
drilling platform, which began drilling work in Sarawak
offshore areas. After it had drilled 9 wells it was replaced
by the Sidewinder, a floating drilling vessel towards the end 
10
of 196^.
The exploratory wells drilled from the Orient 
Explorer off Sarawak near Bintulu during I 962 showed good 
indications of the presence of oil, although it was not rated 
as commercial. Nearby the border between Brunei and Sarawak,
8—9 PACIFIC BASIN REPORTS, op.vit p.4 2
10 Geological Department of British Borneo, op.cit.
102
Shell Brunei had discovered good prospect of oil as a result 
of exploratory drilling encouraged by this prospect and their 
early discovery, Shell Sarawak intensified their drilling.
Two large offshore drilling units replaced the Orient 
Explorer and Sidewinder which proved to be incompatible with 
the conditions of the sea-level by the depth of the Borneo 
waters in the case of the former and unstable in rough water 
in the latter. Shell was convinced of the good prospect of 
finding oil offshore to enable them to incur heavy capital 
expenditure such as these.
In the case of Sabah, exploration works by several
interested oil companies have been carried out since 1915
(see Chapter 2 earlier). These companies concentrated their
attention to several areas on the TOtLas Peninsula near Kudat,
on Sabatik and Magalum Islands and in the South China Sea
off the west coast of Sabah. However, none of these
exploration wells were successful.x *
In the post-war years, exploration in Sabah, as in 
Sarawak earlier, also concentrated on the offshore area. In 
1958, the first deep offshore well was drilled by Shell from 
a fixed platform. Then 3 year's later, 5 deep exploration 
wells were drilled. Five of these 6 wells found no trace of 
oil or ga s. The only well called Keranan drilled into a 
sand with no commercial significance but with some hydrocarbon 
indications.
The concession areas chosen and granted to the Shell
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Group of Companies -were located in the supposedly best 
geological indication for the formation of crude oil deposits. 
The Shell Group of Companies, being partly British in origin, 
was fortunate enough to exercise their influence under the 
British rule with the result that even after independence 
they still possess the optimal concession locations in the 
country. Its monopolistic and privileged position in the past 
with respect to licence selection enabled the Company to 
exercise the position of dominance in the development of the 
Malaysian oil industry in the past, present and in the future. 
The privileged position of Shell also has resulted in its 
early entrenchment in the oil business in this part of the 
world and in the hostile and geologically unexpected areas 
with unfavourable physical conditions both on land and sea 
(the South China Sea is affected by the monsoon weather and 
winds) and poorly developed infrastucture. The risk undergone 
by the company in capital and equipment development in the 
past has earned it as the pioneer in the industry.
The earlier indication of crude oil discoveries in 
commercial quantities by Sarawak Shell has spurred interest 
by the other mineral oil companies to explore for oil in the 
country. The new comers were able to obtain concessions in 
those areas only when Shell abandoned the area. They are in 
a way handicapped by the fact that they were given the less 
favourable area in terms of the possibility of oil find. On 
the other hand, they would concentrate on certain areas as 
risk was decreased by the earlier extensive work carried out 
by Shell,
1Q4
With the interest shown by the international oil 
companies in bidding for concessions in offshore areas, the 
Government passed the Continental Shelf Act of 1966. The 
Act states :
"Malaysia proclaims ownership of the natural resources 
to be found beneath the sea bed of the continental 
shelf beyond the territorial limits of the coastal ,
States up to a water depth of 200 meters or deeper...."
The Government was then able to dispose licences for the 
continental shelf. The Government designated the coastal 
waters to a depth of 100 fathom line. The option consisted of 
a number of concession blocks of ^-,000 square mile each. The 
granting of a prospecting licence was contingent upon a payment 
of premium.
Until I 96T, only Shell Sarawak and Shell Sabah held
oil concessions in Malaysia. However, since the passing of
the Continental Shelf Act of 1966, the number of bidders and
concessionaires have increased. With this development, the
crude oil industry in Malaysia was no longer dependent on the
monopoly of one company, and this improves the negotiating
position of the Government with the oil companies. Moreover,
the participation of oil companies of different nationalities
improves the negotiating position of the Government with the
oil companies. Moreover, the participation of oil companies
of different nationalities reduces the danger of obligspolistic
arrangement and behaviour as they are competitive concession
bidders for high premium.______________________________________________
11 Review of the Development of Petroleum Re$ource$ in
Malaysia by the Department of Mines and Geological purvey appeared 
in Proceedings of the FOURTH. SYMPOSIUM ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PETROLEUM RESOURCES 0F~ASIA AND FAR EAST, BCAFE, Bangkok, 1972.
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4.3 Oil Concession. Areas And Oil and Gas Fields
Figures 4.1A and 4.IB show the offshore areas of 
Malaysia that are actively explored by the various oil 
companies. Figure 4 .J_A shows the offshore areas that have been 
explored by Mobil, Exxon and Continental Oil Company (Conoco), 
i h . Peninsula Malaysia. Only two tiny strips a and b (shaded) 
in the Figure 4. IA remain unexplored, both being in the 
Straits of Malacca, immediately to the north and south of the 
area already explored by Mobil. Figure 4 .113, on the other 
hand, shows the offshore areas that have been explored for 
Sarawak and Sabah. Between the six oil companies concerned, 
Sarawak Shell, Sabah Shell, .Exxon, Oceanic, Aquitaine and 
Teiseki, they have explored most of Sabah and Sarawak offshore 
p,reas and only small pockets of unexplored areas remain.
Figure ^  .2 gives the actual areas that have been 
explored by each of the eight oil companies mentioned earlier. 
With the passing of the Petroleum Development Act of 1973 and 
the production sharing formula, (a detailed discussion will be 
made in Chapter 10), the areas made available and now being 
explored under the production sharing agreement or called 
"contract" areas are much smaller than those areas made 
available under the old "concession" system. Figures 4.2a 
and 4# 2b show the present contract areas for Peninsula and 
East Malaysia respectively. In the case of Peninsula Malaysia, 
a production sharing agreement has not yet been contracted 
with Continental Oil Company (Conoco), but discoveries have 
been made in the area defined. In the case of East Malaysia,
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all the three companies (Exxon, Sabah Shell and Sarawak Shell) 
have signed the production sharing agreement.
The country's first offshore rights went to the 
Royal Dutch Shell Group of Companies after World War II, an 
extension of their Borneo concessions in Sarawak, Brunei and 
Sabah. Shell became the first offshore drilling operator in 
195*5 when it began drilling on the North Borneo Shelf and 
became the country’s offshore producer in I 965 when the West 
Lutong Field was found. Later in 1967? 1970 and 1971 three 
other fields were found: Baram, Baroaia and Bakau - all in 
the area offshore Sarawak; other oil fields in Sarawak are 
Fairley Baram and Tukau, In Sabah, Shell Sabah, has two fields 
- Semarang and West Erb found in 197^+» The other oil sti’ike 
in offshore Sabah was Exxon’s Tembungo field found in 197^. 
This is shown in Figure 4.3£l.
The major gas field in tiie Malaysian waters in 
offshore Sarawak is Shell’s "F" area or Luconia discovery in 
197/4. with, gas reserves conservatively estimated at 6 trillion 
cubic feet.
Though most of the offshore production to date comes 
from East Malaysia, thex,e have been some significant discover­
ies off the East Coast of Peninsula Malaysia. Several years 
of exploration without commercially exploitable reserves being 
found gave way to petroleum gas finds off the East Coast in 
1973 by Exxon and Conoco. Exxon came up with several highly 
rated gas discoveries and a promising petroleum discovery.
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The oil finds were Pulai, Pilong, Bintong, Jerneh and Bekok 
and Setigi wells* Conoco1s discoveries were at Sotong in 
1973 and later at Anding, Duyong and Duyong Barat. The 
petroleum, field found off Peninsula Malaysia's East Coast on 
Exxon's concession is the Tapis field (1975) with estimated 
reserves of 3^0 million barrels of oil - the largest so far 
found in this country. The petroleum from Pulai, Bekok and 
Setigi and Tapis is expected to be brought into production 
sometime in 1977* The only offshore zone to be investigated 
in depth is in the Strains of Malacca. Xn Peninsula Malaysia, 
Duyong is the only gas field and found in Conoco’s concession 
area. The oil and gas fields for Peninsula Malaysia is shown 
in Figure 4.3b,
k tk Drillings And Crude Oil Production
In the period of 1959 to 197^, the number of oil 
wells drilled by the different exploration companies as shown 
in T a b l e -4.1 was approximately 2bk wells. Out of these the 
number of wells drilled in East Malaysia is around 19^ or 78 
percent and Peninsula Malaysia or 22 percent. They were 
mainly concentrated in the Continental Shelt areas on the
West Coast of Sabah and Sarawak and the East Coast of
Peninsula. Malaysia.
In the early part of the 16 year , period, the wells
were located in the areas bordering the Miri offshore fields.
They were drilled by the Sarawak Shell Oil Company. Later, 
there was a widespread rate of drilling away from the
114
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T A B L E  4 .1
EXPLORATION WELLS DRILLED AND FOOTAGE 1956-1976
Year Company
No of 
Wells Location
Total 
Depth / k '
1956 Sarawak Shell 2 Sarawak 12,716
1958 Sabah Shell 1 Sabah 8 ,862
1961 Sarawak Shell 1 Sarawak 7,845
Sabah Shell 4 Sabah 30,333
1962 Sarawak Shell 7 Sarawak 49,818
Sabah Shell 1 Sabah 6,151
I 963 Sarawak Shell 2 Sarawak 16,624
I 964 Sarawak Shell 4 Sarawak 35,301
I965 Shell Group of 
Companies
is(i) Sabah, Sarawak 
& Brunei
n . a .
I 966 Shell Group of 
Companies
24 (1 ) Sabah, Sarawak 
& Brunei
90,117
I 967 Sarawak Shell 27 Sarawak 93,094
1963
Sabah Shell 
Shell Group of
1 Sabah 9,556
Companies 17(1) Sabah, Sarawak 
& Brunei
n . a .
I 969 Sarawak Shell 20 Sarawak 139,169
Exxon 4 Peninsula Malaysia n.a .
1970 Aquitaine 3 Sabah 26,187
Conoco 2 Peninsula Malaysia n.a.
Exxon 8 Sabah 35,137
Sabah Teiseki 3 Sabah n.a.
1971 Exxon 6 Peninsula Malaysia 43,630
Cono co 1 Peninsula Malaysia 9,500
Mobil 1 Peninsula Malaysia 5 ,484
Exxon 5 East Malaysia 
(Sabah)
4 1 ,138
1972 Aquitalre 2 Sabah 21,354
Ashland 2 Sabah 11,030
Exxon 2 Peninsula Malaysia 15,872
Exxon 11 Sa bah 80 ,075
Mobil 1 Peninsula Malaysia 4 ,245
Shel 1 3 Sabah n.a .
1973 Conoco 1 Peninsula Malaysia 10 ,018
Exxon 1 Sabah 7,333
Exxon 3 Peninsula Malaysia n.a.
Sabah Shell 13 Sabah n.a.
Sabah Teiseki 1 Sabah 12,139
1974 C 0110 c 0 7 Peninsula Malaysia 66,255
Exxon 7 Peninsula Malaysia 50,101
Forex Oil 1 Sabah 7 ,500
Sarawak Shell 10 Peninsula Malaysia 83,982
Sabah Shell 6 Sabah 4 5 ,20 9
(l) includes Shell Brunei
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TABLE 4»l(C0NTP.)
EXPLORATION WELLS DRILLED AND FOOTAGE 1956-1976
Year Company
No of 
Wells Locat ion
Total 
De pth
1975
1976
Mobil
Aquitaine
Conoco
Exxon
Peninsula Malaysia 5 »4l8
Sabah 23,595
Peninsula Malaysia 6,355
Peninsula Malaysia 42,056
Source{ American Institute of Petroleum Geologists Section 
on Oil in South-East A s i a , August Issues of Various 
Years from 1956 to 1976.
£>
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continental shelf areas into the areas more than 100 f t , 
fathoms,
The discovery of the first offshore wells in Sarawak 
in 196*1- spurred the number of drillings not only by Shell but
also by the other oil companies. There was an increased
number of drilling activities in the offshore areas of 
Sarawak and Sabah, The Shell Group of Companies were eager 
to develop the concession areas quickly as their licence 
agreements require them to surrender 50 percent of their oil 
prospecting licence after January 1, i 960. This event 
explains the large number of exploration wells drilled at that 
time. Since 196*+ the numbetr of wells drilled has risen 
immediately. This is graphed in Figure '4. *1.
Since I 965 saw the shift in emphasis in the types of
drilling from exploration drilling to appraisal and develop­
ment wells. This change in trend indicates the change in the 
phase of development of oil fields.
Although crude oil in Malaysia started in 1911? since 
the Second World War the production from the only and nearly 
exhausted Miri fields was declining very quickly. The highest 
rate of production achieved since the war was just under 
l ,*+00 barrels per day in 1956 but since then production has 
continued to decline steadily. A temporary slight increase 
in production in i 960 and I 961 achieved by the successful 
reopening of some old wells but was not maintained. By 1963 
production had fallen to 372.5 thousand barrels in that year
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or just over 1,000 barrels per day. By the ©nd of 19^3? 
some 620 wells had been drilled at Miri - about a dozen of* 
them since the War - but only 173 el these, with depths 
ranging from 57 ^0 3>355 feet were still yielding oil (all 
by pumping).
When the Miri field was finally exhausted, the 
ultimate recovery of Miri field was slightly at 80 million 
baxrels and of these some 70 million barrels had been 
produced by the end of 1963. The remaining proven reserves 
to sustain further production was the annual production which 
declined from the I 963 of just under 1,000 barrels of
oil per day till the minimum economic limit of production 
was reached in 197^ when the field was finally shut down.
Exploration successes and current development activity 
for crude oil resources have stimulated discussions and 
optimistic opinions concerning Malaysia's self-sufficiency 
in oil production. In 1967, the daily production of 
indigenous crude oil has risen from just about 330 thousand 
barrels in I 966 or about below 1,000 barrels per day to 1.5 
million barrels in 19^7 or about ^,000 barrels a day. The 
increase in production came from the west Lutong Field which was 
discovered in 1965 and brought into production in 1967, The 
increase in production came from the new fields. The daily 
production of crude oil rose rapidly from I 967 till 1973 to
72.2 million barrels or just below 200,000 barrels per day 
or 5 times the 19^7 level. The increase in production till
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1973 came almost entirely from the Sarawak fields of Baram 
(1967), Baronia (I970) , Bakau (1971) besides West Lutong 
(1965) , And besides the k offshore fields foimd prior 1971 
the other offshore oilfields in Sarawak which brought into 
production since that year was Fairley-Baram and Tukau* Xn 
Sabah, Shell’s production came from 2 other fields - Semarang 
and West Erb found in 197^- • Tembungo field which was 
found in 197 -^> brought into production recently.
Table -4 ,2 shows the Malaysian crude oil production 
from i 960 to 1976.
^ .5 Investments And Costs Xn Crude Oil Production
Like any other natural resources (tin, iron-ore etc) 
the production of petroleum require a number of investments 
before it can be produced and utilised. The discovery of 
the petroleum deposits in the South China Sea sector of 
Malaysia elucidated earlier in Section b,b needs an input of 
substantial and sustained efforts and costs before tangible 
benefits can be accumulated by the various oil exploration 
companies.
The cost of production in the South China Sea is 
much more expensive than a number of other countries because 
the area is not one of prolific in oil deposits. On top of 
that water-depths and weather conditions have forced the 
exploration and production companies to use expensive and 
untried equipment.
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TABLE 4.2
MALAYSIA: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION 1960-1976 (IN *000 BARRELS)
Year Total Annual 
Product ion
Index Increase
(°/°)
Product ion 
Per Day 
(* 000 barrels)
i960 *+35-1 28.598 1.192
I 96I 435.1 28.598 1.192
I 962 418 .2 31.628 - 4.0 1.145
I 963 372.5 24.484 1 H H • O 1.020
1964 351.6 23.110 - 5.7 0.963
I 965' 345.7 22.722 - 1.7 0.947
I 966 328.3 25.128 - 5.1 0 .899
I 967 1,521.4 ' 100.0 +363.4 4.168
1968 3,387.*+ 222 .65 •t-122 . 6 9.280
I 969 6 ,558.7 431.096 + 93.6 17.969
1970 25,070.9 1,647.88 +282.3 68.687
1971 33,866.9 2 ,226.035 + 35.08 92.786
1972 76,83.1.0 5 ,050.020 +126.9 210.495
1973 7 2 ,263.0 4 ,749.77 6.0 197.980
197*+ 68,124.0 4 ,477.72 - 5.8 186.64
1975 64,364 4 ,230.58 - 5.6 176.339
1976 60 , 5*+6 .8 3 ,979.6 - 6.0 165.88
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1976
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The sums involved in crude oil production in 
Malaysia are great. The South China Sea. development is 
characterised by the vastness of the outlays required for 
both expansion and production. Table. 4,3 , shows the costs 
of investments of the various oil companies. The investments 
represent the yearly capital expenditures (not cumulative) 
which excludes producing and operating expenses. The four 
categories of capital investment shown in the table are 
Exploration and Surveying, ‘ Terminal Facilities, Production 
Facilities and Administration and other costs.
Under Exploration and Survey, it includes the costs 
of investments in exploration and drilling, geological and 
geophysical, rentals and overhead expenditures and other 
expenditures related to exploration. The investment in 
Terminal Facilities, on the other hand, includes storage 
tanks, pipelines, shipping terminals (mooring and loading 
facilities). The third category is that of production 
facilities which encompasses the building of production 
platforms and drilling. Other investments include transport 
equipment services units and facilities and general plant 
and equipment.
The period of investments from 1973 till 1976 is 
the period where there is a"bee-hive" of activity in petroleum 
exploration as a result of the oil crisis and shortage of 
crude in the oil market which drove oil companies to many 
parts of the world to find new sources of oil. It is also
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TABLE 4.3
MALAYSIA; OIL COMPANIES INVESTMENT IN EXPLORATION,
TERMINAL FACILITIES AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES 
1973-1976 (in million)
1973 197^ 1975 1976
1 Exploration •
Expenditures
a Oceanic — . 5.0 O .85 3.0
b Sabah Teisaki 6.5 4.5 1.4 —
c Aquitaine 1.0 — 17.0 75.0
d Conoco 2 6 . 9 44.2 10.4 — _
e Shell Sabah 18.7 32 .2 16.7 20 .0
f Shell Sarawak • 10.8 31.9 53.2 33.0
g Exxon 23.1 76.3 86.0 3.6
h Mobil - 2.5 0.3 -
Sub-Total 87.0 18 9.1 174.3 134.6
(Minimum
2 Terminal Facilities
a Shell Sarawak _ 30.5 1.3
b Shell Sabah 0 .6 12,0 31.1 9-6
c Exxon 2.1 12 .3 15.2
Sub-Total 2.7 24.3 76.8 1 0 . 9
3 Production Facilities
a Shell Sarawak 59.9 81.5 123.5 86.5
b Shell Sabah - 23.0 109.3 85.9
c Exxon
0•HH 39.7 77.9 —
Sub-Total 70.9 144.2 310 ,7 172.4
4 Others
a Sabah Teiseki _ 0.37 0.38 .
b Shell Sabah - 18 .8 9.82 9.01
c Shell Sarawak - 0.35 0 .64 0.51
d Exxon - 5.6 1.7 -
Sub-Total
Grand Total 159.6 347.6 561.8 327.4
Source : Private Communications With. The Oil Companies
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tlie period whereby new areas of increased reserves are 
demanded upon by oil companies. South. China Sea has been 
the focus of interest following an earlier discovery of 2 
offshore fields by the Shell Group of Companies in the 
late 1 960s .
There are 7 companies actively involved in the 
exploration of the South China Sea sector of Malaysia.
Up to now only Shell Sarawak, Shell Sabah and Exxon and 
Conoco have located oil and gas fields in their concession 
blocks. However, only 3 out of the 4 companies have started 
to invest in building terminal and production facilities and 
their finds have shown to be of commercial quantities.
Table 4.3 shows the main items of expenditure over 
the past 3 years 1973-75• Production platform and drilling 
investments account for about M$585.0 million or 41.8 
percent of the total capital costs. The production platform 
is the most significant item and the cost will vary according 
to the number required, size and water depth of the field 
concerned. The need for more than one production platfox’m 
and separate platform for pumping, separation and accommoda­
tion would result in increasing capital costs. Similarly 
exploration drilling account for a large amount of cost in 
this category.
Amongst the investment in terminal facilities, the
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moat costly being offshore storage tanks and shipping 
terminals. In the case of the South China Sea area of 
Malaysia the costs under this category amounted to around 
M$103.8 million or about 11 percent of total capital costs.
Funds required to develop oil and gas discoveries 
and potential reserves such as mentioned above are difficult 
to assess and generalise for different and varied regions 
in the world, since the costs associated are based on many 
factors such as water depth, distance from the shore, on­
shore receiving facilities, platform construction facilities, 
geology of reserves and expected end—use of the crude oil 
produced.
Table 4. 4 and Figure -^.5 show some relative costs 
associated with oil discovery and development between offshore 
in less than 150 feet water depth and offshore field of 
more than 150 feet water depth in 1 9 6 9 . This is compared to 
production costs of Middle Eastern crudes (average to Japan), 
Kuwait and Minas (Indonesia) crudes. In the Table the 
technical costs is highest in the case of Sarawak offshore 
areas — US$0 .90 $ per barrel in the case of water depth of 
more than 150 feet, US$0,71 $ barrel in the case of crude
from water depth less than 150 feet, compared with US$0.30 $ 
per barrel in Indonesia (on land); US$0,15 $ Middle East 
crudes and US$0.10 $ in the case of Kuwait. In the calcula­
tion of margins per barrel of crude, Minas crude of Indonesia 
shows the highest with US$0.51 $ per barrel with Sarawak
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Fjgure 4-5 = .COMPARISON BETWEEN COMPANY. MARGIN 
AND-.-.TECHNICAL. COSTS BY-. COUNTR1ES
US $ per barrel
100
80
60
40
20 C v/ . v . v
MIDDLE * 
EAST 
average to Japan
SARAWAK
less than 150 ft. 
water depth
SARAWAK
more than 150ft. 
water depth
MINAS
source > Shell Group of Companies
and from Table 4^ -4.
Technical Costs 
Margins
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offshore crudes netting only US#0.29 $ per barrel in the 
case of crude from less than 150 feet of water depth and 
US$0,28 $ per barrel for crude in more than 150 feet of 
water. Therefore Malaysian crudes show having the highest 
technical costs per barrel and lowest in terms of net 
margins per barrel compared to Indonesia and areas in the 
Middle East, However, in the immediate aftermath of the 
worldwide inflation of 1973-7^ and the associated -quadrupling 
of petroleum prices, these costs have increased. Table 4 .-5 
shows some relative costs associated with oil and gas finding1 
and development in the North Sea, Saudi Arabia, Western 
Europe and United States "New Oil".
TABLE .4. 5
OIL PRODUCTION COSTS BY COUNTRIES IN 1976
A Oil Production Costs - Per Barrel Per Day (US$J
North Sea Ekofisk Complex US $^-,736 barrels/day
Forties Field $7?352 " "
Other North Sea Fields range from:
Argyll $3 y -^6l barrels/day
Statfjord(UK Sector) $17,682 " "
B Oil Production Costs - Per Barrel
Saudi Arabia $0,30$ /barrel
EEC Europe $1.50$ / "
U S A  "New Oil" $6,12$ / "
North Sea $2.00 to $3.00
per barrel
Source: Paper by Ward J and Murphy C L, Financial Aspects
of Malaysian Petroleum Industry, p.1^ 1-0, slide 1,
Sec. 4. A paper presented at the Seminar on the 
Oil Industry and its impact on National Development, 
organised by The Technological Association of 
Malaysia from 13-16 May 197^ in Kuala Lumpur.
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Table 4 .5 shows average relative costs in various sectors 
of the world with the low costs associated with the Middle 
East, The finding and lifting costs in (a) included all 
costs necessary to produce or process a barrel of oil per 
day over the life of the producing property. In (b), the 
actual costs per barrel after dividing by capacity assuring 
a certain productivity of the reserves. The size of the 
field is important as much as its closeness to the shore and 
the stage of development. The reason why Statfjord in the 
UK Sector is estimated at having project cost of US $17,682 
for each daily barrel to be produced is largely the expected 
costs of the platforms, drilling expenses and transportation 
systems and also since the field is only in the preliminary 
development stage. Ekofisk and Forties are much more 
advanced platforms having been built and are in place; 
pipelines have been laid and oil has been transported and 
sold, because the costs are more certain. Also inflation has 
affected projects which cost more than triple from original 
estimates in certain offshore sectors, over the last years. 
The relative oil production cost per barrel shows that Saudi 
Arabia is still as in the past the cheapest crude oil produ­
cing area with $0,30$ per barrel compared to USA "New Oil" 
of $6.12 $ per barrel and North Sea with $2.00 to $3.00 per 
barrel, From 3n Oil company source, the cost of producing 
oil in Malaysiaa offshore areas is approximately US$3 .00.— $ 3 .50 
per barrel.
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4,6 Crude Oil And Natural Gas Reserves
With, the spate of oil discoveries in 197^ j the
proven commercial reserves of petroleum for Malaysia have
been revised upwards from 1.5 million barrels in 1972 to
1.0 billion barrels in 197^ from 25 fields. The figure for
gas reserves as it stood in 197^ has been put at 15 trillion 
12
cubic feet. However, the final figure for reserves still 
cannot be accurately gauged until petroleum has been flowing 
for sometime and the particular reservoir characteristics 
are better known.
Three main factors tend toward upward revisions over
time. They are the appreciation factor, recovery rate and
13
future discoveries. The appreciation factox1 is used 
continuously to upgrade estimates. Series of appreciations 
generally increase the periods between successive revalua­
tions of the fields. Then there is the possibility of 
technological improvements in the recovery rate during the 
life time of a producing field. Finally, future discoveries 
will also add to reserves. Even with no discoveries of new 
fields beyond the current proven reserves, it is possible 
that new discoveries may be found and new reserves be added 
later on.
Besides the crude oil, there were potentially rich 
and natural gas accumulations discovered in the past. They
are either1 associated or unassociated natural gas reserves.
12 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, December 29, 197 5 and THE NEW
STRAITS TIMES,Wednesday, April 13, 1977.
13 Odell, P.R. and Rosing K.E, "The North Sea Oil Province-
A Simulation Model of Development" in ENERGY POLICY, December 1974
p.3%9 - 329.
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The largest potential of associated gas are found in 
offshore oilfields in Peninsula Malaysia. The unassociated 
natural gas reserves are mostly located in the offshore 
fields in Central Luoonia fields in Sarawak (as descrihed 
in Section 4.3 earlier).
Oil companies usually make reduced estimates of the 
extent of reserves that could have been given with the 
objective of suppressing potential competitors. Since 1970? 
the number of oil companies exploring for oil has been 
increasing so that at present there are 11 oil companies in 
competition with one another. It is suspected that oil 
companies make low estimates of the oil and gas reserves in 
their concession areas since high oil reserves would 
strengthen the pressure of the government in their effort to 
increase their share of the crude oil production under the 
new agreement developed in 1974.
In Peninsula Malaysia the biggest oilfields is that 
of Exxon* s Tapis field which is rated to have a reserve of 
320 million barrels, Pulai and Bekok fields each have more 
than 70 million barrels of reserves. In Sabah, the biggest 
fields are Ssmarang and South Furious with reserves of 83 
million barrels and 40 million barrels respectively. And in 
Sarawak the biggest field is Baronia with reserves of more 
than 80 million barrels. Tukau and Ternana each has reserves 
of more than 30 million barrels. The only gas field in 
Malaysia is located in the Centra Luconia Field, offshore
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Sarawak, which has an estimated reserves of 15 trillion 
cubic feet.
According to Petronas the recoverable reserves of 
crude oil found in Malaysia today are in the region of 
900 million barrels. Table 4.6 compares the relative 
positions of the recoverable reserves of some selected oil 
producing countries.
TABLE 4 .6 
RECOVERABLE RESERVES BY COUNTRIES
Country B i l . Barrels
Norway 6 .0
•United Kingdom 9.0
Indonesia 12 .0
Venezuela 18 ,0
United States 32.0
Kuwait . 70.0
Saudi Arabia 107.0
Malaysia 0.9
Source: Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS)
Out of the JO oil producing countries in the world, 
Malaysia is rated number 30 in terms of the total size of 
its reserves.
Table 4.7 gives offshore offtake of Crude Petroleum 
Production from past and projected figures submitted by the 
different oil companies. From the figures, we build up the
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TABLE 4 .7 
PRODUCTION FORECASTS BY COMPANIES 
(in 'OOO Barrels)
Year
Sarawak 
Shell(1)
(s s b )
Sabah 
Shell(2)
(s s p l )
Exxon(3) 
(EMI)
Total Total 
Per Year Per Day 
(Mil.barrels)('000
barrels)
1977 43.4 22 . 6 4.6 70.7 193.7
1978 48.2 22 .3 20 .4 90.8 248.8
1979 55.1 26.6 34.2 116.0 317.8
1980 51.8 30.0 38.7 120.5 330.1
1981 43.4 27.3 38.4 109.2 299.2
1982 35.0 25.2 35.8 96.0 263.0
1983 28.1 22.3 32.0 82 .4 225 .8
1984 1 6 . 9 14.6 23.5 54,9 150.4
1985 9.1 9.9 15.3 34.3 94.0
1986 6.2 8.9 10.3 23.5 64.4
1987 4.0 5.1 6.1 15.2 41.6
1988 2.6 2.9 3.5 9.0 24 .7
1989 1.5 1.5 1.6 4.6 12.6
I 990 1.1 0.4 0.7 2.2 6 ,0
1991 0.7 - - 0.7 1.9
1992 0.4 -- - 0.4 1.1
Source : Private Communications with Oil Companies
(l) SSB Fields are Bakau, Barara, Baronia, Fairley Barara,
T u k a u , ¥est Lutong, Betty, Bokor and Tenxana .
(2) SSPC Fields are Erb West, Semarang and South. Furious
(3) EMI Fields are Pulai, Tapis, Bekok and Tembungo.
0
134
Curve of Expected Offtake in the future from recoverable 
proven reserves of 0.9 billion barrels given earlier. The 
curve in Figure 4.6 gives an impression of the potential 
amount of oil that what oil companies are saying they are 
likely to pro-duce or expected until 1991/92. This curve 
pp assumes that the offtake from 1977 to 1992, is backed 
by a proven recoverable reserve of 0^9 million barrels 
(according to Petrona1s estimate), the phasing of the field's 
development programme is,expected to be 3 years build—up 
period followed by a year of peak production and then 
gradual run down with output falling rapidly each year, and 
the achievements of starting dates and production levels 
are contingent on the plans of the companies being realised.
The limits of the shape of the depletion curve are 
determined by h main factors. Firstly, full depletion of 
total reserves is expected to take place over a period of 
20 years; secondly, majority of the reserves (75 percent) 
is expected to be depleted in the first half of full deple­
tion years; thridly, the build-up period to peak production 
of each field is expected to vary between around 3 to 5 
years depending upon the size of the field (Malaysia have 
smaller fields compared to other countries) and finally, 
the peak production rate is expected to lie within the
range of 5 to 10 percent of the original total of reserves 
14
to be depleted.
The 3 year period of build-up production from 1977
r ‘ ' 1 1 ’ ------------ -——— ........................     —------—----— ------------
14 For comparison with the North Sea o u t l a i d  see Odell,
P.R. and Rosing, K.E, op. cit*
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,to 1979 Is expected to come from all tlie main, fields Temana, 
Baronia, Semarang, Pulai and Tapis operated by all the 3 
companies — Sarawak Shell Berhad (SSB), Sabah Shell Petroleum 
company (SSPC) and Esso Productions Malaysia Incorporated 
(EPMl)(formerly•Exxo Explorations) respectively. The one year 
peak period is expected to be reached by mainly new fields 
just brought into production by EPMI and partly by SSPC from 
their Pulai and Tapis fields and Semarang fields respectively. 
The extent of the rundown is held back somewhat by the new 
fields brought into production in late 197Cs which are 
expected to reach their peak only sometime in early 1980s.
In order to give a clearer indication of home-produced 
petroleum* s potential contribution to domestic demand for 
energy, the requirements curve is constructed and superimposed 
into the Figure 4.6. The DD curve is based on the future 
requirement for petroleum products from 1 9 7 0—1-990 •
The curve DD which shows the domestic demand for 
petroleum cuts the Curve of Expected Offtake PP at Y. (Point 
X is the point of self-sufficiency in crude oils attained 
earlier in 1975)- To the left of y was the period of 
continuing but rapidly diminishing 'dependence® on imported 
petroleum theoretically. Between x and y, is the period of 
surplus production (oil production exceeds oil consumption - 
domestic as well as imported 'available® for demand in future 
years when petroleum is exhausted).
We have included the line cc to show the demand of
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local crude as through-put of the refineries over the 
period, is expected to increase in the future. The 
differences between CC and DD indicate the proportion 
of crude throughput impox’ted from the Arabian Gulf.
The area bounded by Dya in the diagram shows the 
period of beginning but increasingly dependence on 
imported crude petroleum as requirements in local refi­
neries outstrip the total domestic crude oil production.
As we move down to z, the problem becomes worse. The 
area bounded by Czb shows a 'critical1 period has been 
reached where there is a total dependence on imported 
crude oil both from the Middle East as well as from crudes 
sources which produce similar quality as that of domestic 
crudes - perhaps Minas crudes from Indonesia.
If we allow the PP cruve to shift overtime due to 
new discoveries as indicated earlier, a. series of PP 
curves can be superimposed on the diagram and thus prolon­
ging the ultimate date of exhaustion of crude oil resources.
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CHAPTER 5
REFINING CAPACITIES AND PRODUCT SUPPLIES
At present there are three refineries in Malaysia.
The Lutong Refinery (Topping Plant) in Sarawak, has a 
capacity of 45,000 barrels per day. The two hydroskimming 
refineries in Peninsula Malaysia are the Esso Port Dickson 
Refinery (formerly Standard Vacuum) with a capacity of about 
35,000 barrels per day and Shell Port Dickson Refinery with 
a capacity of about 67,000 barrels per day. With the increas­
ing consumption expected between 1976 to 1990 as envisaged 
in Chapter 3 earlier, it is necessary now in this chapter 
to examine the capability of the present capacities of the 
refineries in Malaysia to cope with the growth of demand for 
petroleum products. To achieve this objective, this chapter 
will examine this in the light of the type of refiners and 
their current capacities, the characteristics of crude 
throughput in these refineries, the different refinery yield 
patterns, the market demand barrels, refinery costs, and 
refining capacity - demand relationship in future. Before 
this is done, it is best to trace the historical development 
of the different refineries before indicating how they will 
affect the future development of the industry.
5.1 The Earliest Refinery
The earliest refinery to be established in Malaysia, 
the Lutong Refinery in Sarawak (discussed earlier in chapter 
2), was first built in 1917 by the Sarawak Oilfields Limited
13 9
(now Sarawak Shell Berhad). At the beginning it had a crude 
throughput of about 7,000 barrels per day and operated with 
a crude distillation unit. Later in 1921 and 1924 two other 
crude distillation units were added. Before the Second 
World War, the total crude throughput processed by the refine- 
ery was about 25,000 barrels per day. However, when the 
Second World War broke out and Sarawak was invaded and 
occupied by the Japanese as discussed earlier in chapter 2, 
most of the equipment at the refinery was destroyed. The 
refinery was then rebuilt after the war in 1945 and started 
operating once again in 1946 and at present has a 45,000 
barrels per stream day capacity.
The post-war Shell Lutong Refinery consists of two 
crude distillation units, one gasoline splitter and debutani- 
ser with capacities of 47,000, 14,000 and 5,000 barrels per 
stream-day respectively.
Since its inception in 1927 till 1931, the Lutong 
Topping Plant only processed the local Miri crude but with 
the increased production from Seria Oilfield in Brunei, the 
refinery also processed this crude along with the Miri crude 
till the early 1970s when this arrangement with Shell Brunei 
Petroleum Company ceases as Brunei starts to have a refinery 
of its own. The Lutong Refinery production from 1922 to 
1972 is shown in Table 5.1 and graphed in Figure 5.1.
Currently only one crude oil - the locally produced Miri 
crude - is being processed in this refinery.
TABLE 5.1
LXJTONG REFINERY PRODUCTION FROM 1922 TO 1970 (in OOP long tons)
Year
Production 
From Miri 
Crude 
(1 )
Production 
From Seria 
Crude 
(2)
Total 
Refinery 
Production 
( 1 & 2 )
Total 
Brit ish. 
Empire
Sarawak 
Production 
As A °/o Of 
British 
Empire
1922 403 - 403 • 2 ,220 18 0
1923 508 - 558 2 ,400 22 8
1924 592 592 2 , 640 22 4
1925 603 - 603 2 , 660 22 7
1926 701 - 701 2 ,760 25- 4
1927 701 - 701 2 ,860 24. 5
1928 739 - 739 3,24o 22, 8
I 929 748 - 748 3,430 21. 8
1930 688 - 688 3,540 19. 4
1931 527 - 527 3,380 15. 6
1932 335 I76 511
/ <
1933 321 281 602
1934 278 372 650
1935 234 442 696
I 936 222 452 674
1937 210 567 777
1938 200 696 896
1939 l66 769 935
19^0 150 855 1005 Data not available
1941 106 611 717 af ter 1931
19^2 (a ) 400 4oo
19^3
(a)
600 600
1944 (a ) 800 800
19^5 24 490 514
1946 (a ) 112 112
19^7 1 285 286
1948 24 1700 1724
1949 47 2645 2692
1950 57 3337 3394 t f
continuation next page
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TABLE 5,1 (CONTD.)
LUTONG REFINERY PRODUCTION FROM 1922 TO 1970 (in QQQ long tons)
Production Production Total Total Sarawak
From Miri From Seria Refinery British Production
Crude Crude Production Empire As A °/0 Of
Year (1) (^) ( 1 & 2 ) British
Empire
t\ '
1951 57 4051 4108
1952 52 4892 4944
1953 50 4994 5044
1954 49 4804 4853
1955 70 4710 4782
1956 66 5133 5199
1957 71 5547 5618
1958 66 5^59 . 5325
1959 57 5089 5146 Data not available
i 960 55 5263 5317 after 1931
1961 59 4474 4533
1962 59 4016 4075
1963 57 3720 3777
1964 51 3384 3435
1965 48 3488 3536
1966 48 3874 3922
1967 47 4619 4 666
1968 45 5095 5140
1969 200 5884 6084
1970 440 6005 6445 v' V
SourgSJ STATISTICS OF MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
Cfor various years from 1922 onwards) Imperial Institute 
Publications, London,
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Being a simple topping plant, the Lutong Refinery 
doe? not have any treating units that are required to up­
grade the quality of some of the raw-products '. befoee they 
can be consumed by the market. As a result of this simple 
operation, it produces only a limited amount of finished 
petroleum products - regular motor gasoline, diesel oil and 
light fuel oil and recently premiun motor.gasoline for the 
markets in East Malaysia.
The products after distillation from the refinery 
are sent to storage without any further treatment and these 
are marketed in Sabah and Sarawak. Only a very small amount 
of gasoline is sent to storage in Miri town for local con­
sumption. Most of the gasoline fraction is sent to the splitter 
and debutaniser to produce Miri tops and naphtha for exports 
and liquid butane is spiked back to the crude for export.
The refinery processing scheme is geared towards the 
supply of diesel oil to Sabah and Sarawak markets. The low 
demand for diesel in Sabah and Sarawak dictates a low crude 
throughput of the refinery. This is evidenced by the average 
refinery intake and production for 1970 to 1975. The average 
refinery intake in 1970 was about 72,500 barrels per stream 
day and it decreases gradually to 17,000 barrels per stream 
day in 1975. The explanation given for this phenomena is that 
probably there were more markets for finished petroleum products
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up to 1972. However, with the commissioning of the Shell
Refinery in Brunei in 1972 as explained earlier, the Seria
crude of Brunei started to be processed in the local refin-
‘1
ery in Brunei instead of at Lutong.
5.2 The Establishment of Refineries in Peninsula
Malaysia
The increased consumption of petroleum products in 
the beginning of the sixties and the resultant expansion in 
market demand instigated the two big oil marketing companies 
in Malaya at that time. Shell and Standard Vacuum Oil to 
approach the Malayan Government to seek approval for the 
establishment of refineries in the mainland. During that 
time both the companies had refineries in Singapore.
The two companies mentioned above submitted separate 
proposals to the Malayan Government in 1960 which contained 
amongst other things design capacity, size and type of re­
finery, refinery intake and output, capital cost, financing 
and so on which are finally spelt out fully in the so called 
"Refinery Agreements" (See Appendix 5A).
In the case of shell, in view of the expansion in 
their market demand in the 1960s, they based their design 
capacity on the estimated requirement of the main petroleum 
products in Malaya in 1965. In the case of the Standard 
Vacuum Company, the products to be manufactured by the 
1 Private communications with Shell.
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refinery were intended for sale by the company and marketed 
under brand names already familiar in the Malaysian market 
in 1959. The applications made by both the companies includ 
ed the manufacture of all the main petroleum products except 
liquified petroleum gas (LPG), asphalt or petroleum naphthas 
and solvents in the refineries. The future Malayan market 
for these products was under study by the companies at that 
time.
Both the companies proposed to build their refiner­
ies of modern design integrating the three basic processes 
of distillation, catalytic cracking and thermal reforming 
in a single combination unit with integration and capital 
and operating costs low. The units to be constructed were 
of a size suitable for future development to meet increased 
market requirements.
The proposal of petroleum products output by Shell 
covered their estimated requirements for 1965. However, in 
the light of the changing pattern of product demand and to 
ensure that distribution within Malaysia is carried out in 
the most flexible and economic manner, Shell also proposed 
to import and export marginal quantities of the same product 
and to import such other products not economically produced 
in the refinery. In the case of Standard Vacuum, their 
refinery would be of sufficient size to meet more than their 
requirements in the Federation at the time the refinery 
commenced operations. The company anticipated that any
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refinery products surplus to the needs for their brand 
products in the Federation could be exported.
Shell estimated the capital cost of the refinery to 
be about .064% million (about £lh million) divided into 
four broad categories : processing plant ( $16.97 million), 
tankage and pipelines (' $12.73 million) utilities and facil­
ities ( *$24. 72 million) and land and land preparation ( .$1.3 
million) and the remainder as miscellaneous items of expend­
iture. Shell raised this by means of share capital and 
loans. The total capital requirements of the Standard Vacuum 
Oil Refinery, on the other hand, involved a minimum of .052 
million (about US $17 million) of which later turned out to 
be .$54.7 million (about US $17.9 million) which included 
the manufacture of additional products. Their refinery 
project was to be financed partially by the issue of shares 
and the remainder through foreign loans. About 75 to 80 
percent of the funds required was estimated to be foreign 
currency requirements and the remainder through shares offer­
ed to the Malayan public (the detailed set-up of the Refinery 
Agreements between the oil companies and the Government is 
set up in Appendix 5A ).
The Shell Refinery Oil Company and the Standard 
Vacuum Oil Company commenced construction of their oil 
refineries in early 1963. The plant took about three years
to build. The site chosen by both the companies was Port 
Dickson, about thirty miles south of Kuala Lumpur, the
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capital of the Federation of Malaya. The choice of Port 
Dickson was made on the basis of its deep sea harbour with 
adequate berthing facilities for ocean tankers as the refin­
ery was designed to handle crude oil from the Middle East; 
it has all the required facilities of land, transport, 
utilities and accessibility from all directions; its close­
ness to the supply of labour, and possesses adequate housing 
facilities and amenities; and the refinery sites were capable 
of easy communication to the harbour by pipeline, and to 
transport products by rail to the inland areas or interior 
especially the rail link between Port Dickson and Kuala 
Lumpur (the main consumption area) is shortest than any 
other Malaysian ports except Klang.
The greater part of Kuala Lumpur area accounts for 
about 50 per cent of all petroleum products consumed in 
mainland Malaya and by locating near Port Dickson, Shell 
had the assurance that there was no other cheaper route 
from the coast to the major internal marketing area. 
Furthermore, the area between Port Dickson and Kuala Lumpur 
accounts for a comparatively large market area which should 
grow in importance in future. The established oil product 
pricing system in the mainland allowed Shell to recover its 
distribution costs when delivering inland from Port Dickson 
and there was probably very little additional cost involved 
(as compared with costs borne by other importing companies) 
when making ocean tanker deliveries of refined products from 
Port Dickson to other ports in Malayasia.
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The above general review of factors affecting the 
location of a coastal 'market' refinery such as Shell and 
Standard Vacuum should be compared with the problems facing 
a "resource - oriented" refinery such as that of Lutong 
Refinery was built adjacent to the source of raw-material 
crude oil from the Miri oilfield. The Shell Port Dickson 
Refinery was built close to the main consumption areas in 
mainland Malaya. In both cases it was profitable to locate 
as near as possible to the raw materials source and to 
transport the finished products to the consumer, i.e. pro­
curement costs - the costs of bringing the raw-materials to 
the chosen site of processing - were kept to the minimum. 
However, it must be accepted that each company endeavoured 
to keep the processing costs - costs of transforming the 
raw-materials into refined products - as low as possible, 
it would seem that Shell Port Dickson (as much as Standard 
Vacuum) had a distinct advantage over Shell Lutong where 
amortization of capital is concerned, particularly of relat­
ive output figures taken into consideration. Furthermore, 
when considering the question of distribution costs - costs 
of selling and delivering the products - Shell Lutong is at 
a disadvantage compared to Shell at Port Dickson as the 
latter can recover their inland distribution costs as the 
established price structure is based on costs plus rail/road 
transport costs.
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5.3 The Current Refining Capacities in Peninsula 
or Mainland Malaysia 
5.3.1 Shell Refinery at Port Dickson
The construction and commissioning of the Shell 
Refinery at Port Dickson has been discussed under section
5.2 earlier. However, the refinery underwent an expansion 
programme with a new crude distillation unit (CD2) and a 
new Liquified Petroleum Gas unit (LPG2) and the revamping 
of the existing platformer unit at a cost of M$45 million.
This was completed at the end of 1974 and began to operate 
at the beginning of 1975.
Unlike the Lutong Topping Plant earlier, the Shell 
'Refinery at Port Dickson takes in 2 types of crude oils 
namely, Kuwait Crude (imported) and Miri crude (local).
The Shell Refinery at Port Dickson was designed with a 
given degree of "built-in" flexibility in order to be able 
to process a wide range of crude oils or blends. The 
Kuwait and Miri crude oils will have to go through a 
predetermined processing scheme in the refinery with the 
former being processed for a specific number of days in 
a month and the latter the rest of the month. The processing 
scheme of the refinery .ip,s.o designed; to meet Shell's market 
pattern for petroleum ;.products ^n Peninsula Malaysia
Although Shell processed only Kuwait and Miri crudes 
in the past, but after April 1976, it'took in some- Iranian Light
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crude too. This is because in April 1975/ Shell has entered 
into a processing arrangement with Mobil Oil Company Malaysia 
and in April 1976 it entered with British Petroleum (BP) for 
the same to meet their market requirements in Peninsula 
Malaysia. This processing arrangements between oil companies 
will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.
To achieve a maximum production of petroleum products/ 
the two distillation units CD1 and CD2 in Shell Refinery at 
Port Dickson are utilised with Miri crude processed in CD1 
and Kuwait in CD2. In the case of CD1 on Miri crude oper­
ation/ there is no downstream limiting the Miri crude thro­
ughput. Hence the maximum crude throughput is the maximum 
design capacity of CDl at 20/400 barrels per stream day 
(bpsd). And in the case of CD2 on Kuwait crude operation/ 
the HDT unit is limiting the maximum crude throughput to 
55,276 barrels per stream day (bpsd). Technically, there­
fore, the maximum crude throughput is 75,676 bpsd. However, 
when operating at this technical maximum crude throughput, 
there will be a lot of surplus Kuwait blending components 
which will have to be downgraded to less valuable products 
like fuel oil. A more realistic maximum production capacity 
according to Shell sources is estimated to be around 73,600
2
bpsd - 20,400 of Miri crude and 53,200 bpsd of Kuwait crude.
5.3.2 Esso Refinery at Port Dickson
As in the case of Shell earlier, the construction 
2 Private communications with Shell.
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and commissioning of Esso refinery has been discussed in 
the earlier sections. Unlike Shell earlier, the Esso 
Refinery at Port Dickson processes mixed Middle East crudes 
namely Kuwait, Arabian Light, Arabian Medium, Arabian Heavy 
and Zuluf. Crude mix percentage varies from month to month 
depending on the availability of crudes.
The Refinery is currently operating very close to 
the theoretical or design capacity. For the first three 
quarters of 1976, the average crude intake was 32,610 barrels 
per crude day (bpcd) as compared to the design capacity of 
35,520 barrels of crude per stream day (bpsd). The capacity 
factors for the various units were high (70-90 per cent) 
indicating that the units were operating at high throughput. 
It is believed that the refinery is capable of operating at 
a design maximum capacity of 35,500 bpsd of mixed Middle 
Eastern crudes. With some modification and addition to the 
basic refining factors the refining operation may be increas­
ed up to 50,000 bpsd.
5.4 Crude Oil Throughputs and Products Output From
the Malaysian Refineries 
a ) Crude Oil Throughputs 1970-1975
The crude oils that enter as throughputs in the 
Malaysian refineries are made up of (a) Local crudes and 
(b) Imported crudes. Local crudes are made up of Miri Light, 
Miri Medium and Miri Heavy from Malaysian offshore oilfields.
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Imported crudes are from the Middle Eastern countries and 
include Kuwait, Iranian Light, Arab Light, Arab Medium,
Arab Heavy and Zuluf crudes.
Table 5'.-2 gives the various crude oils processed 
by refineries in Malaysia for the past six years from 
1971 to 1976., Shell Lutong processes only local crudes,
Esso Port Dickson only imported crudes and Shell Port Dick­
son processes both local and imported crudes.
In the case of Shell Lutong Refinery as shown in 
Table 5.3 its throughput was high in 1971 and 1972 because 
of the processing arrangement with Shell Brunei. However, 
throughput was lower in years after 1972 till 1976 because 
of the continued improvement in the refinery operation which 
resulted in a higher yield for gas oil. This product is the 
main consumption of the East Malaysian markets of Sabah and 
Sarawak. This effectively defines the refinery intake for 
the years. It is expected that improvements in the plant 
operation in subsequent years would result in plant modifi­
cation.
The crude supplies for the Esso Refinery at Port 
Dickson come from Ras Tanura. The types of crude are divid­
ed into Arabian Light, Arabian Medium, Arabian Heavy, Zuluf 
and Kuwait crudes as shown in Table 5.3 earlier. In the 
case of Esso, the crude oil processed over the six « year
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period shows an increase from 8.8 million barrels to 12
million barrels in 1976. The increase in the crude oil
processed is due to the increase in demand for products in
the Malaysian market over the years. However, the marginal
decrease in crude oil processed in 1975 over 1974 figure
was principally due to the major refinery turnaround in May
3
for unit repairs and catalyst replacement“. The increase 
again in 1976 was in response to an unexpected decrease in 
refinery downturn and the increase in the market demand 
mentioned earlier.
In the case of Shell Refinery at Port Dickson, their 
crude supplies come from the Arabian Gulf (Kuwait) and Sara­
wak (Miri) with the former ex Mina al Ahmadi and the latter 
ex-Lutong. As shown in Table 5.3, the crude throughput 
showed increased from 10.8 million bands in 1971 to 15.94
million barrels in 1976 except in 1973 when it decreased to
4
9.9 million barrels due to refinery turnaround". The increase 
in throughputs over the years was principally due to the
3 The Esso Port Dickson Refinery under normal condit­
ions has a major shut down once every 18 months for the 
purpose of major services and maintenance work. The durat­
ion of each major shut down is approximately 21 days. There­
fore the loss in refining output is in the region of 745,000 
barrels. Source: Private communications with Esso.
4 The shut down days per year for The Shell Refinery
at Port Dickson are given below
Platformer 20 days in a year for catalytic
generation and maintenance 
Hydrodesulphurizer 20 days in a year for service and
maintenance
Distiller 1 - not running at the moment due to
excess capacity 
Distiller 2 10 days in a year for maintenance
ana repairs.
Source: Private communication with Shell*
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increase in market demand. The increase in 1975 was 
principally due to (a) the expansion of refinery capacity 
from 30,000 b/d to 90,000 b/d when the M^SO million expan­
sion programme was completed in later 1974 and (b) the 
commencement of .the processing arrangement with Mobil in 
1975. The increase in 1976 was due to another processing 
arrangement with British Petroleum in April 1976. With 
these processing arrangements the composition between import 
ed and local crudes also changes. The composition between 
Imported and Local crudes shows that in 1974 it was 70:30; 
in 1975, 67:33 and in 1976, 60:40 in favour of local crudes 
because of the nature of markets of Mobil and B.P. Apart 
from importing and processing crude oils, the refinery also 
imports blending components such as motor spirit, diesel, 
fuel oil and base oils.
5.5 Characteristics of Crude Oil Throughputs in
Malaysian Refineries
Crude oil, used in refineries throughout the world, 
is a mixture of a multitude of compounds (around 3000 of them) 
The majority of these compounds belong to a family of hydro­
carbons. Some of these hydrocarbons only exist as. gases and 
are in the form of compounds of sulphur, oxygen and nitrogen 
The greater the presence of hydrogen relative to carbon in 
the crude oil, the lighter is the crude oil and vice-versa. 
And since crude oil occurs in significantly different condit 
ions and geological environments throughout the world, it is
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not surprising that crude oils differ significantly in 
hydrocarbon content and in quality, e.g. the amount of 
impurities, like sulphur. Thus there are many different 
hydrocarbon combinations that a refiner can select as the 
raw-materials from which to manufacture his product require­
ments .
Crude oil is also characterised by its base, whether 
paraffinic, intermediate or naphthenic. Paraffinic crudes 
are light and on refining gives a relatively high percentage 
of white products. Its residue is used for the production 
of lubricants. On the contrary,naphthanic crudes yield a 
relatively high percentage of fuel oil and low percentage 
of gasoline and kerosene, and its residue yields a bituminous 
product. Intermediate or aromatic base varies between the 
two types of crude.
Some of these crude oil composition and quality 
differences are shown in Table 5.4. Incidentally the typical 
crude oils shown in the table are also the crude oils that 
are typically processed in Malaysia. Prom the table, it is 
evident that there is a considerable variation in the product 
yield.
Malaysian Miri Light crude is diametrically opposite 
to the Middle Eastern crudes. It is paraffinic, rich in 
gasoline and other white products whereas the latter is 
mostly napnthenic, rich in fuel oil. The former has very
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low sulphur content (0.3% by w t -) and are therefore "sweet" 
whereas Middle Eastern crudes are high in sulphur (3.1 to 
3.7 percent) and therefore are "sour". Therefore Malaysian 
crude has an edge over the Middle Eastern crude in terms of 
yield and price.
If local refineries use only Malaysian crude, then 
the volume of fuel oil manufacture will not be enough to 
meet the demand for it and the kerosene/aviation fuel and 
automotive gas oil produced will not be suitable for direct 
use. This is only suitable to cater for the need of the 
East Malaysian market but not the one in the mainland or 
Peninsula Malaysia. Likewise the processing of only Middle 
Eastern crudes especially the Arabian crudes result in the 
substantial manufacture of fuel oil and less of light dis­
tillates. This is suitable to cater for Esso market in 
Peninsula Malaysia.
To comply with the product mix for Shell in Penin­
sula Malaysia, the Shell Refinery at Port Dickson processes 
imported Kuwait crude apart from the local Miri crudes and 
blend them together. As mentioned earlier, the Miri crude 
has only a small proportion of fuel oil and this does not 
match the relatively high demand for fuel oil in the Malay­
sian market and cannot be used at all for bitumen manufac­
ture which is one of Shell's main markets. The Kuwait crude, 
on the other hand, has a high percentage of fuel oil and is
160
excellent for bitumen manufacture. In the case of the local 
crude as mentioned earlier, the kerosene and gas oil pro­
duced exclusively from Malaysian crudes are not suitable for 
direct use as kerosene/aviation and automotive gas oil but 
Kuwait crude produces kerosene and gas oil with properties 
that supplement the properties of kerosene and gas oil from 
Malaysian crudes.
Basically, the combination of crude oils selected 
by a refinery must be economic and meet the market demand 
for the products manufactured, both in quantity and quality. 
The most favourable combination of crudes selected for 
processing in the refinery will vary with changes in the 
product demand from the refinery with any changes which 
occur in crude or product quality and with changes in the 
relative price differences between crude oils. The Shell 
Refinery optimises this by blending the two crudes Miri and 
Kuwait in the proportion of 70:30 in 1974, 67:33 in 1975 
and 60:40 in 1976 in favour of the local crudes the reasons 
as explained in Section 5.4 earlier. This processing arrange­
ment has 2 other advantages : the use of cheaper Kuwait crude 
adequate to meet the products required in the country and 
the export of the higher value Malaysian crude oil (see
Chapter 7) and thus increases the country's revenue and
5
balance of payments .
BERITA SHELL (SHELL NEWS), Shell Malayasia Trading 
Berhad, 1976.
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5.6 Refinery Yield Pattern
No one crude oil can provide a full range of finish­
ed oil products in the proportions and quantities that the 
market requires. The essential function of an oil refinery 
is to manufacture, as economically as possible, the necessary 
quantities of gas, gasoline, gas oil, lubricating oil, fuel 
oil, wax and bitumen from the crude oil or oils supplied to 
it. To do this, appropriate process must be applied and 
the necessary plant and equipment must be available.
Each major oil refining company in Malaysia has -to 
meet its own market demand both in terms of volume and 
product patterns. Market requirements are generally met by 
processing adequate blends of different crude oils,;s.ince they 
could not meet the whole spectrum of market demand if 
processed individually by themselves. Thexefora ,drude 
oils when blended such as found in Shell and Esso Refineries 
at Port Dickson,compensate each other with respect to yield 
and quality, so as to bring overall total expense to a mini­
mum.
In the course of analysing economics of oil refiner­
ies, the most important discussion that hinges on this is 
the nature of the input and the composition of output. In 
practice crude oil inputs are far from homogeneous and the 
output of a refinery consists of a range of products, the 
relative quantities of which are determined by the nature of
162
the combination of crude oil processing units in the refinery, 
which are in turn geared, if possible to market demands and 
exports. The crude oil that is most suitable and best from 
the economic standpoint to be processed in a refinery is 
the one that can yield products in line with the existing 
processing capacity of the refinery and able to fulfill as 
much the structure of market supplied by it. The yield 
structures of the 3 refineries in Malaysia are given in 
Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 gives a comparison of the petroleum 
product yields on the basis of existing design capacity of 
the three refineries operating in Malaysia. There is a 
difference between the maximum throughput of each of the 
refinery in terms of volume of throughput per stream day 
(BPSD) and volume of throughput per crude day (BPCD). In 
the case of Esso Refinery at Port Dickson, the stream day 
is about 335 days in a year compared to Shell Refineries 
at Lutong and Port Dickson whose stream day is about 330 
days in a year. The total crude days in a year is 365 or 
366 depending on the number of days in a year. And the 
crude feedstocks used by the 3 refineries differ : Esso 
Refinery uses or utilises 100 per cent Middle East crudes, 
Shell Refinery, Port Dickson utilises 18,400 BPCD Miri Light 
{27.7 per cent) and 48,100 BPCD Middle East crudes (72.3 
per cent) and Shell Lutong Refinery uses 100 percent Miri 
Light.
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Both the Esso and Shell Refineries at Port Dickson 
produces most of the petroleum products required for con­
sumption in the country. It ranges from LPG, gasoline, 
naphtha, kerosene, diesel oils, fuel oil and bitumen. Shell 
Refinery at Lutong, however, produces a limited range of 
products - LPG, premium gasoline, naphtha and kerosene, Miri 
tops and Miri residue.
In the case of Esso Refinery earlier, the refinery 
gas produced by the refinery is used as a feedstock in its 
Nitrogen (NH^) plant. The naphtha produced from the Shell 
Port Dickson Refinery is from the Kuwait crude and the sur­
plus components from Shell Port Dickson refinery are made up 
of Kuwait sour kerosene, Kuwait Light Gas Oil and Heavy Gas 
Oil. In the case of Shell Lutong Refinery, all of the LPG 
components are spiked back into the crude for export. The 
refinery has started to produce premium motor gasoline to 
meet Sabah and Sarawak demand by importing plat formate ' ffom 
overseas to weet the- demand. In the past, the refinery only 
meets the regular motorgasoline needs of the nearby Miri 
town in Sarawak. The rest of gasoline fraction were used to 
produce tops and naphtha. These naphtha components are in 
turn used as feedstock in Shell Eastern Petroleum Limited 
Refinery at Pulau Bukom in Singapore. Similarly, the Miri 
tops produced by the refinery are used as feedstock in Port 
Dickson and Pulau Bukom refineries. The Miri Residue includ­
es light fuel oil used for distribution to the East Malaysian 
market.
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Taking the three refineries together, it can be seen 
that the total refinery production is aroung 14,000 barrels 
of crude per day - 32,610 being from ESMB 66,500 from shell 
Port Dickson and the remainder 40,600 from Shell Lutong 
Plant. This theoretical maximum capacity to produce finish­
ed petroleum products is vital when matched with the products, 
demand forecast for 1976 to 1990 earlier in Chapter 3. This 
will determine the current and future capability of refiner­
ies in Malaysia to meet demand. This we will take up in the 
following section.
5.7 Malaysian Market Demand Barrel
The starting point for any oil company's logistic 
system is the product demand. Petroleum products are con­
sumed in a wide variety of applications including household 
fuel, transportation, industrial fuel, mining and electrical 
power generation, to name just a few. The primary individual 
petroleum products required for these applications include 
LPG, motor gasoline, aviation turbo-fuel, kerosene, diesel 
oil, fuel oil and asphalt.
The product demand spectrum, the so called demand 
barrel of various countries,or even areas within the same country 
(West and East Malaysia for instance), vary significantly 
depending on factors like climate, degree and type of 
industrialization, availability of alternative fuels, etc.
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Table 5.6 Typical Petroleum Products Demand (in % )
Peninsula or 
West 
Malaysia
Japan Western
U.S.A. (Winter) Europe*
LPG/Mogas
Naphtha 19 50 23 23
Kerosene/
Diesel 42 27 27 45
Fuel Oil/
Asphalt 39 23 50 32
* Western Europe means United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Italy.
Source : J . L Pfohi , Pet roleum Refining in Malaysia.
The above table gives an idea of the magnitude of 
these demand variations : the relatively high motor gasoline
and low fuel oil sectors in the US demand-barrel with the 
opposite in the case of a developing country's demand like 
that of Malaysia. The US demand for fuel oil being low 
resulting from the usage of large quantities of natural gas 
and coal and its high motor gasoline demand resulting from 
the large number of automobile population. The winter 
demands shown in the table for the 3 groups of countries, 
USA, Japan and Western Europe, with significant climatic 
changes there are significant seasonal demand variations. 
Furthermore, the demand barrel of individual oil companies 
within the same country can vary even more dramatically
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depending on such things as their marketing philosophy, 
particular customers, raw-materials availability, refining 
flexibility, etc.
5.8 Supply-Demand Relationship in Refining Capacities
Having indicated the size and complexity, or equip­
ment arrangement of the three Malaysian refineries, it is 
necessary to compare these with the Malaysian product 
demand forecasted for the next 15 years from 1976 to 1990.
In Table 3.3 of Chapter 3 earlier, the major compon­
ents of demand are the heavier distillates such as diesel 
oil and fuel oils. This has led Malaysia to import all of 
its crude petroleum requirements from the Middle East-Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and recently Iran besides Miri crude for her 
refineries in Malaysia. In future, demand for lighter fuels 
will increase (along with the increase in heavier distillates) 
with the increase in the living standards of the population. 
For some years in future Malaysia will export its low-sulphur 
crude and low-gravity premium crude and in exchange import 
the relatively cheaper and heavier crudes from the Middle 
East.
Much of the domestic consumption of petroleum is 
consumed in the more populous urban areas of Peninsula 
Malaysia. However, the development of local industries and 
the infrastructure has resulted in a growth of petroleum
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products demand of between 9 to 10 per cent annually in 
recent years- It is anticipated that the pattern will be 
maintained at least until 1985, when on this basis absolute 
consumption will be more than double to about 180,000 barrels 
per day. As yet, the country is not geared to the use of 
natural gas in power generation.
Assuming the current refineries are running at full 
capacity and no additional refinery being constructed, the 
estimated surplus/deficit of petroleum products by categories 
in 1980, 1985 and 1990 to meet consumption are as shown in 
Table 5.7. It appears from the Table that from 1980 onwards, 
the refineries in Malaysia cannot produce the required con­
sumption required in the country. In 1980 the amount of 
discrepancy (deficit) between projected demand and maximum 
refinery output is around 56,000 barrels per day and increas­
es to 136,000 in 1985 and 254,000 in 1990.
Figure 5.2 shows the refining capacity in the past 
and present and the forecast for future capacity based on 
the future demand estimates for petroleum products in 
Malaysia.
i.
Line A A ' indicates the demand curve for petroleum
f. I.1
products in Malaysia until 1975, A A 1- indicates the forecast-
I
ed requirements until 1990. The line above AA' i.e. .BB shows 
the theoretical refining capacity needed to meet demand.
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mThe line eie203e4 t i^e exi-sting refinery capacity 
and the line s;lS2S3S4 *-s t*ie refinerY capacity available to 
produce the maximum finished products. The difference bet­
ween e and s represents the unusable refining capacity 
limited by downstream capacities in the refineries.
At the start of the refinery operation in Peninsula 
Malaysia in 1963 until 1974, the combined capacities were 
about 65,000 barrels per day but the available capacities 
were about 58,000 barrels per day. The sudden increase in 
capacity in 1975 was made available by the Shell Refinery at 
Port Dickson' and upgraded the total refinery capacities in 
Malaysia to about 139,700 barrels per stream day out of 
which about 100,100 barrels of products could be produced 
daily. For Malaysia as a whole, the total refining capacit­
ies is about 154,000 barrels per stream day out of which 
about 140,000 barrels of products could be produced daily 
(Table 5.5 earlier).
From Figure 5.2 it can be seen that the refineries 
passed through periods of undercapacity to overcapacity then 
to undercapacity and finally back to anticipated overcapacity 
in 1979 when matched with past, current and projected future 
demand.
Up to 1975, the refineries experienced periods of 
undercapacity as the domestic market was being supplied mostly 
by the 2 refineries and the remainder by imports* By 1975,
mmost of the imports were replaced by local sources as a 
result of increased capacity by Shell Port Dickson. How­
ever, we predict that this excess capacity will be fully 
utilised by the end of 1980. Since demand tends to grow in 
a relatively smooth manner, all other things remaining con­
stant, capacity expansion occurs in discrete steps S]_S2S3S4 
s,_ shown in the diagram. From our earlier projection of 
future demand, it appears that the current refining capacity 
will only be sufficient to meet domestic demand up to 1980.
If capacity, however, is taken to mean the actual maximum 
operating limit of production, then the present capacity 
will be exhausted earlier than 1980 and by 1979 we have to
have another refinery operating to cope with the increase in 
6
demand .
Since by 1980, it is expected that the demand for
light distillates such as petrol, kerosene and diesel oil,
as shown in Table 3.6 in Chapter 3 earlier and in Table 5.7
of this chapter will outpace the capacity of the refineries
■ 7
to process, Pfohl had suggested 4 alternatives to the supply 
problem;
i. An import option from neighbouring countries;
ii. An investment option in expanding or building 
new reformers and hydrofiners in the existing 
refineries;
6 Adnan, M.A. Critical Issues in Petroleum Development
in Malaysia, a paper presented to the Fourth Malaysian
Economic Convention, held at University of Malaya in
Kuala Lumpur from 19-21 May, 1977.
7 See next page.
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iii. A crude quality option, i.e. increase in intake 
of local crudes which when combined with the 
Middle Eastern crudes will produce yield spectrum 
and quality more closely related to the increase 
in market demand. This will allow increase in 
light distillates or 'clean' products, 
iv. A combination of (i), (ii) and (iii) of above.
Amongst the options suggested above, it appears that option 
(iii) might seem to be the solution in view of the increas­
ing availability of indigenous offshore crude petroleum 
(mentioned in Chapter 4). Indigenous or local Malaysian crude 
has a high yield of light distillates and low yield of heavy 
distillates. The demand barrel in Malaysia requires about 
3 9 per cent fuel oil and asphalt whereas the main Malaysian 
crude produced only 13 per cent fuel oil and no asphalt. The 
two existing refineries in Peninsula Malaysia can only take 
limited quantities of local crude for refining. These two 
are limited by equipment and quality problems. With the 
combination of Middle Eastern and local crudes, a larger 
amount of clean products can be produced. There is thus a 
need for another refinery to be built in Peninsula Malaysia by 
1980 to cater for the growing demand for petroleum products.
The shaded portion in the figure 2 shows the effect 
of postponing refinery expansion on the supply - demand
7- Pfohl, J.L., Petroleum Refining in Malaysia, a paper
presented at the Seminar on the Oil Industry and Its 
Impact on National Development, organised by the 
Technological Association of Malaysia from 13-16 May 
19 76 in Kuala Lumpur.
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relationship of products. This we refer to as "critical 
triangle" where we have to import products every year 
(above the current level) to satisfy the growing market 
until enough capacity is added to the existing refinery 
capability. A series of rectangles will be added to the 
critical triangle over the years''.
■8 If the Government had decided to build the refinery
in 1977 (on the recommendation of the Consultant 
firms of C.Itoh),it will only be ’on stream' around 
June 1981. Usually it takes sometime for a company/ 
government to make an effective decision about build­
ing a refinery, should the proposed refinery be 
built 2-years hence, it will be 'on stream' only in 
1983 and two rectangles (Y and Z) have been added to 
X in the Diagram 5.2.
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CHAPTER 6
OIL PRODUCTS MOVEMENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
The distribution of natures' storehouse of crude 
petroleum does not follow the pattern of the world demand 
for oil- The essential supply link has to be provided bet­
ween sources and markets in many different parts of the 
world, and crude oils of widely differing quantities and 
product yields matched to customers' requirements. Oil has 
to be transported either by land or sea in right quantities 
and at the right times, and it has to be of the right type 
for the right destination at the lowest possible cost. 
Accordingly, there is a large and highly complex internat­
ional movement of oil, both crude and refined end-products, 
which severly influences the oil industry of a particular 
country, and Malaysia is no exception to this.
This chapter will examine several aspects of oil 
movements and distributions in Malaysia. They include com­
parison between pattern of these movements and distributions 
before and after the establishment of refineries in Peninsula 
Malaysia, product distribution methods, distribution and 
ownership of receiving terminals and supply logistics of oil 
companies. These aspects will help the analysis on competit­
ive behaviour of oil companies in Malaysia in Chapter 7 ^
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6.1 General Pattern of Oil Movements and Trade
Before 1963, most of the crude oil produced in 
Malaysia (with the exception of the small amount used by the 
Lutong Refinery .in Sarawak) were exported and in return 
Malaysia imported most, if not all, of its requirements of 
petroleum products, as the Lutong Refinery did not produce 
finished products for consumption. With the opening of the 
2 ‘other oil refineries in Malaysia, the pattern of crude oil 
and end-product movements and also oil trade have somewhat 
changed.
Figure 6.1 illustrates how the patterns of oil move­
ments and trade have changed since the opening of the 2 
refineries in Peninsula Malaysia.
Before the opening of the 2 refineries in Peninsula 
Malaysia, most of the crude oil production was exported to 
overseas market designated as e and some to c (mostly tops) 
in the diagram. In return, end-products of oil were supplied 
by sources d and c and sometimes e for Peninsula Malaysia 
and c for East Malaysia.
With the commencement of the 2 refineries in Peninsula
Malaysia, the crude oils for the 2 refineries are supplied by
sources a (20%) and d (80%) in the diagram. Some amount of
end-products move both ways between b and c (Excesses being 
sent to Singapore where there is a balancing refinery and
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deficits being imported from it). The oil product movement 
for East Malaysia still remains the same as before. Singapore, 
being the major refining centre in the region, receives 
crudes from sources d and a and exports refined end-products 
to market e. Excesses from refineries in Peninsula Malaysia 
are also exported direct to the neighbouring market e as well 
as to Singapore.
The conclusion drawn from the diagram is that the 
pattern of crude oil movements and trade in Malaysia in the 
past shows rather 'weak' regional ties but much stronger 
links with the rest of the world; on the other hand that of 
products the reverse is true. However, with the Middle East 
conflicts and the oil price hikes and increased domestic 
production, the opposite trend has emerged in the case of 
crude oil movements but end product movements remain the 
same.
In the past, instead of buying crude oil from the 
producer (Shell) within Malaysia, oil companies (including 
Shell) look to the Middle East for the bulk of their crude 
oil needs. More than 80% of the crude oil comes from the 
Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as shown 
in Table 6.1. Sarawak, the only producer in Malaysia, con­
tributes a relatively small portion (20%) to the Malaysian 
crude oil needs. Most of the crude oils from Sarawak are 
exported overseas as shown in Table 6.2. Over the last 6 
years (1970-1976), local supplies have contributed more and
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more towards local requirements as imports fell as has been 
discussed in Chapter 5 earlier.
6.2 Distribution of Imported Petroleum Products Before 1963
The distribution of imported petroleum products before 
the opening of the 2 refineries in Peninsula Malaysia in 
1963 were made by 2 companies namely the Shell Marketing 
Company of Malaya and the Standard vacuum Oil Company.
The two companies had been operating in Malaya since 
the 1890's. Prior to the operating of the Shell and Stanvac 
refineries at Port Dickson, Shell and the Standard Vacuum Oil 
Companies drew their requirements from their refineries in 
Singapore and from overseas sources.
The distribution of petroleum products at that time 
was governed by the Petroleum Ordinance of 1883. (See 
Appendix 6A). The Petroleum Ordinance of 1883 was amended 
by the Petroleum Ordinance of 1886 and served as a milestone 
to the petroleum industry of Malaysia. The Ordinance basic­
ally deals with the carriage of petroleum in bulk (imported) 
by sea and land into the country and its distribution (trans­
port) within the country as specified in Section 8 of the 
Ordinance.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Ordinance specified that the 
only ports through which petroleum might be imported were the
182
principal ports of Singapore, Prince of Wales Island (Penang), 
Malacca and Dindings (in Perak). In these harbours, ocean 
installations had been constructed for the reception and 
storage of products delivered there by tankers. The main 
reason for constructing ocean installations at every port 
was because it was cheaper for products to be brought into 
the mainland market areas by sea and then to send by rail 
for distribution over the entire country. If any one company 
attempted to cover the whole mainland from one part, say 
Singapore, it would have to incur extra transport costs in 
order to compete on a price basis in certain areas with 
products imported by a competitor through another port, say 
Penang.
6.3 Local Distribution and Export
Table 6.3 shows the distribution pattern of refinery 
products by areas in 1975. The figures includes oil refin­
ing companies distribution networks (Esso and Shell), other 
oil companies and direct sales. Lutong Refinery's own con­
sumption and inputs to local affiliated companies in Penin­
sula Malaysia.
In 1975, the total volume of products distributed 
within Malaysia was around 26.8 million barrels. If this is 
combined with export figure of 3.9 million barrels, the total 
output from the 3 refineries in Malaysia in 1975 was recorded 
as 30.7 million barrels. In terms of percentage, domestic
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distribution of products constituted 87.3% and exports 12.7%. 
Out of the total output distributed, Shell Group of companies' 
share was around 64.4% and the remainder 35.6% was by Esso.
The refineries of Shell and Esso in Port Dickson . 
exported about 1% and 1.3% of their total output respectively 
whereas Shell Lutong's exports was around 59.3%. This was 
because the latter's production was mainly intermediate 
products which need further processing before they could be 
used.
Before the opening of refineries in Peninsula Malaysia, 
the pattern of distribution of the various petroleum products 
in Peninsula and East Malaysia was determined by the various 
company logistics such as the distribution and concentration 
of their markets, the different modes of transport and 
accessibility of the area and the costs of operations.
Before 1963, most of the supplies of petroleum products 
brought into Malaysia were supplied by the oil companies' 
refineries in Singapore and from their affiliated companies 
overseas. The methods of distribution were mainly by road, 
railways and water (sea) to the various depots inland and 
along the coastal areas. As figures on this type of distri­
bution are not made available for analysis, we could not say 
which method predominate and the volume of products conveyed 
by the different modes of transport. Suffice to say water 
and road distribution were the cheapest amongst the methods
185
used at that time.
6.4 Methods of Distribution of Refinery Products
After 1963
Refinery products are mainly transported by 4 differ­
ent modes of transport: road tankers, rail, coastal tankers 
and pipelines. The distribution from the individual oil 
depots to consumers experienced no change after 1963 except 
that currently they are being supplied mostly by products 
produced locally instead of imported products. Thus the 
oil supply logistics undergo drastic change at the base.
Table 6.4 shows the various^petroleum products distributed 
by the different modes - by oil companies' own distribution 
network, other contracting companies network and direct sales 
ex-refinery.
In 1975, out of the total of 26.8 millions distributed 
throughout the country, 4.8 million barrels or 15.5% were 
distributed by road tankers, 12.5 million barrels or 46.8% 
by coastal tankers, 6.5 million barrels or 24.0% were by 
pipelines and about 3 million barrels or 11.0% were by rail. 
In the different categories of distribution network, 13 
million barrels or 48.8% were conveyed by the oil companies' 
own vehicles, 2.4 million barrels or 9% were by contracting 
companies'vehicles and 11.3 million barrels or 42.0% were 
conveyed by consumers' own vehicles. This is shown in 
Table 6.5-
TA
BL
E 
6.
4:
 
DI
ST
RI
BU
TI
ON
 
ME
TH
OD
S 
• 0
? 
PE
TR
OL
EU
M 
PR
OD
UC
TS
 
IN 
MA
LA
YS
IA
 
IN 
19
75
 
(i
n 
'0
00
 
"b
ar
re
ls
)
186
§
P
EH
PPHH
scoH
P
P
O
CO
pow
EH
EH
g
EH
PO
EHO
EH
P
H
P
P
CQ
PH
(TV VO in rO VO VO CM VO
VO O o O CO ro CTV CM
VO in CM ro CO CM CO CM
*». «s
CM rO H VO 1—I 
rH
in co in "M* VO H
m vo vo p- VO o-
co in vo ro CM CM
n
H rO
I I I I
in CO P in CM in crv
h - CM CO Ch in CM ro
co -M- VO vo ,vh co
•* n <s
P ro m
co oo vo Ch vo o co
o Ch vo r - vo vo r - P
p p ••v}* C h o
r» I I
CO P - Ch CM VO o - CM PO
1—1 CO 'M- O in p* CM CO
CM vo VO CM Ch p " rO P I I
P  Fh 
§
Fh 
$
5
\  P  
0
rt 0
CD £
ra p  
o a a)
Po
Fh
P
P ra
0 Fhra Fh 0P p  0 0 Po Fh P a pFH cB p O raP p \ P
0 0 p *H ra o
P4 F> co PH P EH•H *H i—1 \ Fh \Fh p  Fh P S cDCD
rH
o P
a ra o OP Pp Z
Pi o £ p P FH P P5} p  p 0 P pO P w
0 3 Fh p m 3 (D 0Pd ■51 H p p S25 Ph
LT\
Ch
IT-
•S
VO
CVl
o
in
r»
vo
OP*
in
CM
H
ch
vo
Ch•s
CM
VOm
oo
r»
3
EH
O
EH
OO
H
P"
CM
t"-
I—I
I—I
m
*
vo
P
CDP
F33O
FH
Sn
■H
§
p
Fh 
o 
*H 
cD
p  ra
CQ P
l>> 3 
aJ P  
P  f3
CQ P
r>s
Pi Fh
•H CD 
Fh 
CQ P  
CD *H 
•H CD 
FH U 
CD
p! CD 
•H U  
P  CD 
CD
FH CQ
i— I 
CD CD 
CD 3  
FH P  
P  P  
P  CQ 
CD
0 P
P  P
a §o
fH CQ
P  P  O 
CD EH
S'cD ■P
CQ P
P p 
o P ,p cD 
P  ^
CD
a fh o
CQ p  
2
O CQ 
•rH CD
Fh Fh cd 3 • 
t> ho cq 
•H CD 
CD P  *H 
P f4
P  0  CD P P
i^ p  a
P  o  
o
P •
(D ra -d  
P  P  0  
2  FH P  
p o r t  
•H P P  
Fh M H  
P  0  p
ra p  
•H 0  P  P P CD 
2
P  H  rH 
2  O (0
PM o
P  0  O 
2  H  
o  ra 
0  p  
rH Fh o  
CD d  
P  ho 0  
o  p  ra 
P  P  2
0 0 0  
P P P 
eh p  p
co
<4
o
F5eh
wp
p|
p
JhO
•H
P
cDo
•rH
o
O
0
P
£
P
Fh
Ph
0O
Fh2o
co
TA
BL
E 
6
.
5
: 
RE
FI
NE
RY
 
OU
TP
UT
 
- 
ME
TH
OD
S 
OF 
DI
ST
RI
BU
TI
ON
 
1
Q7
5
187
a\
CO
CO
CO
•O'ID
CN
LD ro CO
00
00
CD
CO
ro
CN
ch
ro
ro
ro
roco CD
CN
Ch
CN
i—I 
CO
ro
coro.
o
CO
LO
LO
CO
CO
CN
CD
CN
<H
CNN1
CO
ro
CO
LD
00 r-
CN
CN
to
CO
LO
00
ro
N1
LO LO 00
oN1
00
CO
00
•vf
CO
cn
i— ! rH ro
CN
rH
LO
CN
CN
COO1
LO
00,
CNo
00
CO
N*
CO
CO
oo
CN oo
00 I—I
LO
LO
ch
ro
00
CN
00
00
CO
CN
LO
Co
LO
LO
["• 00I—I1—I
CN CO
LO
I—1
p
0
►P
-p
0
O
p
P CN •
o 0
p. 0• fc-l—|
a) ^  cd 
P w
tn o
P £+>
•H P  0
a) a)
P £1 Pi—1 •r"t
U pi a
X o
H
P  ro
• 3  w.—« rP
tn
P P W
O P  0
P 0 -H
P •r4 a
k ! ** Q  0
^ P
o
Pj
P gH <H
0 0 srPP
W o c5
TJ W
P PM
cd
T34^ P• 0
o
• 0
PM 0
•H
P
O 0
0 P j
0 0
w 0 §
*H 0s P
0 1—1
Q Pc
■ 6 0
PM O
0 x i
1—1 p
1—1 Td ■H
0 0 &
Xi p
01 0 0
*H p
• rH o
0 *H
• P p
MH 0
0 o
to ‘H
0 i—1 P
■H 0 P
P O
0 0 ll
P 1—1 O
•H CJ
m o
0 p 0
p p
0 0
0 p >
0 ‘Ed •H
id P j Mid p PM
-p •H
m N 0
o P 0
0 P
■—i p P
0 O
P p CQ
0 0
Eh pci
»—*
i—1 •K
188
Within the category of road-tanters, 19% were 
supplied from oil companies' own-tankers, 26% were from con­
tracting companies' lorries and 71.6% were made through 
direct sales and supplied by the consumers' own vehicles.
In the rail distribution category, 60% were made by the oil 
companies' tankage facilities through the Malayan Railways 
and the remainder were made through direct sales to the 
consumer - the Malayan Railway. The companies'own distri­
bution network conveys mostly kerosene, avtur, lubricants 
and solvents. The contracting companies convey by road all 
the products except bitumen. Bitumen is only conveyed by 
consumers'own vehicles.
In the case of rail transportation, all of the 
products are conveyed by the oil companies tankage facilit­
ies through the Malayan Railway. Direct sales made by the 
refineries are sent by rail for the own use of the Malayan 
Railway and their workshops. There is no delivery made 
through rail network by other contracting companies as there 
is only one railway system in the Peninsula Malaysia.
About 7 million barrels or 57% of delivery by coastal 
tankers were made by companies 1 own barges and boats and 
1.3 million barrels or 10.7% were made through local contract 
ing companies and 4 million barrels or 32.2% use by local 
sales to various fishing companies which provide their own 
boats or barges.
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In the pipeline category, 51% of volume conveyed by 
this method is provided by oil companies'own distribution 
network (pipelines) as in Sarawak. Direct sales made thro­
ugh pipelines which constituted about 3 million barrels or 
49% was for the Tunku Jaafar Power Station (owned by the 
National Electricity Board) at Port Dickson where Esso and 
Shell are responsible for piping Fuel Oil and Gas/Diesel 
oils to the power station. There is no private delivery by 
other oil companies through pipelines.
Table 6.6 shows the total Supply and Distribution 
costs in Malaysia provided by the Shell Group of Companies 
as incurred by them from 1972 to 1975. As there are no 
figures for the whole industry made available for analysis, 
this gives some insight as to how the costs have changed 
over time and to what extent they have changed.
Table 6.6 Unit Supply and Distribution Costs of Oil 
Products in Malaysia (inMgf/barrel)
1972 1973 1974 1975
Brunei , Sabah and 
Sarawak 3 .46 3 . 70 4.42 4. 91
Peninsula Malaysia 1. 73 1. 86 2.12 2.00
Average cost per^^ 
barrel from all 
operations
2.03 2.16 2.50 2.60
Source: Shell Malaysia Trading Berhad.
Note:(1) is obtained by averaging total costs from both their 
Borneo and Mainland Malaysia operations with total sales 
volume for the particular year.
190
According to Shell Group of Companies their unit 
supply and distribution cost in Peninsula Malaysia is 
approximately half of their Brunei and East Malaysian (or 
what they termed their Borneo operations). This reflects 
the relatively high cost of operations in Borneo. And this 
is inevitable in view of the topography of the area, its 
poor infrastructure, its remoteness from Bukom and Woodlands 
and the limitations of Lutong Refinery. This has necessitat­
ed the Shell Group of Companies to have 8 oil depot install­
ations in Borneo compared to 10 in Peninsula Malaysia although 
it has a mere one fifth of trade. Prom oil company sources 
for operating in East Malaysia, they intended to cut down 
the spiralling of cost increases in depot operations by 
rationalization in water transportation.
The unit cost per barrel from both their operations 
has been rising steadily from 1^2.03 per barrel in 1972 to 
M/2.60 per barrel in 1975, giving an average annual increase 
over the period of 9.5%. The main increase occured in 1974, 
due to the oil crisis, and the resulting freight hikes, 
increased surtax values, etc.
Surtax, a new cost element, was imposed in 1973^.
This will most probably increase in proportion to total cost
1. Surtax element in cost-build up was imposed by the
Government at 4 percent of landed price of products 
imported into the country as a penalty or disincentive 
for oil companies to do so. It is calculated after 
imported or custom duties have been calculated on the 
product price.
min the future with increased volumes. Import duties and 
intermediate storage costs, although continuing. to incre­
ase in absolute amount, should progressively be of smaller 
proportion to total cost. According to Shell, however, the 
bulk of their total supply and distribution costs which is 
around 76% and gradually increasing is made up of marketing 
transport costs. Of this water transportation takes up 
around 50%, followed by road 35%, with the balance 15% for 
rail. This is shown in Figure 6.2.
Table 6.7 shows unit marketing transport cost by 
mode of supply of Shell Group of Companies. From the table, 
it is observed that the increase in road transport cost 
from 1972 to 1975 is highest at 43% followed closely by 
water at 40%. The increase in rail is only 15%. This fits 
in well with Shell's plan to switch, whenever possible, to 
rail use. The Malaysian Government is also anxious to pro­
mote rail usage in Peninsula Malaysia and some M#$00 million 
has been earmarked for investment in expanding rail networks 
and facilities in future.
Table 6.7 Unit Marketing & Transportation Costs
in Borneo and Peninsula Malaysia($ per barrel)
1972 1973 1974 1975 %  1975/78
Water 1.09 1.05 1.53 1. 53 40
Rai 1 1. 26 1.11 1.20 1.45 15
Road 0.97 0. 96 1.15 1.39 43
Overall
Average 1.06 1.02 1.32 1.47 39
Increase (0.04) (0.03) 0.15
% Increase (4) (29) 11
Source : Shell Malaysia Trading Co.Ltd.
F i g u r e  6 , 2  ; S U P P LY A N D  D I S T R I B U T I O N  C O S T S  I N C U R R E D
BY THF. SHELL G R O U P  OF C O M P A N I E S
m u m
m m m :
* * 
41.4'
6.3
31.4
Total C o s t ,  
in M i l .M ) f  
46.5 •
44.3
3 6 0
! 9 7 2  I 9 7 3
s o u r c e  : Shel l  Malaya T rad in g Berhad
im p o r t  dut ies 
su r ta x  charges
in te rmediate  
storage costs 
w a te r  t ranspor ta t ion  costs
rail t ranspor ta t ioncosts •
road t ransporta t ion
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6.5 Distribution of Imported Petroleum Products
Although Malaysian refineries produce most of the 
petroleum products required in Malaysia, the amount is not 
sufficient to meet the needs of the domestic market. So a 
certain amount of each of the products are imported from 
abroad to complement local production. Table 6.0 shows the 
various products imported in 1975 into Malaysia, showing 
the countries of origindestinations of imports, modes of 
transport and import volumes. In 1975, about 11.2 million 
barrels of various petroleum products were imported from 
various sources mainly Singapore (90.0%) Bahrain (6.9%) and 
Ras Tanura (2%). Out of these 83.3% were conveyed by sea, 
16.3% by road and the remainder by rail. About 8.6 million 
barrels or 76.6% for the Peninsula Malaysia market were in 
the form received by various depots and terminals and direct 
sales. The remainder were distributed mostly by sea to the 
East Malaysian States.
Table 6.9 gives the total supplies of petroleum pro­
ducts made available in the Malaysian Market in 1975. Out 
of over 37 million barrels supplied during the year, 78.6 
percent or about 30 million barrels are supplied by the 
Refiners (Shell and Esso) and the remainder by the Non- 
Refiners or importers (the remaining oil companies). In the 
case of the Refiners, 81.2 percent or 23.8 million barrels 
are supplied from their refineries and the remainder from 
imports as it is difficult for the refineries to produce
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supplies exactly to match demand. In the case of Non- 
Refiners, 6.0 million barrels or 74.4 percent were suppli­
ed from their affiliated refineries in Singapore while the 
remainder were supplied from the local refineries in Penin­
sula Malaysia.
This results in 70 percent of the overall supplies 
made from domestic refineries in Malaysia and the remainder 
from imported sources. This ratio is expected to increase 
in favour of local sources over the years with the full 
implementation of the processing arrangements by Mobil, 
British Petroleum and Caltex.
6.6 Depot Network and Tankage Capacities
In order to examine the behaviour and pattern of 
oil product movements in Malaysia, locational patterns of 
depot network and their capacities are looked into. This 
will help to evaluate the supply logistics of oil marketing 
companies with which we will deal in the next section.
The base depots before the establishment of refiner­
ies in Peninsula Malaysia were around the main coastal ports 
in Malaysia and Singapore. There were also intermediate oil 
installations and depots in the hinterland. They play a 
vital role in the distribution of petroleum products through­
out the country. At that time petroleum installations and 
depots were and are still located either along the coasts
198
such as Bagan Luar, Telok Anson, Pork Kelang (formerly 
Port Swettenham) Kota Bharu or on railway siding such as 
Brickfields and lpoh. These depots are supplied and re­
plenished with petroleum stocks in bulk carriers by ocean 
and coastal tankers, tank trucks and railways. Places 
which are not accessible by the first three modes of trans­
port are distributed by means of road tankers to fuel con­
sumers. In the case of East Malaysia, the most popular 
means of transport is by coastal barges as the nature of 
topography is not conducive to the use of road and rail in 
many parts of the country. In the case of Peninsula Malay­
sia too, the Malayan rail network could not in any case 
handle the enormous volume of products that would flow in­
land if there was only one port of entry for petroleum fuels. 
To ease the strain on internal transportation resources it 
is essential to use all harbours. There is also a strategic 
reason, in the national interest, for having a number of 
ports capable of handling petroleum products.
As in anywhere else, the ocean installations in 
Malaysia are essentially a facility for the reception in 
bulk, the storage and the inland dispatch of petroleum pro­
ducts brought from overseas refineries. As laid down in the 
Petroleum Ordinance Section 12 earlier, the only ports at 
which petroleum could be imported were the principal ports 
of Singapore, Prince of Wales Island (Penang), Malacca and 
the Dindings obviously the locations of these installations 
were in the ports mentioned. Here the products were stored
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in tanks which have to be of sufficient capacity to take 
contents of a tanker, although sometimes, if the vessel was 
a large one, the contents may be divided between Penang and 
Singapore. The installations at these ports contained 
facilities for loading products into rail tank cars for 
distribution to inland depots.
The ocean installations in Malaya and Singapore were 
generally situated adjacent to the docks. The arrangement 
dates back to the days when petroleum products were first 
imported in bulk and, at that time, land was relatively 
plentiful in the harbour areas. The facility to erect large 
bulk storage tanks near the tanker discharge berths made it 
easier and cheaper to conduct operations, there being only 
relatively short distances for the product to be pumped from 
the wharf to the storage tanks. Another advantage was that 
oil sites could usually be easily served with railway sidings 
taking off the harbour service lines.
Figures 6.3A & B  show" the various inland depots which 
were established by the oil industry for distribution to 
customers. It will be noticed that there is a close relat­
ionship between the presence of inland depots and ocean 
installations. The reason for this pattern of location was 
that a depot for local distribution mostly receives its 
supplies from the ocean installations before being redistri­
buted to the retailers and final consumers. This procedure 
has not changed even when supplies from local refineries
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replace most of the imported products. What has changed 
over the years have been the increase in the number of 
installations and sea-fed depots and inland distribution 
centres. The ocean installations are Bagan Luar (Penang), 
Telok Anson (Perak), port Kelang (formerly Port Swettenham), 
and Woodlands (Singapore). In the case of sea^fed depots, 
they are Bagan Dalam (Penang), Batu Pahat, Kuantan, Kuala 
Trengganu and Johore Bharu. The Internal Distribution 
Centres and depots are Kuala Lumpur (Brickfields), lpoh,
Kota Bharu, Palekbang (Kelantan)t Seremban, and Jelutong 
(Penang). They are owned mostly by Shell and Esso .
The storage depots and installations mentioned ear­
lier are owned by the individual marketing companies in 
Malaysia. Since Shell Group of Companies is the pioneer 
and the oldest company in Malaysia, they have the largest 
number of depots and installations distributed throughout 
the country. After the Second World War especially in the 
1960s, a number of depots were established in view of the 
establishment of 2 other oil refineries in the country and 
the increasing consumption of petroleum products. Owing to 
these increases in capacity expansion in depots and install­
ations, some depots were underutilised and some overutilised. 
Some oil companies found it more profitable to offer compet­
ing oil marketing companies their depots for 2 purposes : 
firstly the offer is made for joint-use for a fee based on 
the amount of oil stored and cost of operating the depot and 
secondly, 'hospitality' arrangements with regard to the use
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of throughput in depots in exchange for similar throughput 
in some other depots. Shell Trading Sdn-Bhd. in Peninsula 
Malaysia operates 16 terminals throughout the country. The 
Shell Marketing Company of Borneo operates terminal facilit­
ies in Sabah and Sarawak - 8 of which are in Sabah and 7 in 
Sarawak. Esso, like Shell, operates terminals both in 
Peninsula and East Malaysia. It has 6 terminals in Peninsula 
Malaysia and its terminals in Sabah and Sarawak are handled 
by its affiliates the Esso Borneo Sdn. Bhd. The other oil 
companies Caltex, British Petroleum and Mobil have 11 termin­
als altogether amongst them.
Table 6.10 Depot Operatina Costs in Peninsula
Malaysia and Borneo by Shell Group of
Companies; 1972-1975.
Year Cost ( /'000) Throughput( '000) Unit Costs
Barrels (( ^/barrel)
1972 3667 358,459 1.02
1973 3865 386,065 1.00
1974 5071 414,029 1.22
1975 4693 453,364 1.04
Source : Shell Malaysia Marketing Co. Ltd.
Table 6.10 shows the extent of increase in depot
operating costs in both the Malaysian states of Peninsula 
Malaysia and East Malaysia over the 4 year period. In spite
of the unit transportation cost increases, depot operating 
cost has, on a net basis, been held remarkably steady,slight­
ly above one dollar a barrel over the years. Total cost 
increases from ^ . 6 million in 1972 to j^-.7 million in 
1975 compared with an increase of throughput of 358.5 million 
barrels in 1972 to 453.4 million barrels in 1975. This is 
because of relatively low investments in the existing facil­
ities inspite of increased depot throughputs because of 
excess capacities of depots in the past. And from Table 
6.10 too in terms of unit cost of depot operating, it shows 
a steady increase except in 1974 (#1.22 # per barrel) where 
unit cost increased tremendously due to the two-fold increase 
in plant charges and maintenance costs during that year.
6.7 Oil Companies Supply Logistics
As has been discussed in Chapter 4 earlier with the 
commissioning of additional capacities in Shell Refinery 
in Port Dickson in 1971, over the past years, local supplies 
have contributed more and more towards overall requirements 
as imports fell from 30 percent in 1972 to 23 percent in 
1974. Further reductions are expected and it is envisaged 
that imports will account for not more than 15 percent of require 
ment s .
Political factors on such questions as self-sufficienc 
and foreign-exchange savings may lead to a further penalty 
on imports in future. This point has been proven with the
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processing deal between Shell and Mobil and the Shell and Caltex 
buying arrangement with Esso which started sometime in 1972.
The movement and direction of supplies of petroleum 
products in Malaysia and thus the oil companies supply 
logistics are also determined by the structure of the var­
ious duties and taxes levied on petroleum products by the 
Government from time to time. Customs duties are imposed 
on crude oil and petroleum products imported into Malaysia. 
Excise taxes are imposed on gasoline, jet fuel, gas oil and 
automotive use and liquified petroleum gas sold domestically. 
(See Appendix 6A for the structure of Petroleum Taxes by the 
Customs and Excise Department of Malaysia).
To avoid high duty differential, mogas and kerosene 
for East coast of Peninsula Malaysia are supplied from Port 
Dickson. Gas oil and diesel oil for the East coast are, 
however, drawn from Bukom in Singapore as there is no surtax 
and this enables the company to save on freights. If the 
surtax, lifted early in 1974, is re-imposed, then there is 
a strong likelihood that these products will preferably be 
supplied from Port Dickson subject to secondary capacity 
restraints especially when excess capacities;are taken up by 
processing crude for a third party.
Prior to 1975, in spite of lower freight cost from 
Port Dickson, gas oil supplies to Bagan Luar in Penang were 
still drawn from Bukom. In the absence of surtax, this
206
arises because of the optimization programme at the Shell 
refinery in Port Dickson. Any increase in gas oil product­
ion at Port Dickson will inevitably result in sur­
pluses (fuel oil and regular mogas) which would have to be 
exported to Bukom. However, with surtax imposed after 1975, 
gas oil is supplied from Port Dickson instead of from Bukom.
In the case of East Malaysia, inspite of duty/surtax 
and freight penalties, supplies to Sabah and Sarawak are still 
determined largely by the refining limitations at Lutong 
Refinery in Sarawak because of the type of crude oil used 
(the local Miri type of crude). Only gas oil and fuel oil 
together with a small quantity of regular mogas are manufact­
ured locally with the rest of products including liquified 
petroleum gas and bitumen being drawn from Bukom in Singapore. 
Since 1976, Lutong produces premium mogas and this gives 
savings on both freight and surtax. The petroleum product 
movement pattern is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.5 shows the products distribution pattern of 
Shell Lutong refinery in Sarawak. The regular grade of 
gasoline requirement in East Malaysia is very small; the 
surplus gasoline component is exported as Miri tops and 
naptha. Most of the kerosene and gas oil from the refinery 
is exported either to Pulau Bukom (in Singapore)?Port Dickson 
or overseas refineries as local requirement, is very small.
In the case of diesel oil, the requirements for both the 
East Malaysian states $re met solely from the refinery
207
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at Lutong in Sarawak. The. current ley el of dfesel o£l 
requirement in Sabah and Sarawak dictates the refinery 
crude processing level. As there is no storage or bottl­
ing facilities for LPG in Lutong, the LPG or liquid butane 
from the refinery is spiked back into the crude for export.
A small amount of bottled LPG is imported from Singapore to 
meet the demand in both the East Malaysian states.
In the case of the crude oils produced by Sabah and 
Sarawak by the Shell Group of Companies, some are sold to 
Shell affiliate companies - the Shell Port Dickson Refinery 
- to be blended with Kuwait crude oil. Some of the crudes 
produced are also used in the Sarawak Shell's own refinery at 
Lutong. However, a greater proportion of the crude is export 
ed to neighbouring countries. From Table 6.11, the volume 
of crude oils sold by Sarawak Shell and Sabah Shell (especia­
lly the former) to their affiliate the Shell Petroleum 
Refinery at Port Dickson has increased during 1974 to 1976 
owing to the increase in the product requirements because of 
the processing arrangements with the other oil companies.
The exports by the 2 companies have also increased over the 
years. The exports from Sabah and mainly sold to 4 countries 
Singapore has increased its purchase of crude oil over the 
period twice their 1974 level; Philippines' imports have
increased by 3 times in 1976 while Japan by 1% times and
2
Thailand by twice from their 1974 levels".
2 Private Communication with the Shell Malaysia Trading 
Co. Ltd.
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Table 6.11 Disposal of Crude Oil by the 
Shell Group of Companies (in 
million of U.S. barrels).
1974 1975 1976
SSB SSPC .SSB SSPC : SSB SSPC
Sold to Affiliates 
and Associated 
Companies in Malaysia 3.2 4.0 0.2 4.0
Sold to Third Party 
Users in Malaysia - - - - -
Used in Own Refinery 
or Other Internal Use ii—1 
i—\i—I 6.2 5.3
Exports 13.0 21.8 1. 7 27,6 4.8
Stocks 0.8 0.9 0.3 _
SSB = Sarawak Shell Berhad; SSPC = Sabah Shell
Petroleum Co.
Source : Privately secured from the oil companies 
concerned.
Other exports are increasingly made to Brunei and to 
United States, Taiwan and New Zealand. In the case of Sabah 
Shell Petroleum Company, their crude oils are marketed to 
Japan and the United States of America.
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Since Mobil and British Petroleum purchase petroleum 
products rather than crude from Shell as a result of the 
processing arrangements earlier, there was no actual sales 
made to third party outside the Shell Group.
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CHAPTER 7
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PETROLEUM PRODUCT MARKET
Having discussed the economics of the operations of 
the petroleum industry in the upstream (production of crude 
oil) and mid-stream (refining) , it remains now to examine 
the operations of the industry in the downstream stage. This 
chapter will examine the competitive behaviour of the indus­
try in the market place in terms of the marketing networks 
of the various oil companies and their interrelationships, 
product profile of these companies, their market channels, 
their sales volume and market shares, the competition posed 
by new competitors or entrifes into the market and co-ordinat­
ion of supplies and output by 'hospitality' arrangement bet­
ween companies leaving the discussion on crude oil and 
product pricing in Malaysia in the next two chapters,
7.1 Regional Consumption of Petroleum Products
The total petroleum products consumption for Penin­
sula Malaysia, East Malaysia and Total Malaysia are compiled 
from the annual sales figures of the various marketing com­
panies in Malaysia. Table 7.1 gives a 6-year record of the 
consumption of petroleum products by the principal marketing 
regions of Peninsula Malaysia and East Malaysia and Malaysia 
in total. It is interesting to note that the consumption of 
petroleum products in peninsula shows an increasing trend
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2X4
from 23 million barrels in 1971 to 34 million barrels in 
1976; in the case of East Malaysia, the consumption too 
shows an increasing trend (except in 1973) from 2.8 million 
barrels in 1971 to 4.5 million barrels in 1976. This gives 
an overall increase for Malaysia around 13 million,barrels from 
the past 6 years or an average of just over 2 million barrels 
per annum.
The share of petroleum products by region over the 
period as shown in Table 7.2 indicates that between 92 to 
97 percent of all petroleum products are consumed in the 
more developed region - Peninsula Malaysia - and the rest 
in the less-developed region - East Malaysia. The share has 
not changed very much over the last 6 year period.
If market shares by products are considered, the 
biggest share of consumption has been diesel oil and fuel 
oil in Peninsula Malaysia and diesel oil and motor gasoline 
in the case of East Malaysia. In Table 7.3, diesel oil and 
fuel oil account for between 32 to 38 percent and petroleum 
products as a whole account for between 35 to 39 percent in 
consumption in Peninsula Malaysia. Over the same period,
East Malaysia consumes 43 to 45 percent in diesel and fuel 
oils and between 21 to 22 percent in aggregate petroleum 
products. From this data it is of interest to note that the 
petroleum demand in both the regions of Peninsula Malaysia 
and East Malaysia is characterised by the relatively large 
consumption of diesel oil in both, fuel oil in Peninsula
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Malaysia and motorgasoline in East Malaysia. This reflects 
the trend in dieselization, the requirements for electricity 
generation and petroleum demand for transportation fuels 
respectively. The high demand for these fuels especially 
for electricity generation results from the position of 
natural gas in the market which is not made available at 
present in Malaysia.
7.2 Oil Marketing Companies in Malaysia
There are eight oil product marketing companies in 
Malaysia - 5 in Peninsula Malaysia and 3 in East Malaysia.
Shell Malaya Trading, Esso, Mobil, British Petroleum and 
Caltex operate in mainland Malaysia while Shell Borneo, Esso 
Borneo and Sabah Oil operate in East Malaysian states of 
Sabah and Sarawak. The marketing network of these compan­
ies are shown in Figure 7.1 and 7.2.
Shell Refining Company supplies their products mostly
to their affiliates the Shell Malaya Trading, Mobil Oil and
British Petroleum - the latter two companies being the result
of processing arrangement which started sometime in 1975 and
1
1976 respectively. At the same time these 3 companies also 
rely'for some of the product s for their markets from imports 
from their affiliate refineries in Singapore.
Esso Malaysia Berhad is 'self-sufficient' in products
for their market from their supplier the Esso Refinery.
1, Private, communication with Shell Refining Company(MaJay^l
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Before 1977, Caltex obtained their supplies wholly from 
their affiliate refineries in the Persian Gulf, but current­
ly they do buy some of their products from Esso Refinery
2
whenever there are surplus production. However, the relat­
ionship shown in the network does not give the maximum 
product decided by the companies, and from time to time 
they enter into hospitality arrangements- amongst them as 
will be discussed later.
In the case of East Malaysia, Esso Borneo and Shell 
Marketing Borneo obtain their supplies from their affiliates 
in the mainland and from overseas sources. Sabah Oil Com­
pany, owned by the Kwok Brothers, obtains its supplies 
from Mobil Oil in Peninsula Malaysia.
7.3 Product Profile of Oil Companies and Their
Market Classifications
Table 7.4 shows the various petroleum products market­
ed by the oil companies in Malaysia. The two-big companies 
- Shell Malaya Trading and Shell Borneo on the one hand and 
Esso Malaysia Bernad on the other - market almost all the 
products in both the markets of Peninsula and East Malaysia. 
In the case of smaller companies Mobil, British Petroleum, 
Caltex and Sabah Oil market a limited number of products 
primarily because they are small in terms of capital invest­
ment and market share and in the case of Sabah Oil, their 
operations are managed by locally - managed business.
2
3
Private communication with Caltex Oil Malaysia.
Private communication with Mobil Oil Malaysia Berhad.
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However, ideally an oil company's product objectives 
are customer - oriented. Oil companies in Malaysia try to 
maintain a wide product range which can meet the needs of 
the consumer and industrial markets and simultaneously 
provide them with the required market. The oil companies' 
basic lines are made up of gas, gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, 
fuel oil, lubricating oil and petroleum residue or "bottom". 
The petroleum products marketed by each company is shown in 
Table 7.4.
The structure of the petroleum product market is 
basically divided into 2 : The Retail Market and the Non- 
Retail or Industrial Market. Although the objectives of the 
oil companies in the various markets are the same i.e. to 
sell their products and make as much profits as possible, 
there are salient features of differences between them.
l The Retail or Customers Market, is aimed at the 
final consumers or public or some established customers who 
buy in small quantities rather than in bulk. The products 
developed are standard products for general usage such as 
motogasoline, kerosene and liquified petroleum gas.
The Non-Retail or Industrial market are confined or aim­
ed at marketing products to industrial buyers which include 
the private commercial sectors, the government and quasi­
government institutions which require the maintenance of a 
multi-product line and product varieties. In meeting the
223
requirements of industrial market, two perspectives are 
viewed by the oil companies namely developing 'custom* 
products - products which are strictly based on customers' 
orders and specifications and secondly, developing 'standard' 
products for general application which are also used by 
retailers.
The most important characteristic of the industrial 
market is the relatively small number of buyers compared 
with the final consumer market. In addition to concentrat­
ion by size, industrial markets are characterised by con­
centration in particular areas. Also the size of many 
industrial establishments makes the buying function extreme­
ly important.
Owing to the different stages of development, the 
industrial market in West Malaysia is larger compared to 
that of East Malaysia. The industrial market can be class­
ified into 5 according to relevant buyer groups which include 
the Government Market, the Defence Market, the Commercial 
Sector, the Competitors' Sales Market and the Export Sales 
Market.
The Government market is the largest customer of all. 
The Federal and State governments buy almost all classes of 
petroleum products from oil companies. Government departments' 
purchases are made through either long-term or short-term 
contracts as well as through sporadic, occasional purchases.
224
The Ministry of Defence which monopolises the Defence
market requirements purchases many classes of petroleum
products especially aviation fuels. Local market sales
direct to end-users or the Commercial Market includes sales
to commercial and industrial accounts such as rubber,
electrical and cement factories, steel mills, tin-mines
>
and others. The Competitors Sales Market, on the other 
hand, include sales of products amongst oil companies and 
other private large marketers. The demand from this market 
is infrequent depending on such occasions as when competitors 
run out of supplies (due'toan 'increase■ rxn-demand, for. products) for 
their terminal depots or service stations. Lastly, the 
Export Sales market are sales of products .made by an oil .com­
pany to a buyer outside the affiliates marketing areas e.g.
Esso sales of asphalt and lubricants to Indonesia and Africa.
The orders are mostly spot requests; the purchase volume for 
shipment has to be reasonably larger in order to justify the 
freight and insurance charges incurred during the shipment.
.4
Table 7.5 gives the retail and non-retail'" market 
configuration for petroleum products in Peninsula Malaysia.
The Retail market accounts for only 28% compared the Non-retail 
market of 72%. The Government sector in the Non-Retail 
market is the biggest with 36.8% of all petroleum products 
followed by Industrial and Reseller sector of 34.1%.
4.. For simplication, the inland Non-Retail markets for
Peninsula Malaysia are divided into 3 categories as 
opposed to 5 in our discussion elsewhere earlier.
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7.4 Market Shares of Oil Companies
The structure of the market for petroleum products 
is characterised by an oligopolistic pattern of competition 
as there are only 5 firms marketing petroleum products in 
Malaysia. R. Armey defined oligopoly as "The oligopoly is 
imperfectly competitive with respect to all market criteria.
To begin with, the oligopoly market is one in which there
are a few sellers The test of fewness is that the number
must be so small and each seller must be so large relative 
to the market that each seller is overly aware of inter­
dependence between himself and the sellers...The oligopolist 
has considerable price discretion, but only with the compet­
itive response to his pricing practices by other firms in 
the industry".
The key feature in this type of market is that of 
recognition of interdependence amongst sellers. Each 
oligopolist realises that changes in pricing, advertising, 
product characteristics, etc., may stimulate responses by 
the rivals. And since competition amongst the 5 oil com­
panies is very keen and the Malaysian market being not very 
large, the market shares amongst the marketing companies have 
not changed very much since the last seven years. Further­
more, with the present policy of the government of free
5. Armey R.K., Price Theory - A policy & Welfare Approach,
Prentice Hall New Jersey, 1977 p. 305.
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enterprise, it is unlikely that now competitors will enter 
the industry (except for a brief period between 1972 and 
1973 by Singapore Petroleum Company of Singapore and Summit 
Petroleum Company of Thailand), and making the already stiff 
competition more unpleasant. However, the state oil company, 
PETRONAS, is making a move to enter the market sometime in 
1979.
Up to 1960, Shell and Standard Vacuum Oil Company 
shared the petroleum market in Malaysia;being the only two 
companies in existence then. Shell being the earliest to 
arrive in the oil marketing scene after World War II was the 
leader and had an overall controlling share of 80% of the 
market, the remainder being by Standard Vacuum. After the 
dissolution of the partnership of Standard Vacuum between 
Scony-Mobil and Standard Oil of New Jersey in 1962, the 
Standard Vacuum operations in Malaya then was taken by 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey later known as Esso Standard 
Malaysia Berhad (ESMB). Subsequently, the market share of 
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. was transferred to Standard Oil Co. 
or Esso.
At about the same time in 1962, Caltex Oil Co. entered 
into the Malaysian market and a small part of Shells' and 
Esso's shares were gained by the newcomer. Shell still main­
tained the lead with around 75% of the market, Esso obtained 
most of the remaining 25% and the remainder went to Caltex.
In 1966, however. Shell experienced a drop in its market
228
share by about 15% from 75% while Esso managed to increase 
its share from some 20% to 28% and Caltex from 5% to 12%.
By then British Petroleum and Mobil (the offshoot of Scony- 
Mobil earlier), two newcomers into the oil marketing scene 
in 1962 and 1963 respectively, had made their impact by 
sharing a small portion of the market. They gained from the 
other 2 companies. This resulted in further erosion of 
Shell's share of the market.
The annual sales of petroleum products by the various 
marketing companies in Malaysia from 1971 to 1976 are made 
available by the individual marketing companies. (There 
exists some discrepancies between the totals of Table 7.1 
earlier and the Tables 7.6, 7.8 and 7. ,10 of Sales of Petrol­
eum Products in Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia due 
to the process of rounding).
Table 7.6 shows that Shell and Esso has the biggest 
sales of petroleum products over the period considered with 
the former increasing its sale from 10 million barrels in 
1971 to 14 million barrels in 1976 and the latter from 7.6 
million barrels in 1971 to 11.5 million barrels in 1976.
The three other companies of British Petroleum, Mobil and 
Caltex share between them 5.4 million barrels in 1971 and
8.4 million barrels in 1976. In Table 7. 7 Shell and Esso 
share ' between them 75.5% to 76.6% while the rest of the 
market were shared amongst the 3 other companies. This is 
because both the companies are well entrenched in the market
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compared to other oil companies owing to their earlier 
entries into the market and therefore possess extensive 
depot networks {as in Chapter 6 earlier) and marketing 
channels (as in the subsequent section).
In the case of East Malaysia, there are 2 main oil 
marketing companies - Shell Borneo and Esso Borneo. (The 
third company Sabah Oil is a very small company compared to 
the two companies earlier).
As shown in Table 7.8, Shell's sales is around 2 
million barrels in 1971 and increased by 56% to just over 
3 million barrels in 1976. Esso's sales increased by 62% 
to about 1.2 million barrels in 1976 from its 1971 level of 
around 0.7 million barrels. Shell's share is around 3 times 
that of Esso as shown in Table 7.3 and this trend has not 
changed very much over the years.
Table 7.io gives the total sales of products by 
companies in Malaysia over the 6-year period. In the over­
all Malaysia Sale's figures, Shell and Esso maintained their 
strong position (from a sale of 20 million barrels in 1971 
to 30 million barrels in 1976) compared to the other compan­
ies (whose sales increased from only 5.4 million barrels in 1971 
to'8.4 million barrels in 1976) owing to their entrenchment in 
the market in Peninsula Malaysia and their monopolistic 
position in the East Malaysian market. Both the companies 
a c c o u n t  f o r  a b o u t 79% of the Malaysian market both in 1971 and
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1976. The market shares of the oil companies in Malaysia 
are graphed in Figure 7.3.
7.5 Competitive Structure in Product Marketing Channels
Petrol companies acquire strings of garages and 
petrol station with an object of creating tied outlets sell­
ing their products. No petrol company could expect to market 
petrol except perhaps in most unfavourable circumstances 
unless it controlled a group of petrol stations. The comp­
etition for petrol stations and sites became severe with the 
establishment of the 2 refineries in Peninsula Malaysia in 
the early 1960's.
The owner of land acquired by the oil company to 
build its station would be given a licence to operate the 
service station . The oil company builds the filling stat­
ions and supplies all the machinery and pumps. The filling 
station will then buy oil from the supplying company and 
sell it at fixed prices recommended by the company.
The rental structure of petrol stations owned by 
the owner-operator varies from company to company and over the 
years. The degree of variation reflects the competitiveness 
of the motor-gasoline business in Malaysia. As far back as 
* the 1960's when the change in ownership structure of filling 
stations was adopted by oil companies, the rental charges for 
all filling stations in Malaysia had been fixed at a basic

23 9
rate of .$'100 per month. However, it is the nature of 
their set-up that rental differs from company to company.
Esso and Caltex, for instance, have the same rental struct­
ure with regard to service stations - $390 per month for
6
a one-bay station and $390 per month for a two-bay station.
In addition Esso stipulates that for any additional bay
after that, a rental payment of $80 per month is levied.
However, British Petroleum based their rental according to
the duration of operation of the filling station's business.
The rental varies from $100 for the first month to $200 in
the second month and to $300 in the third and subsequent months
However, British Petroleum followed Shell's set-up by revising
their policy on new service stations operating after 1966
with a flat rental rate of $300 per month on filling stations
and $4-50 per month on service-stations but later charged a
7
flat rate of $450 a month.
Besides the strategy of different rental charges on
filling and service stations earlier, oil companies' rental
policy are also based on the monthly volume of throughput.
This is to encourage indirectly sales volume by penalising
low sales volume. For all companies, for the first 10,000
gallons of sales, the owner-operator has to pay the oil
company .$t).029 $ per Imperial Gallon (l.G.) as gallonage
charge; the second 10,000 gallons of sales is reduced to
$0,015 to 0.0125 $ per l.G. and the third 10,000 gallons at
8
$".01 $ per l.G. and on subsequent gallons.
v—  ■ —     r
6 Private communications with Esso and Caltex ( M a l a y s i a )
7 Private communications with British Petroleum (Malaysia)
8 Private communications with Shell Malaya Trading Berhad.
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Another competitive strategy adopted by oil companies
in Malaysia as anywhere else in the world in order to induce
sales through their service-station operators is by giving
commissions which again vary from company to company. The
commissions vary from $0,145 / to 0.175 / /l.G. for premium
mogas, $0,125 to $0.155/1.G. for regular mogas and $0.08 /
9
/l.G. for automotive diesel oil.
Keen competition over years has forced the oil 
companies, however, to change their strategies and policies 
towards their agents or operators. In the middle of 1969 for 
instance, Esso gave rental reduction of 20% for all service 
stations in Kuala Lumpur area. In the middle of 1976, how- 
ever, Esso revised their rental policy and currently base it- 
on monthly volume of throughput. In the past, Esso dealers 
were charged fixed rentals based on locations. The rates 
levied in their new rental policy affected their rural and 
urban network of service and filling stations differently.
In the Urban service station network, the rental is $0.15 /
/l.G. on premium mogas, $0.12^ / /.l.G. on regular mogas and
automotive diesel oil, as compared to $0.10 / /l.G. on all 
mogas (premium and regular) and $6.05 / /l.G. on automotive
diesel oil in the rural areas. In regard to filling station 
in both urban and rural areas, they are levied at $0.07^- / 
/.l.G. on all mogas and $6.02^; / /l.G. on automotive diesel 
oil. And in enforcing the new rental policy, Esso has also 
revised their margins for the dealers as follows: premium 
mogas from $0.14^ //1G to $0.17 / /1G; regular mogas from 
9 Ibid
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$t).121; fd/lG tO/^0.13^ $/ 1G, and automotive diesel oil from
$ 0 . 0 7 i $ $ / l G .  to $6.06 $ /1G. on base volumes and thereafter
10
$0.04 $ /1G. on volume in excess of the base.
The degree of competitiveness amongst the oil com­
panies can be seen by examining the rate of growth of 
retail outlets over the years from 1965 to 1976.
The figure^in -the Table 7.11 show that prior to 
1972, there was no attempt on the part of the oil company 
to disaggregate the figures into Peninsula Malaysia and 
Singapore where the latter was classified as if it is part of 
the states of Peninsula Malaysia.
Before the disaggregation in 1971 it is found that 
there were 804 service stations, 340 filling station and 
209 kerb pumps in Malaysia and Singapore. In terms of 
proportions, service-stations predominate with 59% of the 
total, followed by filling stations with 25% and kerb-pump 
with 15.5%. Cross-section analysis by companies show that 
Shell has the highest number of the 3 types of stations with 
685 {or 50%), Esso with 299 (or 22%) and Caltex, British 
Petroleum made up the remainder.
From the above analysis, it can be generalised that 
the reason for the predominance of the service station 
category over others has been the facilities provided by 
their modern technology and equipment to motorists. The kerb
r — ■  — . __ ______ __________________
10 Ksso, op..clt.
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pumps, however, have declined in popularity and their remnants 
are found in the outlying rural areas and in some small 
establishments in the cities and small towns in Malaysia.
No new kerb pumps have been installed in the last six years 
as evidenced by kurb pump figures in 1969 and 1972. In fact 
the numbers have been decreasing which go to show that oil 
companies are not interested in building, this type of faci­
lities any more except to maintain the existing ones only.
On the other hand, service stations have been showing rapid 
increases over the years. However, in the second case earlier, 
it is easy to see the reason why Shell and Esso predominate 
in the additional or increasing petrol station investments 
as they are the biggest marketing companies in Malaysia and 
Singapore.
After the figure for Peninsula Malaysia and Singapore 
started to be separatedfShell still maintained the lead with 
50% of all petrol pump stations, Esso at around 25% and the 
remainder are shared amongst the 3 other companies with 
Caltex owning about half of it.
If the growth figures are considered, then the results 
are more spectacular. The growth of service-stat ions over 
the past five years has been almost 50% as compared to fill­
ing stations where growth has been negative. The growth of 
kerb stations has been fluctuating but its number has showed 
a slight growth. The growth in the service stations reflects 
the increase in mogas diesel and kerosene consumption over the
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years and the competitiveness amongst oil companies in 
increasing their shares of the market in these products.
The slight growth in the kerb pumps especially in rural 
towns and outlying areas also reflects the increasing trend 
of consumption in the rural areas. The decrease in the 
number of petrol filling stations has been replaced by the 
more modern service stations earlier.
7.6 Hospitality Arrangement between Oil Companies
An oligoplistic industry such as the oil industry is 
consistent with a variety of behaviour. The firm in the 
industry may be in competition with one another. There may 
be strong rivalries amongst them in pricing, advertisement 
and quality of products produced. They may obtain from a 
competitive course of action and decide together for the 
pursuit of a unified policy. It is difficult to predict, 
whether or not in a given country, in actual practice a 
competitive or collusive policy would be followed by firms 
operating under oligopolistic conditions.
In a situation such as that in Malaysia where a few 
big oil companies rule the market, and they are bound together 
in varying degrees of interlocking relationships, anti- 
competitive agreements can easily be reached.
In an effort to avoid 'excessive' competition they 
form an agreement between themselves - which in the industry
245
is known as 'hospitality' arrangements. Hospitality here 
means a loose form of arrangement or 'contract' out of a 
long-established understanding. The firms or oil companies 
may come into agreements for one year and subject to renewal 
and there need not be any commitment in black and white but 
mere understanding.
According to one oil company source , hospitality 
arrangements made between oil companies dated about ten 
years back. The main reason behind such arrangement/ was 
that a) the scale of operations of most companies except Shell 
was small, before the '60s. As their market shares and sales 
volume grew with the increase in consumption in the country, 
it was untenable for small oil companies mostly the non­
refiners or importers to be individualistic and continue to 
import their supplies from sources outside the country. The 
smaller oil importing companies approached Shell for hospital­
ity arrangements. The arrangement benefited both the com­
panies. The smaller companies could get their supplies at 
sources nearer their market and Shell could dispose off the 
excess products from their refinery. The other reason for 
the conclusion of the agreement was that the smaller compan­
ies did not have storage depots in mainland Malaysia. On 
the other hand, being well entrenched in the business in 
Malaysia, Shell has depots well in excess of their needs to 
enable them to rent out to other oil.companies. As the 
market volume for smaller oil companies increased, they 
entered into agreement with Shell for use of their depots.
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The loose 'contractual' arrangement between oil 
companies take many forms: it can either be a 'borrow and 
loan1 type of arrangement or that of direct sales. Whatever 
form it may take these type of arrangement have basically 
two aims:
a) one company helps the other in. times of emergency, 
i.e. in terms of 'surplus' and deficit1 of crude 
oil or products in relation to their refinery 
capacity in the case of the former and market sales 
in the case of the latter.
b) companies try to optimise supply and distribution 
facilities and sometimes in terms of saving trans­
port c.osts when markets are scattered over a wide 
area.
On a very small and odd occasion ', an oil company 
draws its emergency supply to meet its market requirements 
from its competitor's refinery. The company makes direct 
sales on the spot to the oil company by selling the products 
below market price. But in most times they charge at the 
prevailing market price. A well known hospitality arrange­
ment was between Shell Marketing Company and Esso Standard 
Malaya in the latter part of 1960s. Although at that time 
both have refineries in the mainland Malaysia, they entered 
into 'spot' hospitality of 'borrow' and 'loan' in terms of 
petrol, kerosene and gas oil to help each other out when
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they run into trouble of shortage.
Up to the present time Mobil Oil has no refinery in 
mainland Malaysia. This is because Mobil has the smallest 
market share in.Malaysia. It entered a processing deal with 
Shell sometime in the middle of 1975, to process 6,000 barrels 
a day of crude oil. For the services rendered, Shell
i
receives an equivalent value of Arabian Light crude cre­
dited to •• their Bukom refinery in Singapore in addition to 
levying a fee of USO. 40 fd per barrel. This formal and 
written arrangement between Shell and Mobil is called the 
'International Crude Exchanges'.
As a result of the processing arrangement above, Mobil 
has an entitlement of a certain volume of finished products 
at Port Dickson Shell Refinery. However, in recent years 
Mobil entered into another hospitality arrangement with Shell 
at Kuantan and Kuala Trengganu (two towns on the east of 
mainland Malaysia) and Bagan Luar in Penang. For these pro­
ducts Mobil gets its account debited by Shell from their 
entitlement in their processing deal mentioned earlier. For 
example Shell gives Mobil 10 tons at Kuantan and for this 
Mobil's entitlement of 10 tons will be less at Port Dickson.
Like Mobil earlier, recently British Petroleum entered 
into processing arrangement with Shell sometime in October 
1976. British Petroleum draws the supply for its east coast­
al market from Shell depots in Kuantan for which it gets its
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entitlement debited at Port Dickson by Shell.
Some oil companies operate under the system of 
product exchanges, the specific aim of which is to minimise 
coastal tanker shipments by the elimination of cross-haul­
ing. A good case for this type of arrangement is that * 
between Shell and Esso. In this type of. arrangement Esso 
Batu Pahat takes Shell products from Shell depot Batu Pahat 
for the Johore market. This is because if Esso were to 
supply south Johore from Port Dickson by road it would a) .not 
be economical and efficient to do so, b) incur a long haul 
for the products and thus expensive and c) would be better 
to continue with the past source of supply from Singapore. 
Shell has an oil supply depot at Batu Pahat and Shell supplies 
Esso its products and charges Esso throughput fees on year to 
year basis. Shell charges Esso at Batu Pahat a) jetty fee 
at Port Dickson of $1.70 per ton, b) sea freight to Batu 
Pahat at $7.85 per ton and c) depot throughput fee at 
2.4 ^ per IG. In return Esso Port Dickson terminal pays 
hospitality volume by giving back to Shell via rail to 
Kuala Lumpur at their Brickfields installation for Kuala 
Lumpur Shell market. Such arrangements are also seen between 
Caltex and Esso and British Petroleum and Caltex.,
Sometimes smaller companies make hospitality arrange­
ments between themselves. In 1971, Mobil Oil Company negot­
iated with Caltex Oil on exchange agreements at Sandakan, 
Tawau, Lahad Datu and Kota Kinabalu. - all in Sabah. Caltex
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wanted to obtain Mobil's hospitality from their "scow" (a 
flat bottomed boat) and land facilities at Sandakan in 
exchange for hospitality from their landing craft and shore 
skid tanks at Tawau. At that time Caltex was trying to 
acquire land for their proposed depot in Tawau and use their 
Sandakan depot facilities for exchange hospitality with Mobil.
At Lahad Datu, Sabah Oil (a 'subsidiary' of Mobil Oil) indicat­
ed their willingness to build the depot and give throughput 
to Caltex and at the same time agreed on replenishment by 
Caltex ex Philippines at Lahad Datu. Mobil, however, could 
not commit their hospitality at Kota Kinabalu as they were 
awaiting permanent land for the storage depots to be made 
available.
In the case of the first one, Mobil at first turned
down Caltex's request for hospitality ex Mobil Sandakan scow
and motor barge. The reason was because Mobil was unable to
in their scow
accommodate the products/ However, later they agreed to have
hospitality arrangements with Caltex at a monthly rate of $2,000/- 
In the second case,however,Mobi1 agreed to 100% throughput 
for Caltex at Tawau in exchange for hospitality at their 
land tank facility at an increased throughput fee - from 
lh / to 2h / per l.G.
Hospitality arrangements ig not defined 'only to 
petroleum products; liquified petroleum gas (LPG) is also 
added to the list of petroleum products that come under this 
type of arrangement.
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In the case of LPG,Esso draws its LPG from Shell 
Lutong Refinery and f from Shell's Sandakan, (Sabah)and 
Kuching (Sarawak) depots for its East Malaysian market, and 
in return Esso returns LPG ex their Port Dickson refinery 
or Bukom refinery in Singapore to Shell. Esso takes from 
Shell depots in the two towns mentioned at 'nominal' price. 
In this case, Esso pays Shell a small fee in terms of trans­
port cost and overhead charges.
7.7 New Competition and the Rise and Fall of the
"Independent" Marketers
There are three distinct stages provided by the 
"independent" markets which to some extent poses severe 
competition to the relatively 'stable' (in terms of price) 
petroleum product market in the 1970's in Malaysia. The 
stages which we will consider here are, their rise and 
entry, their activities and their fall and exit out of the 
market.
7.7.1 Their Rise and Entry Into the Market
In the early part of the chapter, it has been ment­
ioned that there are 5 oil marketing companies in Peninsula 
Malaysia and 3 in East Malaysia. But over the years mass 
marketing of petroleum products has been constantly subject 
to change - and notably the entry of new participants or 
the rise of "independent" marketers.
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Towards the end of March 1973, there was a rumour in the 
Malaysian ■ oil ;iaarket that a Thai Petroleum Company namely 
SUMMIT was planning to market kerosene and LPG in the North 
of Peninsula Malaysia. In April of the same year, Caltex 
Oil Company confirmed the rumour and expressed concern about 
the matter.
At about the same time, Singapore government-sponsor­
ed SINGAPORE PETROLEUM COMPANY also entered the oil market 
and was ferrying kerosene from their refinery in Singapore 
into the southern part of Peninsula Malaysia (Johore and 
Malacca areas).
It was reported in the oil circles at that time that 
Summit would be carting their petroleum products between 
Songkhla in Thailand and northwestern states of Malaysia 
(perlis and Kedah) via Chungloon (in Thailand). They would 
be setting up storage facilities in Province Wellesley in 
the state of Penang. Later Summit also intended to store 
and sell gas oil, automotive diesel oil and other petroleum 
product s .
What concerned the oil companies operating in Malay­
sia most was that the kerosene market in the north Peninsula 
Malaysian area had been quite stable with regard to price 
and their market shares (which earlier had been plagued by 
price instability and price undercuting and stiff competition). 
The entry of Summit in the northwestern market would therefore
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disrupt the market balance for kerosene there. The oil 
circles were also informed that Summit would be ferrying 
diesoline besides kerosene into the market and the diesoline 
was to come from Singora in Thailand via Chungloon. They 
had also appointed a transport company and an agent to 
prepare their entry into the market.
Summit officially entered into the northwestern 
Peninsula Malaysia market towards the end of May, 1973.
The selling price of diesoline in Kedah area at that 
time was 2 / /IG, higher than in South Thailand. Diesoline 
net-back price to Bagan Luar installation (the nearest 
depot in north of Peninsula Malaysia) was 40 //l.G. for 
Consumer Sales and 43 / /l.G. for Reseller market. This 
could be the strong reason for Summit to enter their 
kerosene and diesel oil into the Malaysian market.
The buoyant petroleum product market at that time 
prompted Singapore petroleum Company (SPC) to enter into 
the Malaysian market at about the same time as Summit. In 
fact SPC had made arrangements with Summit earlier whereby 
SPC would be handling bulk sales while Summit continue to 
handle retail sales. However, owing to some delay, SPC 
entered the Malaysian market 5 months later (sometime in 
early September 1973) at the same time as they entered their 
home market in Singapore. They had appointed dealers and
a transport company in the Johore area - the state bordering 
Singapore.
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7.7.2 The Activities of the Independent Marketers
Four months after they started business in Peninsula 
Malaysia, Summit had been expanding their market of kerosene 
and diesel oil as far as Penang and Perak (two states border­
ing west and south of Perlis and Kedah). Summit was offer­
ing kerosene in Kedah at net-delivered price of 61 / /l.G. 
below the other oil companies except Mobil. In addition"
Summit indicated that they would consider giving laddered 
discounts for volumes of sales ranging from 1 / /l.G. for
the first 10,000 gallons up to 5 / /l.G. for sales above 
10
60,000 gallons.
SPC's marketing strategy was aimed at marine diesel 
oil resale market on the east coast of Johore State.in which 
they expected to sell about 60,000 l.G. per month. To achieve 
this target, SPC adopted a compaign of aggressive solicitat­
ion through price cutting in Johore by offering ADO at 63 / /
l.G. to Reseller's market. At the same time, SPC had started 
to market kerosene in Johore and Malacca, with an estimated 
monthly volume of 20,000 l.G. Their continued 'dumping' of 
automotive diesel oil and soliciting from all companies' 
distributors and service station dealers in Johore paid 
handsomely. ^
As a result of their entries and activities in the
Peninsula Malaysian market in the north and south,the
price pressures offered by these new competitors affected
     — “ — “   --------
10 - 11 From Monthly Market Report of an Oil Company (confidentia! 
information!
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most oil companies' sales to distributors as these new 
companies were seducing oil distribution in the areas affect­
ed from their old sources to that of theirs by offering
attractive prices and terms.
7.7.3 Their Fall and Exit
Towards the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, 
Singapore Petroleum Company was badly hit by the Arab Oil 
Embargo and oil price hikes. They found themselves short 
of kerosene for the supply to their customers in the Johore 
area. By the month of March, 1974, SPC was reported to have 
notified their customers of their intention to discontinue 
selling kerosene and ADO in the Malaysian market at current 
prices as it had become uncompetitive for them.
Owing to the oil price hikes followed by the control 
of prices of kerosene and diesel by the Malaysian Government 
through the Control of Supplies Act of 1961, the 
Summit Oil Company of Thailand also withdrew from the north 
Peninsula Malaysian Market in the early part of 1974. It 
was more profitable for them to divert marketing activities 
back to Thailand where gas oil and kerosene commanded higher 
preiraum than in Malaysia.
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In respect to the nature of competition in the petro­
leum industry in Malaysia, we can conclude that this is far 
from "perfect". As in every other market situation, the 
"perfect" market with its characteristics of large number of 
sellers, homogenous product, mobility of factors and wide­
spread of information is as lacking as in any other market 
situations. Actually there are relatively small numbers of oil 
marketing firms (oligopolists) in each market, so that the 
actitivities of any one affect the others. Moreover, in some 
instances, strong preferences develop for certain brands over 
others. Buyers and sellers (particularly the latter), do not 
flow in and out of the industry in the manner predicted in a 
competitive model. There is a fair degree of freedom of entry 
by competitors at distribution levels in the petroleum indus­
try (Caltex, BP and Mobil in the 6 0 ‘s and Summit and SPC in 
the 70 ’s) . This takes the form of "invaders" from another 
market in the neighbouring countries. On the other hand, 
while intensive competition exists in the industry at various 
levels, some collusive activities (product exchanges, buy and 
loan policies and to some extent, price-making^may exist in 
certain markets from time to time.
It should be pointed out that Malaysia has no anti­
trust laws (like the Sherman Anti Trust Laws or the Clayton 
Act) controlling the degree of monopoly activities in indus­
tries such as that in the United States. With the problem 
of prices, supplies and hoarding of products (including
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petroleum} especially during and after the oil crisis of 
1973, the Government has implemented the Control of Supplies 
Act of 1961 in 1974 to include the control on supplies and 
prices of petroleum products in Malaysia. However, there is 
no law or legislation to control active competition and 
collusive activities amongst the oil companies per se. With 
the passing of the Petroleum Development Act of 1974 (to be 
discussed fully in Chapter 9), the Government has established 
PETRONAS, the State Oil Company, PETRONAS was given the res­
ponsibility to take charge of all matters related to petroleum 
and vested into it not only the exclusive right to explore 
and extract oil within the country, but also the right to 
undertake and control all downstream activities including 
activities related to petroleum and its products. In compliance 
with the TMP and the NEP objectives, the Government through 
the Petroleum Development Act may "impose" conditions on the 
oil marketing companies of Malay participation in the distri­
bution and marketing activities of the oil companies in line 
with the objectives of the NEP discussed earlier in the Intro­
ductory chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
MARKETING PRACTICES AND PRICES OF IMPORTED 
AND DOMESTIC CRUDE OILS______________________
8.1 Supply Arrangements of Imported Crude Oils to
Malaysian R e f i n e r i e s __________________________
With the growth in inland consumption of petroleum 
products in Malaysia (then Malaya) after the Second World 
War, two refineries were established in Peninsula Malaysia 
beside the already existing Lutong refinery in Sarawak in 
West Malaysia. (This has already been discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 earlier). As a result of the refinery agreements 
concluded in 1962 between the Malaysian government and the 
refineries concerned - Shell Refinery Malaysia and Esso 
Standard Malaya Berhad (formerly Standard Vacuum Oil 
Company) - the question of crude oil sources and prices 
became increasingly important. Since Malaysia produces 
a small percentage of her crude oil requirements from the 
Sarawak Miri fields (mostly used in the Lutong Refinery 
and a small proportion by the Shell Refinery in the main­
land Malaysia, the rest for exports), her refining industry 
is heavily dependent on imports. Out of a total of 33.4 
million barrels of crude oil used as throughputs in 
Malaysian refineries in 1976 only about 11.6 million 
barrels or 34.8 percent were supplied by domestic sources 
while the rest 21.8 million barrels or 65.2 percent from 
imports from the Persian Gulf area.
2.58
Except for the Lutong refinery in Sarawak which are
totally based on domestic crude, the two refineries in
Peninsula Malaysia were set up under refinery contracts
between the Malaysian government and foreign oil companies.
Each of these agreements contained provisions concerning the
supply and price of imported crude oils. The agreements
signed in 1962 with the two oil companies of Shell and Esso
gave the companies freedom of choice as to the source of
supply of crude oil and exempted the. crude oil from import duties.
(1)
As in the case of India, the Malaysian refinery agreements
did not make any reference to price although the crude was
expected to originate in the Persian Gulf (See Appendix 5A).
By implication, this was expected to be based on the posted
prices of crude oils in the Persian Gulf although the 2
agreements gave priority to the use of domestic crudes in the
refineries. Like the Indian Refinery agreements, each of
these refiners is tied to a supplier or a number of suppliers
and there is no option for the purchase of crude from the
(2)world market at competitive prices . Since the crude 
supplying companies themselves are producers of crude in 
large amounts in the nearby Persian Gulf area, and since 
these arrangements were concluded at the time of the setting­
up of the refineries and on a continuing basis, they are 
likely to continue for a long period.
1. Dasgupta, B. op.cit. p. 184
2. Dasgupta, B. ibid. p. 185
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To feed or supply the refineries crude purchases 
are made on forward forecasts subject to confirmation 
within 3:0 days of actual receipts. These supply arrange­
ments are made through their affiliated companies. In the 
case of Shell Refinery such arrangements are made through 
Shell Petroleum International in London to supply their 
Kuwait and Miri crudes (See Figures S.l and S.2 in Appendix 
8A) and in the case of Arab crudes for Esso Refinery through 
Esso Headquarters in Houston, Texas. These parties are 
not the original suppliers or producers. In both the cases, 
the procurement of crude oil is arranged by the oil companies 
headquarters through one or more intermediaries in the 
Persian Gulf and in Sarawak. Since the domestic refining 
companies do not have access to the original producers/ 
suppliers of crude oil and remittances of foreign exchange 
are settled by them on the basis of the invoices of their 
intermediate consignors, who are not the original producers 
or suppliers of crude oil, it is difficult to know precisely 
what transpires between the original producers or suppliers 
and the intermediate consignors and how their relations are 
governed in regard to remuneration and transactions passing 
through their hands. Whatever it may be, the intermediate 
consignors render the important services of finding a 
suitable source of supply at competitive prices, arrangement 
of shipping, payment to suppliers, billing amounts payable 
by the final consignors and short-term financing on behalf 
of the purchaser.
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8.2 The Price of Imported and Domestic Crude Oils
to Malaysian Refineries_________________________
8.2.1 Before the Oil Crisis
There are in general three different prices ■ 
for crude oil: the transfer price, the market price 
and the posted price.
The largest part of oil production in the
Eastern Hemisphere is controlled (except in Libya
(3 )and Algeria) by the international majors v ' which 
have developed highly integrated operations including 
exploration, production, transportation, refining and 
marketing through various affiliates. The large part 
of this production (85 percent) is disposed of 
through integrated channels i.e. it never changes 
hands but passed from one affiliate to another (it is 
also the price at which crude oil is invoiced from 
producing affiliates to refining affiliates). Prices 
shown at such levels of transfer i.e. transfer price 
cannot be explained or justified by conventional 
economic considerations since they are insulated from
3. The 7 International majors are: Standard Oil 
Company (New Jersey) (EXXON) , Socony-Vacuum Oil Company 
(now MOBIL), Gulf Oil Corporation (GULF), Texas Comapny 
(TEXACO) ,Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL), 
British Petroleum Company (BP) and Shell Transport and 
Trading (SHELL).
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(4)the free competitive forces of market transactions .
The remaining 15 percent of crude production is sold
in so-called "arm's length" transactions to third
parties under the competitive conditions of supply
and demand in a free market. Price effectively
represents the commercial level at which ownership
changes hands. They are usually called realised or
market prices but their real significance and level
(5 )can be blurred by non-price discounts . Such non­
integrated oil is produced and sold by both 
independent producers and the major oil companies.
Posted price of an integrated oil company is, however, 
the 'public offering price by the seller/ f.o.b. port 
of origin'. The posted prices for crude oil in the 
Middle East by the major oil companies before 195 9 
were not subject to the freeplay of the forces of 
j________demand and supply. Very little of crude oil was______
4. The level of transfer prices is determined to 
maximise the company's consolidated net profits because of 
the different tax systems where affiliates are domiciled. 
Integrated oil companies "allocate overhead costs among their 
foreign brancfes, subsidiaries and affiliates, and adjust their 
transfer prices, in order to reduce their total tax outlays".
See Penrose, E.T. THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL FIRM IN A DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES; George Allen and Unwin 19 68, London, 1968, p.43.
5. Non-price discounts ,Include freight concessions, 
tied loans at favourable interest rates, generous terms of 
delivery and terms of payment, buy-back commitments, technical 
assistance and favourable currency treatment. See Rifai, T.
THE PRICING OF CRUDE OIL (N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p.33.
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"sold" at posted prices as most of them were absorbed 
in the integrated network of the major oil companies 
at internal bookkeeping prices or transfer prices.
The very few cases where crude oil sold was at posted 
prices involving independent oil companies who bought 
crude from the majors for their refinery operations. 
Until 1959 the posted prices were used as internal 
prices at which the producing affiliates of a major 
company transferred their crude oil to the refinery 
affiliates. But to the oil-producing countries, the 
posted price is the most important price since it 
serves as a bench mark or indicators designed to 
determine their revenues or the tax liability of the 
oil companies at the production stage. The main 
function of the posted price, therefore, was to 
serve as tax reference prices for both the producing 
countries and the oil companies in calculating the 
government oil revenues under the 50:50 profit- 
sharing arrangement. There are different posted 
prices for crudes: depending upon distances from 
the major markets and technical factors such as 
sulphur content and gravity of oil.
From the beginning of the operations of the 
two refineries, the refinery agreement provided 
price of crude oils to these refineries to b£ cal­
culated on the basis of import parity formula with
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the Persian Gulf posted price as its base, AFRA
ocean freight and other incidental charges being
added to the Persian Gulf posted price. That is
to say the purchase price of the crude oils was
the suppliers' export price to the market from
time to time at the ports of loading on the date
the vessel commenced to load. The suppliers gave
a discount which vary from time to time on supplies
(6)of their crude oils. . Although there emerged a 
number of non-major crude suppliers in the market 
in competition with that of the majors in the early 
1960's which in itself was an important factor in 
reducing the price of crude oil but this can be felt 
more in the markets where the refiners were 
independent companies than the majors. In a captive 
market, where the entire refining capacity is owned 
by the major oil companies, the competition in the 
crude oil market is not exploited by the local 
refiners since the latter were supplied with crude 
by their own parent establishments at prices dictated 
by their central organizations. In Malaysia, where
6. Before 1959 there was generally no discount 
available on f.o.b. crude prices in the Middle East, 
although there was evidence of discounts allowed on c.i.f. 
prices by way of reduced ocean freights, or allowances 
based on quantity purchased. See Dasgupta, B. op.cit, p. 187.
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100 percent of the refining capacity isowned by the 
major oil companies, the pressure of competition did 
not operate here. This is because of the vertically 
and horizontally-integrated nature of the oil 
industry - the relation between an affiliate (Shell 
Refining Company) and its parent company (ROYAL DUTCH 
SHELL) resulted in the refineries in Malaysia, their 
immediate consignors, and crude oil suppliers all are 
a part of one and the same corporate organisation.
8.2.2 After The Oil Crisis
The advent of .the profit-sharing agreement 
under the 50:50 arrangement introduced a new element 
in the relationship between the producing countries 
and the oil companies. Producing countries revenues 
depended not on fixed royalties alone as under the 
concessionary system but on oil price as well. They 
received half the difference between posted price of 
oil and its cost of production. However, even under 
this arrangement, the international majors could 
influence the amount of oil revenues to the oil- 
producing countries by changing the selling price of 
crude. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was established by the major oil- 
producing countries in 1960 to prevent unilateral 
price reductions by the oil companies, and, if 
possible, to raise oil prices and thus increase 
government oil revenues. When OPEC was established
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there were five founding members - Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela - and they were 
joined later by 6 other countries: Qatar (1961), 
Indonesia and Libya (1962) , Abu Dhabi (.1967) , Algeria 
(1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador and Gabon (197 4) and 
United Arab Emirates (1974).
Up to 1970, the world oil industry had been
operating on the basis of a modus tfivendi between
oil companies and OPEC members. Even though the
posted prices were not reduced by the oil companies,
the market prices of oil were largely determined by
supply and demand, only the oil companies dictate
the amount of oil to be produced. However, during
the early 1970s, the international oil industry
underwent drastic political and economic changes due
to 3 main factors: (1) global price inflation in the
late 1960s while oil prices remained constant,
(2) rising nationalism among oil producing countries
(1)and (3) the Arab-Israeli conflict. The oil crisis
beginning in 1973 manifested itself in the dramatic 
increases in the prices of crude oil - imported and 
domestic - used as throughputs in the Malaysian 
refineries and subsequently shaped a new price 
structure for petroleum products in the country. To
7. Jacoby, N.H. MULTINATIONAL OIL (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., 1974), p.27.
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appreciate this development, the background of the 
crisis and its consequences on the prices of crude 
oil consumed in Malaysia are first discussed.
The oil crisis in 1973 precipitated by the 
Tehran and Tripoli Agreements which were signed by 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) on February 14, 1971 and February 23, 1971 
respectively. They were agreements made to settle 
matters relating to oil from the Arabian Gulf in 
the first instant and matters relating to Mediterra- 
nean crude in the second instant. However, the 
balanced situation achieved in Tehran and Tripoli
was threatened by the United States decision to revoke
* f8)
the convertibility of the dollar on August 15, 1971
This decision which amounted to defacto devaluation
of the dollar, reduced the purchasing power of the
oil exporting countries whose posted prices were in
US dollars.
In the 25th OPEC Conference held in Beirut in 
September 1971, the Arab producing countries demanded 
the reopening of talks with the oil companies on the 
question of compensation and the immediate opening of 
renegotiations aimed at obtaining an effective share 
in the oil concession.
8. Park, Y.S. OIL MONEY AND THE WORLD' ECONOMY,
Wilton House Publications, London, 1976, p.22.
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The Geneva Agreement on January 20, 1972 
resulted in the posted price to increase by 8.5 
percent. -However, the increase in posted prices was 
not retroactive. It came into force on January 20,
197 2 and provided no compensation for losses suffered
9
during the five months since August 15-, 1971.
The US $ was devalued for the second time in 
February 1973. This devaluation led to producing 
countries to attempt to question the adjustments 
adopted in Geneva. Algeria, Venezuela and Indonesia 
decided on unilateral action to change their posted , .
prices in relation to the damage suffered. The other 
OPEC countries and the international oil companies 
negotiated. The new Geneva Agreement (.amended) , 
signed on June 20, 1973 in Geneva, envisaged an 
immediate increase of 11.9 percent in posted prices 
in order to compensate for the second devaluation of 
the dollar and an amendment to the revision formula.
This second Geneva Agreement still hold the disadvantage 
of compensating countries which had suffered different 
losses in- identical manner. This led to another 
revision in posted prices in January.1, 1974.
9: Park, Y.S., ibid., p.22.
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In the meantime crude free on board (f.o.b.) 
costs have been affected by 2 major developments since 
the previous price adjustment in 1973. Firstly, the 
change in posted prices made OPEC effective on 
January 1, 197 4 correspondingly increased royalty/tax 
payments to producing states. For Arab Light Crude, 
the posted price increases from US $ 5.03/ per barrel 
to US $ 11.651/ per barrel with a resultant increase 
of US $ 4.01/ per barrel in royalty/tax payments.
And for Kuwait crude oil, its posting increased from 
US $ 4.822/ per barrel to US $ 11.555/ per barrel.
At that time participation issue was still unresolved 
with provisional f.o.b. price US $ 8.25/ per barrel 
subject to retroactivity. Sarawak’s Miri Crude 
(Malaysia) increased from US $ 6.00 per barrel f.o.b. 
to US $ 10.80/ per barrel f . o . b . S e c o n d l y ,  the 
change was the result of the ultimatum made by the 
producing states to revise terms of "participation” 
agreements signed in December 1972. These agreements 
provided that Gulf producing states will acquire 25% 
equity participation in oil production in 1973 to be 
increased progressively to 51% by 1982 and that certain 
portions of "participation" crude will be sold back 
to oil companies at specified prices. Producing 
states were then demanding that their equity partici­
pation entitlement share increase to 60% from
10. Information from Shell Trading Malaya Berhad.
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January 1, 1974, and that the price of "participation" 
crude to be sold back to oil companies to at least 
93% of the posted price or higher.
Revision in Government participation in Kuwait 
was then in the process of ratification by the Kuwaiti 
Parliament. Producing states also insisted that the 
changes in participation agreements retroactive to 
January 1, 1974. These demands substantially raised 
the cost of "participation" crude oil and oil com­
panies were compelled to buy a major part of crude 
oil at these higher prices in order to be able to . 
continue supplies to existing consumers.
As a result of these developments, the f.o.b. 
cost Arab Light which is the crude diet of Esso 
Port Dickson refinery in Peninsula Malaysia was 
increased to US $ 8.320 per barrel on an interim 
basis and a further increases of between US $1 to 
$2 per barrel 5 The real price of US $ 9.00
per barrel, which was retroactive to January 1, 1974 
was expected when participation terras were finalised. 
At that time, indications were that the Arab Light 
Crude cost f.o.b. effective January 1, 197 4 would 
settle at about US $ 9.650 per barrel. However, 
in February 1974, the Kuwaiti Government obtained
11. Information from ESSO.. Malaya Sendirian Berhad.
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from the international oil companies an increase in 
its equity share of oil from the 1972 Participation 
Agreement level of 25% to 60%. As a result of this, 
the f.o.b. cost of Kuwait crude, which is the Shell's 
Port Dickson refinery main diet, had been retro­
actively adjusted from US $ 8.25jztto US $ 8 .68^ per 
barrel effective from January 1, 1974 to March 12, 
1 9 7 4 (1 2)^ In a{j^j_tion, effective from March 13, 1974 
Kuwait crude was increased from US $ 8 .68^ to US $9.43^ 
per barrel. Sarawak's Miri crude used in conjunction 
with Kuwait crude in the Shell refinery at Port 
Dickson remained unchanged at US $ 10.80^ per barrel. 
However, the Sarawak crude increased to US $ 11.70jzf 
per barrel f.o.b. on April 1, 1974 ^ ^ .
Crude prices confined to rise throughout 197 4 
reflecting the constantly changing and increasingly 
costly terms and conditions imposed by OPEC producing 
governments. Arab Light crude was increased retro­
actively to US $ 9.00 per barrel as of January 1.
197 4 and subsequently increased throughout 197 4 to 
reach US $ 10.46^ per barrel by November 1974. The 
Kuwait Government increased royalty rate on crude 
from 12.5 percent to 14.5 percent resulting in the 
f.o.b. price to increase from US $ 9.43^ to US $ 9.58jd 
per barrel on July 9, 197 4. Sarawak crude was 
increased from US $ 11.70^ per barrel to US $ 12.60^5
12. Information from Shell Malaya Trading Berhad.
13. ibid.
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per barrel on July 1, 1974. Three months later,
Kuwait increased royalty rate from 14.5 percent to 
16.67 per cent and income tax from 55 per cent to 
65.75 percent. As a result of this f.o.b. price of 
Kuwait crude was increased to US $ 10.030 per barrel 
on October 1, 1974. Sarawak crude remain unchanged 
at US $ 12.60jd per barrel. However, in November 1974 , 
posted price of Kuwait crude decreased from US $ 11.5 45^ 
per barrel to US $ 11.145^ per barrel but royalty was- 
increased to 20 percent and income tax increased to 
85 percent. The f.o.b. price of Kuwait crude was 
increased from US $ 10.03^ to US $ 10.36^ per barrel 
on November 14, 197 4 as a result.
In a move away from posted prices, OPEC announced 
in January 197 5 a nine month price freeze with Kuwait 
crude as a "net price" of US $ 10.36jd per barrel 
with Arab Light "Marker" crude at corresponding level 
of US $ 10.46^ per barrel. Sarawak crude average 
export price fell from US $ 12.60^ to US $ 12.35jzf per 
barrel with narrowing of quality differentials world­
wide and slack demandV^^And towards the end of the 
first quarter in April 1975 there was an erosion of 
light quality crude prices worldwide. The average 
price of Sarawak crude was falling to US $ 11.95^ per 
barrel but average price of the crude rose to US $12,010 
per barrel towards the middle of second quarter in July.
14. Information from Shell Malaya Trading.
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Towards the end of the first quarter in April
1975 there was an erosion of light quality crude
prices worldwide. With an average price of Sarawak
crude falling to US $ 11.95^ per barrel but average
price of crude rose to US $ 12.01^ per barrel towards
/15)
the middle of second quarter in July 1975 v
At the expiry of the 9 months price increase, 
OPEC announced a 10 percent increase in the price of 
Arabian Light Marker crude, the new price to be frozen 
for a further 9 months until June 197 6. The price of 
other crudes were negotiated seperately between the 
producers and the oil companies with some changes in 
quality differentials. In the case of Kuwait crude, 
a firm invoice price of US $ 11.30^ per barrel was 
advised by the Shell Company from Malaysia's suppliers 
effective October 1, 1975. The average price of 
Sarawak crude was increased to US $ 12.50^ per barrel.
The first crude cost increase in 1977 was the 
result of the 48th Congress meeting at Doha on 
December 17, 1976 where Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates increased their prices by 5 percent 
and 11 other members agreed to an increase of 10 
percent plus an additional 5 percent six months later 
in July 1977. This meant that Arab Light Marker crude 
oil increased from US $ ll.Sljzi to US $ 12.08^5 per
15. ibid
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barrel (5 percent group), Kuwait from US $ 11.23^ 
to US $ 12.42jz< per barrel (10 percent group) and 
Iranian Light from US $ 11.62$ to US $ 12.81jzf per 
barrel (10 percent group). Malaysia, although not a 
member of OPEC, also increased its Miri Light crude 
from US $ 12.59^5 to US $ 13.85gf per barrel - an 
increase of 10 percent from its January 1977 level.
The changes in 'crude prices internationally 
affect the prices of crudes imported by the refineries 
in Malaysia. The changes in the prices of the main 
crude oil imports into Malaysia namely Arabian Light 
crude, Kuwait crude and domestic Miri Light crudes 
are shown in Table 8. 1 and is graphed in Figure 
8.1. And as crude oil is internationally traded and 
Malaysia consumes about .two thirds of its crude 
oil needs from import sources, international events 
discussed earlier have not escaped their influences 
on the structure of petroleum product prices in 
Malaysia. The impact of the oil price hikes earlier 
on the petroleum product prices and the national 
economy in shaping a new price structure for petroleum 
products will be discussed in the next Chapter.
16. ibid.
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8.3 Marketing Practices of Domestic Crude Oil Exports
There are at present three crude oil marketing com­
panies in Malaysia. They are Sarawak Shell Berhad (SSB),
Sabah Shell Petroleum Company (SSPC) and Exxon Malaysia 
Incorporated (EMI). These three companies are also the only 
crude oil producers in the country. Amongst the three com­
panies Sarawak Shell Berhad is the most established crude 
oil producer and marketer having been the sole marketer since 
1911. Sabah Shell Petroleum Company and Exxon Malaysia 
Incorporated began crude production and marketing only in 
1975.
In the case of Sarawak Shell two types of marketing 
•practices for crude oil are adopted: longer term or contractual 
sales and "spot" sales or contracts. In the former case, the 
oil is sold to affiliates overseas, especially in East Asia 
and the Pacific Areas, and internally to the Shell Refinery 
at Port Dickson. The affiliates which have contractual sales 
with Shell are the Philippines Shell Petroleum Corporation, 
Shell Eastern Petroleum (Pte.) Ltd., based in Singapore, Shell 
Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha and Shell Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha of 
Japan, Shell Oil of New Zealand, Mitsubishi Corporation, Shona 
Seikiyu Kobushiki Kaisha, Mitsubishi International Corporation 
- non-Shell consumers from Japan, Thai Oil Refining Company 
and Brunei Shell Petroleum Company Limited. Internally, they 
have long-term contracts with Shell Refining (FOM) in West 
Malaysia. These eleven companies make up about 75 percent of 
the total output of the Sarawak Shell Company. The remainder
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(17)is mostly consumed by their refinery in Sarawak itself
The "spot" sales type of arrangement is only recently
undertaken by the Sarawak Shell Berhad whenever they have had
excess of crude at their disposal. Spot sales are essentially
opposite to contractual sales, as they are made available at
any time and the purchasers are not necessarily their present
customers. Most of Sarawak Shell's spot sales are made to
the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, Philippines National Oil
Company, Daikyo Oil Company Limited. Essentially they only
contribute about 6 percent of the total output of Sarawak
(1 8)
Shell at any one time
The excess of production over contractual and spot 
sales are made available at Shell Refinery at Lutong to be 
processed into petroleum products, intermediate and finished, 
for the use of local markets and for exports.
According to Shell sources, the long-term contractual 
sales are generally covered by long term base agreements but 
prices will be set for a particular period or in some cases 
for a particular shipment. These prices are, however, prices 
which are negotiated between the parties in the light of 
prevailing market circumstances. The ability of the company 
(seller) to use specific market indicators depends on the 
bargaining power at any period. This depends on whether there 
is a seller's or buyer's market. The period between middle
17. Private communications with Shell Malaya Trading Berhad.
18. ibid.
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1973 to middle 1974 was dominated by a seller's market and 
from middle 1974 onwards by a buyer's market. During the 
period of seller's market, Sarawak Shell Berhad was able to 
use the going px~ice of Minas crude oil from Indonesia.
However, during the buyer's market, comparison has in some 
cases been made with the alternative supplies open to the 
customers concerned from the Persian or Arabian Gulf which 
were cheaper than Minas by over one US $ per barrel during the 
period July 1, 1974 to September 30, 1975.
The published official prices for Indonesian crudes 
was in competition with the Malaysian crude oils. They were 
sold still somewhat above the true competitive level compared 
with Persian/Arabian Gulf crude costs (also African crude costs), 
in view of the low freight rates ruling currently especially 
for backhauls for African crudes to Japan. Thus Shell was 
still unable to sell their Malaysian crude oil unless they were 
prepared to have slightly lower prices than the apparent com­
petitive level. But this situation somewhat improved after 
July 1, 1974.
In the case of arrangements for transporting their 
crude overseas, Sarawak Shell Berhad varied the proportions 
FOB and CIF charges for crude oil exported to countries 
outside Malaysia in the following percentage splits:
27 9-
FOB 1 (.%}
C&F/CIF2 (.%)
^*FOB = free on board 
2CIF = cost, insurance and freight.
Sarawak Shell Berhad acquired transport in order to 
enable them to make C&F/CIF sales under a contract of Affreight­
ment, for which Sarawak Shell was to pay the Average Freight 
Rate Assessment (AFRA) rate for the size of the vessel 
involved in transporting the crude from Lutong to the res­
pective destination of their customer. In the majority of 
their CIF sales, this was also the freight they recover. Thus 
Shell’s netback to FOB equates with the FOB unit prices used 
in the build-up of their CIF selling prices. Shell mentioned 
that payment of each cargo concerned was made in US $ by 
telegraphic transfer, irrevocable letter of Credit or Bank 
sight draft at 30 - 60 days after the date of the Bill of 
Lading upon such maturity. In Shell’s experience, since 
exchange gains and losses caused by short-term fluctuations 
in exchange rates largely compensated each other, the exposure 
was limited to a one to two month period of credit only and
during this short span of time the relationship between US $
(1§]
and the Malaysian Ringgit ($) remained relatively stable
1973
47
53
1974
61
39
1975
64
36
19. Private communications with Shell Malaya Trading.
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All of Shell's crude is exported from their Lutong 
Terminal except for production from their Fairley—Baram 
fields which is exported directly to Brunei by pipelines for 
export overseas from there.
As in the case of Sarawak Shell Berhad earlier, the 
marketing procedure followed by Exxons Productions Malaysia 
Incorporated for crude oil sales is based on "spot" sales 
and long-term contractual arrangements.
According to Exxon, prices of their crudes are based 
on numerous regional and interregional factors in the current 
market such as prices of other crudes adjusted for quality, 
freight dirrerentials and other considerations. The price 
of their crude is not fixed for any future time period and 
represents a market value which can be influenced by different 
factors at different times and, therefore, is subject to a 
change from time to time.
Unlike Sarawak Shell Berhad, Exxon disposes of its 
crude oil through sales to affiliates outside the country 
especially in Singapore and Japan. There are no sales made 
to affiliates and associated companies and to third parties 
in Malaysia, nor for use in their refinery or other internal 
use.
Malaysian crude from Esso's offshore fields is sold
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FOBat the Tembungo platform, and unlike Shell, the transport 
of their crude to the customer is provided by the purchaser. 
Credit notes in US $ are received for the FOB value of each 
export sale. The. crude oil is exported directly from the 
Tembungo offshore platform .
The exported Tembungo crude is used for overseas 
refineries to manufacture primarily petroleum products. The 
ultimate yield varies from day to day with each refinery 
depending on the local supply situation and the feedstock mix.
Unlike the previous two oil companies, Sabah Shell 
Petroleum Company has only one method of marketing arrange­
ments for its crude. It entered only into long term con­
tractual sales with their overseas affiliates and the 
domestic affiliates of Shell Kosan Kaibushiki Kaisha of 
Japan and the Shell Refining (FQM) Berhad of Malaysia res­
pectively for all their crude production. Sales were 
generally covered by a long term base agreement but prices 
varied from period to period, sometimes depending upon a 
particular shipment, especially in respect of the first trial 
cargoes. The prices are negotiated between buyers and sellers 
in the light of the prevailing market situation. Since the 
company came into the export market only recently, it started 
with first experiencing the buyer's market. Unlike Sarawak 
Shell, Sabah Shell's export price is wholly F O B ^ ^  .
20. Private communications with Exxon and ESMB.
21. Private communications with Shell Malaya Trading
Berhad.
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8.4 PETRONAS Involvement In Crude Oil Marketing
Long before PETRONAS1s direct involvement in crude 
oil marketing, the Malaysian Government had began forward 
planning in the early 1970‘s to prepare for an active involve­
ment of this nature in the future. Sometime in 1971, the 
Malaysian Government requested the only crude oil company,
Sarawak Shell Berhad, to pay some of their royalties in kind
(2 2 )besides the usual payment in cash . The objective of 
this exercise was for the government through its agency to 
gain experience in crude oil marketing and to establish a 
foothold in the international oil business. This went on for 
a number of years till the establishment of PETRONAS in late 
1974 when the function was transferred to the latter. Since 
then PETRONAS has been active in involving itself with the 
actual crude oil trade and in making its own price.
PETRONAS's early experience in crude oil marketing
inherited from the government was in the form of "spot" sales
and (buy-back oil) to the oil companies. Recently it had
diversified itself in Long Term Contractual Arrangements with
(23)its buyers beside Spot Sales . Most of PETRONAS crudes 
are sold to the Philippines National Oil Company, Japan and 
US West Coast refineries.
With the conclusion of the production sharing with 
the oil companies in 197 6 and with the increase in the off—
22. Private communication with the Tax Division, the Treasury 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.
23. Private communication with PETRONAS.
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shore wells from different fields brought into production 
by PETRONAS (and the oil producing companies), it would have 
diverse types of crudes from different origins. From 1977 
until 1981/82, PETRONAS would be , selling its participation 
crudes from Tapis, Pulai and Bekok fields (Exxon offshore 
fields)(35.5°API and 0.07 percent sulphur) and Erb West crude 
(Sarawak Shell)(30.1°API and 0.05% weight sulphur) apart from 
the present crudes of Miri Light, Labuah Light and Tembungo.
For the purpose of price classification, PETRONAS 
has divided them into groups based basically on their API 
gravity due to the lack of crude assays. The classification
is made into .4 groups - Group 1 comprises of the Very Light
Crudes of Tapis, Pulai and Bekok; Group 11 Light Crudes which 
are made up of Miri Light and Tembungo crudes; Group 111 that 
of Medium Crudes comprising of Labuan and South Furious crudes;
and Group IV made up of Heavy Crudes of Temana and Erb West
^ (24)crudes
8.5 Major Problems in Present Marketing Arrangements
and Practices_________________________________________
A major problem which is at present faced by all the 
crude oil marketing companies (both private and state) in 
Malaysia with respect to the current marketing arrangements 
and practices is on pricing. The fundamental price deter—
24. Ibid.
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minants in any market are without doubt the interaction of 
demand and supply forces. However, the move agreed by OPEC 
and accepted by suppliers unilaterally to increase crude 
prices and rationalise quality premium differentials amongst 
crude oils resulted in the creation of 'artificial' official 
prices and actual market prices. This put Malaysia, a small 
producer, in a difficult position to secure the best possible 
price for her crudes.
Related to the above, but inherent in crude oil 
marketing is the problem of the pricing method used. This 
arises because prices of Malaysian crudes are based on the 
Minas crude of Indonesia (marker crude). However, the 
actual market price depends upon various factors, both 
technical and economic. Technical factors are the intrinsic 
qualities of the indigenous crudes such as gravity, sulphur 
content, wax content and product assays. In the case of 
economic factors, they include freight, relative price of 
other crudes in general as well as specific market situation. 
Given the erratic nature of the political, social and 
economic variables and as the price level of world major 
crudes are determined by OPEC guidelines, it is hard to 
predict as to what price level that is probable in making 
a price forecast. The best way to look at it is to review 
the current and likely future trend in the world oil market »
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8.6 The Future Price of Crude Oils
The OPEC Conference in Caracas Venezuela in December 
1977 failed to reach an agreement on crude price which 
resulted in the crude oil freeze. Their "agreement to dis­
agree" left the marker crude unchanged at US $ 12.70 a barrel 
till June 1978. Basically the price freeze was to be the 
result of economic rather than political terms. The oil 
market was in a depressed state since the middle of 1977 
because of the oversupply situation. As a cartel, OPEC had 
developed no mechanism for collectively reducing output in 
time of slack demand. The trend of oversupply seemed likely
to persist for at least till* the middle of 1980's. Many 
(25)studies have drawn attention to the possibility of an
‘energy crisis after the middle of 1980's though they had not 
been unanimous in their predicted timing.
There are three main reasons for the oversupply 
situation : (i) OECD estimate suggests that economic growth
rate taken as a whole will average no more than 3^ percent 
in 1978 as against a target rate of 5 percent in June 1977;
(ii) Non-OPEC oil production will continue to increase and 
Alaska's North Slope production is expected to reach 1.2 
million barrels per day by June 1978 while Britain's North 
Sea oil output will be around 160 million tons in 1978; and
(iii) The U.S. imports of oil are expected to fall back from
j
25, Exxon and Shell; Walter J. Levy^E.T. Penrose, J.E.
Hartshorn and Rostow; The Congressional Research Service;
The Workshop of Alternative Energy Studies (WAES) etc. T'c.
A challenge to this expectation came from an article in 
New York Times January 18, 1978 which contended that oil 
supplies currently in abundance might remain adequate at 
least through 1990, thereby reducing the likelihood of sudden 
oil price increases in future.
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8.6 million barrels per day in 1977 to 8.1 to 8.4 million 
(2 6)in 1978 . Because of this surplus production and the
availability of different types of crudes in the world
markets (especially the lighter crudes from these new
sources), the refiners will naturally choose those crudes
which fit their particular requirements based on their market
product-mix and maximise their profits accordingly. Since
market demand dictates refinery requirements and determines
profitability in different countries and over peridos of
time, there is a continuous change in the preference for
different crudes. The competitive forces of supply and
demand will result in discounts at the spot market. Sellers
will have to give discounts to adjust their relative prices
of different crudes in relation to Saudi Arabian Light or
(27)'reference1 crude . This has been due to the inflexibility 
of OPEC in dealing with the problems of differentials 
(differentials governed by specific gravity or °API (relative 
yield of valuable light products), sulphur‘content and loca-
26. See PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, January 1978.
27. As long as buyers are in a position to exercise their 
preferences it is perfectly natural for them to press for 
discounts on crudes which are worth less to them individually. 
While the general supply situation remains easy, relative 
prices cannot be the concern of the petroleum exporting 
countries alone. PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, February 1978, p. 53.
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tion in relation to main markets. . This is best summed
up by Professor E. Penrose in the following:
"Since oil is not a homogeneous commodity and OPEC 
does not determine in detail the relative prices 
of different types of oil but only a price for a 
'reference' crude, individual countries make their 
own price decisions for their own crude in the light 
of market reactions and their own situations. Since 
each country sees the relationship between its. price 
and its sales, any country desiring to increase its 
sale can easily evade the OPEC guideline. There­
fore, output decisions are made by individual
countries within the framework of prices related to
(2 9 )a standard price set by OPEC" .
28. In January 1974 when the posted price of the Arabian
Light "marker" crude was raised by 130 percent, the gravity 
premium was raised to 6 cents per °API for crudes lighter than 
the "marker" (34°API) while a penalty of 3 cents per degree 
was imposed on those below this level. Sulphur premium was 
around 7 cents per barrel for each 0.1 percent of sulphur 1.7 
percent. As for location, Arab Light and Iraqi crudes at 
Mediterranean terminals were given a freight premium of almost 
$2 a barrel over Ras Tanura. Since then, the locational ad­
vantage has varied depending on the level of tanker freight 
rates. For all' light African crudes the advantages of location, 
gravity and sulAhur content have been eroded by the advent of 
North Sea and Alaskan North Slope Oil. See ibid, p. 53.
29. See Penrose, E. "Choices for the Oil Exporting
Countries" in MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY January 16, 1978 
pp. 2-3.
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However, there is the prevailing belief amongst 
oil experts that there will be an oil shortage in the coming 
years because of several factors which include (1) low 
economic growth in the major industrialised countries but 
demand for energy continues to grow; (.2) development of non­
oil energy sources has been disappointing because of long 
lead times; (3) minor energy savings for conservation in 
major consuming countries; (4) the flow of oil from Alaska 
North Slope and the North Sea will stabilise after 1980;
(5) shortage of oil in USSR and (6) increase reliace on 
OPEC oil . in a study by Mabro that "there is a good 
chance that a demand for OPEC oil in 1985 consistent with 
the assumption about economic growth and conservation made 
here would exceed the amounts that OPEC would be willing to
supply ......   but be cautioned "there is nothing like a
20-25% probability that the demand for energy consistent 
with our assumptions about economic growth, conservation and
alternative energy supplies would not imply imbalances by
(31) ■ (32)1985 . According to Rabmani unless massive and new
efforts are made to conservation, serious oil shortages
and sharply increased prices will occur sometime in the 1980‘s.
30. Rahmani, B.M, "Energy Conservation in Iran and
Hedging Against Energy Crunch, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, 
January 23, 1978, p.7.
31 Mabro, R. "Energy Crisis in 1985", MIDDLE EAST
ECONOMIC SURVEY, April 10, 1978, p. 4.
32. Rahmani, B.M., op.cit, p.7.
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Any price increase may be best brought about by controls on 
the rate of supply imposed by the large exporters rather 
than by explicit increases in real prices by OPEC. However, 
there is a prevailing uncertainty concerning price. If there 
is indeed a shortfall in oil supplies, market forces will 
drive prices up thus invalidating the assumption.about con­
stant real prices. It is hard to know how responsive oil 
demand will be to such changes in price. Hartshorn showed 
that if oil demand were to fall by only 0.1 percent for 
every 1 percent increase in price the basic projection of
demand for OPEC oil could be reduced from 4 4 to 3 9 million 
(33)b/d by 1985 . Another doubtful favour concerns the level
of production that OPEC governments will be willing to permit 
as oil reserves begin to run down. Since the existing glut 
of crude is bound to be temporary f while lead-times for new
energy projects are so long, decision makers need to ma^e the
(34) (35)
investments now. And according to one forecast , when
OPEC surplus producing capacity gradually disappears as demand
rises and additional supplies of oil from outside the OPEC
area are not forthcoming in significant quantities, crude oil
prices will rise perhaps as much as $20 per barrel in 197-6
dollars.
33. Hartshorn, J. "Energy Expectations and Uncertainties" 
MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, November 14, 1977 . p>.5'
34. Penrose, E.T. op.cit, p.8.
35 Parra, F.R., "Energy Perspectives Worldwide" in MIDDLE
EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY October 24, 1977 , p.l
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PETRONAS, being a small oil company, will have to 
gear . its,* crude price forecasts along the guidelines 
mentioned and making adjustments in price from time to time 
according to market conditions of similar and competing crudes 
in both the scenarios of surplus and shortage.
ft
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CHAPTER 9
STRUCTURE OF PRICES AND COSTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
Having looked into the structure and trend of crude 
oil prices in Malaysia in Chapter 8, we turn now to discuss 
the structure of prices and costs of petroleum products 
marketed in Malaysia. In this Chapter, we trace the 
development of the structure from the historical, economic, 
social and political changes that have taken place in the 
country since World War II.
To trace this development of petroleum products' price 
and cost structures, one has to look into the historical 
developments in the petroleum market in Malaysia since World 
.War II. Three scenarios of development will be appraised:
(a) the period before the establishment of the refineries 
in Peninsula Malaysia, (b) the period after the establish­
ment of the two refineries in port Dickson and (c) the year 
after the Oil Crisis of 1973. These developments are import 
ant in determining the changes of petroleum product prices 
and costs since World War II in Malaysia.
9.1 Historical Development of Petroleum Product Prices
In order to be able to show the effect of crude oil 
processing in Peninsula Malaysia on petroleum product prices 
the price scale before the opening of the refinery should be 
compared with the price determining factors in the domestic
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refineries in Peninsula Malaysia.
Before the opening of the refineries in Peninsula 
Malaysia in 1963, the price of petroleum fuels in Malaysia 
depended essentially upon the landed price, import duties 
and the cost of distribution in Malaysia. The landed price 
in Port Kelang, the main port of entry into Peninsula Malay­
sia, was determined by the posted refinery price in produc­
ing countries in the Middle East and in Singapore, by ocean 
freight from the supplying refineries to Malaysia, -and by 
harbour dues and wharfage. The import duties and recently 
surtax on refined products imported from overseas, which 
are designed predominantly for the creation of fiscal income, 
are determined by the Malaysian Government in accordance with 
its objectives in economic policy.
In the case of motor gasoline, kerosene and gas oil 
for private domestic consumption the import duty exceeded 
the import value of the individual products. Gasoil and fuel 
oil designated for public or government consumption through 
its agencies on the other hand, are free of import and customs 
duties as they are used for public consumption. The basic 
inland price resulting in the main from the landed price and 
the relevant import duty, which the marketing companies 
operating in Malaysia can scarcely influence, form the basis 
in determining selling price of petroleum products in 
Malaysia.
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The regional selling prices for premium and regular 
petrol, kerosene, gas and diesel oil, fuel oil and other 
products before and during this period had been fixed by 
"historical costs".^^ in the Persian Gulf area.
The historical costs were fixed by the oil companies 
and only allowed to vary from time to time. The variations 
in price amongst the cities were based upon several factors 
which include (a) changes in crude oil prices which led to 
changes in product prices, (b) changes in the exchange rate 
as between £ sterling and Malaysian dollars, (c) changes in 
government duties from time to time, (d) changes in transport 
costs and (e) improvement in the quality of petroleum products 
such as octane ratings in petrol.
Prices of petroleum products especially petrol,increas­
ed over recent years due to the steady rise in petrol taxation, 
the inflationary trend in costs and expenses, the two Middle 
East crises including the closing of the Suez Canal and the
1. Historical costs are based on "World parity price
system" or "U.S. parity price system" evolved by the 
major oil companies operating in the Eastern Hemisphere. 
This was a kind of basing point system w.i th the Persian 
Gulf as the basing point for pricing both crude oil and 
oil products. The price build up included - f .o.b.Persian 
Gulf price, freight from P. Gulf to a port in Malaya, 
leakage and insurance, import duty and other charges 
and margins to arrive at total ex-seaport installation 
price. An extra charge was made for inland transport­
ation and distribution costs when the products were 
sold in the interior of the country. An example of this 
'in the case of India, See Dasgupta, B., op.cit.,pp 81-82.
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unilateral declaration by the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) on crude prices in and after 
1973 .
(a) Product Price Structure Before the Opening of 
Refineries in Peninsula Malaysia
Up to the middle of 1956, the price of most of the 
petroleum products particularly petrol was uniform through­
out the country. The price of regular petrol on January 1, 
1956 was $1.47 j£ (including duty of $0.73 but was 
increased by $ 0.-02 ^ to $1.49 j£ on February 2, 1956
because of the increase in freight. The increase in freight 
was uniformly distributed throughout the country irrespect­
ive of the distances from Port Kelang - the main port of
2entry into Malaysia .
The principal of keeping a uniform price of petrol
throughout the country as prior to the end of August, 1956
was uneconomical and impracticable to the oil companies.
3A system of base point pricing with price "laddered"
2. Private communications with Market Research Section, 
Shell Malaysia Trading Berhad.
3. This system enabled the oil delivered prices to differ 
ent areas and locations away from the receiving ports 
of landing to be graduated according to distances from 
it. The different delivered prices in different locat 
ions reflected the different freight rates charged.
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accordingly was developed by the oil companies in Malaya 
then to recover increased transportation costs incurred by 
them at that time. The system of laddered price came into 
being in Malaya on September 1, 1956 where some areas exper­
ienced an increase in price of between $0.01 }d to $0,04 fd 
and some a -decrease in price of $0.01 fd in the period of 
transition between the old and the new system.
In the case of the former the increase mostly affected 
Kota Bharu (searfed depot) in the east coast of Malaya and 
I p’-oh, (inland depot) in the north-central of Malaya. In the 
case of the latter, Johor Bharu, at the southern tip of 
Malay Peninsula experienced a decrease in price from ‘$1.49 id 
to $1.46 ;d per I.G. (including a uniform tax of ' $0.73 sd 
per I.G.) because it is the nearest stopping point from
Singapore, which already had refineries.
As for Shell, the premium grade of petrol was first 
introduced into the market on October 30, 1956 following the
system of laddered price set forth by the regular grade
earlier. The difference in price between the 2 grades of
petrol was $0.20 id per I.G. to premium's favour.
Towards the end of 1956, the prices of petrol increas­
ed again with the increase in government duty of $0.27 id per 
I.G. The increase was affected countrywide. However, there 
was only a slight price increase of $0.01 id per I.G. for both 
grades of petrol and only in some selected areas where Shell
2.96'
had no depot at that time. Following from this, there were 
2 other occasions of price changes for both premium and 
regular petrol in 1957. At the beginning of 1957, there was 
a$0.02 fd per I.G. increase in the case of premium and regular 
but there was a decrease in the middle of that year for 
premium of up to $0.05/z? per I.G. (See Appendix 9A) .
As a result of the price adjustment for both regular
and premium petrol effective February 15, 1958 as shown in
the Table a and b in Appendix 9.A., the west coast of Peninsula 
Malaysia was carrying a small subsidy on behalf of the east 
coast of Peninsula Malaysia but the opportunity then was 
taken to reduce the subsidy and make the latter move realis­
tic. According to Shell, until the real laddered prices 
were in existence, the Federation would not be achieving the 
profit margin the oil companies considered reasonable. This 
resulted in the increase of Kota Bharu price to M$2.00 fd per 
I.G. At the same time too, the oil companies strongly argued 
that their expenses had increased in Peninsula Malaysia at 
a time when trade had been levelling off and thus there was
a necessery to make a small adjustment upwards in the motor-
4
gasoline price.
Towards the end of 1958, the government duty was 
increased by $0.20 jd to $1.20 fd per I.G. for both grades 
of oil; the government duty had been uniform for the past 
2 years at $1.00 fd per I.G. As a result of the revision 
in Bukom posted prices, the following price change which 
4 Private communications with Shell.
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became effective on February 8, 1960 has been introduced in
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. The downward revis­
ion of price resulted in the price of petrol being reduced by 
$ 0.20 per I.G. The same phenomenon was reported through­
out the year where there were 2 other price revisions result­
ing in a further decrease of$0.02 to$0.03 per I.G. for 
both grades of petrol.
The different in prices of petroleum products amongst 
cities in Peninsula Malaysia at any particular point of time 
was being determined by the "basing-point" system of distances 
of the various cities from the nearest depot - inland or 
sea-fed. As a result, petroleum product prices vary depending 
on the "zones" where the products were delivered and sold.
The zone system was for a long period the one establish­
ed by the Shell petroleum company in Malaya but since 1963 
the system had been developed and amended to incorporate 
the effect on delivery costs of new refineries and storage 
centres in Peninsula Malaysia. Each company was free to 
adopt its own system and there were variations between 
companies, but on the whole the major companies appear to 
operate similar zoning boundaries.
According to Shell sources, their selling price had 
been based or determined by a zone system with each zone
referred
graduated at 18 miles distance apart from the base.Zone 1 was,/ 
to as a ring up to 18 miles from the nearest basing point
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(depot) 7 Zone 2 between the next 19 to 30 miles and Zone 3
between 31 to 43 miles away and so on. Zone 1 had a
difference of$0.0l fd per I.G. in price to that of the base
point 7 $0.02 jd in the case of Zone 2 and $0.03 ^ per I.G. in
the case of Zone.3 and so on. Also a significant point of
difference in price between regions was seen in the case of
different locations of the base points - whether they were
inland or sea-fed depots. Variations in base point prices
were due to the accessibility and cheaper transport costs
5
expecially by sea.
Premium petrol was first introduced as a 90 octane 
material in 1957. In 1958, the quality was increased to 
93 octane until 1953 at which time octane ratings were 
further increased to 95. Again in 1964, the quality of 
premium petrol was further increased to 97 octane. During 
1959, retail price for premium petrol was $1.00 per I.G. 
at which level it remained till 1961. In 1961, duty for 
retail price of premium petrol were dropped by $0.06 per 
I.G. Following this, there were a series of petrol price 
drops until 1964 when the retail price of premium petrol 
was at$0.89 ^ per I.G. and this remained so for the next 
2 years till October 1966. (See Appendix 9A).
In October 1966, Shell improved the quality of both 
regular and premium grades of petrol. At the same time, it 
was necessary from the point of view of the oil companies 
to increase the retail prices by$0.03 ^ per I.G. for both
5 Ibid.
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grades in order to recover the additional cost of manufacture
During this time, petroleum products consumed in 
Peninsula Malaysia were largely produced locally from the 
Shell and Esso Refineries in Port Dickson. Crude oil process 
ing .in the Port Dickson refineries had influenced the reg­
ional differences in prices in different ways. Since after 
the opening of the refineries, the majority of the oil 
products consumed in Malaysia were no longer imported but 
produced within the country. There was a Port Dickson 
refinery cost in place of the landed cost at Port Kelang.
As a result the price in 1966 for premium petrol at Port 
Dickson was $2.13 jzf per I.G. while the highest price at 
Kota Bharu was $2.26 per I.G. The next cheapest place to 
Port Dickson was Port Kelang with $2.15 per I.G. and 
Kuala Lumpur at $2.16 ^ per I.G. The laddered price since 
1956 appeared to be complete and uniform to areas away 
from Port Dickson.
(b) The Period of Continuous "Price Wars"
Since the Second World War, competitive conditions 
in the Malaysian market had vastly changed as compared to 
before the war. Retail prices for petroleum products in any 
market varied greatly from time to time as market conditions 
changed. The conditions ranged from considerable uniformity 
in the prices of rival sellers or companies to wide variat­
ions in prices.
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Up to the beginning of 1960s competition amongst 
companies supplying petroleum products in Malaysia con- 
tinued to intensify as suppliers expanded their petroleum 
operations and made inroads into each other's marketing 
territories. At. this time there were only two oil market­
ing companies in Malaysia notably Shell Oil Company of Malaya 
and Standard Vacuum Oil Company of Malaya. But mass market­
ing of petroleum products were subject to change notably by 
the entry of new participants into the market such as Caltex, 
Mobil and British Petroleum in the early 1960s and 2 "in­
dependent" marketers of Singapore Petroleum Company and
6
Summit of Thailand in the early 1970s.
Owing to the post-war developments in product price 
structure discussed earlier, one can expect a fair degree of 
uniformity in the prices of oil products at major oil com­
pany outlets in any particular market because of several 
factors such as a) oligopolistic market and "follow-the- 
leader" tradition, b) homogeneous products differentiated 
only by brands and thus the absence of "consumers preference" 
and c) attempts by major companies to have some sort of 
resale price maintenance. However, the above guidelines were 
seldom being adhered to,resulting in the historical price 
structure of petroleum products in the past characterised by 
deep-seated competition amongst companies resulting in 
depressed prices and shortages of some products. The main 
reason for this has been the different market characteristics 
between petrol on the one hand, and other products such as
6 Information obtained from private communication with
Shell
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kerosene, diesel, fuel oil and others.. Petrol had all 
along been . considered by the oil companies as a product 
with its attendant brand-conciousness on the part of con­
sumers, unlike the rest which had been regarded as ' commodit- 
ies_. The newcomers in the 1960's Caltex, British Petroleum 
and Mobil had concentrated therefore their market penetrat­
ion into the commodity markets which was not affected by 
brand conciousness.
The kerosene market after the Second World War was by 
far the most sensitive, unpredictable and unstable market 
amongst all the oil products. The market was disrupted by 
the price "war" in kerosene which started in the beginning 
of 1960s and continued into the 1970s with great intensity 
and impact. The price wars, which led to one or several oil 
companies dropping their prices, were waged in order to 
maintain their market in the case of the already established 
companies and capturing some markets in the case of new 
companies making inroads into the business. Some companies 
even increased discounts to their distributors to meet the 
competitors' price. For the well established companies, like 
Shell and Standard Vacuum then, they had either to cut prices
'7
of their products or face a reduction in their market shares.
The price war amongst companies led to erosion of 
kerosene price in many areas where competition took place.
This price problem spread to many parts of the country. Many 
oil companies found it difficult to meet their sales volume
7 Information from an Oil Company1s Monthly Market Report
(Confidential)
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objectives and at the same time hold the line on price.
Despite the series of price wars waged by the various
oil company distributors, all major distributors at some
point of time managed to reach some sort of agreement to
8
stabilise kerosene price. However, this sort of arrangement 
was only good as a "stop-gap" measure and lasted only for a 
brief period as price war intensified again in the following 
year. The worst hit in this kerosene price wars were the 
new comers into the market. The newcomers being new and of 
small organization, experienced the difficulty of keeping a 
young organisation in competition with the much older, more 
experienced and better financed group when price erosion 
continued for an extended period of time.
As in the case of kerosene earlier, the post-war 
market for diesel oil was marked by competition amongst the 
various oil companies - established and newcomers. Compet­
ition between suppliers resulted in them to increase compet- 
ltive allowance to their dealers. Some oil companies made 
the competitive level worse with the offer of additional 
discounts. Another factor in the price competition in diesel 
was the "under the counter" offer made by the various oil 
companies to their competitive dealer in order to secure the 
market. This phenomenon was quite prominent amongst the 
newcomers into the industry. The decision taken by the 
established companies to counterbalance the offer to their 
dealers resulted in further price erosion in the diesel market.
8 - ^ 9  rbtd ♦
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Another feature in this competitive diesel market was the 
competition between retailers and wholesalers. This took 
the form of "cut throat" competition from both competitive 
service stations and wholesalers who sell through roadside 
skid tanks at low prices. However, in the middle of 1970, 
the government began to form pressure on unauthorised road­
side retailers and by the end of 1971 their numbers had been 
reduced and diesel retail price through service stations 
managed to hold fairly stable. In the meantime, there was 
another reason for the price problems faced in the retail 
diesel trade with service stations selling low grade diesel
imported from Indonesia towards the end of 1968. However,
10
this did not last for very long.
In studying petroleum product prices after the 
commencement of operation of the 2 Port Dickson refineries 
in 1963, it would be fruitful to provide a basis of orient­
ation by showing the relationship between Port Dickson prices 
and those of other areas in Peninsula Malaysia. The inherent 
difficulty in this type of analysis is that the price data 
of petrol, and diesel oil which prevail at any point of time 
are the posted/pump prices of major oil companies and they 
do not reflect any variations for them by (a) major company 
dealers who may offer secret or open concessions from the 
prevailing price or (b) small company dealers who usually 
must offer their product at a discount if they are to 
compete successfully. From 1966 to 1970, oil companies in 
Malaysia engaged in a series of competitors programme
' ~~ '    — ■■■-— ■ .   « ' 11 — ....... ■ tmmm,
10 Ibid.
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throughout the country using strategies such as coupons,
11
stamps and giveaways. In a moveaway from passive to aggress­
ive campaign, the competitive reactions of oil company deal­
ers to their rivals ranged from the offer of generous pre­
miums to slashing petrol prices by discounting up to $0.10 )& 
per I.G. in the northwest Malayan markets, "hawking"(selling 
cheaply)their petrol "below cost" to rival branch dealers 
and to transferring their gasoline stocks from underground
12
tanks into 46 I.G. drums in order to register meter sales. 
These wars in price went on throughout the 60s and into the 
early 1970s and disappeared with the oil crisis and embar­
goes and the intervention of the Government through the 
Control of Supplies Act in 1975. However, the problems of 
price instability and price wars gave way to product short­
ages, dislocations and hoarding in the retail level as a 
result of the fixation of price by the Government after 1974 
as we shall see later in Section 9.9.
9.2 Product Prices, Costs and Margins Between Domestic 
Refiners and Importers
In order to determine the price policy followed by 
the domestic refineries in structuring their product prices 
in the domestic market, we determine the price build-up of 
the different products imported into Malaysia by the non­
refining/importing companies of Mobil, Caltex and British 
Petroleum which are in competition with the locally refined 
petroleum products in the Malaysian market.
11 - 12 Ibid
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Table 9.1 shows the differentials between product 
price at Mobil's refinery at Jurong in Singapore (f.o.b. 
Jurong), and the Landed cost at Port Kelang between 1973 
and 1974. {the periods before and after the oil crisis as 
a comparison).
Column 1 in table 9.1 shows Pulau Bukom cargo prices 
on which the Jurong refinery based their product postings 
for the various years and these are converted into the 
equivalent of Malaysian value at the exchange rates pre­
vailing at that time (Column 2). Column 3 shows the actual 
costs for local shipping from Bukom or Jurong in Singapore 
to Port Kelang in Peninsula Malaysia with the appropriate 
duty (Column 4) and surtax (Column 5) added to give the 
landed cost at Port Kelang (in Column 6).
Prom the Table, the Average Product-mix for the 
5 products show that the landed cost in 1974 is almost twice 
the landed cost in 1973 due to the oil crisis. From the two 
periods it can be seen that the landed cost at Port Kelang 
is between 10 to 15 percent higher than that of Singapore's 
Pulau Bukom. Since the oil refineries in Malaysia are bound 
by their respective Refinery Agreements (Appendix 5A) to 
price their products not higher than their import-parity 
price, one can infer from this that Shell and Esso's price 
ex-refinery are the same as the landed price of imported 
products at Port Kelang.
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Table 9.2 shows the competitive margins between
refiners and non-refiners or importers based upon Kuala
Lumpur posted pump price of premium and regular petrol and
automotive diesel oil sold at the retail level. Because
the importing oil companies have to incur import duties and
import surtax (4% on CIF value) on petrol and none on diesel
oil (after 1974), and higher transport cost, the importers
are at a little disadvantage in their net margins - ' 14 /
per I.G. in the case of premium petrol,and 13 / per I.G. in
the case of regular petrol (except 3 /per I.G. in the case
*of automotive diesel-]- over the domestic oil refiners of 
Shell and Esso.*
From the competitive margin figures earlier between 
the importers and domestic refiners, we can also calculate 
the net margins of each of the 3 products concerned. If our 
assumption that the landed costs or prices at Port Kelang 
are the same as the Port Dickson ex-refinery costs/prices, 
the net margins for each of the 3 products are as follows:
Competitive Landed Price/ Net 
Margins or Refinery Margins 
($ per barieQ] Price/Costs ($/barrel)
Premium Petrol Refiners 1.60 7 1.185 0.4 22
Importers 1.4600 1.185 0.275
Regular Petrol Refiners 1.2868 1.041 0. 246
Importers 1.1490 1.041 0. 108
Diesel Oil (ADO) Refiners 1.0.22 0. 988 0. 034
Importers l.oso 0. 988 0.0.6?
This is because the Government began to exempt ADO 
from the payment of surtax in 1976 to encourage, imports 
to meet local requirements which were then in short supply. 
This made the product more competitive with local supplies.
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The net margins above show that the local refiners 
have an edge of one and half to two times on the average to 
that of the importers except for ADO where the reverse Is true.
Table 9.3 shows the differences in Retail and Non- 
Retail (Contractual and Consumer/Reseller Prices) in Malaysia 
both for domestic refiners and importers. The variations 
in price in each category reflect the different locations in 
which the products are sold. Consuming areas nearer to the 
refineries and landed port (in the case of imported products) 
are lower in prices than places in the interior.
Contractual and Consumer/Reseller prices are generally 
cheaper in most products as they are purchased in bulk and 
on long-term contracts. Contractual sales to Government 
departments and related institutions are tax-free. However/ 
with the 'stickness 1 of prices of some products in the up­
ward direction (price control by the Government)/ the 
variations between Retail and Non-Retail may not be signi­
ficant and at times may be to the Retail channel's favour.
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9.3 Costs Components in the Malaysian Petroleum Industry
In Table 9.4,it can be seen that the costs components 
of the industry constitute the biggest share- in the prices 
of petroleum products in Malaysia. Over the period consider 
ed, costs constitute about 74.7 percent on the average of 
all the total pricer taxes and duties 22.8 percent and 
profit margins 2.45 percent. In a study on a major oil 
producing country, Iran, Fesheraki found that since 1962, 
costs have contributed about half of the price taxes and 
duties two third and profit contribution the remainder. The 
reason for this difference in costs between the countries 
is explained below.
Table 9.5 gives the breakdown of the various costs 
components which are made up of raw material costs which 
include costs of crude, transport or freight costs and other 
charges from one oilfield to the refineries; refinery costs; 
distribution and marketing costs which include costs of 
administration, selling, depreciation and other overhead.
It is seen from the table that, during the period, raw- 
material costs were ■ the largest cost component, constitut 
ing about 83.3 percent of the total costs in the period.
This has been due to the oil-crisis which increases the 
crude oil costs to refineries in Malaysia as 80 percent of 
its crude requirements are imported from the Middle East. 
Refining costs, however, have generally declined over the 
period from 5.47 percent in 1970 to 2.10 percent in 1975
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as a result of low crude intake of refineries which registered 
an average of 4.29% of total cost. The increased utilizat­
ion of refinery capacities reduces production costs and 
increases the operating efficiency. Also distribution and 
marketing costs,, which constitute an average of 12.4% of 
total costs, have been reduced during the period from 12.4 
percent to 8.5 percent because of 2 factors, firstly, 
rationalisation of cheaper means of transport as a result 
of fuel oil increase since the oil crisis and secondly, 
transport costs per unit fell as volume handled by oil 
companies increased during this period.
However, in the case of Iran the opposite conclusion 
emerges. In the first instant, all the crudes processed by 
her refineries were from local sources. During 1962-1972 
transport costs were by far the largest component accounting 
for about 45 percent of the total costs. Product and trans­
port costs have generally declined over the period of study 
from 32 percent of the total in 1962 to 28 percent in 1972. 
Unlike the Malaysian case earlier, the distribution costs 
in Iran constitute about 25 percent of all costs.
9.4 Profitability of the Petroleum Industry
The profitability of the petroleum industry is govern­
ed by 2 main factors (a) internal factors such as raw-material, 
refining, transport and distribution costs and (b) external 
factors such as taxes and duties and government policies.
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Profit margins of the oil industry are, therefore, governed
by the changes in the above variables. Contrary to Fesher-
aki's’■ findings on the Iranian oil industry, where he showed
that profits on product sales rose from 8.6 percent in 1962
to 20.3 percent in 1973 of the average price, in the case
of Malaysia, our study shows the opposite. Profit margin^,
as shown in the Table 9.6 and graphed in Figure 9.1, have
fallen from $1.59 f£ per barrel in 1970 to $1.01 ft per
barrel in 1975. This has been due to 2 main reasons, (i)
price
the series of crude oil/increases since 1973 made the raw- 
materials and crude costs in the Malaysian refineries to 
increase considerably, and (ii) the limitations or control 
on price increase and supply of petroleum products forthcom­
ing into the market by the government under the Control of 
Supplies Act of 1961 in 1973 whereby increases on petroleum 
product prices allowed by the government at the retail level 
were small and thus oil companies could not recover their 
cost increases fully. (This will be discussed fully in t . 
■Section- -9 , 7 ) -
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AP and AC 
per barrel
Figure 9-1 ; R E L A T IO N S H IP  BETWEEN
AVERAGE PRICE,AVERAGE  
• COST T O  NET PROFIT
50-
40-
Net Profit
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
source •. Table 9.6
NPper barrel
M  " >3
.
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9.5 Refinery Production Costs and the Problem of
Joint Costs
The analysis obtained in the earlier section shows 
the relationship between average price and average cost of 
all petroleum products sold in Malaysia by the various oil 
companies from 1970 to 1975. In that analysis there is no 
indication of therelationship between individual product 
costs and prices.
The common approach used in getting closer look at 
individual petroleum product prices is by looking into the 
refinery production costs. Table 9.7 shows the refinery 
production costs in Malaysia from 197^ to 1975. In the first 
stage, a computation is made of the average refining costs for 
all the three refineries. Owing to the simple processing 
unit of Shell refinery at Lutong and the limited finished 
products produced by it, the average figures earlier do not 
reflect the true average cost of refining. Since the two 
refineries at Port Dickson in Peninsula Malaysia are of 
modern design and operating at technical efficiency and 
producing an array of finished products, their average costs 
are considered here.
From the Table, the movements of costs and prices 
showed a regular pattern of increase over the 6 years and 
to some extent indicate some policy of cost and pricing
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TABLE 9.7: REFINERY PRODUCTION...GOSTS IN MALAYSIA 
 ________FROM 1970 TO 1975'| U I _______
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975(;
REFINERY PRODUCTION(’000 bisu)
E S M B (ESSO) 10699 8786 9533 10065 10950 7638
S R C  (SHELL) 11604 11767 11301 10724 11429 10142
REFINERY COSTS ($'000)
E S M B 23400 22100 22600 22500 33200 37900
S R C 22052 22740 21928 27398 34814 33438
PRODUCTION COST 
PER BARREL (M $)
E S M B 2.19 2.515 2.37 2.24 3.03 3.72
S R C 1.90 1.93 1.94 2.55 3.05 3.30
AVERAGE COST PER 
BARREL 2.04 2.18 2.14 2.40 3.04 3.51
(lj Shell Lutong Refinery not Included. 
(2 ) till the end of 3rd Quarter.
Source: Data on Refinery Production and Refinery Costs obtained
from private communications with the refineries concerned 
as that of Tables 9.4, 9. Sand 9.6.
Production cost per barrel is then calculated thereof.
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in Malaysia. However, this analysis does not show any 
relationship between individual costs and prices of products. 
This apportining of prices and costs is important. For a 
successful operation, the industry must operate profitably, * 
i.e., total revenue must exceed total cost. However, 
allocating costs to individula products poses several problems. 
This problem of allocation appears In the Industry as it 
enters into the downstream operations - refining, transportation 
and marketing.
The costing of reginery products has been a perpetual 
controversy and exist since the existence of the modern 
refining industry. There have been as many suggestions to 
solutions as there are problems. However, none can provide 
an adequate and satisfactory answer.
In the petroleum industry, the problem of joint-costs 
i.e., apportioning costs amongst products enters into the 
downstream operations particularly at the refinery operations 
stage. It is difficult to estimate the cost of refining a 
gallon of product out of a given crude oil. This is because 
each is a joint-product. It is made along with other products, 
e.g., petrol, diesel, kerosene, fuel oil and even 'residuals' 
such as asphalts and bitumen. The essential difficulty inherent 
in the joint: ^  product costing is the allocation amongst them 
the costs of raw materials, equipment, salaries, depreciation, 
etc.
In the refinery, for a barrel of crude oil input 
several products are produced as output. They are produced 
whether some of them are desired or not by the oil company. 
The production function of a refinery can only vary these 
proportion -to a very limited extent. It is possible to 
increase the output of one product while decreasing the 
other a little. Although kerosene, for example, is consider­
ed to be ■ undesirable by an oil company in Malaysia because of 
low price in the market the production of a certain amount 
of this product is unavoidable. This is also true in the 
case of furnace oil in some countries. In these two cases, 
no cost has been incurred in order to produce kerosene or 
furnace oil, since they were not desired by the refining 
companies concerned, and to attribute a part of the total 
cost of refining either equal to its proportion in the total 
volume of oil production or to a proportion in the total sales 
would be wrong. And any attempt in allocating costs in
this fashion is meaningless. Stigler in The Theory of Price
1.4 .
and Porter m  Petroleum Accounting Practices pointed out 
the fallacy of allocating joint-costs. In the case of firms, 
Stigler wrote that the principle of profit maximization is 
where Price is equal to Marginal Cost (P=MC) and it is at 
the minimum. Porter pointed out the impossibility of
1? G.J. Stigler, THE THEORY OF PRICE (New York:
Macmillian, 1966), pp. 162-65.
M. Porter, PETROLEUM ACCOUNTING PRACTICES, (New York, 
1966), p. 419.
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attributing particular operating costs to particular pro­
ducts because of the complexity of costs in refining.
According to Porter, the closest that one could get is by 
an arbitrary fashion.
From the economic point of view, however, although it 
is impracticable to allocate total costs to individual pro­
ducts in a joint-cost industry on an average cost basis, it 
would be better to decide prices on the basis of marginal 
cost basis to overcome the joint-cost problem. It is possible 
to compute the marginal cost of production of certain indivi­
dual oil products. If a refinery decides to increase the 
proportion of light distillates such as petrol because of 
the increased market demand and high price, it can do so by 
installing a catalytic cracking unit. The marginal cost of 
installing the new unit is roughly equal to the total 
cost of installation of the unit and the discounted value of 
the loss of earnings over the whole life of the unit because 
of a fall in the proportion of other oil products. This 
estimated marginal cost of increased production in petrol 
plays a decisive role in determining whether the unit is 
to be installed or not. Unless the additional earnings over 
the whole life of the cracking unit, resulting from the 
increase in the proportion of motor spirit, less the dis­
counted present value of the loss in earnings over the whole 
life of the cracking unit .is at least equal to the cost of 
installation and the future discounted cost of maintenance of 
the cracking unit, it would not be economically feasible for 
a refinery to install a cracking unit.
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9.'>6 The Structure of Oil Product Prices After the Oil
Crisis of 1973.
$•6.1 Rationale for Product Price Increases by Oil
Companies
In Malaysia and elsewhere any proposal for product 
price increases by oil companies will have to be submitted 
to the Government for approval. For the past 4 years (1974 
to 1977) after the oil crisis, there were 4 price increases 
approved by the Malaysian government. The arguments for 
and rationale of product price increases advanced by both 
the Government and oil companies are discussed below.
Following the substantial crude oil price increases 
imposed by OPEC producing countries/governments on January 
1, 1974 proposals for consumer petroleum product price
increase in Malaysia were discussed by the oil companies in 
Malaysia with the Government. The oil companies involved 
were Shell Malaysia Trading Company, Esso Standard Malaysia 
Limited, Caltex Oil (Malaysia), British Petroleum and Mobil 
Oil Malaysia Limited.
Before going into the arguments for and the rationale 
of product price increases advanced by the oil companies, 
there is a need first of all to look at the method of cal­
culating Crude Cost Build-Up and Recoveries (or in short
CCBR). This is the central or key issue in the whole argu­
ment of product price increases.
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There are several steps involved in the calculation 
of Crude Cost Build-Up and Recoveries. The first step is 
that of calculating the weighted average cost (F.O.B.) of 
the actual crude oil processed at the company's refinery.
The second step is by adding the actual costs for local 
shipping (freight at LR AFRA) of the weighted average of 
the crudes earlier from overseas sources to Port Kelang - 
the port of handling in West Malaysia. This gives the 
Landed Cost of Crude in US $ per barrel, (CIF crude price) 
which is the third step. This is subsequently converted 
into the Malaysian equivalence of crude value (M$) on which 
a factor of 1.055 is multiplied to it to take into account 
ocean losses and standard refinery loss which together account 
for about 5.5%. The next step is to deduct the recovery
settled in the last round of price increase (if available) 
in order to get the Net Cost Recovery required at that time 
(in M$ per barrel). Three other considerations have been 
added into the crude cost build-up. For importers, the 
element of surtax - a sort of penalty tax imposed on import­
ers, has to be added on to the cost of crude to get the 
Landed Cost of crude at Port Kelang. Two other items were 
included especially in the recent submissions for price 
increases. They were Freight Cost Increase and increases 
in financing and operating costs of oil companies during 
the period.
(i) Price Increases of January, 1974
As a result of the development in the crude oil price
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negotiation between OPEC and oil companies stated earlier 
in section 8-2-2 OPEC decided to increase the posted price of 
crude oils from January 1, 1974. They were raised to a level 
nearly 4 times higher than the prices that had been in force 
in early October 1973. Most of the price submissions by the 
oil companies made to The Government incorporated the cost 
of ocean freight- The oil companies felt that this item had 
not been given adequate consideration in the past price nego­
tiations. They strongly felt that freight costs, being a 
major component of their landed cost must form part of the 
basis for determining the recovery of crude increases. This 
is because the long term trend is likely to be upwards due 
to increased cost of tankers and other operating costs.
Another argument put forth by oil companies in support 
of their application for product price increase was that of 
increases in financing and marketing operations costs which 
have not been considered in the past negotiations because 
increasing economies of scale had enabled them to absorb 
them. With the crude price hike, volume growth can no long­
er be assured and thus their ability to absorb these costs 
was negated. In addition, they argued that there had been 
substantial further increases in cost of labour, machinery 
and spare parts, and chemicals, catalysts, additives used 
in refining, as well as in land transportation and other 
marketing expenses. Financing costs were increasing sub­
stantially due to higher working capital requirements emanat­
ing from escalated crude costs and due to higher interest
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rates. The cumulative effect of these increases according 
to the oil companies was reaching proportions which can no 
longer be offset by efficiency improvements and therefore 
it was necessary to reflect these increases in product 
prices.
(ii) Price Increase of October 1975
The second application for product price increases 
by the oil companies was in October 1975. This followed the 
announcement by OPEC that effective October 1, 1975 the price
of Arab Light Marker crude had been increased by 10 percent 
from its 1974 price. Other crudes also increased in price .
Sometime in December 1974 and more so during the early 
part of 1975, the U.S. $ weakened against the Malaysian ring­
git so that the increased crude prices in January 1974 were 
largely offset by the lower Malaysian Ringgit (Dollars) cost 
of purchasing crude oil and petroleum products. However, 
in July 1975 the US $ began to strengthen rapidly so that 
by August 1975 the Malaysian Ringgit (M $) cost of purchasing 
crude oil and petroleum products had increased to levels 
higher than that of November 1974. This situation continued, 
so that the offset of a weak US $ is no longer available to 
cushion the effect of crude oil increases since January 1974.
With such large increases in the cost of oil companies 1 
raw-materials, oil companies reiterated that they were still
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bearing the burden of under-recovery from the previous 
increases of January 1, 1974. They claimed that they cannot
continue to trade normally without increasing the price of 
products they sell. The oil companies concerned applied for 
price increases in October 1975.
(iii) Price Increases of January 1977
Arising from the decision of OPEC to increase prices 
of crude oil with effect from January 1, 1977, the oil comp­
anies in Malaysia again submitted requests for retail price 
increases for the 4 main retail products. In view of the 
multi-tier price increase announced by OPEC, the various 
companies have requested different levels of price increases. 
The companies at the request of the Ad Hoc Committee sub­
sequently submitted a joint application. The individual 
companies1 requests were as follows : Shell 8.1 ^ per I.G.,
Esso 7.9 jzf per I.G., Caltex 8 / per I.G., Mobil 8.1 fd per I.G. 
and BP 10.7 $d per I.G. The joint industry requests was on 
the average at 8.6 yd per I.G. The requests comprised crude 
and operating costs increases.
The applications made for product price increases by 
the various oil companies to the Malaysian Government from 
1973 to 1967 is tabulated in Table 9.8 below:
0
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Table 9.8 Product Price Increases Requested by the 
Oil Companies at Retail Levels (in jd per 
across the products)
Name of Company 1973 1974 1975
Shell Malaysia 11.28 39.8 23.7
Trading Sdn. Berhad
Esso Malaysia 11.28 46.6 33.6
Berhad
BP Malaysia Berhad 12.8 37.30 33.6
Mobil Oil Malaysia 11.34 36.70 23.1
Sendirian Berhad
Caltex Oil Malaysia 14.7 46.7 35.0
Limited
Average Requested by 12.28 41.42 29.8
Oil Cos.
Average Approved by 13.2 29.4 27.2
the Govt.
I .G.
1977
8.1
7.9
10. 7 
8.1
8.0
8. 56
1.525
Source : Private Communications with PETRONAS.
329
9 . Government Approval for Product Price Increases
As a result of the oil companies1 various submissions
to the Government earlier, all petroleum products prices at all
installations and depots in Malaysia were increased with a
lag period of between 3-4 months after the submissions or
requests. The various price increases for petroleum products
at retail level approved by the Government from 1973 to
*
1977 are shown in Table 9.9. and graphed in Figure $.2 .
The first price approval by the Government after the
oil crisis was in December 22, 1973 when all petroleum products
prices at all installations and depots in Peninsula Malaysia 
and East Malaysia were increased. Ex-pump prices for 4 pro­
ducts at all locations were also increased correspondingly 
and by the same amount as shown in the Table except kerosene 
which remained at the old level of $0.71 ^ per I.G. For the
East Malaysian state of Sarawak effective January 31, 1974
excise duties on petrol was raised from 90 $6 per I.G. to 
$1.20 f£ per I.G. in line with the import duties. (See Appendix 
9A). Consequently the ex-pump price of regular petrol to 
their dealers were increased by ’30 per I.G.
The second product price increase approved by the 
Government during this period was on May 9, 1974 about 5
months after the first approval. Two changes on approval 
were made this time compared to the price increase of December 
1973. From the Table 9.9 earlier, kerosene was allowed a
■k
Product Price increases before 1973 are included in the 
Figure 9.2 for comparative purposes only. This helps to 
show the trends of the various product prices in Malaysia.
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revision of price upward by$0.05 j£ per I.G. and automotive 
diesel oil was exempted from price increase. The allowance 
of kerosene increase to the oil companies was absorbed by 
the Government by reducing tax of similar amount of $0.05 ^ 
per I.G. The Government gave a tax reduction of $0.20 ^ to 
oil companies to enable them to reap the extra margin and at 
the same time allowing the diesel price .to be at the old 
level. As a result of this announcement, prices of premium 
and regular petrol, kerosene and fuel oil rose up again at 
Kuala Lumpur pump-price registering the highest in the history 
of product price increases in Malaysia. However, the oil 
companies were dissatisfied as the price increases and duty 
reductions (except for petrol or gasoline) were far below 
the levels proposed by the oil industry and took no account 
of the industry's needs for retroactive recovery of crude 
and product cost increases incurred since January 1974.
For the next 2 years from the second price increases, 
the price of the 5 products mentioned earlier remained stable 
in the retail trade channel. However, following another 
price hike in October 1975, and subsequent application by 
the oil companies for product price increase, the Government 
announced price increases on February 16, 1976 and effective
the following day. In this third price increase approval, 
the imposition of a nominal duty on kerosene was made and 
according to a. Government source this was for control pur­
poses and the oil companies could pass on the duty to the 
wholesalers but the retail price remained unchanged. The
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Government instead promised to reimburse the oil companies 
by way of subsidy o f $0.30 £ per I.G. for every gallon of 
kerosene sold. The Government would then use the increased 
duty revenue from gasoline to subsidise kerosene.
9 .§' Effects of Product Price increases on Trade Channels
CRetail and Non-RetailI
. .9 > 8 .1 Retail Trade Channel
The crude oil price hikes in 1973, 1974, 197 6 and 
recently in 1977 together with the subsequent licensing of 
petrol, diesel and kerosene as controlled items in the 
retail market has led to an uneven distribution in the list 
price adjustments in individual products. The problems 
have been magnified as a result of the past price adjustments 
approved by the Government which were insufficient to allow 
for full recovery of increased 'crude' costs by the local 
refiners. The approved adjustment have led to a skewing 
of the price structure of rhese 3 products in the market, 
namely motor spirit known as petrol or mogas, diesel and 
kerosene. The past price revisions of 1973, 197 4 and 1976 
had been generally granted largely in the form of signi­
ficantly higher petrol prices with only minimum adjustments 
to diesel and kerosene prices.
Table 9.9 shows the product price changes before 
and after the international oil crisis. Table 9.10 and 9.11 
show the product prices and demand for petrol and diesel 
for the periods between 1971 and 1976h
Table 9.10 shows the widening of differentials between 
the Premium petrol and Regular petrol retail prices (the 
quoted price is the Kuala Lumpur pump price}. The price
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TABLE 9.10: PENINSULA MALAYSIA; PETROL PRICES AND DEMAND
Kuala Lumpur Price M0/1.G. -
1971
(June)
1972 1973 
(Dec.)
1974
(May)
1975 1976 
(Feb.)
(a) PRICES
Premium Petrol 
Regular Petrol 
Difference
2.25
2.08
0.17
-
2.59
2.32
0.27
3.10
2.75
0.35
3.38
3.00
0.38
(b) DEMAND ('000 barrels)
Premium Petrol 
Regular Petrol
2240 • 
918
2571
929
3193
988
3428
1369
3829
1446
2057 
(4 yr 
753 
(4 yr
% Premium/To tel. 
Petrol 70.9 73.5 76.4 71.5 72.6 73.2 
(i yr
°/o Premium/Total 
Petrol (Retail 
Level)
41.5 44.3 43.7 43.9 42.8 42.6 
(£ yr
Source: Data for prices obtained from Market Research Dept., 
Trading Malaysia Berhad.
Shell
TABLE 9.11: PENINSULA MALAYSIA:DIESEL OIL 
DEMAND
PRICES AND
Kuala Lumpur Price M$/l.G.
1971
(June)
1972 1973
(Dec.
1974 
) (June)
1975
(March)
1976
(Feb.)
(a) PRICES
Retail
Commercial
Difference
0.77
0.64
0.13
0.77
0.64
0.13
0.88
0.81
0.07
0.96
1.01
(0.05)
1.00
1.10
(0.10)
1,18
1.28
(0.10)
(b) DEMAND(‘000 barrels)
Retail 
°/> Growth
1176
8.7
1 2 8 6
9.4
1453
13.0
2101
44.6
2468
17.5
—
Commercial 
°/o Growth
6056
4.7
6637
9.6
7005
5.5
7086
1.2
6932
(2.2)
—
io Retail/Total 16.3 16.2 17.2 22.9 26,3 -
Source: As above.
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differential has widened from $o*17 / in 1971 in favour of
premium to $.0.38 / in 1976 (February) having increased 
through
gradually/ 0.27 / in 1973 (December) and $.0.35 / in 1974 
(May). In the case of demand for premium in relation to 
total petrol, the ratio has increased from 70.9% in 1971 to 
73.2% in 1976 hitting its peak at 76.4% before the announce­
ment of price increase in 1973 (December).
The substantial fuel price increase at the end of 
1973 (before the oil crisis) had not had any strong negative 
effect on the Malaysian motoring public. This was reflected 
in the maintenance of retail motor fuel sales at that time 
and only a little slow-down in sales of small and medium 
sized cars. However, there was a slippage in retail premium 
gasoline sales without any corresponding gain in the regular 
gasoline after the price increase became effective as shewn 
in the downturn of the graph in Figure 9.3 after January 1973 
- till the end of the year. This tended to support field 
reports that Malaysian motorists were becoming more and more 
travel conscious to save fuel expenditure in' the early stage 
of crisis. However, the decrease in sales of premium petrol 
was small at around 5% over the period.
The conclusion from the above analysis is that the 
substantial price differential has an immediate but not 
sustained effect on the ratio. In the medium term forecast 
of one oil company, price differential was assumed to remain 
at the current level of $0.38 / per I.G. until the ratio
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Figure  9*3 E f fe c t  of Price D i f fe r e n t ia l  B e t w e e n
Premium^. M  a g a s 
Prem i um M o q as^ Premium/ 
Total M o gas P r ic e  d i f f e r e n t  
b e t w e e n  
p r e m i u m  &
(M jz5 /IG)
7 5 -
74-3
7 6 * 2 2 ^  73'22
72-
70*9/.
feb!76
3 8 / 40
may 74
3 5 £
30d e c / 7 3
274
20
10
. 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 79 7 51 9 7 2971
source: Shell and Table 9.10
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gradually rises to 74.7 percent by 1978. In the short run
the demand for petroleum products is very price inelastic
and this is particularly true for certain products such as
petrol for which no substitute is available. Some American
studies suggest .that the price elasticity of demand for petrol
might be as low as 0.13 and in Malaysia it has been computed 
15
as 0.22. '
In the case of diesel oil, Table 9.11 shows the price 
differential between retail ADO and commercial ■ ADO out­
lets widened very greatly in an opposite direction to the 
retail market's favour i.e. the commercial market has a price 
very much above the retail channel by $0.10 ^ per I.G.
Market growth over the years has tended to favour the 
retail sales outlets which registered a 17.5 percent increase 
in 1975 compared to only 8.7 percent in 1971 (doubling the 
growth rate). Performance in the commercial channels register­
ed a negative growth of 2.2 percent during the period as a 
result of the shifting of demand from commercial to retail 
outlets caused by the great difference in price. Despite 
measures taken by the Government and the oil companies to curb 
the flow of automotive diesel oil (ADO) to commercial sector, 
the same oil company quoted earlier forecasts percentage 
retail/total ratio to remain around the 1975 level. Figure
9.3 and 9.4 show the effects of the price differential on 
the demand ratio between products.
15 See Adnan, M.A. op cit.
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F jg ure 9:4 Gas O i l : R e t a i l /C o n s u m e r  Pr ice
D if fe ren t ia l  versus Product Demand30
.Price Differential 
e t a i I V o 1 u m  e/HTo t a 1
26-3Z
2 2 9;
20
17-2,
13
10
1971 1 9 7 51 9 73
.source , shell and Table 9.11
-r-wvm/ i
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However, amongst the controlled oil products mentioned 
earlier, kerosene sold at the retail for domestic lighting 
and cooking purposes showed the most sensitivity with regard 
to price and supply. For socio-economic reasons the Govern­
ment has allowed only an absolute minimum in the increase of 
kerosene prices whilst placing higher increases on retail 
petrol and to a lesser extent on automotive diesel. Table 
9.9 earlier shows that the increase in price of kerosens has 
been minimal from $0.17 jd per I.G. to 1$0.82 fd per I.G. 
over the period under consideration compared to non-retail 
market sales of between . $1.10 fd and . $1.15 fd per I.G.
depending on the purahase agreement.
The two-tier pricing system adopted for diesel and 
kerosene has led to the free-flow from a low-price market 
to a high-price market leading to occasional shortages, 
hoarding, smuggling and profiteering of the two products.
One obvious reason, however, lies in the much higher retail 
price of kerosene in Thailand,where this product could fetch 
as high as $ 0.50 jd per I.G.above the price -than in Malaysia^. 
It is significant that the three States in the north of 
Peninsula Malaysia (Perlis, Kedah and Kelantan) which exper­
ience problems of shortage border on Thailand. Also since 
January 1974, Summit Petroleum Company of Thailand ceased 
their marketing activities in the states of Kedah and Perlis
\6 . Information from Monthly Market Report of an oil
Company (Confidential)
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where they have been supplying a monthly average of 100,000
I.G. of kerosene. Their sudden withdrawl affected the 
market.
For comparative purposes, it would be fruitful to 
compare diesel and kerosene prices in the neighbouring 
countries of Malaysia such as shown in Table 9.12.
Tab1e 9.12 Diesel and Kerosene Retail Price in Selected 
Neighbouring Countries in 1975 
(5 Asean Capital Cities and 1 Non-Asean City)
Location
Asean Cities
M $ Equivalent per I.G.* 
Diesel Kerosene
1. Bangkok 0.84 0.87
2. Jakarta 0.58 0.47
3. Manila 1.51 1.40 to 1.63
4. Singapore 1.00 1.30
5. Kuala Lumpur 1.00 0.81
Non-Asean City
1. Hong Kong 2.29 1.68
Conversion : * M$ 1 = 12.6 Bhats US $ 1 = MS2.56
- H.K. $ 1.94 = 7.5 Pesos
= S ; $ 1.00 = 415 Rupiah,
Source : Private Communications with PETRONAS.
£
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The prices of kerosene were higher in the neigh­
bouring countries compared to the price in Malaysia. This 
makes kerosene price in Malaysia to be the lowest in the 
region except Jakarta.
y 0). 8 . 2 Non-Retail Trade Channels
Customer contract or non-retail prices are either 
tied to Pulau Bukom postings in Singapore or Rajs Tanura in 
the Persian Gulf and the Government has no control or 
influence with regard to price level in this market. As a 
result of anouncement by OPEC of price increase for crudes 
and products on June 2, 1973, oil companies in Malaysia
increased their contract prices to customers tied to Ras 
Tanura 's posted prices effective June 8, 1973. The products
affected were Regular Petrol or Mogas, Kerosene, Automotive 
Diesel Oil, Marine Diesel Oil, Light and Heavy Fuel Oil.
And effective June 14, 1973 their contract prices to customers 
tied to Pulau Bukom posted prices on Premium Mogas, Regular 
Mogas, Kerosene, Automotive Diesel Oil, Industrial Diesel 
Oil, Marine Diesel Oil and Marine Fuel Oil were all increased.
The announcement by OPEC and the subsequent price 
increases in petroleum product postings in the non-retail 
channels have resulted in various reactions by the non-retail 
customers as well as the oil companies.
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Sometime in October 1973, wholesalers in north and 
central Peninsula Malaysia obtained higher inventories than 
usual in anticipation of product shortage and price increase 
as a result of the Middle East Oil embargoes. At the same
'I
time, the wholesalers'selling activities in the market place 
were stepped up because of similar speculation by smaller 
resellers and sundry shop owners.
Most major oil companies increased prices for lubric­
ating oils and greases as well as automotive specialities 
around November 1973. General discounts for wholesale 
automotive diesel oil were reduced by ■ M6 fd per I.G. by all
competing companies in early November. Other special dis-
17counts to distributors were withdrawn at the same time.
In conjunction with that, special automotive diesel oil 
discounts given to service stations were reduced -by up to M6 ^ 
per I.G. And effective from December 1, 1973 all discounts
for ADO to service stations were eliminated and dealers were 
expected to sell at pump prices throughout the country. The 
November 2 and 27 increases in posted prices amounting to
12.3 fd per I.G. for ADO and 13.1 fd per I.G. for Light Fuel 
Oil (LFO) passed onto contract customers tied to these 
postings. Some oil companies were reported to have imposed 
a premium charge of 10 fd per I.G. for ADO sales to whole­
salers which were above their historical average monthly 
volume. This move was believed to have been implemented to
17. Information from Monthly Market Report of an oil
company.
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ensure fair distribution of products and to prevent hoard­
ing by wholesalers^.
In the meantime, the product supply position in 
Malaysia remained "tight" particularly for the 3 importers 
- British Petroleum, Caltex and Mobil. One oil company was 
reported to have implemented a voucher - system for the 
sales of kerosene and ADO to wholesale market. Every cust­
omer was issued with vouchers concerning its monthly allotted 
volume. This was done to ensure effective policing of 
volume allocated to customers.
Again following January 1, 1974 crude price 
increases, and the February 1974 product posting increases 
in the Persian Gulf and Pulau Bukom respectively, the indust­
ry increased all escalating contract prices accordingly. 
Because increases in list prices at retail levels were await­
ing Government concurrence at that time, contract prices were 
then substantially above list prices. This caused some 
contract buyers to protest their price increases but oil 
companies were firm in insisting they pay the escalated price. 
Some firm-priced contracts were converted to contracts with 
price-revision clause on 30 days notice. At the same time 
selling prices to these customers were substantially increas­
ed .
18. Monthly Market Report, ibid.
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Towards the end of April 1974, all companies increased 
ADO, IDO and LFO prices to the commercial and wholesale trades. 
With this increase, wholesale and commercial ADO prices were 
1 / to 3 jz! per I.G. above retail prices. The differential 
of 2 fd per I.G. between ADO and IDO, however, remained. At 
that level, LFO price were also revised upwards drastically 
to almost the same level as that of ADO and IDO to wholesale 
trade and non-contract commercial accounts. And effective 
April 15, lube oil prices were also increased upwards to 
recover increased costs. In the same period, all oil com­
panies increased their ex-terminal kerosene prices to dis­
tributors by 7 fd per I.G., thus reducing distributor margins
19from 14 fd per I.G. to 7 fd per I.G. .
During this time ADO commercial bulk sale prices were 
already 1 fd per I.G. to 2 fd per I.G. above pump price ex­
terminal. Competitors also increased dealer tank wagon prices 
by 3 fd per I.G. thus reducing the dealer margins from 7 fd 
per I.G. to 4 fd per I.G.
In the case of fuel oil, oil companies were ignoring 
the Government's announcement 20 fd per I.G. increase in fuel 
oil as the resulting list price quoted by the Government 
at 65 fd per I.G. was well below the level at which market 
prices for fuel oil had risen by the end of April 1974. The 
oil companies tried to maintain non-contract fuel oil prices 
within correct competitive levels of 92 fd to $1.00 per I.G.^'0,
19. Monthly Market Report, ibid.
2.0, Monthly Market Report, ibid.
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With the bulk ADO prices to wholesalers/commercial
trades having been escalated above pump prices and with the
increasing tighter credit, the convenience offered by
service stations had become an attraction to commercial
consumers such as vehicle operators, taxis and lorries.
Also with a price differential of 10 / per I.G. between
service stations in Johore Bharu (the southern most town in
Peninsula Malaysia boardering Singapore) and Singapore since
March 1974, all trucks plying between the 2 countries were
purchasing their ADO in Johor Bharu rather than in Singapore.
In order to minimise ADO consumption at retail channels
volume limitations at January - September 1973 average levels
were reimposed since May 9, 1974 and dealer margins on ADO
had been reduced from 7- >z5 per I.G. to 4 / per I.G. to limit
21
the incentive for dealers to sell ADO" . Thus the favourable 
retail performance reflected by substantial increase in retail 
offtakes or sales during this period was an artificial demand 
resulting from purchases from service stations by commercial/ 
industrial consumers who had to pay higher prices for bulk 
purchases from their traditional suppliers.
Following the price increase announced by the Govern­
ment on February 17, 1976 various oil companies moved up 
their industrial gas oil (IGO) prices varying between$0.07 / 
per I.G. to$0.08 / per I.G. to $1.24 / per I.G. (delivered). 
And on March 22, 1976 oil companies increased their dealer
Monthly Market Report, ibid.
&
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prices for gas oil or ADO by a further 2 / per I.G. to $1.26 
22
/ per I.G."
Sometime in January 1976, dyed kerosene was introduced 
both for domestic and industrial consumers. All oil com­
panies in Malaysia since then were selling blue-dyed kerosene 
for domestic use and colourless kerosene for industries.
Owing to the significant price difference between wholesale 
and commercial accounts as discussed in section 9.10 (a) 
earlier, the introduction of blue-dyed kerosene was to 
inhibit the wholesalers from selling kerosene meant for 
domestic purposes to the industrial sector where prices were 
substantially higher. Also this strategy would ensure 
adequate kerosene supplies for domestic users. The dyed 
kerosene was aimed at reducing adulteration of gasoline with 
kerosene.
9.9. Comparative Petroleum Product Prices Recoveries
Table 9.13 compares the 4 petroleum product prices 
in three of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
member countries of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The 
Table compares the retail pump price, duty, refund and 
recovery given to oil companies in their respective countries 
on the 4 products mentioned earlier.
22 Monthly Market Report, ibid.
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Before the oil crisis, petroleum product prices 
in Malaysia for the 4 petroleum products were almost the 
same as that of Singapore. As a result of the price increas­
es in February 1976, comparative prices between the two 
countries differed especially with regard to premium and 
regular petrol. Prior to the price increases approved by 
the Singapore Government on April 21, 1977 the levels of
recovery in Malaysia for the 4 products, except diesel, are 
higher than that of Singapore. In the case of Thailand, 
the levels of recovery are much lower than Malaysia despite 
the recent price increases approved by the Thai Government 
on March 17, 1977.
The factors affecting products price recovery among 
the 3 countries which border each other were due to the 
differences in local conditions. In the case of Singapore, 
the oil companies reasoned that the weighted average recovery 
obtained by the oil companies is more or less the same as 
that of Malaysia. However, in the case of Thailand, it was 
explained that the net recovery obtained by oil companies is 
higher due to lower investment in service stations and lower 
commissions given to dealers. Unlike in Malaysia and Singa­
pore, dealers in Thailand build their own service stations 
and are only given$0.Q5 fd per I.G. commission, whereas in 
Malaysia the oil companies had to build their own service 
stations inspite of higher commissions given to dealers at 
between $0.15 fd to $3.17 fd per I.G. for premium, $0.14 fd per 
I.G. for regular and $0.13 fd per I.G. for diesel.
3.49
In view of the disparity in prices of petroleum 
products ajnongst the .3 countries discussed earlier, it 
would appear that the oil companies have benefited from the 
over-recovery in Malaysia,particularly the bigger companies 
with bigger market shares in the country.Despite the recent 
increase in prices of the 4 products in Singapore and 
Thailand, the levels of recovery obtained by oil companies 
from premium and regular petrol in these 2 countries are 
lower than the existing levels of recovery in Malaysia.
9.110 Actions/Measures Taken by the Government in Relation 
to Product Supplies
$-1 10.1 The Implementation of Control of Supplies Act of 1961
As with most other countries throughout the world
during the early period of 1970's, Malaysia continued to
the
experience pressure from/rapid pace of inflation and increas­
ing shortage of certain products for her development since 
the turn of the 1973. During tdis period too, crude oil prices 
quadrupled as a result of rising "nationalism" among oil 
producing countries, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. After 
1973, OPEC emerged as a powerful organization possessing the 
power to control and regulate the production volume of oil 
in their countries and "dictate" oil prices unilaterally.
With this increases in material prices (crude) reflected in 
the product prices, there was an 'apparent' product shortages 
all over the country especially kerosene. This unsettled
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situation had been caused by the 'under-recoveries 1 in 
product prices approved by the Malaysian Government as a 
result of the crude price increases after 1973. This was 
compounded by the practice of hoarding, smuggling and 
profiteering.
In the light of the prevailing supply problem at 
that time, the Ministry of Trades and Industry (MTI) imple­
mented the regulation under the Control of Supplies Act of 
1961‘ . This followed the formation of the National Consult
ative Council in February 1974 by the Malaysian Government 
as a step to contain the increasing inflation in the country 
it took amongst other things by announcing on March 8, 1974, 
that a special licence would be required for trading in 
such staple goods as sugar, wheat, flour, cooking oil, 
kerosene and fertilisers. This new licensing system, which 
was authorized by the control of Supplies Act of 1961, was 
expected to strengthen considerably the Government's legal 
position in the anti-hoarding campaign. Earlier to this 
too, the Government made petrol, diesel and kerosene as 
licenced items effective from March 1, 1974. Every manu­
facturer, wholesaler and retailers of any of these items 
declared licenced have to get a valid licence to trade. In 
the licence, all places of storage, business and quantities 
•allowed to be stored at any one time are imposed mainly to 
ensure continuous supply of the 4 products' '
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Kerosene was made a licenced article on March 21,
1974 and as such all manufacturers and distributors have to 
obtain licences to deal in the commodity quotas have been 
stipulated in the licenses allowing for a specific quantity 
to be kept at any one time and records of sales and purchases 
have to be maintained. Powers have also been provided for 
the direction of sales to areas affected by shortages. Un­
limited purchases by industrial users from distributors 
and .retail outlets have also been discouraged and new con­
ditions imposed on the licensees to ensure continuity of 
supplies and to check the diversion of sales meant for domestic 
household consumption.
Before the declaration of control of Supplies Act of 
1961 in October 31, 1973, there was no regulation pertaining 
to the control of supplies. The Ministry of Primary Industry 
then had the power of approving price increases with the 
approval and in consultation with the Prime Minister's 
Department. Later,this power was transferred to MTI. MTI 
took the initiative of setting up a Special Committee on 
Prices to deal with the ever increasing problems of petroleum 
product price increases. Since 1974, the first Price Committee 
was set up for kerosene in March, 1974 and the second one for 
diesel fuel at the end of October 1974. Since then the MTI 
is in charge of supplies of essential products .-including 
petroleum in Malaysia.
352
9.10.2 Government Policy Guidelines for Price Increases
As a result of the oil crisis of 1973 and the sub­
sequent applications for product price increases by the oil 
companies in Malaysia, the Government has devised some policy 
guidelines in determining the new price structure for petrol­
eum products at the retail levels in Malaysia. The basis on 
which the guidelines are based is on the social and economic 
set-up of the Malaysian community especially the effects of 
increases in these 4 controlled products on the rural poor 
and the low-income group.
As a result of this consideration, the Government had 
placed higher incidence of price increases mainly on retail 
petrol (premium and regular) used by the higher income group 
and to a lesser extent on automotive diesel sales through the 
pumps, with an absolute minimum on kerosene used by the lower 
income or poorer community in the rural areas leaving indust­
rial or non-retail market prices which are mainly on contract 
and long term basis and subject to competitive bidding to 
find their own price levels.
o v ^ - * -
These J products - petro]. ,diesel and kerosene - and
their marketing channels where final market prices are con­
trolled by the Government are not to allowed to fluctuate 
normally, namely retail motor gasolines and high speed diesel 
(automotive diesel) sold through retail outlets and kerosene 
sold for domestic lighting and cooking purposes.
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The market for kerosene, the most important of all 
the above products as shall be seen later, although estimated 
only to be around 88 million gallons per year or about 6.4 
percent of the total consumption of petroleum products in 
Malaysia but 90 percent or 79.2 million gallons is for 
domestic use for household lighting, hawkers usage, padi 
drying and other similar uses. There are no chemical or 
physical differences between kerosene for domestic household 
usage and industrial use kerosene and this has led to some 
problems with regard to prices later on.
Also in the past, Government approval was based 
generally on the ratio of costs and returns expected from 
the sales volume of each individual products extracted from 
crude oil, i.e. petrol (both premium and regular), diesel 
oil, kerosene and fuel oil. In other words, it was based 
on product mix of the various by-products of crude oil on 
the basis of which an "over-recovery" was given for petrol 
(both premium and regular) and fuel oil with the expectation 
that the "excess" could be used to subsidize the relatively 
lower returns from the sales of domestic household-use of 
kerosene and diesel oil. Not withstanding this, the price 
of industrial use kerosene was allowed to find its own level 
by a process of competition amongst the 2 companies for 
industrial contract purchases.
The process of redistributing or rechanneling "excess" 
revenue collected from higher petrol prices to subsidise the
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relatively lower returns from the sales of kerosene and
diesel oil in the above is called "cross subsidization" The
principle or policy of cross subsidization is very popularly
used in public enterprises or nationalised industries all
over the world. In simple terms, it is a direct government
intervention to provide a service for one group of people
(the poor), which is subsidised by another group (the rich).
In the United Kingdom, cross-subsidization is practiced in
railways and coal production especially on production costs' ,
in the case of the Iranian oil industry showed by Pesheraki1s
study, it operates on transport costs under the principle of
- 24
"hidden subsidy"*’"' . Like in Iran, in Malaysia, the principle 
of cross-subsidization also operates in the petroleum industry 
but it operates at the product levels as shown earlier.
9.10.3 Present Problems of Supplies and Prices of 
Petroleum Products
The four previous price revisions announced by the 
Government earlier have led to an uneven distribution in the 
list or retail price adjustments of the 4 controlled products. 
The problems have been magnified as a result of the cumulat­
ive effect of under-recoveries experienced by the oil companies.
23- W.G. Shepherd, "Cross-subsidization in Coal" in
R. Turvey, ed., PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (London:Penguin 
Modern Economic Series, 1968). pp. 316-51.
24 F . Fesharaki, DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY
- International and Domestic Aspects (New York :
Praeger Publishers, 1976) pp. 288.
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This has resulted in the further skewing of the price 
structure.
In the past, recovery of increases in raw-materials 
costs had been granted largely in the form of significantly 
higher petrol prices with only minimum adjustments to kerosene 
and diesel oil prices. Price disparities between retail 
diesel and kerosene versus commercial/international value of 
these products generates a false retail demand which "over­
taxes" the retail facilities. The oil companies complained 
that they are incurring a loss of every gallon of automotive 
diesel oil sold through their service stations. Additionally, 
the oil companies pointed out that the extremely uneconomic 
situation with respect to the distribution of kerosene where­
by they were loosing approximately $0.60 fd per I.G. and even 
with the increase in price approved by the Government these 
would still be an absolute loss of. $0.25 fd per I.G.
The oil companies also proposed that price increases 
should be spread out over products on a basis which reflects 
the relative international market values of the products as 
typified by the prevailing Pulau Bukom (Singapore) product 
postings. The distortions in 1973 and 1974 alleged by them 
had led to some uneconomic product prices and uneven and 
inequitable cost recoveries among the oil companies. The 
result had been unstable product supply to those sectors of 
the community; this supply can only be assured by giving 
consideration to economic prices to all sectors of the
35ff
community-rich and poor alike. They reiterated that should 
the Government wish to reduce the impact of overall price 
increase on any particular sector of the community (the 
rural poor), they believed that the Government should do so 
by way of direct subsidies rather than distorting price 
increase among products as in the past price revisions.
The rigid and skewed price structure imposed by the 
Government had resulted in the middle distillates of diesel 
and kerosene alleged by the oil companies to be marketed 
significantly below costs and consequently had discouraged 
sales of these commodities by some marketers resulting in 
recurring supply imbalances. Similarly, it had led to 
widespread illegal adulteration of petrol with low-cost 
kerosene, creating quality problems and loss of tax revenues 
to the Government. The oil companies argued that any fur­
ther price skewing, resulting in greater losses on kerosene 
and diesel would only aggravate the situation. The oil 
companies wanted the Government to rebalance product prices 
but if this cannot be achieved then they suggested uniform 
price adjustments in both kerosene/diesel and petrol should 
be instituted.
9.11 Critique of the Present Arrangement
Three main weaknesses can be singled out from the 
above price arrangements.
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Firstly/ the agreement between the Government and the 
oil companies was based on a ’’goodwill" and understanding 
which does not provide any legal safeguard on the part of 
the Government should any break of agreement occur.
Secondly, the "over-recovery" in respect of petrol 
was a lop-sided decision. In the first instance while it 
brought immediate gains to the companies in terms of over­
night increase in petrol and fuel oil prices, it did not 
guarantee that the price of domestic household kerosene 
($1.00 £ per I .G .) will be maintained for as long as the 
prices of petrol and fuel oil are permitted to be sold at 
the over recovered prices of $3.00 ^ per I.G. and$0.65 ^ per 
I.G. respectively. In the second instance, the volume of 
sales of any domestic household kerosene is relatively small 
as compared to the total volume of premium and regular petrol 
marketed thus avoiding an apparent gain to the companies 
through their product-mix presentation. In the third instance, 
any "forced" increases in the prices of domestic household 
kerosene (resulting from further shortage) will not result 
in a downward readjustment of the "over-recovered" prices 
of petrol and fuel oil.
Thirdly, the decision on the two-tier pricing system 
of kerosene for industrial and domestic household users with 
distribution being undertaken by the same resellers did not 
anticipate the flow from low-price users ( 74 jz5 to 80 
per I.G.) to the high-price consumers ($1.05 to $1.08 $ per
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I.G.), thus causing acute shortages in the lower-price 
markets. This is currently the major source of the shortage 
problem in the domestic household-use sector with the exist­
ing price structure, the companies have claimed that although 
with the subsidy on the domestic household-use kerosene 
given by the Government, they still incur a loss in the region 
of$0.30 16 to$0.50 £ per I.G.
9.1 ‘2 Market Readjustment and Supply Problems
As a result of the price arrangements earlier, what 
therefore followed over the ensuing years was the readjust­
ment to the pricing structure namely by resellers diverting 
more and more supply meant for domestic household consumption 
to industries, a reaction motivated by the higher gain result­
ing from the price differential between the 2 sectors - 
resellers margin being around. 8 ^ per I.G. to the former 
channel compared to between 4% per I.G. to 5 per I.G. 
depending on the industrial purchase agreements or contracts 
in the case of the latter. Secondly, the oil companies 
themselves established sales where lists or "quotas" on 
their distributors who have been supplying kerosene for 
domestic household consumption thus diverting a large volume 
to the direct industrial consumers from which they were 
fetching about $1.15 ^ per I.G. by direct sales as compared 
to about 65 f6 to 72 fd per I.G. for domestic consumers.
35.9
During tire period too, the following practices were 
especially rampant among the manufacturers, importers and 
distributors of kerosene which contribute too to the symptoms 
of the underlying shortages. Deliveries of kerosene were 
made on a weekly basis and when the monthly allocation has 
been exhausted by the third week of the month, the particular 
distributor will not be given additional supplies by the 
companies. Deliveries were also stagerred and irregular 
especially to areas which were removed from the depots and 
main towns. And in the northern and southern states where 
supplies were largely supplemented by the amount brought 
in through foreign resellers, the volume of domestic house­
hold consumption was rapidly withdrawn and diverted to 
industrial consumers.
Over the years and with subsequent product increases 
and under-recoveries granted by the government, other 
sauses of supply shortages became apparent. The normal rate of 
commission granted to wholesalers of domestic kerosene by 
the oil companies was in the region of lo 0 to 13 0 per I.G. 
However, effective June 1976, one oil company had taken 
steps to reduce their commission from 13 0 to 11 0 per I.G. 
and subsequently to 9 0 per I.G. on October 1, 1976 on 
normal purchase. It is further reduced to 3 0 per I.G. on 
additional volume. The objective of the company in doing so 
was to reduce their sales of kerosene which had increased 
substantially in May 1976.
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From June 1, 1976, an oil company had increased
its transportation costs to wholesalers between $ 0.01 fd 
to $0.09 jd per I.G. depending on the distance from the main 
supply depot. These increases had caused reductions in 
commissions to wholesalers which indirectly have resulted 
in reduction of domestic kerosene in south of Peninsula 
Malaysia as they were the main supplier . 'in the region.
Deliberate restriction on the increase in kerosene 
supply during the first 10 months of 1976 was made by all 
oil companies (except one). Most oil companies had not been 
supplying the required additional quantities to meet the 
increase in consumption.
By this time the Government had instructed oil 
companies to introduce "blue-dyed" kerosene for non-indust­
rial or household use and "water white" kerosene for indust­
rial use to curb the flow or rechannelling of kerosene from 
the former to the latter. The plan was thwarted by the ability 
of certain wholesalers and retailers in removing the blue- 
dye in domestic kerosene by the use of'FuHer 1 s earth".
Lastly "excessive" buying above normal requests by 
consumers had further aggravated the supply situation. This 
was due to the feeling of uncertainty with regard to the 
price of domestic kerosene because of the number of price 
increases in the past.
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At any rate, it must be emphasised that the allocat­
ions in supply over the past 4 years (1973 to 1977) are 
essentially symptoms of the underlying problems and not 
the actual causes. Although the pricing structure had been 
shown to be a major cause of the present problems, one 
cannot rule out the existence of other causes, such as (i) 
increases in demand due to the growth of new industries and 
household consumption, (ii) the substitution of kerosene for 
gas and diesel oil as a cheaper source of fuel, (iii) the 
inherent inefficiency of the distribution system including 
transportation difficulties and payment problems on cash 
basis instead of credit, and new distributors operating over 
wide areas and failing to maintain regular deliveries.
As a collolary, it can be deduced that although supply 
has expanded, it has not fulfilled the entire requirements 
of demand especially for domestic household consumption.
The total volume supplied has indicated an increase but the 
more significant proportion of this increase has been to 
industrial users.
9. lg "Deskewing" of the Product Price Structure
Sometime in November 1975, the Malaysian Government 
decided to form Cabinet Sub-Committee on Price Review. At 
the same time the Ministry of Trade and Industries (MTI) 
also suggested the formation of a working committee com­
prising of officers of the various government departments
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to (i) verify the facts and figures submitted by the oil 
companies and (ii) to consider the proposed pros and cons 
of the present two-tier pricing system of kerosene and 
diesel.
There are 2 methods to overcome the present problems. 
Firstly to develop some policy guidelines in granting 
recoveries to oil companies as a result of crude oil price 
increases and secondly, to offer solutions to the present 
problem -i.e. to deskew the price structure at the same time 
minimising the burden of the general consumers and unload­
ing some of the burden from the oil companies.
After experiencing some hard negotiations in the 
past with oil companies, the Price Committee (thereafter 
the Committee) has developed some guidelines in evaluating 
oil companies requests for price increases. They include 
the evaluation of (a) Market Configuration and (b) Cost 
Increases.
Market Configuration of petroleum products of the 
individual companies is a significant factor in deciding 
the actual recoveries of the industry and the individual 
companies. To be consistent with past price increase exer­
cises the retail market configuration was considered as the 
basis for a recovery to be allowed.
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Having set the quantum of recovery, the Committee 
looked at oil companies cost increases which consist of (a) 
crude cost increase, (b) operating cost increase. The basis 
of determining crude cost increase is by a starting/chosen 
"base" period, different exchange rates US $ to M$ (the diff­
erent between the exchange rates at the base year and the 
current year recovery is sought), fuel and refinery loss 
factor of 5.5% (the internationally recognised measurement). 
The last item had been disregarded by the Government in the 
previous submissions before 1977.
The crude cost recovery is not being determined on 
the basis of marker crude (Arabian Light). The quantum of 
recovery is based on the weighted average of the industry, 
since oil companies obtain their crudes from different 
sources.
The determination of recovery on the basis of market 
crude is inappropriate since it would result in an inequitable 
levels of recovery. If the Government, on the other hand, 
decides to give the necessary recovery to oil companies 
while keeping and maintaining the present retail prices, the 
Committee suggested 3 ways out of the problem, viz. duty 
reduction on petrol (premium and regular), cash subsidy (such 
as the kerosene subsidy) and duty exemption on petrol. Each 
of the alternatives have their advantages and disadvantages.
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Duty reduction of petrol involves reduction at a 
level in line with the quantum of recovery to be granted.
Since different companies have different market configurat­
ion, such reduction would result in an inequitable recovery 
of the various companies. Some companies would over-recover 
when they have larger petrol or mogas market and companies 
which have larger diesel oil market (and small mogas market) 
would under-recover. This would discourage companies to 
expand their kerosene and diesel.sales and thus reduces the 
sales of these products in the market. This would result 
in the supply problems from retail kerosene and diesel oil 
with the present increased differential between their retail 
and industrial market price.
The second alternative is of cash subsidy which involves 
cash payments to oil companies as presently done to domestic 
kerosene. By extending the scheme to include diesel as well, 
it would place the Customs and Excise Department a heavier 
burden, complication and additional manpower to do so.
Duty exemption on petrol would mean that the amount of 
recovery to be given to each company would be determined 
by the monthly sales of domestic kerosene at retail diesel.
The oil companies would be exempted from payment of duty 
on mogas for that amount. The tax exemption would only be 
given after verification by the Customs and Excise Department.
With the continuation of depressed or low price for
365
the 2 sensitive retail products of diesel and kerosene to 
continue in the future and thus dislocating supplies from 
time to time, the Price Committee proposed that prices on 
these products/be revised (minimum increase) and deskewed 
(reduction of kerosene subsidy and excise duty on mogas be 
increased) without increasing the prevailing weighted level 
of recovery obtained by oil companies. This is done by 
looking at the increase approved by the governments of the 
neighbouring countries. And above all, the Committee 
recommended the price of kerosene be fixed at 0.20 per 
standard one lltrebott le.
Earlier in a meeting in early 1977 to find means to 
minimise the impact of oil price increase to the consumers, 
both industrial and non-industrial consumers and the economy 
as a whole, the Committee had put forth 4 alternative suggest­
ions which include (a) direct subsidy, (b) issuing of coupons 
to certain consumers, (c) Petronas to buy essential products 
and to resell them at the controlled prices and (d) stabiliz­
ation fund.
In (a) above, the Committee felt that direct subsidy 
was distasteful from the economic and political viewpoints.
If this alternative is introduced, all consumers will benefit 
and it would be too costly. The second alternative is for 
the government to tax exempt certain products and hence these 
products will be sold to identified consumers at a relatively 
lower price. This system could be implemented by the issuing
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of "coupons" to the identified consumers. The operation
of this system is complicated. The "tax exemption" aspect
will further burden the Customs Department which is
to
already complaining/the Government of their administrative 
difficulties.
The final alternative is for PETRONAS to undertake 
the distribution of essential petroleum products at the 
controlled prices and this system, is expected to alleviate 
the kerosene supply problem. However, it may not be 
advisable for PETRONAS to undertake this exercise because 
the likely adverse economic effects to PETRONAS. The Qd_l 
companies will be more than willing to let PETRONAS 
undertake domestic distribution of diesel and kerosene and 
leave the oil companies concentrating on the more profitable 
activity.
Lastly MTI also suggested (d) that a stabilization
fund be created to lessen the impact of increases in oil
prices. A conservative figure of M$100 million is envisaged
to operate this fund. They felt that the source of fund would
17
be derived from "cess" imposed on the export of crude oil.
17. This is to be similar to the rubber "cess" levied on 
rubber exports in Malaysia. The collection from the 
rubber cess or tax is used to provide grants and sub­
sidies for rubber smallholder farmers for replanting 
purposes, buying seeds and fertilisers. Similarly 
petroleum cess could be used back for the development 
of the oil industry - subsidies for products, research 
and development and so on.
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CHAPTER 10
GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, STATE INTERVENTION AND 
PARTICIPATION AND INDUSTRY CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
10.1 The Development of Oil Legislations and Policies
in Malaysia___________________________________________
There are three basic stages in the development of 
the legal framework for the petroleum industry in Malaysia 
to be considered in this chapter. The first is that of the 
Concession System which governed the oil legislation in the 
constituent states of East Malaysia and that of Peninsula 
Malaysia up to 1965. The second phase in the development of 
the legal framework of the petroleum industry is related to 
the standardization of the petroleum legislation in all the 
states of Malaysia as a result of the passing of the Petro­
leum Mining Rules of 1966 which changed the Concessionary 
System to that of Profit Sharing on Equal Basis between the 
Companies and the Government in Malaysia. Later in 1974 the 
Profit Sharing System was replaced by the Production Sharing 
System with the passing of the Petroleum Development Bill in 
Parliament in 1974. The subsequent Petroleum Development 
Act established PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS) the 
state oil company as the Principal.
To appraise these developments in the legal frame­
work of the industry over the past 66 years, this section 
traces the development scenarios of oil legislation and
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policies in Malaysia from 1911 till the present. It is 
against this background that, the various contributions of 
the industry to the economy are unfolded' in the following 
sections.
10.1^1 The Concessionary System
The first concession granted to any oil company 
operating in Malaysia was in Sarawak on March 19, 1909 called 
the Sarawak Prospecting Licence for the rights to explore for 
petroleum. The Concession was made between the Rajah Brooke 
of Sarawak on behalf of the Sarawak Government and the Anglo - 
Saxon Petroleum Company. They were the legal pre-requisite 
under which the oil companies could gain the first general 
View of promising structures in a country largely unexplored 
geologically. The exploration licences were issued for a 75 
year period on the conditions agreed upon by the Government 
of the day and the oil company. This was the foundation 
stone for concessionary terms between the Government and the 
oil companies.
After April 29, 1921 the granting of concession had 
been standardised by the Mines and Minerals Enactment of 1921. 
It was a one-paged document which granted permission to explore 
and produce crude oil. It was called the Prospecting Licence.
r
After World War II and following the British colonial in­
fluence over the Borneo Territories, another amendment was 
made to the earlier Mines Enactment of 1921. This was called
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the New Lease and was passed on June 23, 1952 in the state 
of Sarawak. This applied only to the state of Sarawak 
because it was the only area where oil activities had been 
going on for a longer period than in West Malaysia. In 1954, 
however, an Order in Council extended the mineral rights of 
Sarawak to include the area of the Continental Shelf, which 
was then formally incorporated into the Shell Oil Mining 
Lease under the terms of the Supplementary Deed made in 1956.
Before 1966, the Sarawak Government under the terms 
of the Sarawak Mining Ordinance adopted in 1958 granted a 
new oil prospecting right. The Ordinance did not affect 
Shell’s rights under its 1952 oil mining lease except to the 
extent that any regulations issued to implement the 1958 
Ordinance would apply to Shell provided that they were not 
in conflict with the terras of the existing lease. The 1958 
Ordinance was essentially an enabling Act which specified the 
basic conditions under which the Government might grant oil 
exploration and prospecting licences. Licensee and Lessees 
must pay an annual rent which increased with the age of the 
right. Royalties for licences and leases remained the same: 
12% percent for oil and 5 percent for natural gas. Both rates 
were lower for offshore production.
Under the Concessionary System there were two sources 
from which any Governments of the producing states get their 
oil revenue - royalties and income tax. In Malaysia, the
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only revenue from oil producing operation (crude oil) was 
that received by the Government of Sarawak from their oil­
fields which started production in 1911. This revenue was 
obtained from royalties on crude oil and natural gas and 
latterly income tax on profits made by the Sarawak Shell 
Oilfields Limited in selling refined products processed from 
their Lutong Refinery.
In the case of Sabah there was no crude oil or natural 
gas production prior to 1966 although legislation stipulating 
provisions for the payment of royalties and income tax on crude 
oil and natural gas had been^enacted under the 1958 Oil Pros­
pecting Agreements.
In the case of Peninsula Malaysia, no royalties and 
profit tax legislation on crude oil had been made as there 
was no oil prospective areas yet found in the area but the 
Government reaps revenues from profits or income tax on 
locally produced petroleum products by the domestic refineries.
In the case of Sarawak, the Sarawak Oil Mining 
Ordinance of 1958 and in Sabah, the Sabah Prospecting Licence 
provided for the payment of royalties on crude oil and natural 
gas production. Crude oil found on land (onshore) in Sarawak 
the royalty rates was fixed at 10 percent and in Sabah it was 
12% percent. In the case of crude oil found offshore the 
royalty rate in the 2 countries were fixed according to the
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distance from the coast or landfall. On the territorial 
waters within 3 miles from the coast the rate for Sarawak 
and Sabah was at 12% percent; between 3 and 10 miles from 
the coast at 8 percent and more than 10 miles 5 percent 
both for Sarawak and Sabah. In the case of natural gas, 
the royalty rates fixed varied between offshore and inland 
and the distance from the shore. On land and in the terri­
torial waters in Sarawak i.e. less than 3 miles from shore 
the rate was M 0.07^ per 1,000 cubic feet, between 3 and 10 
miles from the coast at M 0.048^5 and more than 10 miles at
0.028fz?. In the case of Sabah, the rates on land as in terri­
torial waters was 5 percent, between 3 and 10 miles from the 
coast 4 percent and more than 10 miles from the coast 3 per­
cent.
All the oil companies operating in Sabah, Sarawak 
and Peninsula Malaysia were subject to a general corporate 
income tax on their profits from crude oil and natural gas 
sales. This was set at 40 percent of taxable profits in all 
the states. Expenses were deductables from income but rates 
of depreciation of capital investment allowed for tax purposes 
varies between Sarawak, Sabah and Peninsula Malaysia. Royalty 
payments on crude oil production was allowed as a deductable 
expense in calculating the taxable income.
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10.Xl-2 The Profit Sharing Arrangement or the 50:50 model
As a result of merger between the states of 
Borneo and Malaysia, and the need to standardise the petro­
leum legislation in Malaysia, W.J. Levy Inc. was commissioned 
by the Malaysian Government in 1965 to review the petroleum 
policy of Malaysia. The terras of reference of the Commission 
was to make recommendations on the policy which should be 
adopted by the Malaysian Government to promote oil explora­
tion in Malaysia and the effective exploitation of existing 
and potential discoveries and to ensure an equitable share of 
the value of any oil for the Malaysian Government. The 
Commission was to recommend the legislation governing oil
prospecting and mining licences, the prospecting terms and
(1)conditions and taxation system to be adopted
The oil policies adopted by the two East Malaysian 
states of Sabah and Sarawak in the past 55 years till 1965 
had provided the fiscal framework for petroleum exploration 
and exploitation in the states. However, the terms of pros­
pecting licences and mining leases were either inflexible or 
needed modifications as they did not establish comprehensive 
fiscal framework within which all such petroleum exploration 
and developments would be carried out uniformally throughout 
Malaysia. A new petroleum mining and income tax legislation 
was, therefore, needed and made to accomplish 2 main objectives 
(1 ) to encourage the most rapid and effective search for and 
development of the country's oil resources:and (2 ) to provide
1. Levy, W.J. A REVIEW OF THE PETROLEUM POLICY OF
MALAYSIA, W.J. Levy Associates, April 1965.
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a maximum contribution to Government revenue . In the 
light of these objectives, the Levy Report recommended that 
the basic principles of the arrangments determining Govern­
ment revenue from, oil production in Malaysia should be related
to those in force, from time to time in the major oil producing
(3)countries of the Middle East . While this being so, the 
Report took into account the fact that physical conditions 
for oil exploration and development and the prospects of find­
ing oil were less favourable in Malaysia then they were in 
(4)the Middle East . Basing on the fundamental changes in oil 
exploration and production laws such as in crude oil producing 
countries of Libya, Algeria and Nigeria in the 1950s, the Levy 
Commission found the 50:50 profit sharing model appeared to 
provide a sound framework both its effects on the Malaysian
(5)
Government revenue and oil companies return on investment 
The other reason for adopting this model was because most of 
the Middle East crude oil, produced under such arrangements, 
were also the crude oils produced in Malaysia directly com­
peted for delivery to refineries either in Malaysia or in the 
Far Eastern countries.
In Malaysia where the risk of incurring heavy explo­
ration expenditures without finding any oil was much greater 
than in an established producing country in the Middle East 
or North Africa assurance, in terms of. jLn.cen.tiv.es for explo-
2-3. Levy, W.J. ibid., p.15
4. Levy, W.J. ibid., p.18
5. Levy, W.J. ibid., p.19
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ration was given prime importance by the Levy Committee. To
achieve this objective, modifications were made to the profit
sharing model, not by changing the basic principles of the
agreement, but by incorporating special "incentive allowances"
(6)
into the tax rules
Another area of significant development in any profit 
sharing arrangements was the Petroleum Income Tax Enactment. 
This was separated from the general corporate income tax 
legislation. The Petroleum Income Tax Enactment would apply 
to the upstream activities of the petroleum industry in the 
exploration, development and production of crude oil and 
natural gas. The general corporation income tax governed the 
downstream activities of the industry - transportation, re­
fining and marketing of petroleum products. The Petroleum 
Income Tax Enactment applied uniformly throughout Malaysia 
provided the fiscal framework within which the new legisla­
tion was drawn and the terms on which prospecting licences
(1 )and mining leases were based 1 .
Based on Levy's recommendation, a close cooperation 
and co-ordination between the State Government and the 
Malaysian Ministry of Lands and Mines was made in administer­
ing and implementing the petroleum agreements. The State 
Government had the power to issue prospecting licences and 
the Federal Government the right to supervise petroleum 
mining leases ___________________________________________________
6 . Levy, W.J., ibid. p.24
7. Levy, W.J., ibid. p.30
8 . Levy, W.J., ibid. p.34
»
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The fundamental provisions of the Profit Sharing 
Agreement between the Malaysian Government and the oil com­
panies operating in Malaysia is given in Appendix 10 (A).
10.1;,3; Petroleum Development Act and the Concept 
of Production Sharing_______________________
The oil legislation in Malaysia underwent a 
change once again for the second time in 1974. This stems 
from the fact of the discovery of substantial petroleum 
reserves/deposits in the offshore areas of Malaysia in the 
early 1970's which resulted in a significant increase in the 
production of crude petroleum. Although speculation about 
the existence of those deposits occured long before 1973, it 
was only about this time that the potential importance of 
petroleum became a serious political consideration. The 
passing of the Petroleum Development Bill in Parliament in 
1974 and the announcement by the late Prime Minister, Tun 
Abdul Razak, of the establishment of PETRONAS (Petroleum 
Nasional Berhad), the National Petroleum Corporation Limited, . 
changed the whole political atmosphere. Apathy was replaced 
by a feeling of euphoria but also by a concern that the newly 
found resource should be locally controlled.
The Petroleum Development Act spells out the frame­
work for PETRONAS1s operations and the role to be played by 
the National Petroleum Advisory Council (now reduces in 
status to Petroleum Development Unit in the Prime Minister's 
Department). The Act makes no specific mention of production
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sharing for this is spelt out in a separate agreement between 
PETRONAS and oil companies.
The Petroleum Development Act of 1974 came into 
force with the establishment of PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD 
(PETRONAS) on October 1, 1974 ^ .  Section 2(1) of the Act
i'
vests the entire ownership and the exclusive rights, powers, 
liberties and privileges of exploring, exploiting, winning 
and obtaining petroleum whether onshore or offshore of 
Malaysia in PETRONAS which was incorporated under the Com­
panies Act of 1965.
Section 3 (.1) of the Act spells out petroleum is 
.subjected to the control and direction of the Prime Minister. 
PETRONAS is subjected to both Federal and the various State 
Governments in financial matters. Section 4 stipulates that 
the Corporation has to make relevant cash payments to the 
Federal Government and the relevant State Government (s) from 
which the oil is produced. And to make effective control of 
PETRONAS in Section 3(1) earlier, the National Petroleum 
Advisory Council was established with the duty to advise the 
Prime Minister on national policy, interest and matters per­
taining to petroleum, petroleum industries and energy resources 
and their utilisation as spelt out in Section 5 (ii) of the 
A c t .
9. except sections 6(3), 6A, 7A, 7B and 7C which came
into force on May 1, 1975.
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The Act gives sweeping powers to PETRONAS over the 
oil activities in Malaysia. Section 6 (i) advocates that the 
business of processing and refining of petroleum or manufac­
turing of petro-chemical products from petroleum could only 
be carried out by PETRONAS and no other oil companies. And 
Section 6 (ii) establishes that companies which existed to 
carry out such business before the operation of the Act will 
have to get the permission of the Prime Minister in order to 
continue operation.
Any other company besides PETRONAS which gets the 
licence to continue the business, are obliged to keep 2 types 
of shares - Management Shares and the Ordinary Shares (Section 
6.1(a),. These Management Shares can only be issued to PETRONAS 
(Section 6.1(b)). Further to this, in Section 6.2(a) if the 
shares of the company in question are quoted on the Stock 
Exchange in Malaysia or elsewhere, the company will have to 
issue for cash at a price which is equivalent to the market 
price of the ordinary shares prevailing at the date of issue 
of the shares. The Act values that the Management Shares 
issued to PETRONAS is equal to one percent of its issue and 
paid-up capital. Section 6 (6) of the Act puts the privileges 
of the holder of the Management Shares. The holder of such 
shares are entitled to 500 votes (500 votes to one management 
share) in matters relating to the appoinment or dismissal of 
a director or any member of the staff of the company.
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Further to the implementation on October 1, 1974 of 
Petroleum Development Act earlier, the Act gives the power 
to the Prime Minister to make regulations for the purpose of 
carrying out the provisions of the Act. The first set of 
regulations made under the Petroleum Regulations, 1974 
(Section 7) were signed by the late Prime Minister on December 
3, 1974. These Regulations are called the Petroleum Regulations 
of 1974.
With the Regulations being put into force, all 
existing oil companies which have been issued with exploration 
licences or have entered intp petroleum agreements under the 
Petroleum Mining Act of 1966 have to submit to PETRONAS all data, 
.information and records pertaining to survey, study, research, 
exploration and production carried out by them. The applica­
tion in terms of continuing any business or service 3 (a) 
licence to commence or continue business of processing or 
refining petroleum or manufacturing petrochemical products 
from petroleum and related business 3 (b)(i) and equipment and 
facilities pertaining to petroleum activities 3(b)(ii) Sec. 6 
spells out 15 conditions relating to Section 3 above which 
include royalties, bonuses, work and investment programme, 
employment and training, fixing of prices, distribution,, 
marketing etc.
After a heated controversy and the unwillingness 
of the oil companies to enter the Petroleum Development Act
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and production sharing, the Government repealed the Petroleum 
Development Act of 1975, governing the provisions involving 
the issue of the Manacpment Shares by oil companies to PETRONAS. 
The Act also amended section 6 of the Petroleum Development 
Act of 1974 so as to enpower the Prime Minister to exempt 
certain business activities relating to petroleum and petro­
chemical products from the requirement that they be licenced. 
The amendment also provides for the payment of compensation 
to oil companies in the event of nationalization of oil com­
panies by the Malaysian Government in line with Article 13 
of the Malaysian Constitution.
10.2 The Production Sharing Arrangement
In December 1976, after a series of negotiations 
regarding the production-sharing agreements and issues in the 
Petroleum Development Act, PETRONAS finally reached agreement 
on fiscal terras with Sarawak. Shell Berhad, Sabah Shell Co.
Ltd. and Pecten (Malaysia) Company and Exxon Production In­
corporated (now Esso Productions). With the signing of the 
production sharing agreements, Malaysia has ushered in a new 
era in its petroleum development history.
The Malaysian production-sharing-contract is basically 
the same with other production-sharing contracts in other 
countries. However, it is believed that the Malaysian pro­
duction-sharing contracts have two new features - a royalty 
clause and a built-in provision for the Government to benefit
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from an increase in world oil prices - which are uniquely 
Malaysian and a new contribution to petroleum legislation.
The basic production sharing formula of 70:30 agreed 
between PETRONAS and the oil companies means in practice the 
Government will get 68.5% of the oil produced while the com­
panies take 31.5%. That is to say for every 100 barrels of 
crude oil produced, the split between PETRONAS and the oil 
companies are as follows: the companies get 20 barrels for 
cost recovery and the Government gets 10 barrels as royalty. 
This leaves 70 barrels to be split in the 70:30 formula. At 
70 percent, the Government will get 4 9 barrels, the companies 
get 21 barrels. . Out of the 21 barrels received by the oil 
’companies, they will have to pay the petroleum income tax of 
45 percent or 9.5 barrels. This leaves the oil companies 
with 11.5 barrels. On adding the 20 barrels earlier which 
they get for cost recovery their total take becomes 31.5 
barrels. The present agreement in addition incorporates the 
latest Indonesian-initiated features of production-sharing 
such as production bonuses. Although the production sharing 
ratio after cost recovery is 70:30 in PETRONASls favour, the 
actual after tax-ratio is 83.5:16.5 which is only a little 
less favourable than Pertamina's 85:15 split. This new agree­
ment offered a new package deal which represents a M $258 
million (US $101.98 million) annual revenue concession by 
PETRONAS, assuming an average daily production of crude of 
175,000 barrels at a base price of US $12.7 2jz5 per barrel - a
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figure agreed by both the oil companies and PETRONAS.
Under the original production sharing proposal by 
PETRONAS to the oil companies, it consisted of a 10 percent 
cost-recovery and 80:20 split in production sharing. Royal­
ties would have stayed the same at 10 percent. Under this 
original formula, the after tax split would be 8 9:11 rather 
than the present 83.5:16.5 assuming complete cost recovery 
in both formulae.Malaysia's total share of the oil produced 
would be 81.2 percent under the original scheme instead of 
the 68.4 percent under the present agreement. In money terms, 
the original proposal would have brought in M $1,644.3 million 
in 1976 for Malaysia while the new agreement leaves the 
country with M $1,386.07 million. At the same time on the 
assumption of a 45 percent income tax, oil companies have 
managed to increase their after tax profits by 30 percent under 
the final scheme to M $233 million from M $178.2 million under 
the original proposal.
The basic contour of the agreement has taken its 
inspiration from Pertamina with several modifications. The 
contract for crude oil according to the new contract lasts 
for 20 years, with another 4 years possible extension. The 
limit for cost recovery, which includes the oil companies' 
exploration, production and development expenditures, and 
can be carried forward each year, was set at 20 percent of 
total oil production. Another 10 percent royalty will be
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evenly split between the Federal and State Governments in 
which the oil is found. Previous oil legislation around the 
world has incorporated either royalty payments or production 
sharing, but not -both. After cost recovery and royalties, the 
remaining oil will be split 70:30 before taxes. On the other 
hand, the agreement for natural gas differs only in having a 
14 year extension rather than 4 years in the case of oil earlier. 
Additionally it has a 25 percent cost recovery compared to 20 
percent in the case of oil because gas production and develop- 
ment is inherently more expensive.
Another amendment made by the Government from the 
original production sharing formula was in the area of taxation. 
.The standard 50 percent income tax rate under the original 
formula was revised to 4 5 percent for oil producing companies 
in the revised and agreed formula. This means that a total 
of about M $21 million less taxes for the oil companies each 
year based on daily production of 175,000 barrels and the 1976 
base price. PETRONAS will also be taxed at 45 percent.
In later years of production, after the heavy capital 
investments in exploration and initial production are recouped 
the oil companies may not have to pay annual costs which amount 
to 20 percent of the oil produced. The ratio of cost to total 
production may even decline over time due to economics of scale 
and rising production levels. Instead of making the entire 20 
percent going to oil companies under cost recovery termed as
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"cost oil" which is non-taxable, actual annual costs will be 
tax deductable, and the rest of the cost oil will be taxed at 
the same rate as the "profit oil" i.e. the 30 percent going 
to companies from production sharing ratio. In the case of 
Sabah Shell this technicality will be less important than for 
Sarawak Shell because Sabah Shell's heavier capital investments 
will make its annual actual costs equals to the maximum 20 
percent recovery for many years whereas for Sarawak Shell, 
annual costs will be a fraction of total recoverable costs 
within a shorter time.
Following Pertamina's initiative in 1975, the new 
Malaysian agreement contains discovery and production bonuses. 
Upon the discovery of any new, commercially viable oilfield, 
the oil companies concerned - known in the agreement as the 
contractors - will pay PETRONAS M $2.5 million. For existing 
fields off Sabah and Sarawak there will be a production bonus 
- when production increases beyond present levels by a 
quarterly increment of 50,000 barrels a day, the contractor 
will pay PETRONAS a flat M $5 million. Each oil company will 
also contribute 0.5 percent of the proceeds of sale of its 
oil - both "cost" and "profit" oil — to a petroleum research 
fund.
To ensure that Malaysia will benefit from windfall 
profits because of oil price increases, PETRONAS has incorpo­
rated a formula in the contract that 70 percent of the increase
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in the price of crude beyond the fixed base price of US $12.72jd
per barrel will go to PETRONAS, However, the base price index
in the hope
will be increased by 5 percent each y e a r , £ »  that oil companies 
will not be adversely affected by inflation in their own costs.
As a result of the new agreement between oil companies 
and the Government, PETRONAS will not take over equity in the 
existing oil companies. In the case of the Shell Group of 
Companies, their corporate structure will remain unchanged,
i.e. in Sarawak, the production sharing contractor will be 
Sarawak Shell Berhad (SSB), a wholly-owned Shell Group of Com­
pany and in Sabah the production sharing contract has been 
signed by the 50/50 Sabah Shell/Pecten partnership for which 
Sabah Shell Petroleum Company (SSPC) is the Operator. The 
production— sharing contracts apply only to exploration and 
production, and not equity participation in the downstream 
activities of oil companies; i.e. refining, supply and marketing 
operations. Lutong Refinery in Sarawak is, therefore, not 
affected by the new arrangements, although it is still part of 
Sarawak Shell Berhad.
10.3 The.Methods used by the Malaysian Government to
Intervene in the Oil Industry_____________________
Just as there are several reasons why governments 
may wish to intervene in oil affairs, so this intervention 
may take several forms, ranging from the imposition of pro­
tective duties, to the establishing of national oil companies.
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As producing and consuming countries have different aims so 
they use different methods to influence the industry. Malaysia 
is both a producer and consumer country and, therefore, the 
aims are wide-ranging.
Since Malaysia imports most of its crude oil needs 
from the Middle East countries and exports most of its low- 
sulphur/sweet oil the Government express'reason for giving a 
close attention to the industry particularly to these countries 
from which it imports its oil and to those countries which 
consume large quantities of its oil. The importance of the 
industry in this context arises from the fact that political 
instability in any of these countries may affect both prices 
and supply and thus affect the revenues to the Government.
This is so, since we depend for a great deal of our crude oil 
from the Middle East as our domestic demand requires the crude 
from the Gulf sources to be blended with domestic crudes. As 
has been elucidated earlier, in Section 3, oil accounts for 
about 90% of Malaysia*s energy requirements and the likelihood 
of getting alternative sources of energy is small. Since we 
rely heavily on our oil imports from overseas, we need to 
increase the security of our supplies. Although these con­
siderations do not apply to producing/exporting countries in 
general but Malaysia, also preoccupied with obtaining markets 
for its oil, is perhaps a close parallel. Malaysia, like 
other producer countries, may act to secure markets in the same 
way as it tries to secure supplies.
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10.3'jD  Crude Oil Exports and Earnings
In the past up to 1972, various agricultural and 
mining products had dominated the export volume and value of 
Malaysian trade. ■ The most important of these were rubber, 
tin, palm oil and timber in that order. Since 1972, with the 
spate of offshore oil discoveries and production, the structure 
of Malaysia exports had changed somewhat. The export volume 
and later value as a result of the upward revision in petro­
leum prices in the world market increased annually since 1974 
and in 1976 reached M $1774.7 million from a mere M $318 million 
in 1972 as shown in Table 10.1. The proportion of crude oil 
in the total value of export* of the country increased from 
6.6% in 1972 to 17.6% in 1976. In such a short span of 4 years, 
.the crude oil exports has climbed to become the third largest 
export earner for Malaysia..' More important;still is that, the 
rate of growth of crude oil exports exceeded the rate of growth
•k
of the total commodity exports. It is projected that crude 
oil will play a very significant role amongst the exports of 
Malaysia in the future. However, this depends on our estimates 
of the future crude oil exports on the basis of the production 
prognosis earlier - "with conservation off". However, it looks 
as if the Government have opted for some policy of conservation 
but neither the Government through PETRONAS nor the oil com­
panies make information available on the programme-production 
strategy of conservation. Such being the case, we have to opt 
for a lower estimation of exude oil development. However, the
proportion of crude oil in the total export will increase con-
.*. For the first quarter of 1977 petroleum has moved
into’ seCOfid'position after rubber. ■ 1
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tinually until 1980 that is the peak production period.
The development of crude oil exports since 197 4 when 
it showed an (Exports over Imports; has somewhat changed the 
structure of exports of Malaysia. In 1967 when Malaysia was 
formed the proportion of primary exports of agriculture and 
forest products in the total export amounted to 75%. In 1973 
it was still 62.1%. However,- because of the offshore oil 
developments in the South China Sea sector of Malaysia, the 
percentage of oil exports to total exports increased from 5.0% 
to 14.5% in 1976. With the development of the crude oil 
industry a new export product contributed enormously to the 
export proceeds and was significant in revenue contribution. 
This diversification of exports help to stabilise the fluctua­
tions from the sale of Malaysia's export of tin and rubber as 
a result of changes in world prices of these products - the 
traditional pillar of export earnings.
10. 3^ 2' Taxation and Duties
There are basically two types of taxation that 
the Government levies on the oil industry. They are profit, 
and consumption taxes. The taxation of the oil industry is 
particularly important to the exporting as well as the import- 
ting or consuming countries. Taxation contributes a large 
proportion of the producing countries national revenue - it 
contributes about 95% of the revenues of Kuwait, 66% of 
Venezuela's, 75% of Libya's and 65% of Iran's. In Malaysia
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petroleum taxation contributes about 17 to 18% of all the 
national revenue collected by the Government.
There are- two types of taxation under the classifica­
tion of profit taxes imposed by the oil producing and exporting 
countries on the petroleum industry. They are royalty taxes 
and income or corporation taxes.
The first type of payments under the Profit Taxes 
category is that of Royalties. Royalties are payments made 
by the producing companies to the host Governments as compen­
sation, in return for the right to dispose of the oil. Al­
though this is a form of Government take, it is not ’tax1 in 
fche true sense of the word. In historical perspective, it is 
the left over from the days before the introduction of income 
taxes. It originated from the times the Crown claimed all 
mineral wealth. In the United States the land owner take the 
place of the Crown since in that country he is the owner of 
the sub-surface mineral wealth. In other words, royalty in 
the United States refers to landowner's royalty which very 
commonly is one-eight or 12%% of the value of the oil and gas 
produced. However, in all the exporting countries including 
Malaysia the sub-surface mineral rights are owned by the nation 
and the royalty is, therefore, payable to the Government.
The usual level of royalty in many countries especially 
in the Middle East is 12%% of the value of the oil Cat posted
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prices) which is sold. In the past, these royalty payments 
were credited against the taxes on profits in the producing 
countries of the company. OPEC ruled this out and stipulated 
royalties should be 'expensed' i.e. deducted as cost in arriving 
at taxable profits. Since January 1, 1964 the general rule has 
been that they should be treated as a cost against income and, 
therefore, ceased to be regarded as a 'tax'. However, in 
Malaysia with the passing of the Petroleum Development Act, 
royalty is not expensed against income but it is separate from 
taxation and deductable.
TABLE 10.2 ROYALTIES FROM PETROLEUM 1969-J-:976 Cin M $'000)
Year
*
Federal Sabah and Sarawak Total
1969 — 1,197.7 1,197.7
1970 1,803.5 2 ,745.0 4,548.5
1971 14,814.0 2,775.2 22,592.2
1972 24,735.8 1,937.6 26.678.4
1973 36,877.8 1,475.7 38,353.5
1974 63,473.8 919.0 64,392.8
1975 62,096.2 52,90*9.7 165,005.9
1976 44,858.9 44,633.3 89,492.2
* figures from 1/1/76 till 30/6/76.
SOURCE: Private communications with The Treasury, Malaysia, 
(figures are not published)
Table 10.2 shows the amount of royalties collected by 
the Government for the period between 196 9 till the first half 
of 1976. In the lh year period, a significant change has been
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the increase in the amount collected by the Federal Government 
with the decline of the royalty collection by the states for 
the greater part of the period except in 1975 and in 1976. The 
Federal Government collection from royalty was nil in 1969 but 
it jumped to 62 million in 1975 and is expected to reach 90 
million in 1976. With the expected increase in crude oil 
production in future, royalty collection will increase accord­
ingly.
The Malaysian Government collects royalties twice in a 
year - the first half is usually received in March and the 
second in August. The figure in Table 10.2 shows the actual 
amount of royalty (accrued for the year) collected by the 
Government for the period. In 1969, the oil companies were 
still under the concessionary system and the Federal Government 
had no royalty collected from petroleum under the Income Tax 
Act of 1966. Under the Concessionary system before 7th November 
1969 from all producing wells offshore 3 nautical miles from 
landfall the royalties went to the State Government near which 
the wells were located (in this instance Sarawak); beyond three 
nautical miles the royalties of wells in production go to the 
Federal Government. Since all producing wells were then within 
the 3 nautical mile limit, the Federal Government did not get 
any royalty entitlement. With the extension of the Continental 
Shelf Act of 1966 by Emergency (Essential Power) Ordinance, the 
Federal Government obtained royalties for wells in production 
beyond 3 nautical miles after November 7, 1969. Even though
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it was passed in November 1969, the Federal Government did 
not receive any royalty in that year because only in 1970 were 
offshore wells beyond 3 nautical miles brought into production.
Royalties are also determined by the distance of the 
producing wells from the shore (from mean low water mark).
The rates are graduated in several ways; for wells offshore up 
to 3 nautical miles the rate is at 12%%; beyond 3 nautical 
miles but less than 10 nautical miles offshore, the rate is 10% 
and beyond that the rate is 8%. This applies to Shell Sarawak. 
But for Exxon, the royalty rate is 12%% flat.
Subsequently, with the implementation of the Continen­
tal Shelf Act of 1966, the Federal Government collected some 
$78.2 million worth of royalty for the period between 1970 till 
the end of March 1973. Only one Company was paying royalty at 
that time i.e. Sarawak Shell Berhad but after 1973 when the oil 
wells in Sabah were brought into production, Sabah Shell Berhad 
and Exxon started to pay royalty to the Federal Government. 
Under the concessionary agreement which was applied to the 
Petroleum Mining Act, the Government had the option of taking 
royalty in cash or in kind. In 1973, the Government started 
to receive royalty both in cash and in kind. The reason behind 
this move was that the Government wanted to develop an indepen­
dent marketing outlet and expertise with the formation of a 
state oil company in future in mind. The royalty as agreed 
under the profit sharing of 50:50 as confirmed by the Petroleum
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Income Tax Act of 1966 was tied to the posted price in the case 
of the crude oil which was exported and realised price for crude 
consumed locally. As a result of this agreement and with the 
establishment of PETRONAS, the Federal Government, in the middle 
of 1974 opted for royalty in cash after that date and the 
• Treasury gets cash payment as royalty from PETRONAS.
Another significant feature in the royalty figures in 
the above table is that from 1972 to 1974 royalties to the 
Federal Government increased rapidly by 45 times, since 1971 
at the expense of the State revenue which declined by the same 
extent as its 1971 level. This has been due to the fact that 
most of the new oil fields are found beyond the 3 nautical mile 
limit offshore and the decline of the onshore Miri field and 
its complete shutdown in 1972. Most of its revenue comes from 
a small offshore field less than 3 nautical miles. But after 
1975 with the production sharing agreement, the revenues for 
both the Federal and State have picked up steeply.
Included in the 1975 royalty figures is also the 
royalty from gas resources found offshore Sarawak and Sabah, 
which is equally shared between the Federal and the State 
Governments at 5% each. The gas royalty for the Federal 
Government in 1975 stood at approximately $286,000 and for the 
State at $95,000.
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The royalty payments received by the Government 
earlier were incurred in the upstream phase of the develop­
ment of the oil industry. In addition to these, the oil 
operating companies in Malaysia as elsewhere were charged 
with income tax usually at the rate of 40% of net earnings 
(previously it was at 50%1 of all the phases of their opera­
tions. This tax is usually a flat rate on net earnings 
regardless of size, but in some countries it is progressive 
up to a certain point, depending on the total size of income, 
and a flat rate above that point. In most of the major con­
cessions in the Middle East, the tax was levied on net income 
calculated on the basis of the posted prices less an agreed 
discounts. However, this was changed after late 1973.
TABLE 10.3: OIL INDUSTY INCOME TAXATION 1970 to 1975
Year Income Tax Rate of Growth Net Profit Ratio 
I .T/N.P
%
•
1970 17 .0
} -21.2
39.7 0.4 40
1971 13.4
) +16.4
11.85 1.13 113
1972 15.6 31.8 0.5 50
1973 29.2 > -87.2 33.5 0.87 80
1974 5.7 ) -80.5 24.4 0.2 20
1975 14,1 ) +147.4 37 .0 0.4 40
Sources: Figures in column (1) and (2) derived from sources for 
Table 9.4.
From the above Table 10.3 , during the period under 
review, there are two occasions of falling tax and three
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occasions of tax increase. The first drop in tax collection 
was in 1971 when as a whole the profitability and thus per­
formance of all companies have been affected. By 1972 and 
1973 the sales of these companies have picked up again and 
thus their profitability except one company which showed nega­
tive profit. The crude oil price hikes in early 1974 and the 
subsequent implementation of the Control of Supplies Act per­
taining to supply of petroleum products and the regulation of 
price, discussed elsewhere earlier, have depressed the profit 
levels of companies in the industry and the tax collection 
registered the lowest for the period. In 1975 with the re­
covery of the industry slowly from the world depression in
general, profitability of the industry picked up again and 
thus revenue collected from this source began to rise again 
and this is expected to increase progressively over the period 
and into the future.
If a comparison between the net profits gained by the
oil companies in the industry and the payments of taxes to the
Government for the period 1970 to 1975 are made, on average
payments to the Government were almost equal to half the profits
earned by the industry. From the above table 10.3, the payments
gained by the Government equal (.in fact exceed) the net profit
of the industry in 1971 but in 1974 were only about a quarter
of the industry's net profit of that year. In the case of
Indonesia, A r i e f ^ s h o w e d  that the ratio between the two was
almost equal to the industry net profit in' 1973 but fluctuated
10. Arief, Sritua THE OIL INDUSTRY TKT. TNDONEBIA - A Study
of Resource Management in a Developing Economy , Sritua Arief 
Associates, Jakarta, 1966.
396
around one and half times in 1974 in favour of Government tax 
take.
If these results are compared to the seven major inter­
national oil companies (Standard Oil of New-Jersey, Shell,
Texaco, Mobil, British Petroleum, Standard Oil of California 
and Gulf Oil) operating in the Eastern Hemisphere in 1967 - 70 
period, it was found that it was steady above 2:1 in all the 
years, i.e. 2.2:1 in 1967, 2.1:1 in 1968, 2.4:1 in 1969 and 
2.6:1 in 1960C11).
While indirect taxation levied on. basic consumer goods, 
taxation on petroleum products form a substantial part of 
Malaysia’s internal budget revenue. Contrary to the profits 
tax earlier, the burden of these taxes are shifted on to the 
consumers of petroleum products.
Essentially, the taxation of oil products is no diffe­
rent from any other indirect taxation. The burden is largely 
shifted on to the final consumers by the sellers (oil companies). 
The collection of these taxes has to be financed by the oil 
companies themselves.
The important of this kind of sales tax on the level of 
demand for the products have been varied. It is often suggested 
that for many products, especially petrol, the demand in price
11. Arief, Sritua, ibid.
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is elastic as has been discussed earlier in Chapter 9. How­
ever, elasticity is greater for middle distillates and fuel 
oils. There is a tendency for motorists to switch to cheaper 
grades as tax progressively increased the retail price of 
petrol and this suggests that for this product price levels 
can be reached at which demand becomes fairly price elastic.
The increase in taxation has the same impact as that of 
increase in price.
From before 1947 till 195 9, there were no taxes levied 
on the consumption and sales of heavy fuel oil in Malaysia 
except for petroleum - mogas-and diesel. The total import 
duties from petroleum over the 2 years increased steadily from 
$12.9 million in 1947 to $67.6 million or about 5 times its 
1947 level. In terms of % of the petroleum revenue to total 
import revenue during these years they have also increased 
steadily from 15.5% in 1947 to 22.5% in 1959. Since 1960 to 
1976 - over a period of 16 years the revenue for petroleum has 
increased from its 1959 level of $67.6 million to $80.0 million 
(18%) but the ratio of % of petroleum revenue to total import 
revenue has increased and in 1975 it is only 7.9% compared to 
22.5% in 1959. This has been due to the lessening of imports 
and thus import taxes due to the local refinery started to 
produce .petroleum products locally since 1963 despite the 
introduction of HFO tax since 1960. The divergence has also 
been aggravated by the number of other imported products during 
these years that come into the market as a result of the pace
V
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of development and increase in the standard of living in
Malaysia after independence in 1957 and especially with the
formation of Malaysia in 1963.
TABLE 10.4a:MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT 
(1947 - 1976) (M$) (A)
REVENUES FROM PETROLEUM 
IMPORT DUTIES
H.F.O. PETROLEUM
TOTAL IMPORT 
DUTIES FROM 
PETROLEUM
TOTAL OVERALL 
IMPORT REVENUE
^ % OF PETR.
REVENUE TO 
IMPORT REVENUE
12.9 12.9 '83 .4 15 .5
18.3 18.3 105.0 17.4
20.2 20.2 116.2 17.2
23 .1 23.1 148.6 15 .5
27.5 27.5 214.7 12.8
31.0 31.0 206.5 15.0
33 .2 33.2 198.4 16.7
• 36 .8 36.8 205.9 17.9
39.7 39.7 250 .0 15.9
46 .0 46.0 270.0 17 .0
56.3 56.3 294 .7 19.1
59.3 59.3 282 .0 21.0
67.6 67.6 300.7 22.5
18.2 70.9 89.1 n.a. n.a.
20.4 71.5 91.9 n . a . n.a.
23.2 73 .5 96 .7 n.a. n.a.
22 .3 66.9 89.2 n.a. n.a.
13.3 29.5 42.8 n.a. n.a.
13.3 31.9 45.2 n.a. n.a.
15.2 29.3 44.5 n.a. n.a.
28.3 35.7 64.0 n.a. n.a.
30.7 38.0 68.7 n.a. n.a.
31.1 37.-6 68.7 n.a. n.a.
33.6 40.7 74.3 557 .1
&
13.3
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YEAR H.F .0. PETROLEUM
TOTAL IMPORT 
DUTIES FROM 
PETROLEUM
TOTAL OVERALL 
IMPORT REVENUE
% OF PETR. 
REVENUE TO 
IMPORT REVENUE
.1971 35.2 46.1 81.3 581.8 14.0
.1972 41.0 42.0 83 .0 588.9 14.1
1973 48.8 50.4 ' 99.2 746.3 13 .3
1974 35.8 50.1 85 .9 893.3 9.6
1975 20.1 . 43.3 63.4 800.8 7.9
1976 30.0 50.0 80.0 n.a. n.a.
HFO Heavy Fuel Oils.
Source:
Private communications with Tax Division, The Treasury, Ministry 
of Finance Malaysia (data not published).
After 1963, when the refineries of Shell and Esso 
started to produce petroleum products locally, the Government 
imposed excise tax on locally produced HFO and petroleum sold 
in this country. The value of the HFO tax has increased from 
$3.1 million in 1963 to $34.0 million in 1976 an increase of 
over ten times since 1963, in the case of petroleum the value 
of tax collected in 1963 was $13.6 million and in 1976 it 
increased to $205.0 million - thus registering an increase of 
fifteen times over the past 13 years and much more then that 
of HFO. However, over the years the two locally produced 
products have also undergone export expansion and sales and 
thus the total excise duties have also increased but not as 
steeply as that of duty revenue from imported petroleum 
products. Thus the ratio of petroleum revenue to total excise
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revenue collected or received was around 47% a little over 
the 1963 period.
If the total value of indirect taxes collected by the 
Government in petroleum products Is compared to that of the 
indirect taxes on all products it is seen'that from 194 7 to 
1959 this was on the average around 17.2% having increased 
from 15.5% in 1947 to 22.5% in 1959. However, from 1970 till 
1975, the average percentage of petroleum revenue to total 
import revenue decreased to 12% on the average. This was due 
to the decreasing imports of most petroleum products after the 
operation of the refineries in Peninsula Malaysia in 1973.
TABLE 10.4btMALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM PETROLEUM 
(1963 - 1976 (M$) (B) EXCISE DUTIES
YEAR H.F.O. PETROLEUM(PETROL)
TOTAL EXCISE 
DUTIES FROM 
PETROLEUM
TOTAL OVERALL 
EXCISE REVENUE
% OF PETR. 
REVENUE TO 
TOTAL EXCISE 
REVENUE
1963 3.1 13.6 16.7 36.6 45.6
1964 17.3 51.5 68.8 90.3 1 76.2
1965 22.6 53.8 76.4 102.3 74.7
1966 21.9 67.2 89.1 133 .9 66.5
1967 36 .9 68.3 105.2 151.3 69.5
1968 41.6 71.9 113.5 165.3 68.4
1969 44.1 76.1 120.2 181.6 66 .2
1970 40.6 76.9 117.5 248.7' 47 .2 ,
1971 49.3 94.4 143.7 306“. 7 46,9
1972 61.2 126.7 187 .9 3 66.0 51.3
1973 56.6 136.0 192.6 406.7 47.4
1974 45.2 154.2 199.4 442.5 45.0
1975 31.0 183,6 214.6 449.9 47.7
1976 34 .0 205.0 239.0 453.0- 52.8
Source: Private communications with the Tax Division, The Treasury, 
Ministry of Finance, Malaysia.
&
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In Table 10.4,.in the case of the Malaysian Govern­
ment Revenue collected as excise duties from locally produced 
petroleum from 1963 - 1976 of $1,884.6 million out of a total 
of $3,534.8 million again showing that petroleum contribution 
is on the average about 50% to total excise duties.
If both the indirect taxes on petroleum are taken 
together and compared to the overall excise' duties we see 
that total excise duties from petroleum average around 5.7% 
over the past 14 years.
10.4 PETRONAS Financial Arrangements with the Government
In return for the vesting of the ownership of all
hydrocarbon resources below the land and sea in PETRONAS,
PETRONAS is required to pay a certain percentages of its 
gross income as royalties to the State and Federal Governments. 
PETRONAS is required to pay the Federal Government and State 
Government each an annual cash payment of 5% of the value of 
the petroleum won, saved and sold by PETRONAS or its agents 
or contractors during the period provided in Clause 2 of the
Agreement. The value to be supplied for the purpose of sub­
clause 1 must be the realised 6 monthly average FOB price 
obtained by PETRONAS or its agents.
Any petroleum which is used by PETRONAS, its agents 
or contractors for the purpose of carrying on drilling and 
production operations shall be deemed to be sold for the 
purpose of calculating the cash payment under this clause.
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However, PETRONAS unlike many other oil companies, was not 
obligated to reimburse the Government for indemnification 
payments on the expropriated properties, as there was no 
such event taken, place. PETRONAS is authorised to issue 
securities and to make certain contracts for operations 
within the industry based upon percentage of production or 
participation in profits as agreed.
Unlike many national oil companies which emerge 
after expropriation and nationalisation such as the Mexican 
and Libyan oil industries, the task that faced by PETRONAS 
was non-monumental. The industry's background in technical 
knowledge has not been impaired with the new arrangment with 
the oil companies; international markets for Malaysian crude 
oils exports were not blocked as experienced by other nationa­
lised oil companies. The internal transportation system for 
supplying the domestic market was more than adequate. The 
only difficulty faced by the new state oil company has been 
the financing of the establishment and the financing of its 
activities. Large expenditures were required to set up the 
organisation and to recruit staff and maintain administration. 
However, maintenance of production and conducting exploratory 
activities are met by the oil companies themselves. In short, 
PETRONAS was caught between, on the one hand, the problem of 
'controlling' foreign oil companies and having no experience 
in the industry at all and initially to raise capital from 
domestic sources. However, PETRONAS was fortunate in this
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in that the Federal Government provided some sort of subsidies 
and aids as a stop—gap measure in the early development years 
of the state oil company. PETRONAS ultimately will be forced 
to seek investment capital overseas either through long term 
loan or joint ventures with foreign firms for all the future 
projects.
10.5 The Distribution of Crude Oil Production between 
the Malaysian Government and PETRONAS and the 
Oil Companies_________________________________________
Having elucidated the nature of the production- 
sharing formula in the earlier section, we are thus able 
in this section to determine the distribution of shares of 
the crude oil production expected from offshore fields in 
'Malaysia for the next 6 years from 1977 to 1982.
The Malaysian Government's share of the crude pro­
duction are made up of Royalty and 'Equity' or 'Participation' 
oil as they are sometime called, and the latter is vested by 
the Government in PETRONAS. The oil companies crude oil 
shares are made up of 'Expense' or 'Cost1 oil and 'Profit1
oil.
In Table 10.5, the total share of the Government over 
the next 6 years is expected to be increased by 37.3 percent 
from 41.7 million barrels in 1977 to 56.6 million in 1982 
while the oil companies share over the same period increased 
by 36 percent over its 1977 level to 39.0 million barrels in
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1982.
Our next objective or purpose is to match the 
increasing, availability of the Malaysian crude oil against 
the increasing requirements of crude oils - imported and 
domestic - for the use of local refineries. This latter 
objective will determine the state of the Oil Account in 
the next 6 years.
In order to achieve thi's objective, the Saudi 
Arabian Light Marker crude (ALC) is used as the representa­
tive crude for oil imports into Malaysia and this is matched 
with the local Miri Light Crude (MLC) as representative of 
all local crude oils as shown in Table 10.6. This exercise 
will help to determine the "surplus" available for exports 
from 1977 to 1982.
In Table 10.6, the net balance or "surplus" from the 
oil account increase progressively from 41.5 million barrels 
in 1978 to 61 million barrels in 1980 and falls again to 26 
million barrels in 1985, a little above its 1977 level. If 
the total balance is taken over the 6 year period, it is 
around 261 million barrels. This is also the amount of oil 
available for exports to the world market from 1977 to 1982*.
Part of this will find their way into the integrated channels 
of the oil companies (oil companies’ shares of crude) and 
the remainder will be offered for sale in the "open" market.
* No attempt is made here to forecast the revenues that will flow 
into the country as a result of the Increase in "surplus" oil 
for exports as any attempt at this time at forecasting oil 
price even in a short period is difficult and misleading.
TA
BL
E 
10
.5
: 
TH
E 
DI
ST
RI
BU
TI
ON
 
OE 
CR
UD
E 
OI
L 
PR
OD
UC
TI
ON
 
BE
TW
EE
N 
TH
E
 
GO
VE
RN
ME
NT
 
AN
D 
PE
TR
ON
AS
 
AN
D 
OI
L 
CO
MP
AN
IE
S 
BR
OM
 
19
77
 
TO 
19
82
(i
n 
Th
ou
sa
nd
 
of 
Ba
rr
el
s)
COp
M
in
OI
L
PA
N
P coP P oP H oPi Pio o
cJ?Ph P
O  EH
■e4 \
0  ° EHp co
2} Mm P H &CO S oP p! piM P EH
O > P 
O  Ph
ci» •
co p  
p  M  
H  O
o  Pi
o  o
P Ph M  o  
o
g
EH
H  H i
Ph H
o  o
Pi
Ph
g
CO
<*-
O  EH 
pH H
Ph P
§
H
EH
PhH  PI 
O  H  
H  O  
EH
EH
9
O
rt
Hi £5 
H  O  
O  Hi 
Hi EH .
JH CMEH P  
O  p  
Eh pi O  Pi 
o  pi P  
Ph Ph
P
H h o c^
P O H [ h  
*4  EH *<1
P h P  O  P - ^
P  ^  Ph '—  ^
-3} S  O  H  o p p 
Ph
H- rO O LA CM O
00 rO VO O C— VO
cn LTv H- H- ro
oo C"- CT\ H- <n
CM rO H- H- rO
on CO O ICO co o
rH t - "sd” CO CM H *
c-~ ir \ H- o vo
rH rO oo H •v}* VO
LTV VO H - vo LTV
H- H O LO CM O
H* O- vo O rO vooo O ro rO cn rH
H- cn H* LTV CM O
i—1 H CVJ CM CM CM
O CM O O O O
vo O o H- O
i—t i—1 CM H 00 CM
CO rO ■H" i—1 cn
rH rH CM CM CM H
ro OO O LO oo O
H" cn -H- o H~vo co O LO O
H- VO cn ro H-
rO LT\ LO. LO vj-
O rH O o O o
H - CO O LO CM o
O O vo o cn vo
C- cn rH CM o cn
H H i l
o CM o O O oo rH O O O o
H- 00 O LO CM o** tv •* tv tv tv
O o VO o cn vo
0 - cn rH CM o cn
rH H i—i
oo 00 i—i CM Ot # » . • #
ro oo C" O cn rocn H- rH ro cn VO
1—1 CM rO rO CM CM
t— 00 cn o H CMH- r- c— 00 co 00cn cn cn cn cn <n*H i—1 i—! i—i i—1 rH
cm
o
H
Pi
O
•HH-*
O
CD
CO
Pi
*H
cd
rH
a
u
o
Ph
W)
Pl•H
u
p!
o
•H■P
O
3
o
JH
Ph
rH
• Q)
3
CD
H aP O
cd u
EH «H
a rd
o CD
U •P
cd
tH>d pf
CL) O
-P  rH 
cd «3
rH o
o
LO 
__'
o d
CM s'—'/—\
d -sj-
S
/—\
H m
405
TA
BL
E 
10
.6
: 
TH
E 
MA
TC
HI
NG
 
OF
 
ES
TI
MA
TE
D 
CR
UD
E 
OI
L 
A
V
A
I
L
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
 
WI
TH
 
C
R
U
D
E
 
OI
L 
R
E
Q
U
I
R
E
M
E
N
T
S
 
TO
 
DE
TE
RM
IN
E 
BA
LA
NC
E 
IN 
TH
E 
OI
L 
A
C
C
O
U
N
T
 
 
FR
OM
 
19
77
 
TO
 
19
82
 
(i
n 
'O
OP
 
b
a
r
r
e
l
s
)
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
406
W  CM
oS3
< I 
P
PQ rH
Q
H
Ph
H
P
a
P
H
O
W
PP
&
U
CN
P  H 
H p  
O PQ 
<! 
H P  
P  H 
P
PS > 
O rtj
.-j
+ A
CO
P
P
P4
P4
D
CO-
(fi 
I— I
Q)
U
UaJ
O
O
H  O
Q
W
P P  ^  
P  g  ‘ tqft; p  i-f 
U  P  pq
Eh P  Q 
O H 4', 
Eh O V
P  >-f OHO? 
H  O ^
co p , P Q Q
§ 9 9O PS Q
Q u o
to
13 f—I
P  PS p  pq
PS P  P  P  
O P  Eh p  Q
p  P  CO Ph o
SH  <] U  OS M  -
I
P
P  P  
P  g
PQ
P 
P  
O
> o  
P  o
H  O 
O -
P
>H
00 i—t CM CO H CO COCT\ co r - 0 00 CO CM
CO in O M1 00 0 COK ■k. *. •* k,
in H CM 1—1 CO 1—1
CM CO CO CM CO
CM
+ + 4. + + + +
CM 1— I 00 ov CM cn
O 00 CM on 1—l CO 00
O CM CTi O CO OY in
in cn CO cn M1 Cn ■—1
in in CO CO
CO
1—1 00 in CM r-in r- 00 rH 00 inr- CM 00 CO m in
n l> 00 O CM OY
rH 1—1 1—1 CM CM CM 1—f 
1—1
1—1 CO CO CO in CM
ID CO in 1—l O r - CO
CM O O 00 M' OCT\ CM in CO 1—1 in CM
CM CO co CO M1 •M1 CM
CM
O CM 0 0 O O
O r—f 0 O O O
00 0 in CM O
O 0 CO O cn CO
cn H CM O cn
1—1 1—1 rH
00 cn 0 1—1 CM
t-~ 00 00 00
cn cn cn cn cn cn
1— I rH rH i— l rH rH
CM 
i—I 
CM
rO
O
CO
CM ..
00 Q)
g  cn OO ■—l UPS 3
Pm 0 O
Eh W
P
r t j I""-
Eh r -Q cn
Eh H
in
Re
su
lt
 
in
 
co
lu
mn
 
C2
] 
fo
un
d 
fr
om
 
i
n
f
or
ma
ti
on
 
in 
Ch
ap
te
r 
3 
an
d 
C
h
a
p
t
e
r
407
The usefulness of this type of projection depends on 
the trade prospects of Malaysia's crude oils in the inter­
national market. The extent of demand and price for the 
crude oils will enhance the surplus revenue that Malaysia 
can expect in the future.
10.6 The Future Trade Prospects in the Petroleum Market 
1 o S®} 1 Markets for Malaysian Crude Oils
There are two recent forecasts made by CIA and 
WAES on world energy demand and supplies for crude oils in 
1985.
Table 10,7 relates worldwide energy demand in 
*1985. The data are - either for OECD countries or for the 
world outside Communist areas (WOCA) which comprise all 
countries other than the USSR, Eastern Europe and China. In 
the table CIA assumes a rate of economic growth of 4.3 percent 
per annum between 1976 and 1985 for OECD, while WAES offers 
two alternative rates of growth for WOCA - high (5.2 percent) 
and low (3.4 percent) projections.
Table 10.8 relates to energy supplies for the 
same period as that of demand. The CIA estimates that WOCA 
would need 68 to 72 million barrels of oil per day in 1985, 
and non-OPEC oil supplies would amount to 24 to 26.5 million 
b/d. The demand for OPEC oil another 3.5 to 4.5 million 
barrexa per day representing estimates of Communist Countries
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TABLE 10.7: DEMAND FOR ENERGY 1985
Rate of Economic Growth. 1976 
- 1985
World Outside Communist 
Areas CWOCA)
OECD (Excl. Australia & New 
Zealand}
Other Developed Countries 
OPEC
Non-OPEC Developing Countries
(Million Barrels Daily of Oil 
Equivalent}
CIA WAES (High} WAES (Low)
4.3% 5.2% 3.4%
123 114
99 97 93
2 3 2
4.9 4.2
18.2 14.9
TABLE 10.8: ENERGY SUPPLIES WOCA 1985
(Million Barrels Daily of Oil 
Equivalent}
CIA WAES CHigh) WAES (Low)
Gas
Nuclear
Hydro-elec trie 
Coal
Geothermal, Others 
Total Non-Oil
Oil Required
Non-OPEC Oil
OPEC Oil for WOCA
Communist Countries 
Requirements
Total Oil Requirements 
from OPEC
68
24
- 72
- 26.5
41.5 - 48.0
3.5 -*■ 4.5
45.0 - 52.5
21
12
7.8
19.3
0.6
60.7
62.5
24.7 
38
18.4 
10.1
7.3
19.4 
0.4
55.6
58.2 
22 .0 
36
39 36
Source for Tables 10.7 and 10.8: Mabro, R. "Energy Crisis in
1985 " in' M E E S , April 10, 
1978, p. 6.
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requirements. On the other hand, WAES estimates that oil 
requirements in WOCA at 62.5 million b/d in the high growth 
case and at 58.2 million b/d in the low growth case. WAES 
expfects the Communist Countries to be roughly in balance.
OPEC oil supplies come from 3 main groups of 
countries: Group I, comprises of Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Iran, Gabon and Ecuador, Iraq and Qatar which could produce a 
maximum production of 14.5 to 16.0 million b/d in 1985; Group
11, are group of countries likely to restrict output between 
7 and 9 million b/d in 1985 which include Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, 
Libya and Venezuela and Group III - Saudi Arabia. If Groups 
I and II supply a total of between 25 to 27 million b/d and
.if Saudi Arabia is willing to supply the 15 million b/d making 
total supply of OPEC oil to be 4.. 2 million b/d, enough to meet 
demand from WOCA in 1985. If extra demand from Communist 
countries are considered, by 1985 there would be a deficit 
of OPEC oil in the range of 3 to 10.5 million b/d. This will 
result in a crisis or shortage.
Between 1977 and 1985 oil will remain the dominant
fuel in the Pacific Basin, and the region as a whole (excluding
China) will continue to consume about three times more oil
(12)than it produces . At present, total, production is around
12. A Caltex study pointed out that the Asean group of
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Singapore) will generate faster growth through 1985 than any 
other area in the world except the Arabian Gulf with projected 
growth of GDP at 7 percent per annum to 1980 and 6.5 percent 
for 1980—85, it will still remain heavily dependent on oil as 
its main energy source. See Zingaro, WV, "New Patterns of 
Demand for Oil - Part III" in ASEAN BUSINESS Q U A R T E R L Y 1977 
(3rd Q r .), Vol.l, No:3, pp. 28-30.
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2 million barrels a day; most of it from Indonesia, with
C13)smaller volumes in Australia, Brunei and Malaysia 
Against this, some 7 million barrels a day is consumed 
mostly by Japan. .
By 1985, oil production could be .around 4 million
barrels daily and demand between 10 and 12 million. This
demand depends largely on the Japanese ability to develop
its nuclear power programme which will have tremendous
effect on oil and coal requirements, and the ability of
(14)other countries to substitute other fuels for oil . On 
the supply/production side, it depends on how much more oil 
will be found and where. Indonesia is hoping to increase 
its production to well over 2 million barrels a day in the 
next five to ten years although at the same time, its con­
sumption is expected to rise considerably thereby limiting 
increment available for new exports. Malaysia's output 
could be around 250,000 according to our projection earlier 
(one estimate put it at 500,000 barrels a day by 1985 ^ ^ )
13. In East Asia, amongst the oil producers in the region, 
Indonesia is the biggest producer producing about 1.6 million 
per day in 1975 accounting nearly 60% of all crude oils pro- 
duced in the region. See Carr, W.I. & Sons & Co.- (Overseas) , 
FAR EAST OIL RESEARCH, 1976
14. The major sources of power will be nuclear from zero in 
1975 to a combined output of 8,000 MW in 1985 or at an average 
rate of 9.7% a year for the Philippines, Indonesia and Taiwan. 
See Zingaro, W. op.cit.
15. Wagner, G ,A . "Energy Prospects for the Pacific Region" 
a paper addressed to the Indonesian Petroleum Association, 
Jakarta on 7 June 197 6, p. 4.
411
but Australia's existing fields would by then be declining, 
and Brunei's production would probably also have peaked near 
its 1976 level.
China could become a significant oil exporter by 1985, 
as only in this way could it meet rising internal energy re­
quirements and at the same time increase exports. According 
to Shell, there is no evidence to support estimates made by 
many forecasters that China could be producing 8 to 10 million 
barrels a day by the early 1980s. A more probable figure 
would seem to be around 3 to 4 million barrels a day by 1985 
which suggests that exports could be doubled to 400,000 b/d Cor 
even 800,000) over the same period .
On the demand side of the equation, it seems that 
there will not be a large market in North America in the 
medium term for oil from the Western Pacific, although appre­
ciable quantities of low—sulphur Indonesian crude (and recently
C17)Malaysian crude) are already moving to the United States 
Currently there are some competing exports from North America 
(Alaskan North Slope oil) with the surplus of Alaskan production
16. Wagner, G.A. ibid., p.6.
17. The West Coast became a major buyer of Indonesian oil 
when Canada sharply limited exports following the 1973-7 4 oil 
price crisis, and as California encountered a natural gas supply 
problem. The US now buys 43% of Indonesia's oil exports, out­
stripping Japan's share of 41% in 1974, the US was only 25%. 
Currently, Indonesia is the West Coast's major supplier and has 
looked to the US in the recent past to ease the pressure created 
by Chinese competition in the Japanese market.
See Hiatt, F. and Shapiro, M.A. "Don't fret over Alaskan crude 
Union tells Indonesia" in PETROLEUM NEWS SOUTHEAST ASIA, Nov., 
1977, p. 11.
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have to find markets elsewhere. The West Coast of the United 
States will, therefore, be largely self-sufficient and the 
balance of Alaskan oil availability will probably be trans­
ported to other parts of the country, primarily to the East 
Gulf Coasts .
Latin America as a whole is expected to remain broadly 
\ self-sufficient in oil, with exports to the. United States
offset to a large extent by imports into major markets on the 
Atlantic side of South America.
At present Japan is the main buyer of Chinese crude. 
The heavy characteristics of the Chinese crude could pose 
some constraints in the Japanese market for the crude. China 
will have to export her crude , to other countries in the far 
eastern countries. Since the Malaysian and Chinese crudes 
differ in qualities, there would be no keen competition 
between the two crudes. The only competition that Malaysian
18. The influx of Alaskan oil would appear to threaten the
safety valve, at a time when California may also be increasing 
its own production through tertiary techniques. Since Alaskan 
crude is considerably lower in sulphur than Middle Eastern 
crude (approximately 1.8% versus 2.5%}, less Indonesian oil, 
which is lowest in sulphur, would be needed for blending pur­
poses. According to Hartley there are several factors which 
when combined to protect most of Indonesia’s share of the 
market: (i) California still faces the prospect of a natural gas
shortage, and if Alaska cannot meet its gas needs, demand for 
the relatively clean sulphur crude will increase; (ii) the surplus 
Alaskan crude will finally be piped to the central and east coast 
of US; (iii) stringent air pollution standards In Los Angeles 
(where the maximum sulphur permitted is now 0.25%) and San 
Francisco give Indonesian crude a strong and continuing advan­
tage in the competition against Alaskan crude oil.
See Hiatt, F. and Shapiro, M.A., ibid, p. 11.
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crudes will face is that of Indonesian crudes which are low in 
sulphur too.
The Malaysian import-export situation in terms of 
crude oil in future can be looked from two points of view.
The first is that in order to meet the domestic demand for 
petroleum products, Malaysia will have to import and refine 
the Middle Eastern crude oil in combination with the domestic 
crude and exporting some large portion of her crude to foreign 
market. Secondly, because of its light and low-sulphur charae 
teristics, the position of the Malaysian crude will be more 
or less complementary with the other exporters of crude oils 
in the Pacific market. And in the final analysis, Malaysia 
in the foreseeable future has a broad range of flexibility in 
her choices of crude-mix to be refined in the country as shown 
in Chapter 8; importing necessary amounts of crude from the 
Middle East as at present, while exporting surplus domestic 
crude to mainly Asia-Pacific area especially in the Asean 
regional market.
10.6 i-2: Markets for Petroleum Products
In the case of petroleum products, the domestic 
market is expected to more than double in the 15 year period 
between 1975 to 1990 as shown in Table 3.5 in Chapter 3. 
However, as pointed out in Chapter 5, the present refinery 
capacities to meet future product requirements are not suffi­
cient. There is a need to have another refinery in Malaysia
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by 1983 , the conclusion reached in Chapter 5. Howeveb-y it 
is not possible to produce all of the products in sufficient 
quantities because of the discrepency between characteristics 
of the crude oils to be refined and the pattern of demand for 
each of the products. There is bound to be some surplus for 
export and some deficits which have to be imported. Moreover, 
it. is difficult to expect a stable export market for refined 
products refined in Malaysia.in overseas countries due to the 
competitive forces operating in the world oil market.
In the international scene, the market for petroleum 
products is determined mainly by the pattern of international 
trade as a whole, past and present worldwide refining capa­
cities, operating rates of new refinery projects coming on 
stream in future and projected demand for oil products.
Since the oil crisis in 1973, average operating rates
of refineries in the world have been cut by 12% from 85% in
1972 to 73% in 1975. This relatively low operating rate is
predicted not to have been improved very much after 1977
through 1985. This is because refinery capacity will increase
at least 40% per annum whereas demand for oil products will
n  9)
grow at most by 5% per annum
The petroleum product movements and trade in the past 
and present are mostly between the Western countries and the 
Middle Eastern and Latin American countries. The position of
19. Cited in the Preliminary Draft of the Master Plan by
C. Itoh for the Government of Malaysia, 197 6.
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Asian countries in this trade as exporters has been minor 
(5% of the world’s exports). And almost all of these exports 
are made to Asian countries. This trend of regional concentra­
tion of petroleum trade is not likely to change in the fore­
seeable future. Self-sufficiency in petroleum products is 
regarded as a common feature in the countries around the Asian 
Pacific region with the exception of Hong Kong.
The total potential figure for the region in Table
10.9 does not mean that the sufficiently large market is ready 
for Malaysia to capture the surplus from her new refinery.
This is because the potential regional market has to be shared 
with Singapore, Indonesia and the Middle Eastern countries.
In 1974, 80 to 90% of the markets for products in this region 
was keenly contested by the three countries earlier and it is 
expected that the competition for the market will be keener 
and more competitive than in the past. So there is a need to 
look into ways of exporting surplus products from the new 
refinery project in Malaysia earlier such as the fixing of 
lower FOB price, not to provide some provisional size of 
promising overseas market.
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TABLE 10.9: POTENTIAL EXPORT MARKET FOR
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE FAR EAST
PRODUCTS POTENTIAL MARKET
TOTAL POTENTIALITY 
CMillion barrels 
per year)
1974* 1980 1985
LPG Japan 19.5 30.0 30.0
Gasoline Hong Kong 2 .0 2.2 2.5
Naphtha Japan 40.0 25.0 25.0
Kerosene Indonesia, India, Hong Kong 17 .0 20.0 20.0
Gas Oil Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand and 
India 25.0 30.0 33.0
Fuel Oil Hong Kong, Japan, Australia 
Taiwan, India 120 130 140
* Actual figures.
Source: Extracted from Preliminary Draft of the Master Plan by 
C. Itoh for the Government of Malaysia, 1976.
10.6 .\3i, Market for Natural Gas
Japan is already receiving 1 million tons a year
of liquified natural gas from Alaska and almost 5 million tons
from Brunei. By 1985 the Pacific will see,a considerable 
increase in this highly sophisticated trade. Indonesia will 
4re the largest exporter, with plans to export a total of 10 
million tons annually, of which 7 million will go to Japan 
and 3 million to California. Total exports of liquified 
natural gas from Pacific countries could thus be up to some 
28 million tons annually in mid-1980 . According to
Shell, it seems unlikely that China .will .become a major
20. Wagner, G.A., op.cit., p.5.
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energy exporter in the near future. Its own internal needs 
must grow enormously; and should the Chinese oil industry 
achieve only a moderate level of success during the 1990s, 
it is even possible that China could face the alternative of 
restricting its own development or becoming a net oil importer. 
Also the year 1985 would appear too early for gas exports 
from Russia's Yakutsk region in Eastern Siberia. This mean 
too that any new Russian energy supplies are unlikely to
i
enter the Pacific market until well beyond 1985 Although
there has been a spate of gas discoveries associated with the
exploration for oil in Malaysia, from oil company sources, ■
i i
i
the existence of big and commercial gas finds is limited at 
present and in the future.* The present gas discoveries
i
indicated in Chapter 4 earlier are small and are only 6on- 
fined to the offshore areas of the east coast of Peninsula 
Malaysia. Except for the big and commercial gas fields in 
Bintulu, Sarawak (also known as the Central Luconia fields) 
there are no gas finds of that extent in Malaysia. The gas 
reserves found in offshore Pahang on Esso and Conoco con­
cessions may prove to be commercial later on but this has 
not been confirmed as yet. The existence of these reserves 
would not find big marketing outlets as the states which 
border the South China Sea sector of Malaysia Cwhich are
under-developed) do not have many industries which consume
I
a large amount of energy from gas at present and in the. 
foreseeable future. Moreover, the local or domestic dis­
tribution of natural gas by pipeline network presupposes 
the need of big and concentrated consumers .whose .level of
21. Wagner, G.A. ibid, p. 6.
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consumption is stable throughout the year. In the gas pro­
ducing areas of Sabah and Sarawak there is no big consuming 
market. There is no likelihood that the situation may change 
in the foreseeable future. This is also true in the case of 
Peninsula Malaysia since it is not feasible to construct a 
submarine gas transmission line from Sabah and Sarawak. Even 
in a big city such as Kuala Lumpur, the setting up of a town 
gas network is not economical. The distribution of natural 
gas in Peninsula Malaysia is still difficult to consider, 
even the oil and gas finds in offshore Malaysia is developed 
in the future.
The most probable big consumers of natural gas would 
be the power generating installations and units such as 
National Electricity Board (N.E.B.) in Peninsula Malaya, Sabah 
Electricity Commission and Sarawak Electricity Commission. 
However, according to NEB sources, the power plants projected 
by the board within the next decade are all envisaged to be 
fired with fuel oil. From reliable sources too, there are 
no plans at hand for the setting up of industries in the 
future that will be powered by natural gas. This is also 
true in the case of residential use of natural gas because 
of the high cost of constructing pipeline networks and the 
popularity of liquified petroleum gas in steel containers 
and kerosene amongst the population. However, with the 
increase in the living standard and modernization, city gas 
piped to residential complexes may also be conceived in the 
future.
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY OF MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
11.1 Summary of Major Conclusions
Despite some limitations described earlier in 
Chapter 1, this study met all the objectives of the study 
on the economics of petroleum industry in Malaya with vary­
ing degrees of success. This study produced several major 
findings.
Malaysia depends between 85 to 90 percent of her 
energy consumption from petroleum sources. The development 
of local industries and infrastructure since the attainment 
of independence or statehood in 1957 and the subsequent 
formation of Malaysia in 1963 had resulted in the growth of 
petroleum products demand of between 9 to 10 percent annual 
growth in recent years. It was anticipated that the pattern 
would be maintained at least until 1985 when on this basis 
absolute consumption would be more than doubled.
With the spate of oil discoveries in 1974 from the 
offshore fields in Malaysia, the proven commercial reserves 
of petroleum for Malaysia had been revised upwards from 1.5 
million barrels in 1972 to 1.0 billion barrels in 1974 from 
25 fields. The figure for gas reserves as it stood in 1976 
had been put at 15 trillion cubic feet. Using the past and
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projected figures, the curve of expected production from the 
proven reserves was constructed which indicated the potential 
amount of oil that could be expected and made available under 
the present circumstances until 1992. The assumption 
behind this expectation had been the realisation of the plans 
of the oil companies with respect to production dates and 
production levels. With new discoveries of new oilfields, 
we anticipated that the date of exhaustion of the oil re­
sources would be prolonged beyond the 19 90s.
From our study of the refinery capacities in 
Chapter 5, we concluded that the excess capacities experienced 
by the three refineries in Malaysia after 1975 would be fully 
\itilised by the end of 1980. From the projected product 
requirements made in Chapter 3, it appeared that the current 
refining capacity was only sufficient to meet domestic 
demand up to 1980. The best alternative available to meet 
the supply problems were either investment in expanding the 
existing refineries or by building a new refinery in Malaysia. 
The first alternative was found to be of a short-term nature 
and the latter was more feasible as a long-term solution to 
meet the requirements. This solution seemed to be valid in 
view of the increasing availability of indigenous offshore 
crude petroleum.
The crude oil price hikes in 1973, 1974, 1976 and
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recently in 1977 together with, the licensing of petrol, 
diesel and kerosene as controlled items by the Government 
led to an uneven distribution in the list or retail price 
adjustments for individual products which were insufficient 
to allow full recovery of increased crude costs to the local 
refiners. The approved adjustments had also led to the 
Skewing of the price structure of these products in the 
market namely motor spirit, known as petrol (premium and 
regularL, diesel and kerosene. The price increases of 1973, 
1974, 1976 and 1977 had been granted largely in the form of 
higher petrol prices with only minimum adjustments to diesel 
and kerosene prices.
With the conclusion of the production sharing agree­
ment between PETRONAS and the oil companies concerned, over 
the 6 year period from 1977 to 1982, PETRONAS's share of 
crude oil was expected to be around 2 96 million barrels; oil 
companies share was expected to be around 248 million barrels. 
On the other hand Governments share of royalty was expected 
to be around 60 million barrels. This was matched with the 
volume of crude oil required over the same period from imports 
and domestic sources by the refineries in Malaysia. It was 
expected that the surplus or net balance from the oil account 
would be around 41.5 million barrels in 1978 and was expected 
to rise to 62 million barrels in 1979 and fall rapidly to 
26 million barrels in 1982 (giving net balance of 26i.6 
million barrels of crude oil from 1977 to 19821 as local pro­
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duction started to fall and import requirements increased.
11.2 Policy Implications
The mair} issues faced by the petroleum industry in 
Malaysia with long-term implications are thus clearly - crude 
petroleum production, refinery capacities and end-product 
price developments. And in this Chapter we shall try to con­
sider these issues.
Six major policy implications are derived from the 
major findings. More detailed studies are required for each 
of the five areas to put them into practice. The six major 
policy implications based upon the findings of this study 
are as follows.
11.2.1 Conservation and Depletion Policy
As a consequence of the international oil crisis 
of 1973, the Malaysian government announced its intention 
to control the country's hydrocarbon resources - petroleum 
and narural gas. The objective of the control is to secure 
for the nation a large share of the oil produced by the multi­
national oil companies in Malaysia as well as to obtain 
increased benefits through ancillary services and oil faci­
lities. To achieve these objectives, the Government drafted 
legislation to effect its production - sharing policy. The 
Petroleum Development Act amongst other things, vests owner­
ship of petroleum and natural gas resources in PETRONAS.
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The Petroleum Development Act which gives the 
Government sweeping powers of control over the petroleum 
industry was enacted by the Malaysian Parliament in October 
197 4. Together with the production sharing policy (amended), 
the provisions of the Act presented the companies involved 
in oil exploration and development with a completely 
changed operating environment. A major issue deriving from 
the Act concerns depletion policy and the extent of control 
by conservation policies on the rate of production in indivi­
dual fields.
The term "conservation" has been applied to many
t
programme!s concerned with the protection of public interest 
in the development of varied types of natural resources with 
two strands of objectives: firstly, much economic waste would 
occur and many social benefits would be foregone unless public 
regulation were introduced and, secondly, long-range planning 
of resource development was required to eliminate the wastes 
and secure the benefits. And within the broad areas to which 
the conservation concept was applied, mineral resources, 
especially oil, were assigned a special place because they 
were exhaustible and non-renewable. According to Lovejoy 
and Homan, "The rationale behind conservation is that there 
should be some restriction or postponment:. of present use 
in order to have a larger supply available for the future 
and economically efficient methods of recovery should be 
required in order to assure the fullest possible utilization
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(1)of underground supplies . Under the Act, PETRONAS could 
have insisted that, on the grounds of conservation in the 
national interest, production should be cut back to any 
specified level; pn the other hand, when the Government 
insists on operators stepping up production in the national 
interest, they will not be expected to invest more than the 
cost of one new wellP^ .
As has been discussed in Chapter 9, the current
expectations are that there will be supply scarcity of oil
in the world sometime in the middle of 1980's (or a little
later) especially in the non OPEC countries. Under this
circumstances, "there is a need to use oil as efficiently
as possible (by conservation), to develop alternative sources
of energy and to conserve the present oil resources in the
expectation of higher prices in the future, ceteris paribus,
(3 )such expectations reduce the optimum rate of depletion"
Malaysia being an exporter as well as importer of oil will 
experience an energy gap of "unmet" demand in the early 1980's 
(under present proven reserves) if no proper and effective 
conservation measures are undertaken by the Government from 
now. If our hunch on the situation of supply - demand for 
oil in Malaysia in Chapter 4 is correct, .then Malaysia will
1. Lovejoy, W.F, and Homan, P.T. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION, John Hopkin's Press, Baltimore, 
1967, p.8.
2. See "National Oil Policy", a paper addressed by the
Chairman and Executive of PETRONAS to the Rotary Club of Gombak,
Kuala Lumpur on January 20, 1977 extract of which found in
NAPA PETRONAS (Petronas News), February/March 1977, P.2.
3. Penrose, E.T. op.cit., p.4.
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be experiencing a net importer at the time when the world 
is just about to experience another energy "crisis" when 
price of oil begins to rise dramatically.
Following from this, "it is not true that in all 
circumstances present revenues are preferred to future 
revenues, especially if the expected rate in oil price 
exceeds the expected rate of interest. The.oil in the 
ground may be preferred to the foreign assets which have to 
be held if the rate of receipt of oil revenues exceeds the 
desired rate of consumption of imports plus the rate at 
which the economy can transform important resources into
( 4 )
productive investments"
Another main benefit from the conservation exercise 
is that the development of economically recoverable and 
proven reserves would not be compressed in terms of time.
It would give the country time to develop indigenous expertise 
in offshore technology which may be encouraged by a slower 
and steadier build-up of production. Since PETRONAS will be 
responsible for all aspects of the oil industry, no doubt in 
time it will take part in the exploitation and production of 
crude petroleum and natural gas. It is expected that PETRONAS 
will apply for its own exploration zone in Malaysia's offshore 
waters. Execution of this function will greatly assist the 
development of local capabilities and experience that will
4. Penrose, E.T., ibid. 4
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permit PETRONAS to take a more active role in its partner-, 
ship with the contractors.
11.2.2. Opportunities For Upstream Investment
If the estimates of the future recoverable reserves 
and production in Chapter 4 are correst, perhaps we may be 
able to conjecture or surmise the future direction of up­
stream development especially in terms of investment potential 
in petroleum exploration and development.
The discovery and production of crude petroleum 
rather than natural gas appears likely to be the major 
activity of the oil industry and success in exploration 
remains the most important factor in operating revenues of 
oil companies in general. It determines the future degree 
of activity of the myriad contracting companies allied to 
the industry. It also determines a potentially valuable 
source of income for the Government and local participating 
companies. This is a factor which may have considerable 
bearing on the objectives and goals of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP). On a regional basis, the opportunities opened 
would have a lasting spread effect on the less-developed 
regions affected.
The size of financial and industrial opportunities 
relating to offshore exploration and development to be under-
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taken until 1985 are massive, but perhaps slowing down after 
then. In 1974 it was estimated by Carr in Table 11.1 (Appendix 1 
investment would be in the region of US $2 billion - US $230 
million in exploration, US $1,100 million in development and 
US $600 million in operating investments. A large proportion 
of the estimated expenditure will accrue to the large inter- 
national servicing, supply and contracting companies, but it 
is entirely possible that domestic markets will be to an 
increasing extent be served by local companies. For obvious 
reasons, both avoidable and unavoidable, the Malaysian share 
of the offshore developments will be much less than the sums 
estimated. It cannot be derived that Malaysian involvement 
to date has been disappointing and thus has been and will 
remain a major political issue in the future. However, we 
will indicate the possible future areas of local participa­
tion.
There are 9 area categoies where there is some 
potential scope for participation by Malaysian companies in 
offshore development. They are drilling contractors, fabri­
cation and construction, transport services, engineering and 
surface production facilities, subsea - engineering, catering, 
workovers, supply boats and shore support, and specification 
and inspections. The most promising of these are perhaps: 
drilling contractors, engineering maintenance and surface 
production equipment, catering, specifications and inspections, 
and workovers. The total investment expenditure in these 5
* The estimated expenditures over the period in exploration
development and operating were based on their projected production
§rofile which is much, higher than ours. Carr believes a high egree of optimism that this would be achieved. See Carr, op.cit.
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categories is around US $600 million. Possibly the most 
promising area for government or state participation is 
perhaps in the areas of supply and shore support and communi­
cations.
In Malaysia, initial efforts will be concentrated 
on developing the logistical capabilities of the service 
sector particularly in the following categories which account 
for almost 50 percent of the total potential market in value. 
They are sub-sea engineering, transport services, supply bases 
and shore support, engineering and surface production faci­
lities and drilling contractors. Of these expenditures, a 
large part involve local services rather than local goods. 
Hence there appears to be a little scope for the exploitation 
of scale economies. Moreover, most of the firms supplying 
the petroleum industry are foreign owned and managed and were 
established prior to the growth of Malaysian offshore oil 
production. The payment to these suppliers mainly constitute 
an addition to foreign incomes rather than the employment of 
underutilised domestic resources.
11.2.3 Strategy for Expanding Refiney Capacity
From our analysis of Chapter 5, we found that the 
refinery capacities in Malaysia would not be able to cope 
with the increasing demand for products after 1979. The 
earlier but unsuccessful move by Caltex Oil Malaysia to 
establish a refinery in Malaysia at Lumut sometime in 1973
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was an indication of such need. We also envisaged that the 
projected requirement growth for all petroleum products 
would be around 8 to 9 percent per year from 1977 onwards.
And by 1985, we also predicted that the requirement of these 
products would double the 1975 demand figure.
In order that the "critical triangle" mentioned 
earlier does not become larger and larger, we recommend that 
PETRONAS should go into the refinery business as soon as 
possible. Perhaps it is not too optimistic to have the 
refinery constructed in or around 197 9 (reasons explained 
earlier) the best possible time under the prevailing circum­
stances, and should be on stream sometime in 1983. If our 
hunch is correct, then the unavoidable "critical triangle" 
in Figure 5.1 would only be from 197 9 until 1982. PETRONAS 
should give this venture a top priority and should not divert 
to other prestigeous investment projects.
The second consideration advanced is the urgent need 
for PETRONAS to enter into the refining business is the size 
of public sector demand for petroleum products, such as fuel 
oil and diesel fuel for the use of National Electricity 
Board (LLN), Malayan Railway (KTM) and Public Works Department 
(JKR)? jet fuels for Malaysian Airline System (MAS) and the 
Ministry of Defence, and bitumen for JKR. These products 
constitute about 40 percent of total product demand in Malaysia. 
It is estimated that LLN spends about $400 million on fuel
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oil and MAS is spending $30 million on jet fuel for domestic 
flights out of the $65 million spent annually on jet fuel. 
These two examples alone suffice to show the size of the 
government market.
Following from the above argument, one significant 
event that will have great bearing and impact in future is 
the contract entered into by.LLN with the two big oil com­
panies in Malaysia as the suppliers of fuel oil. The Board 
entered a five-year contract with Esso for the supply of 
boiler fuel oils for its power stations in 1968 with the 
contract effective from January 1, 1969, and towards the 
end of 1973, another 5 year contract was signed for the same. 
.The Board also entered into contract with Shell and Esso to 
supply boiler fuels to its Port Dickson power station for the 
period between September 1968 to end of August 1978. The two 
5 year contracts signed after 1973 had escalation clauses 
built into them compared with the previous contracts. As a 
result of escalation of fuel prices provided for in the 
contract and no fuel variation charges applied to industrial 
and commercial tariffs, for the-period 1974/75 to 1978/79, 
the Board will be subsidising the commercial and industrial 
sector by about $500 million, or $100 million a year. Half 
of the subsidy will come from the government in the form of 
rebates of fuel oil and duties, custom duty, surtaas. and sales 
tax (around $150 million) and reduction in corporation and 
development tax (around $100 million). And in the years
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1978/79 when the present contract for the Port Dickson Power 
Station terminates, the annual amount of subsidy will be 
increased to over $200 million. Since about this time too, 
the refinery capacities are at their maximum output and since 
only 2 companies are supplying fuel oil to the Government, 
the Government may not be able to get the. best price and an 
adequate and continuous supply later on.
The most pressing longstanding problems have been 
of product dislocations, shortages, hoarding etc., and this 
situation seems to continue. The present kerosene subsidy 
is 30/ per l.G. and has been operative since 1973. The 
kerosene retail market volume is about 88 million gallons 
per year. This is going to increase in the future especially 
with the increase in population. Taking the present rate of 
subsidy and demand, the subsidy incurred by the Government 
is to the tune of $26.4 million. If we look back 3h years, 
the total subsidy given by the Government amount to around 
$29.4 million! Although diesel oil has no subsidy but if 
the duty foregone is accounted for (price increase resulting 
in absorption of tax of 20/ per l.G.) then the total subsidy 
for both kerosene and diesel would cause a larger reduction 
in Government revenue. And the kerosene retail market is 
projected to grow at 6 percent per annum (Government1s 
estimate is 11 percent per annum) and diesel oil at 5 percent, 
one can imagine the amount of subsidy to be incurred by the 
Government in future. The kerosene subsidies which are 
adopted for socio-economic reasons, e.g. kerosene and the
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poor people and, therefore, constitute a transfer of income 
from taxpayers of petrol consumers (mainly the rich) to 
kerosene consumers. This is feasible for a short-time but 
in the long-run it becomes more and more of a problem as many 
countries have discovered. And if PETRONAS is required to 
go into the refinery business and make the products available 
in continuous supply, the present subsidy scheme for kerosene 
should be eliminated and the product concerned should be 
charged proper economic prices. Otherwise PETRONAS would 
get deeper and deeper into trouble and becomes a continuing 
drain on the state through the need for subsidies; for 
Petronas to survive and competitive with other established 
oil companies, it must be guided by commercial considerations, 
i.e. making profits.
The Master Plan which is in the process of prepara­
tion by C. Itoh of Japan for PETRONAS will provide the lists 
of investment projects (or project package) deemed appropriate 
to be undertaken in Malaysia during the coming decade con­
cerning the utilisation of hydrocarbon resources. The project 
package includes individual projects such as LNG, petroleum 
refining, petrochemical complex and nitrogenous fertiliser. 
These linkages would give the best and maximum benefits to 
the industry and country in future in the areas of industrial, 
regional and skilled-employment generation.
Beside involving itself actively as individual or
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partnership with foreign oil companies on the above projects, 
PETRONAS would involve itself more and more in the downstream 
activities in the future. For a start, PETRONAS will have 
to acquire shares, by "buying-in" (as opposed to "buying-out" 
or nationalisation) of the present oil refineries in Malaysia, 
With the "buying-in" of these companies, PETRONAS refinery 
due to be on stream in 1983 as suggested earlier would have 
total if not some effective control of the market for future 
petroleum products in Malaysia.
With the growing market, employment and income 
gained from the petroleum business will be significant. 
Transport agencies, service stations etc. would be amongst 
the opportunities created. Since it is a growing market, it 
opens up opportunities for all Malaysians to participate in 
the industry. If all other avenues have not shown satisfactory 
results in achieving the NEP, then this area is one left fpr 
the Government to depend on. The growing market would not 
infringe upon the competitor companies (existing oil companies) 
to expand and pick up part of the growing market and impair 
the investment climate in this country.
During the critical period underlined earlier between 
1979 to 1982, PETRONAS would seek the opportunity to parti­
cipate in the importation, distribution and marketing of 
petroleum products in the country. In the meantime, PETRONAS 
MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LTD. should be established
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to prepare for eventual operation of PETRONAS REFINING CO.
LTD. to gain experience and expertise before 1983. It is 
also envisaged that by that time Asean Council for Petroleum 
(ASCOPE) would be more purposeful for member countries 
especially in sharing crude and products in time of shortage 
and in getting technical assistance.
11.2.4 End Product Development ■
From the viewpoint of the economic performance of 
the industry in the future, several major conclusions regard­
ing the possible trend of the industry could be forcussed.
In terms of oil companies operations, we can expect 
•that the immediate future would not be too different from the 
past and present. Shell and Esso will continue to enjoy more 
profit margins per barrel than the other oil companies. This 
is because the two companies have local refineries and will 
continue to process products for the non—refiners of Mobil, 
British Petroleum and to a limited extent Caltex charging them 
the necessary processing fees.
Shell followed by Esso will continue to be the 
leaders in the oil industry in the immediate future because 
of their early entrenchment in the market and having the most 
extensive network of distributors and resellers. In the past 
Shell and Esso have invested a large amount of capital in 
storage facilities, terminals and depots in strategic loca-
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tions throughout the country. This has resulted in a large 
market shares than the others and this is likely to continue 
in the immediate future. However, over a longer period, it 
may be that with.the active involvement of PETRONAS in the 
marketing fields there would be some erosion in the market 
shares of the oil companies especially the bigger ones by 
PETRONAS and this will increasingly threaten their position 
if PETRONAS is competitive and efficient enough in the field 
that is new to them.
Because of the present operation of the Control of 
Supplies Act and the price cpntrol of the 4 essential products 
at retail level, the oil industry is expected to concentrate 
pn only the most profitable and non-controlled products in 
the future to justify their growth, profitability and invest- 
ment in the country. There is the likelihood that the oil 
companies would concentrate in products like petrol or motor 
spirit, liquified petroleum gas and lubricating oils and 
less of diesel oil and kerosene. According to one oil com­
pany sources, liquified petroleum gas has a gross margin of 
around $1,700 per l.G. but investment in LPG cylinders is 
very high although LPG itself needs a small investment. It 
is estimated that the oil industry has to invest around 
M $40 per cylinder and the total investment per year in 
cylinders alone is around M $20 million. In this type of 
investment Shell and Esso will dominate for sometime. This 
is because they have the refineries from which they get their
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LPG. Mobil and British Petroleum have a limited amount of 
LPG to sell in the market because of the nature of fixed 
entitlement from the barrels of crude they process in the 
Shell refinery at. Port Dickson.
Similarly in the case of lubricating oil manufac­
turing, Shell, Esso and British Petroleum and recently 
Castrol are the leading manufacturers and marketers and they 
have an edge over the other companies. Since this product 
does not come under the controlled product category under 
the Control of Supplies Act, from the same oil company 
sources, the present product„margin is between M $3 to M $4 
per barrel and this proves to be a very profitable invest­
ment in the future.
There is the likelihood that the price control 
imposed by the overnment under the Control of Supplies Act 
and the alleged unprofitability of some products marketed 
by oil companies, the production and marketing of these 
products are bound to be reduced in quantity especially in 
the retail market in future. This will aggravate the present 
problem of product shortage in the market. Facing with such 
problem of supply in the market place, PETRONAS may be urged 
by the Government to undertake the marketing of these products. 
To help the attainment of this supply objective, the Control 
of Supplies Act pertaining to the controlled products should 
be repealed by the Government. Only then that the present
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price skewing in the product structure be discontinued and 
instead the price structure would be reverted to its original 
form with competitive price determined by the free forces of 
supply and demand in the market place.
11.2.5 Recycling the 1 Surplus" Oil Revenue
Oil revenues can come from two sources: income 
from foreign exchange or surplus oil revenue and income from 
the internal operations of the oil industry through taxation. 
It is misleading to lump foreign exchange and domestic income 
together in determining the Government's income from the oil 
industry. This is because foreign exchange is only received 
for foreign sales and can only be used to import foreign goods 
•or finances the import content of a plan and also helps to 
keep down inflation due to excessive domestic spending.
Foreign and domestic income are not economically comparable, 
particularly in view of the fact that the quantity and value 
of the domestic money may be determined by the Government.
The fiscal influence of the oil revenue has a two­
fold effect on the economy: first, it provides a source of 
income for a government to supplement its budgetary expen­
ditures and second, the oil revenues are channeled for invest­
ment in various development projects.
Several oil exporting countries are being concerned 
about the rate at which they have been attempting to speed
438
(5)their revenues to finance their development plans . This
is especially true for countries too heavily reliant on oil
revenues alone such as in the Middle East. Any increase in
revenue required .would tantamount to incurring a fast rate
of depleting their exhaustible oil resources. However, this
is- unnecessary because elasticity of demand implies that prices
and thus revenues could be reached with little effect on the
f  6  \
rate of output in the short to medium term . . Since it is 
probable that crude oil prices can be raised still further 
in real terras yielding increased revenues to the exporting 
countries (at the same time only a small reduction in the rate 
of depletion) while producing an acceptable substitution for 
even the countries with the large reserves, and according to 
Penrose, it should seem producing countries should raise 
them{7).
5. With the advent of non-OPEC oil from the North Sea,
Alaska and Mexico^ Nigerian crudes have become increasingly 
difficult to sell at the high price asked in a situation of 
oversupply. The three main African producers (Nigeria, Libya 
and Algeria) faced a cut in their combined output. For Nigeria, 
an agreement on pro-rata cuts is of greater significance than 
for Libya and Algeria which have smaller populations and 
accordingly less pressing problems of internal development.
They are, therefore, reluctant than Nigeria to boost current 
income (to the detriment of their long-term gains) by cutting 
prices. Nigeria, on the other hand, is committed to very heavy 
current expenditure under the Third National Development Plan 
which is intended to result in a self-sustaining economy by 1980. 
A considerable share of the oil income (95%) will be needed to 
service her $1,000 mil. loans borrowed abroad. See PETROLEUM 
ECONOMIST, March 1978, p. 105.
S. Penrose, E.T., op.cit. pp. 5-6
7. Penrose, E.T., Ibid. , p. 6
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Owing to the expected increase of oil production 
forthcoming from its offshore fields between 1977 to 1980 
under the production prognosis based on current proven 
reserves of under 0.9 billion barrels, Malaysia is estimated 
to have a "surplus" (exports exceed imports of crude oil) in 
the oil account -as shown in Chapter 10 earlier. This is by 
no means big compared to surpluses of big oil producing 
countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya to quote a few, but 
it is significant in terms of less-developed countries. The 
question here is whether Malaysia has the "absorptive capacity" 
to channel the excess funds into investment avenues available 
in the country and how fast it can absorb to a level suffi­
cient to contain the oil connected surpluses without creating 
inflationary pressure in the economy.
Public current expenditure of the Government is 
estimated to amount to about $42.5 billion over the period 
of the Third Malaysia Plan (IMP) 1976-1980. In contrast, 
the Federal and State Government revenues is estimated to 
exceed current expenditure by M $800 million. Together the 
current surplus of the Federal and State Governments and 
Public Authorities amount to $1.7 billion for 197 6-80. And 
under the Third Malaysia Plan, development and defence expen­
diture is targeted at $18.6 billion resulting in a deficit of 
$16.9 billion - twice higher than under the Second Malaysia 
Plan 1971-1975. This gives rise to the need for a substantial 
higher level of borrowing from external and internal sources.
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The Government estimated that $11 billion would be financed 
from domestic or internal sources and the remainder $100
/ Q \
million from accumulated assets .
It is expected that the heavy expenditures for the 
TMP would be financed from Malaysia's export earnings of 
rubber, tin, palm oil, timber and petroleum whose volume of 
exports is projected to growr. by 8.4 percent per annum 
yielding an annual increase in export earnings of 13.4 per­
cent during the period of the Plan. Most of the expenditure
( 9 )is expected to be financed from the oil revenues .
11.2.6 Research and Development in Alternative Energy Sources
The revival in oil demand has awakened fears, pre-
I
■valent before the 1973/74 crisis, of a possible future 
shortage of oil, if consumption continues to grow at its 
customary rate as evidenced by a number of reports on this.
The first warning on this is found in an OECD report WORLD
8. THIRD MALAYSIA PLAN, 1980-1985 / P- 244
9. If this development expenditure fails to meet the
necessary foreign exchange needed to finance the plan then 
Malaysia can turn to foreign sources of borrowings. Her 
external debt service ratio was never less than 4 percent of 
export earnings in 1975. By 1980 the Third Malaysia Plan 
envisages that the ratio will be increased to 7 percent.
This level of debt service ratio is about the lowest amongst 
the countries of similar levels of development. See THIRD 
MALAYSIA PLAN, ibid.
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10vENERGY ' C^ JTXiOOKi • who concluded that if industrialised
states took no new steps about energy balance and consumption,
there might be rough parity between OECD's exportable oil
surpluses and world demand for OPEC oil by 1985. In another
study by CIA oresaw that world oil demand would approach
productive capacity by the early 1980's, .and exceed it by
12 ■
1985. The OPEC '*T3 'study • forecasts that industrial expansion
based on oil export revenues could, by 1985, result in a rise
in OPEC oil production from 1 million barrels daily in 1976
to over 8 million b/d with OPEC oil output declining in the
(13)19 90s. The WAES Report points out the major energy
problem facing the non—communist world sometime after 1985
will indeed be the shortage of oil at the time when energy
demand would still be growing. WAES found that it would be
difficult to satisfy energy demand after 1985 even if all
the alternatives - conservation, coal, nuclear, natural gas,
solar and other renewables are developed with the utmost
vigour. Coupled with this we have'analysed in Chapter 9
several recent studies in the past 12 months which have drawn
attention to the possibility of an energy crisis, though they
have not been unanimous in their predicted timing. The latest
(14)of such study pointed out that the present oil surplus
is largely due to the poor economic performance of the
10. OECD, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK
H . CIA, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SITUATION: OUTLOOK TO 1985
12. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
13. Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES), 
GLOBAL PROSPECTS 1985-2000, McGraw Hill, N.Y., 1977.
14. ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION; INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SUPPLY:
A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD., cited in PETROLEUM 
ECONOMIST, May 1978, p.178.
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industrialised nations - itself partly the result of the high
price of oil — coinciding with the advent of North Sea and
Alaskan supplies which are sufficient, temporarily, to take
care of the growth of consumption and that crisis may arise
in the late rather than the middle 1980's. They suggested
that there must■b e .continued efforts to restrain the growth
of oil consumption, by more efficient use, conservation
measures and the development of alternative.forms of energy.
This being the case, there are 2 forms of approach to the
(15)problem suggested by Rahmani 1: (i) a systematic increases
in crude oil prices and (ii) the calls for simultaneous 
incentives to encourage greater international trade in natural 
gas. All these entail costly increases in delivered energy 
prices which at present are no longer cheap anyway. In the 
first case, this would bring awareness to the consuming public 
the need for serious energy conservation ^, remove the un­
certainty over prices and bring the price of oil on par with 
the alternative energy sources and encourage the private 
sector to make much needed investments in such sources. In 
the second case, its proven reserves worldwide, including gas 
found dissolved in or lying over crude oil (associated gas), 
and gas found in independent formation (non-associated gas) 
are sufficient to support a large expansion in its present
15. Rahmani, B.M., op.cit. pp. 8-9.
16. Decisions about energy saving may be easier to make 
even during the period of energy shortage than decisions to 
develop new energy production. See Hartshorn, J. op.cit,
p . 6 .
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fl7)trade '. Since the first alternative has been discussed at 
length in Chapter 9 and in the earlier section of this 
Chapter, we will discuss only the various alternative energy 
sources available- in Malaysia such as water (hydropower), gas, 
nuclear power, solar energy and coal resources particularly 
in Sabah and Sarawak.
Since Peninsula Malaysia has been endowned with a 
certain amount of hydro-potential, research should be done to 
examine the feasibility of developing this potential as early 
as possible in view of the continuing increase in price and 
the diminishing availability.of oil (fuel oil for power gene­
ration) . However, since rainfall in the country is seasonal, 
it would be necessary to provide simultaneously steam gene­
ration back-up facilities to ensure that electrical energy 
would be available to the growing industries at all times.
Research should be made in the economies of using 
gas turbines for peak power generation unit. The rise in 
fuel oil prices as a result of the successive oil price hikes 
since 1973, it has been found that electricity generation 
using gas turbines would be extremely expensive. Since gas 
has been found along the east coast of Peninsula Malaysia, it 
may be necessary to introduce generation with gas turbines 
if gas is permitted to be used for electricity generation.
__________The very rapid rise in the price of fuel oil follow-
17. Rahmani, B.M. op.cit. p.9.
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ing the war in the Middle East has made dramatic changes in 
the acceptance of nuclear generation as an economic form of 
power generation. Up to the end of 1972, it had been con­
sidered that nuclear power generation would be economical 
only in large units of the order of 600 MW to 1000 MW^^^ .
Recent studies have shown that smaller-sized units could 
prove to be acceptable to developing countties which are 
entirely dependent on imported fuel oil.
The National Electricity Board of Malaysia (LLN)
recognised the fact that petroleum has been found within
the territorial waters of Malaysia and that residual fuel
oil obtained from these finds could be used for power
generation. But in view of the high quality of the fuel
oil, it would be extremely uneconomic to use this oil for
firing in their boilers, in view of the very high market
prices this oil would fetch for use in the petro-cheraical 
(19)industries ■ , So the alternative fuel which would be
attractive for serious consideration is nuclear fuel.
CONCLUSION
For the past four years, the petroleum industry has 
exercised an increasingly pervasive influence on the economy
18. Ramanath, A. "The Development of Electricity Generation 
Facilities in Peninsula Malaysia", a paper presented at the 
workshop on Energy Resources and Environment, Penang, Malaysia, 
February 21-23, 1975
19. Ramanath, ibid.
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of Malaysia. There are two strands to the influence.
Firstly, the actual effect of the petroleum industry on the 
growth of domestic investment and the creation of employment. 
Secondly, its role in supplementing Government revenue to 
enable it to continue to achieve The New Economic Policy.
Between the two, the Government could rely on the latter 
influence to achieve a potentially more valuable and lasting 
economic regeneration. Up to now, it has to be admitted that 
these dreams have suffered some 'hard knocks'. With the 
current small size of reserves, the people who see the petro­
leum resources as a continuing bonanza should be contented 
with only a bonus. The South China Sea discoveries cannot 
be regarded as the magical wand or panacea to cure the 
country's ills or woes. Many of the problems today in the 
industry such as those elucidated in this paper can be regarded 
as the growing pains in the development process of the industry. 
The rate at which these pains can be cured depends on the 
ability and speed at which PETRONAS grows. This is largely 
determined by how deep is its involvement in upstream acti­
vities, and how soon it ventures into downstream business 
like refining and petrochemicals on fully commercial lines, 
i.e. no subsidies. What is perhaps required more than any­
thing in the present circumstances is the development of 
harmonious relations amongst the integral parts of the 
industry from PETRONAS, as the arm of the Government, to the 
international oil companies and the various contracting 
enterprises. Only then will the consumer and Nation gain the 
most in the long run from the efficient exploitation of this
446-
dirainishing natural resource.
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There has been several omissions in the present 
study. Since the study only concerned;.the petroleum industry 
in Malaysia, industries like natural gas and petro-chemicals 
which are related to the oil industry have been barely men- 
tioned. No attempt has been made in the study of the methods 
of crude oil pricing before 1970 as information on this was 
not made available by oil companies and nowhere could be found 
in Government documents. There has been no attempt to trace 
the effects of the industry on the balance of payments, for­
ward and backward linkages to the various regions affected by 
it and employment generation. This is because it is difficult 
to do so since it was a relatively small industry before 1970 
and its impact after 1970 yet to be seen. The purpose of 
this study will be served if it has been able to stimulate 
interest amongst Malaysian researches in the economics of the 
petroleum industry for further research in the above areas 
where we stopped.
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APPENDIX 3A
TABLE 1: MALAYSIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 1970-1990
( in pillion M $ )
Year GDP at Factor Cost Average Annual Growth Rate
1970 IO7O8
1971 11589
1972 12 3/+ 9
1973 I3867
197^ 14797
1975 15315 1971-75 : 7.4%
1976 16650
1977 I8060
1978 19600
1979 21260
1980 23070 I 976-8O : 8 .5%
1981 24850
1982 26870
I 983 29040
1984 31400
1985 33940
1986 36690
1987 39660
1988 42870
1989 46340
1990 50090 I 98I-9O- : 8 .1%
Source: Third Malaysia Plan 1976-80
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APPENDIX 3.?
The linear function ax + b is assumed to be an 
approximation of a function y.
Given the values of y at the points xl, x2, x3 ....xn 
we aim at minimising the sum of the squared errors.
Consider: Yt approximated by axt + b
error et = - (ax.fc + b)
squaring errors r
Z 6t2 = "■ (Yt - ax,. - b)2...- 1
t=l t=l
derive the normal equations by differentiating the R.H.S. 
with respect to a and b and equating to zero.
et2 = ( Yt - (axt + b))2
Summing all errors at the n points.
n n
Z. 2 X t (Y - axt - b) = 0.. - 2
t — 1
from 2
from 3
- 4
- 3
5
Solve for a and b to obtain the linear equation.
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APPENDIX 5A
THE REFINERY AGREEMENTS AND TI-IE BASIC 
PRICING OE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
According to tlie Refinery Agreements, the prices of 
refined petroleum products fox’ Shell Petroleum Company Limited 
and Standard Vacuum Oil Company Ltd., were based on imported 
parity. Tlie refining companies were permitted to establish^ 
the prices of refined products at any level not higher than that 
at which they could sell or make available for sale equivalent 
imported products subject to consultation with the Government 
before they alter the prices of any products. The cost would 
be built up from posted prices of products at overseas supply 
sources plus recognised freight costs to the ports in the 
Federation such as Bagan Luar, Telok Anson, Port Swettenham and 
so on.
On the principal of 1 import parity1 laid down in the 
Refinery Agreements above, the price of products ex-refinery 
should not be higher than the landed cost in Malaysia, i.e. 
such prices should be the ceiling. The landed cost of the 
imported products into Malaysia would depend on the following:
(i) arrangements between the oil companies with 
their suppliers of finished products,
(ii) manner of determination of prices of bulk 
refined products,
(iii) discounts prevalent from time to time on the 
posted prices of bulk refined products at the 
sources of supply, and
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(iv) alternative sources of supply for import 
of such, products,
. On this basis, the ex-refinery prices for products 
for consumption.in the mainland should not exceed the sum of:
(i) the F.O.B. posted price for products of
similar quality from regular sources of supply 
for export to world markets which sources are 
competitive in relation to Malaya,
(ii) ocean leakages of marine insurance,
(fli) freight according to AFRA applicable to
General Purpose Size Vessels,
(iv) import duties, landing charges and other 
applicable charges.
It was assumed that the Government would levy excise 
duties on imported products displaced by domestic refinery 
production. This excise duties to be imposed on products 
manufactured locally destined for inland consumption in 
mainland Malaya would not be greater than import duties 
chargeable on imported products of similar quality.
The Malaysian consumer would, therefore, pay no 
higher price for refinery products than he would otherwise 
pay for equivalent imported products. Prices would, however, 
fluctuate with world market petroleum product prices and 
world freight rates.
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According to Section 5 of the Refinery Agreement, 
the refining companies were given the freedom to import 
crude oil and other feedstocks from sources and vessels of 
their own choice provided that the value thereof should not 
be more than the sum of:
(a) the F.O.B. posted or assessed price for crude 
oil and other feedstocks of similar quality 
obtainable from regular sources of supply for r 
export to world markets which sources are 
competitive in relation to Malaya,
(b) freight according to AFRA applicable to large 
vessels ,
(c) marine insurance ,
Moreover, the refinery agreements contained the 
assurance that for the importation of crude oil, foreign 
exchange either sterling or dollars would be provided as 
required. The Refinery Agreements of the two companies further 
contain assurance to the effect that 110 import duty would be 
imposed on crude oil imported for the refinery use unless 
and until this was required for the purpose of protection to 
indigenous crude oils. Assurance was also given for regulation 
of the inward and outward wharfage rates on crude oil and 
products. By virtue of another assurance which provided 
uniformity in the two agreements, the product prices of 
refineries had to be kept at par and in the event of any other 
refinery producing similar products from imported crude oil 
being granted terms more generally favourable than those granted
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to a particular refinery, those terms -would also be made 
applicable to these refineries.
The selection of the types of crude oil to be 
obtained for processing at any refinery was mainly dictated 
by:
(a) the price of crude, oil,
(b) the refinery.design,
(c) the outlets for the products manufactured.
The considerations of (b) and (c) of above were 
being somewhat of technical nature. However, the cost 
aspects in (a) included:
(i) arrangement in the crude supplies
(ii) manner of crude price determination
(ili) discounts off posted price
(iv) utilisation of crude supply alternatives and
(v) types of crude to be processed, i.e. the crude
oil selected by the refineries to suit their 
individual requirements.
Section 9 of the Agreement further stated that 
crude oil and other feedstocks should be imported duty-free. 
Similarly equipment, machinery, materials and supplies for 
non-construction operation, and the expansion of the refinery 
should be imported and duty free and re-exported free of 
duties, charges etc., if found surplus to requirements.
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Both the companies mentioned earlier applied for 
the benefits under the Pioneer Industries Legislation for 
the maximum period provided. The Government was prepared to 
enter into this formal agreement with the two companies but 
would deal with .the applications within the framework of the 
Pioneer Industries Legislation. Section 4 of the Pioneer 
Industries (Relief from Income Tax) Ordinance 58 applied here 
whereby, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in pursuance 
of the Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income Tax) Gazette 
Notification December 24, 1959 Nos. 514-2 and 5232, declared 
certain industries and products to be classified under Pioneer 
Industrie s .
PI No. 3 Ordinance i 960 declared pioneer status for 
Mineral Oil Refineries to produce:
(i) Motor Gasolines (all types)
(ii) Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF)
(iii) Diesel Oils (all types)
(iv) kerosene
(v) Gas Oils
(vi) Bitumen and Asphalt
(vii) Petroleum Naphtha and solvents
(viii) Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG)
(ix) Refinery Gas
(x) Butane
(xi ) Special Boiling Point Spirits
(xii) Fuel Oils (all types)
Items (vi), (vii), (viii) and (xi) products were 
declared pioneer products under PI (Relief from Income Tax) 
(No.3 ) Order i 960 dated February 3j i 9 6 0  ,
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Before further approval was sought , the Government 
stipulated two other conditions on the oil companies. Firstly, 
they should allow a reasonable participation of* the refinery 
by Malaysian investors if sufficient interest was shown by 
them. In this connection, it was suggested that the enquiries 
should be carried out by the companies to determine the degree 
of interest of local investors. Secondly, the Government was 
satisfied that vigorous and realistic efforts were made by the 
companies to train local personnel to replace to the maximum 
extent practicable of foreign personnel recruited for the 
project.
In the beginning of I 96I, the Government agreed to 
meet most of the proposals in the "Heads of Agreement" by both 
the companies which include:
the right to offset replacements and additions 
to the existing refineries
free importation of crude oil and feedstocks from 
any sources
the ex-refinery price not exceeding the import— 
parity price
to freely determine export price and destination 
the proposal agreements on foreign exchange to 
finance the refineries and their operations 
equal treatment in every respect all their 
shareholders.
In addition, the Government had given the assurance 
that the tax relief period was not to be limited to five years
(i)
(ii)
(iii ) 
(iv)
(v )
(vi)
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subject to the conditions that tlie construction day for Sliell 
Petroleum Company of Federation of Malaya be January 1, 19^2 
and production day Marcli 1, 196^.
On July 27, 1963? Pioneer Certificate No. 6h was 
given to the Sliell Petroleum (Refining) Company of Malaya 
allowing an authorised capital of M$50 .million and with, an 
initial paid-up capital of M03O million - M$7^ million 
contributed by the Malayan investors and M$22-^- million from 
foreign sources . And in the case of the Standard Vacuum 
Company of Malaya Limited, Pioneer Certificate No 60 was 
issued on April Z h , I 962. However, on April 19, 1962, the 
name of the Standard-Vacuum Refining Company of Malaya was 
changed to Esso Standard Refining Company of Malaya and 
subsequently on May 1 6 , 1962 to Esso Standard (Malaya) Limited. 
The authorised capital was M$150 million with paid-up capital 
of M$50 million. Foreign capital constituted M$33-J million 
with the remainder from local sources.
According to the agreements between the Government 
and the Shell Petroleum (Refining) Company and Esso Standard 
(Malaya) Limited the capacities of the two refineries were to 
be adjusted so that their output meet the inland demand 
requirements of gasoline and fuel oil.
The average capacities of the two refineries of 
20,000 (Shell) and 26,000 (Esso) barrels per day would be 
more than sufficient to meet the whole inland requirements of 
motor gasoline and fuel oil required by the Government. The
o>
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Sliell refinery1 s capacity -was expanded to 90,000 barrels 
per day in 197^- and Esso to 35 >500 barrels per day. The 
capacities were necessary for meeting Malaysia's future 
requirements in motor gasolines and fuel oil. The refineries 
were initially designed to meet Malaysia* s inland oil 
requirements and were never intended to be an export refinery 
like Shell's Pulau Bukom and Esso’s Pulau Ayer Cavan 
Refineries in Singapore.
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APPENDIX 6 A
S' T R A I T S S E T T L E M. E NTS.
P a p e r  la id  before the  L e g is la tiv e  C o u n c il b y  C o m m a n d  o f  
H is  E x c e lle n c y  the  G o v e rn o r.
T H U R S D A Y ,  FEBRUARY,  1893.
. R U L E S
. MADR BY
HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL
■ ■ UNDi^R
“ The Petroleum Ordinance 1883," as attended by Ordinance X VIII of 1886, 
and " The .Petroleum Ordinance Amendment Ordinance 1802.”
\
xOrd.f 1. All words'and expressions vised in these Rules and defined in “The interpreta- 
itHu. Petroleum Ordinance 1883,” or “The Petroleum Ordinance Amendmenttion- 
ivTf Ordinance 1892," shall in these Rules have the meanings respectively as- 
'«»»■ signed to them in those Ordinances, and
■ (1)— “petroleum in bulk" means petroleum in any vessel or recep­
tacle having a capacity of three hundred gallons or upwards ;
(2)— “ transport " means to remove from one place to another within
the Colony; . ■
(3)— import" means to bring into.the Colony by sea or land, and 
“ importation " mean's the bringing into the Colony as afore­
said.
2. No quantity of dangerous petroleum equal to or less than twenty Landing, 
gallons shall be landed, stored, or transported wilhouL a license. forage, ami
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply in any case when the 
quantity of the petroleum transported by any person does not exceed three petVoh^m°Ub 
gallons, and the petroleum is placed in separate glass, stoneware, or melal 1,01 exceeding 
vessels, each of which contains not more than a pint and is securely stopped. 20 Eallons-
3. (1)— No quantity of dangerous petroleum exceeding twenty gallons Landing,
shall be landed, stored, or transported by any one person or on the same pre- lituraEu> a,ld 
mises, except under, and in accordance with, the conditions of a license from ^dangerous 
the Governor granted as next hereinafter provided. petroleum
(2)-r~Every application for such a license shall be in writing, and shall exceeding 20 
declare :—r gallons.
(a) the quantity of the petroleum which iL is desired to land, store,
or transport as the case may be ;
(b) the purpose for which the applicant believes that the petroleum
will be used ; and
. ,(cj that petroleum other than dangerous petroleum cannot be used
for that purpose.
(3)— If the Governor sees reason to believe that the petroleum will be 
used for that purpose and that no petroleum other than dangerous petroleum 
can be used for the purpose, he may grant the license for the landing, tempo-
■ rary storage, or importation (as the case may be) of the petroleum, absolutely 
or subject to such conditions as he thinks fit.
4. Dangerous petroleum—  Conditions of
(a) which is kept at any place after seven days from the date on tLmP°™ry
which it is landed, or storage of„  , , . , . 1 dangerous(oj which is transported, or petroleum.
.(Vote :<—Any person guilty of any breach of, or disobedience to, Rules 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 shall be 
liable to a penalty not exceeding five hundred dollars and if smph breach or disobedience 
be of a continuing nature to a penalty not exceeding five hundred dollars for each day or 
part of a day during which such breach or disobedience continues. (Section 8 (2) of 
‘‘ The Petroleum Ordinance 1883" as amended by Ordinance X V 111 of 1886.)
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16. Every special license for the transport of petroleum shall specify Particulars to 
the places from and to which, respectively, the petroleum is to be conveyed, specified 
the quantity of petroleum covered by the license, and the time for which the t,lunMn- 
license is in force. •
17. (ij— Applications for special licenses for the transport of petroleum Applications 
shall specify the description and quantity of the petroleum to be transported,
the places from and to which, and the route by which, the petroleum is to be oTpctmfeum; 
conveyed, and shall describe the receptacles in which the petroleum is to 
be contained. 1 ' •
■ (2)— Applications for licenses [or the transport of dangerous petroleum <,f dangerous
•shall aiso contain the particulars required by sub-seetiun (2) of section 3 of Pelrolc'im- 
these Rules. • ■'
18. Licenses for the transport of petroleum otherwise than in bulk Vessels in 
shall only be granted if the petroleum to be transported is packed in air-tight
tins, .air-tight tanks' or drums of steel or iron, or other air-Light vessels ported is to 
not easily broken, or is contained in stoppered bottles carefully packed so as packed, 
to avoid the risk of breakage.
■ ' 19. No larger quantity than four ca^ es of peLroleum other than dangerous Conditions of
petroleum shall be kept or stored in any place outside the limits of any 
Municipality except under and in accordance with the following conditions:—  p:iuty of'non-
(i) No such quantity of such petroleum shall be stored in any wooden dangerous 
building. \ petroleum.
• (2) All petroleum shall be stored within the licensed place in a brick, 
stone, or iron receptacle. .
(3) N° goods of a combustible nature shall be stored in the licensed
place. *
(4) Subject to the provisions of section 11 of these Rules no cask or
other receptacle containing petroleum shall be opened, or the 
oil drawn off, within the building hi which the petroleum is 
stored.
(5) No smoking, light, or fire in any form sliall be permitted at any
time within such building.
(6) Such materials or appliances for extinguishing lire as shall be
approved by the Licensing Authority shall be kept ready for use 
in every such building.
(7) On the outside of every place licensed for the storage of such
petroleum there shall be conspicuously affixed a sign-board of 
a pattern approved by the Licensing Authority bearing the 
words “Licensed Petroleum Store” and the number of the 
store.
(8) If the Licensing Authority calls on the holder of a license, by a
notice in writing, to execute' any repairs of the licensed place 
which may, in the opinion of. such Authority, be necessary for 
the safety of the place, the holder of the license shall execute 
the repairs within such period, not being less than one week 
from- the date of the receipt of the notice, as may be fixed by 
the notice.
20. No quantity of petroleum other than dangerous petroleum exceed- Additional 
ing 20 cases or 160 gallons shall be kept or stored in any place outside the conditions of 
limits of any Municipality except under and in accordance with the following 
COnditionS pality of uon-
(1) A plan of every building intended for the storage of such petro- ;n
leum in such quantity shall be furnished by the applicant for a nu^ntity ex­
license to the Licensing Authority on which plan shall be shewn cueding 20 
the position and description of every building within 60 feet of °r 160 
the building for which a license is applied for. °n:>'
(2) There shall be affixed to every such building a lightning conductor
leading into a pit or well, or into a river or the sea.
{3) All the doors of every such building shall be of the thickness of 
not less than one inch and a half, and all the windows shall be 
fitted with external shutters. The sills of all external doors 
and windows on the ground floor of every such building shall 
be at a height of not less than 3 feet from the ground, and all 
' the floors shall be of stone, concrete, or brick.
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fcj which is sold or exposed for sale,
shall he contained in steel or iron drums marked with a broad 
band painted white round the centre of the drum having* 
attached thereto a label in conspicuous characters stating 
the description of'tlie petroleum, with the addition of the 
wordf; “ highly inflammable
5 . Every license for the temporary storage of dangerous petroleum in
any premises shall specify the maximum quantity of such petroleum which
may be stored in those preriiises.
6. Every license for the temporary storage of dangerous petroleum shall 
be in force for three months from the date of the grant of the license.
7. Every application for the renewal of a license for the temporary 
storage of dangerous petroleum shall be made in the same manner as an 
application for an original license.
Every such application shall be made at a date not less than fifteen days 
before the dale on which the original license expires. The same fee shall be 
charged for the renewal of a license as for a new license.
8. No quantity of petroleum shall be transported except under, and in 
accordance with, the conditions of a license granted under these Rules.
Provided that no license shall be necessary for the transport of any 
quantity not exceeding five hundred gallons of petroleum other than dangerous 
petroleum.
9. When petroleum imported otherwise than in bulk is landed within 
any port—  •
(t) it shall be landed only after sunrise and before sunset, and only 
at such place or places as the Conservator of the Port shall 
direct; • ■ .
(2) no smoking, fire, or light of any description shall be allowed in any 
boat during'the time that the petroleum is on board the boat.
10. All petroleum while being landed shall be conveyed at once from 
the ship in which the same was imported to the place of landing, and thence 
shall be carried at once to premises in respect of which a license for the 
keeping of petroleum has been grat i l ed .
11. When petroleum is imported in bulk, its removal from the ship shall 
be effected by means of a hose and a wrought-iron pipe between sunrise and 
sunset. Petroleum so imported shall be pumped into storage-tanks and 
when the ship has finished discharging the pipe shall immediately be emptied 
by means of a supplementary pump 011 shore. When the ship has not finished 
discharging by sunset, arrangements must, be made by means of a valve for 
elTectually preventing any of the oil in the pipe from escaping.
12. The only ports at which petroleum may be imported are the princi­
pal ports of Singapore, Prince of Wales' Island, Malacca, and the Dindings 
as defined under 1 he Harbours Ordinance 1872/' and at such other places 
as shall be fixed for that purpose, from time to time, by the Governor in Council, vuur
LT (1)— Licenses for the transport of petroleum other than dangerous 
petroleum in quantities exceeding five hiindred gallons may be either general 
or special. y
{2) Licenses for the transport of datlgerous petroleum shall 'be special
only.
T4- (1)— General licenses for a period of twelve months may be issued 
for the transport of petroleum in bulk by road or by water and for the trans­
port of petroleum otherwise than in bulk by cart only. Such licenses shall 
authorise the holders to transport any petroleum bond fide their own property 
without restriction as to destination or quantity.
(-) 1 he holder of a general license shall, with each consignment of
petroleum conveyed under cover of his license,,issue a pass in form J* ap­
pended to Lhcse Rulesj specifying the places from and to which the petroleum 
is to be conveyed and Lhe quantiLy of petroleum covered by it.
15 Special licenses for the transport of petroleum shall be in force for 
such period not exceeding six months from the date of the grant of the license 
as may be specified in the license.
lRjJ.
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(4) The f loor area of every such building built after the passing of 
these Rules shall not exceed 1,700 square feet, and the height 
of such building from the f l oo r .level to the under-side of the 
roof tie-beams shall not exceed 12 feet. The walls of every 
such building which is of briclc shall be solidly built of bricks 
throughout well bonded together with freshly made mortar 
and shall be of a thickness of not less than 14 inches.
(5j No qoanbty of petroleum exceeding 10,000 cases or 80,000 gallons 
shall be stored in any one compartment of any licensed place, and 
where more than such quantity is stored in any such place 
the_ walls between each compartment of the building shall be 
solidly built of bricks throughout well bonded together with 
freshly made mortar, and shall be of a thickness of not less 
than 14 inches, and shall be carried at least 2 feet above the 
roof of the hudding. There shall be no communication between
t°hm-eCo°fmPartment °f th<2 buildin'? and anI other compartment
(6) No license will be granted for the storage in any ohe compartment
ol more than 10,000 cases or 80,000 gallons
(71 An embankment not less than 3 feet in height shall be raised round 
every place licensed for the storage of such petroleum in such 
quantity and at a distance of at least 10 feet from such licensed 
place. I he roads or paths on such embankment shall be made 
of brick, stone, concrete, or cement.
(8) Outside such embankment, or within a similar separate embank­
ment, a detached building of brick, stone, or cement shall be 
erected within which all leaky tins shall be repaired, and within
which not more than 25 cases of such petroleum shall be kept at 
any time. . r
(9) All drains leading from the licensed place shall lead into catch pits
which shall be provided with iron plugs or doors capable of 
being closed *in case of fire.
21. (1) Licenses for the temporary storage or transport of dangerous 
petroleum in quantities exceeding twenty gallons maybe granted subject to
ic. provisions of section 3 of these Rules under the signature of the Colonial 
Secretary or of a Resident Councillor on the recommendation 0r a President
h-.nlUm7Pi^.C:on;im,i!?l,.nc,rarir ^ license applied for is for such storage or 
_ a 1.port within the limits of any Municipality, or if the license applied for 
is for such storage or transport outside the limits of any Municipality on the 
recommendation of a District Officer or Magistrate.
M J2.)~/)PPlk’a1ti°ns for Sl,ch licenses should be made to the President of the 
may be Comm,ss,oncrs or to the Strict Officer or Magistrate, as the case
nnliti3nfTlLiCtM1SeS ^  1 tcmPorai7 stora8T or transport within any Munici- palit) of dang< rous petroleum in quantities not exceeding twenty gallons, and 
licenses for the transport of other petroleum, may be granted if thf license be ■ 
for such storage or transport within the limits of any Municipality by the
Municipal Commissioners o such Municipality, and if the license be for such
storage or transport outside the limits of any Municipality by the District
limoCCiro°time I aR,StriU l’ ^  by “ ch othei\Person as the Governor may from’ lime to time by an order in writing appoint in this behalf. 1
(4) —  Licenses for the storage of petroleum other than dangerous petro- 
leutn outside the limits of any Municipality may be granted subject to the 
provisions of sections 19 and 20 of these .Rules under, the signature of'the 
Colonial Secretary or of a Resident Councillor.- Applications for such licenses 
should be made to a District Officer or. a Magistrate
22. Licenses granted under these Rule^  shall be in the forms and shall 
Sc he chd c °he ret ^annexed C°nditi°na
to be^ orfeited? 1106050 ShaU’ ^  thC °f ^  SU°h conditi°n> be 1!abIe.
C o u n c i l  C h a m b e r ,  
Singapore, 3rd February,
A. P. TALBOT,
Clerk of Councils.
Source: PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL O F .THE
STRAITS SETTLEMENTS FOR THE YEAR .18 93 . Government 
Printing Office, Straits Settlements, 18 94 ,'pp 87-90
APPENDIX 6 B
/  : DUTY STATUS ON PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
i . IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
i 1!
Products
Exci se 
Duties
Import 
Dut i es Surtax
Sa 1 es 
Tax
Tar i f  f 
Code
1 . Premium Mogas 90/Oct .  and 
above (Loca l ly  re f ined)
$ 1 .41 /  
IG
NIL NIL NIL Cl
2. Premium Mogas 90/Oct.  and 
above (imported) 1
NIL $1 .51 /
IG
5% NIL 2710211
3. Regular Mogas (Local ly  
r e f i  ned)
$ 1 .4 1 /
IG
NIL NIL NIL C2
4. Regular Mogas (Imported) NIL $1.51 / IG 5% NIL 2710212
5. Kerosene (Local ly  re f ined) $ 0 .0 1 / IG NIL NIL NIL C3
6. Kerosene (imported) NIL $0.01/ G 1 Exempted NIL 2710293
7- ADO (Local ly  re f ined) NIL NIL NIL NIL 04
8. ADO (Imported) NIL- NIL Exempted NIL 2710410
9. Other Diesel  Fuel (Local Ref. ) NIL NIL NIL ■ NIL 05
10. Other Diesel  Fuel (Imported) NIL NIL Exempted NIL
1
27104.90
11. Av iat ion S p i r i t  100/Oct. and 
above (Local Ref. )
$1 .30 / NIL NIL NIL C6
12. Av ia t ion  S p i r i t  100 /0ct.  and 
above (Imported)
NIL $ 1 .40/ 5% NIL 2/10221
13. Av iat ion S p i r i t ,  other  
(Local ly  re f ined)
$1 .3 0 / NIL NIL NIL C7
14. -  do -  (Imported) NIL $1.40/1G NIL 2710229
15. Other Petroleum Spir ic  Having 
a Flash Point BELOV/ 73°F 
(Local ly  Ref i ned)
$ 1 .30 / NIL NIL NIL cs
16. -  do - |( Imported) NIL $1-40/ IG 5% NIL 2710291
17. Vapourisingl  O i 1 (Local ly  Ref. ) $0 .05/ IG NIL NIL MIL C9
18. - do - ( Imported) NIL $ 0 .0 5 /1 G 5% NIL 2710330
19.
i
Aviat ion  Tujrbine Fuel ,  having
Flash Point 73 F or over
(Jet Fuel) (Local ly  Refined)' %
$0 .0 5 / NIL NIL NIL CIO
20. -  do - ( Imported) NIL $ 0 .0 5 /1 G 5% NIL 2710310
...2/~
/4
/
/
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Products
21. Residual Fuel O i ls  (Local ly  
re f ined)
22. " d o  -  (imported)
23* Lubricat ing Oil containing a t  
least 70% Petroleum Products 
(Local ly  manufactured)
2*4. -  do -  ( Imported)
Including Lube base o i l s  for  
d i rec t  sales
25* Lube Base Oil imported fo r
Manufacture of  f in ished lubes
26.
27*
2 8.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Lubricat ing Grease Containing 
at  Least 70% Petroleum Products 
(Local ly  Manufactured)
-  do ( Imported)
33.
3A.
Lube Oil containing less than 
70% Petroleum Products 
( l o c a l l y  manufactured)
-  do -  ( Imported)
Lube Grease containing less 
than 70% Petroleum Products 
(Local ly  manufactured)
-  do -  (Imported)
P ara f f in  Was, Micro C rys ta l ­
l ing wax, slack wax, Ozokeri te ,  
L ign i te  Wax, Peat Wax, and any 
other mineral wax, whether or 
not coloure<jJ (Local ly  manu­
factured)  vj-
-  do -  ^Imported)'
Other Petro eum S p i r i t  having
35.
36.
a Flash point of  73 F or over 
Including Wnite S p i r i t  (Local ly  
Ref i ned)
(a) -  do -  ( imported)
(b) White S p i r i t  (Imported)
Petroleum Gases and o ther  * 
Gaseous Hydrocarbons (Local ly  
Ref i ned)
Exci se 
Put ies
$17.00
/ L . T .
NIL
$1.00/
IG
NIL
NIL
$10 .0 0
/cwt
NIL
$1.00/ 
IG
NIL
$1 0 .0 0
/cwt
NIL
$0.03
/ l b
NIL
$0.03
/ I G
NIL
NIL
$0.02
/ l b
Import
Put ies Surtax  
NIL NIL
$17.00/LT 5%
NIL NIL
$ 1 - 0 5 / IG 5%
Exempted 5% 
NIL NIL
$ 1 0 .0 0 /cwt 5% 
NIL NIL
$1.05/16 5% 
NIL NIL
$ 10.00 /cwt 5% 
NIL NIL
20% ad. 5% 
v a . lorem
N I L NIL
$ 0 . 0 5 / IG 5% 
$0 .0 5 /1 G 5%
Sal es 
_ Tax
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
NIL
5%
5%
5%
5%
NIL
N I L
N I L
NIL NI L
N I L
NIL
NI L
Tari f f  
Code
Cll
2710500 
Cl 2
2710610
2710610
C13
2710620
CIA
3A0A100
C15
3*iO*t2Cf
C16
2713000 
C17
27102S9
27103A0
036
.3/*
Products
Exci se 
Du t ies
Import 
Dut i es Surtax
Sales
Tax
Tar i f f
Code
37- Petroleum Gases and other  
Gaseous Hydrocarbons 
(Bulk Import)
NIL $0.03
/ l b
53 NIL 271lcoo
38. LPG i f  imported in c y l inde rs ,  
addi t ional  import duty imposed 
on cyl i  nders
NIL $15.00
/c y l
5% 53 732^900
39. Addi t ives for  Petrol  (Imported) -NIL NIL 53 53 3814100
40. - d o  -  Lubes (Imported) NIL NIL 5% 53 381 *+200
41. Crude Oi l s  (Imported for NIL NIL NIL NIL 270900
Ref i n i ng)
12/1 0 / 7 6
Source; Mobil Oil Company.
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APPENDIX 8A
(a) The Royal Dutch Shell Group of Companies
The Royal Dutch Shell Group of Company was formed on 
June 16, 1890 with an initial capital of f1.1,300,000 to 
operate an,oil concession in North-Eastern Sumatra. The 
company was established in Hague, Netherlands with the title 
"NETHERLANDSCHE KOLONIALE PETROLEUM MAATSCHAPPIJ" or "Royal 
Dutch Company for the Working of Petroleum Wells in Nether- 
land Indies". Over the years the name was simplified to its 
present title of "Royal Dutch Petroleum Company".
When the managment of the company was taken over by 
HWA Deterding, the policy was to seek cooperation with other 
.petroleum companies operating in Indonesia. Among the com­
panies which responded was one which the entire share capital 
was held by the "Shell"Transport and Trading Company Limited". 
It was only in 1907 that the full association of Royal Dutch 
"Shell" Transport now known as the Royal Dutch/Shell Group 
of Companies materialised.
The "Shell" Transport and Trading Company was formed 
in 1897 with an initial capital of £1,800,000 to take over 
the oil interest of Marcus Samuel and Company, including a 
producing field in Dutch East Borneo. These oil interests 
were becoming increasingly important to remain part of the 
firms general merchandising business. Among the mechandise 
which they traded were ornamental shells which were popular
473
in Victorian England; this was where the trade make "Shell" 
originated.
The first step in merging of interest of the Royal 
Dutch and "Shell" Transport was the formation of joint mar­
keting company called the East Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.,
The next step was in 1907 when the 2 parent companies trans­
feree! all assets to.the two companies namely the Anglo-Saxon 
Petroleum Company Limited (London) and N.V. De Bataafsche 
Petroleum Maatschappij (B.P.M.) now Bataafse Petroleum 
Maatschappij N.V., the Hague.
Royal Dutch took 60% and Shell Transport 40% of 
shares in both these two companies and then withdrew from 
active operations and functions only as entirely holding 
companies. At the same time Royal Dutch and "Shell" Trans­
port transferred their shares in the Asiatic Petroleum 
Company (renamed the Shell Petroleum Company Limited) to the 
Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company Limited in 1955 as a result of 
structural simplification the business of the Anglo-Saxon Co. 
Ltd. was vested in The Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. and the number 
of parent companies was thus reduced to two: BPM and Shell 
Petroleum. This is shown in Figure 8A(1) .
The main feature in which Shell differs from the other 
major international oil companies is in its special corporate 
structure and the uniquely international character of the
k
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Group. The basic structure of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group 
of Companies can be represented by a block diagram of the 
type shown.
This structure does not resemble that of the other 
international oil companies, and is unusual as the Group 
does not exist as a corporate body. The three essential 
elements in the Group are tlie holding companies, the opera- 
ting companies and the service companies. Surmounting these 
units and not strictly part of the Group are the parent com­
panies. They are the vehicle by means of which investors 
may hold shares in the Group.
Directly or indirectly BPM and Shell Petroleum hold 
a proportion or all of the several hundred operating companies 
throughout the world. And a notable operating company which 
supply the Group oil requirements in the East Asia region is 
the Shell Group of Companies in Malaysia and Brunei. The 
Shell Group of Companies are divided into various exploration 
and producing, refining and marketing companies.
The two parent companies, Royal Dutch and "Shell*1 
Transport and Trading are public companies. These two com­
panies hold the entire interest in BPM and Shell Petroleum 
in the ratio of 60:40 percent. BPM and Shell Petroleum in 
turn hold a proportion or all of several hundred other opera­
ting companies throughout the world which are collectively
476-
known as the Royal Dutch/Shell Group.
The Figure 8A^l[)shows the flow relationship amongst 
the various Shell Group of Companies in London, Singapore, 
Brunei and Malaysia.
Shell International Petroleum at London has a supply 
and affreightment contracts with the Shell Refining Company 
of Malaya in providing Kuwait crude to its refinery at Port 
Dickson. The Shell Eastern Petroleum Refinery at Singapore 
acts as a balancing of products (surplus/deficit) to the 
Sarawak Shell Lutong Refinery and the Shell Refinery Company 
of Malaya. The crudes for both the refineries are supplied 
•by the Sarawak Shell Company's production. The Sabah Shell 
Company's production are wholly exported overseas. The 
Lutong refinery also draws a minor supply of special crude 
and products from the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company in Seria. 
The Lutong Refinery supplies products to markets in Sarawak 
and Sabah, and the surplus for exports.
The ownership of the Exploration and Producing Com­
panies of Sarawak Shell Berhad and Sabah Shell Petroleum 
Company are vested fully in the hands of the Shell Inter­
national Petroleum Company in London. The Sarawak Shell 
Lutong Refinery, the Shell Borneo Marketing Company and the
Shell Malaya Trading Berhad are also owned fully by the
h c\
parent company in London. However, Shell Refining company is
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a public company: 25% of the share owned by the public and 
75% held by Shell International London.
In terms of services, Shell International Petroleum 
in London/Hague provides advisory services in production, 
manufacturing and marketing to Sarawak/Sabah Exploration and 
Producing Companies. The Kuala Lumpur Marketing Management 
provides management services to 3 Shell companies - The Shell 
Trading Malaya Berhad, Shell Borneo Marketing Company and 
Shell Refining- Malaya especially in manufacturing, trading 
and marketing activities. Shell International Petroleum also 
provides production manufacturing and marketing to the Lutong
and P.D. refineries. The Shell Eastern Petroleum in Singapore
\
provides a back-up operational assistance in manufacturing 
to both the above refineries. Both the Sarawak/Sabah Explo­
ration and Producing Companies as well as the Brunei Shell 
Petroleum Exploration and Producing Company provide mutual 
operating assistance in exploration and production with one 
another. This is shorn in Figure 8a  Ciii) .
FI
GU
RE
 
8.
A 
fi
ii
l 
FL
OW
 
OF
 
SE
RV
IC
ES
 
IN
SH
EL
L 
CO
MP
AN
IE
S 
IN 
M
A
L
A
Y
S
I
A
479
■3C>:'OZ'
H
CO
in
o-:
E-I £ 
CO H
480
Cbl Esso Standard Malaya Berhad 
Brief History
ESSO Standard Eastern of which ESSO Standard 
Malaya Limited forms a small section, engages in all phases^ 
of the oil industry from exploration to marketing in the 
Eastern Hemisphere. The Company's area of explorations 
extends from South to South Asia andAustralia and northwards 
to Japan and Korea, It is an affiliate of the Standard Oil 
of New Jersey, the oldest as well as the largest international 
oil company. Being a wholly owned affiliate of the parent 
company, it has direct access to petroleum — petroleum products, 
processing plants, transportation facilities and technical 
sources.
ESSO Standard Malaya Limited, an offshore of this huge 
organization, was established primarily as a supplier of fuel 
for kerosene lamps more than 80 years ago. Since then, the 
company has expanded to be a leading refiner and marketer of 
all forms of petroleum products as well as an important 
manufacturer in the national chemical industry.
In the first 30 years or so of its business history 
in this area ESSO marketed petroleum products imported from 
the United States of America. By 1928, following the dis­
covery of important oilfields in Sumatra and the construction 
of refinery at Palembang, ESSO in 1933 entered into a partner­
ship with Socony"^acuum \ oil Company (now known as Socony
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Mobil Co. Inc.] to form Standard Vacum Oil Co. The Standard 
Oil Co. combined all phases of the oil industry from explora­
tion to marketing in South East Asia, the Far East, Australia, 
South East Africa and India.
In view of the expansion of the market for the products 
of the company and the Sherman's Anti Trust Law ruling on the 
Standard Oil in America, and-the fact that the partnership 
imposed certain expansion limitation on each partner's organi­
zational objectives, ESSO and Mobil decided to end their joint 
ownership of Standard - Vacum Oil Company. The partnership 
was formally dissolved in 19-62. ESSO's share in Peninsula 
Malaysia became ESSO Standard Malaya Berhad.
ESSO Standard Malaya Berhad was incorporated in the 
Federation of Malaya in 1960 with a paid-up share capital of 
$54 million — 35% of its share or $18.9 million are owned by 
local investors. This makes it one of the largest Malaysian 
companies. On September 20, 1960 ESSO Standard Malaya was 
granted a Pioneer Certificate for the construction and opera­
tion of an oil refinery at Port Dickson. In November 1962, 
the company purchased and took over all the ESSO Standard 
Eastern Incorporations CESI] petroleum marketing business and 
assets in the Federation of Malaya in exchange for 16,09 9,700 
fully paid $2 ordinary shares of ESSO Standard Malaya, the 
payment of about $394,600 and the assumption of ESI's liabi­
lities. The company thus became member of the world wide
482
EXXON organization of over 300 companies affiliated to the 
world's biggest oil company - The Standard Oil Company (N.J.) 
The company was converted into a public company on March 30, 
1963 and on April 9 the same year, 8.75 million of ordinary 
shares of $2 each were issued to the public at par.
At present, the ESSO Group of Companies comprises of: 
ESSO Standard Malaya Berhad (Marketing), ESSO Standard Refinery 
Berhad, ESSO Chemical Malaya Sdn. Bhd., ESSO Exploration Malaya 
Incorporated now known as EXXON Malaya Incorporated.
The relationship between the various ESSO affiliates 
is graphed in Figure 8A (iv)
Saudi Crude Import
EXPORT -a— I P.D. REFINERY
EAST MAL. 
MARKETING
PENINSULA
MALAYSIA
ESSO BORNEO 
C O . LTD.
ESSO MALAYA 
BHD .
EXXON INCORP. 
(HOUSTON)
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN 
(SINGAPORE)
SUPPLY AND AFFREIGHTMENT 
CONTRACTS
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The flow of relationship between ESSO affiliates is 
less complicated compared to the Shell Group of companies 
earlier. EXXON Incorp. in USA has a supply affreightment 
contract with the ESSO PD Refinery. The products for the 
ESSO Malaya Refinery Bhd. is marketed by ESSO Standard 
Malaya Bhd. in Peninsula Malaysia and ESSO Borneo Co. Ltd. 
for Sabah and Sarawak markets. On the other hand the 2 com— 
panies also obtain additional supplies for their markets 
from the ESSO Standard Eastern Refinery in Singapore.
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APPENDIX 10A
THE PROFIT SHARING- AGREEMENT OR 50 : 50 CONCEPT
The basic terms of the petroleum agreement of1 1966
important in this discussion are duration, areas covered (size) , 
provisions of relinquishment minimum expenditure commitments, 
rental payments and royalty rates. Comparisons will be made 
with other producing countries not only regarding the basic 
agreements but also as to the total effect of all the terms in 
each country.
(i) Duration of the Agreement
Basing on the recommendation by ¥.J. Levy, the 
Malaysian petroleum agreements provided for an 8 year explora­
tion phase on land and a 10 years exploration phase offshore,
followed in each case, by a 30 year development phase. In many
other oil producing countries the exploration and prospecting 
phases of current petroleum agreements are often less than 10 
years.
(ii) The Size of the Agreement Area
The Commission recommended that an effective 
exploration programme can be carried out, in Malaysian conditions 
even offshore, over an initial area of ^-,000 square miles and 
less. The New Petroleum Agreement Sec. 8(2) specified that the 
initial area covered by the new exclusive agreement should not 
exceed ^,000 sq. miles.
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(iii) Compulsory Relinquished Provisions
Under this, the New Petroleum Agreement stipulated 
that 5 0 °/o of the initial agreement area should be relinquished 
after 5 years , and that a further 2^f0 of the initial agreement 
area should be relinquished after a further 5 years. This was 
stipulated under the Surrender Provisions sect. 4(l)(i), (ii) 
of the Petroleum Agreement,
(iv) Work Obligations and Minimum Expenditure Commitments
The minimum expenditure commitment provided for in 
the existing Sabah model offshore prospecting licence was adopted 
in new offshore petroleum agreements in sect. ^-(l) (i) and (ii)
except the minimum expenditure during any third 5 year term (if 
the exploration phase is extended) should be 5 0 °/o higher than 
the minimum expenditure during the second 5 year term giving the 
following scale as per stated under sect. 1 0 (k) of Petroleum 
Agreement:
Period
1st 5 yrs
2 nd 5 yr s
3rd 5 yrs 
(if extended)
Rate Mil Minimum Expenditure Maximum
on offshore Area
 _____ _______ Exploration(M^ Mil) fsq.miles
0.2 mil. for 1st 3.^ ^.000
2 years
0,5 mil. for 2nd 
2 years
2.0 mil. in the 
5th year
2.0 mil, per year 10.0 2.000
0.3 mil. per year
15.0 1.000
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(v ) Rental Payments
No rental payment was Imposed during the exploration 
phase of* a comprehensive agreement , except in respect of* land 
physically occupied toy the company. After the fix’st five 
years of the development phase, rental payments on acreage 
outside the area of a developed oilfield would toe imposed.
Sect. ll(l) of the Petroleum Agreement required that the 
company pay the Government a fixed yearly payment in respect 
of each sq, mile of land held the following: (a) Exploration
Phase: No rental payment was levied in the first 5 years.
After that between 6-10 years at $20 per sq. mile per year; if 
the exploration were extended then it had to pay $40 sq. miles 
per year and was not to toe offset against new exploration 
expenditure within the agreement area, (to) During the Develop­
ment Phase: The rental during the 1st 5 years was at $50 Per SG» 
miles per year and from 6th to 20th year at $l,000/sq. mile 
per year and beyond that at $2,000 sq, miles per year.
(vi) Royalty Rates on Crude Oil
Under Part VI sect. l^(l) and 1 5 (1 ), l6(l) the Royalty 
rates under the new agreement was uniform at the generally 
established level of 12-g-$ on crude oil, natural gas and 
casinghead petroleum spirit produced in Malaysia, whether on 
land or of offshore and a lower rate was set for marginally 
profitable, fields .
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(vii) The Concept of Posted Price
Under the new agreement , the royalty value of4 any 
crude oil product in Malaysia was directly related with an 
appropriate adjustment lor transport cost and quality 
differential to the royalty value established from time to 
time in the Middle East. Similarly the tax value of any 
crude oil produced in Malaysia was directly related with an 
appropriate adjustment for transport cost and quality 
differential, to the tax value established, from time to time 
in the Middle East i.e. to the posted price of comparable 
Middle East crude less any discounts off these prices and 
allowance for tax purposes from time to time./_Part VI sect.
18 (i) (a) and (b)JJ7
(viii) Deduction from the Export Price
Under this any marketing allowance accepted for tax 
purposes in Malaysia should not exceed one half of one US cent 
per barrel.
(ix) The Royalty and Tax Value of Natural Gas
Unlike crude oil, the value of natural gas, for 
royalty and tax purposes should be taken as the actual selling 
price of the gas.
(x) The Expending of Intangible Development Costs
Under the new arrangement, the Government allowed
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current intangible development costs to be fully expensed 
against current income.
(xi) Expensing of Exploration Costs
The new agreement gave the oil companies the option 
of expensing all of their current exploration costs against 
current income.
(xii) Accelerated Depreciation
The agreement gave oil companies initial allowances, 
or accelerated depreciation, on a generous scale.
BONUS PAYMENTS
Xn many oil producing countries, the granting of 
concession was based on bidding in the form of cash bonus to 
be paid by the company to the government. This cash bonus 
would be made in 2 forms: after a certain number of years, or 
after a certain level of production had been reached. The 
first category of bonus was called "initial" or "signature" 
bonus whereas the second was called "delayed" or "production" 
bonus.
A signatia”; or1 initial bonus was a net cash payment 
to the government and the company bore the risk that no oil 
may be found. A production bonus was payable only if a 
commercial oilfield were found. The company paid nothing if 
it was unsuccessful. Between the two, the former was more
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■costly than the latter to an oil company as it was paid at 
an earlier date.
Xn the Petroleum Agreement, under sect. 9 of the 
Petroleum Mining Act, 1966 in respect of offshore land signed 
on l 6th April, 1968 between the Government of Malaysia and 
ESSO Exploration Malaysia Berhad and Continental Oil Malaysia, 
the companies paid the Government M$6,000 on signing the 
Agreement.
GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION XN PETROLEUM OPERATIONS
Towards the end of 1950s, in the Middle East 
producing countries, some governments had insisted on having 
the option to participate in the petroleum operations. The 
Government did not participate in the exploration venture 
initially, but reserved the right to do so after oil has been 
found. Under this form of joint—venture agreement the 
Government was normally committed to contribute its propor­
tionate share of the costs of developing the oilfield.
However, in the case of Malaysia, there was no provision for 
government participation as Malaysia was not a substantial oil 
producer.
EMPLOYMENT IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN MALAYSIA
The petroleum legislation of several oil producing 
countries included the stipulation that the staff of any oil 
company operating in the country must include a certain 
proportion of the country’s citizens in the higher executive
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and board of directors. This was included in the Malaysian 
Petroleum Agreement as well. Sect. 51 of Oil Agreements, 
under sect, 9 of Petroleum Mining Act, 1 9 6 6 , stipulated
that any oil company must use its best endeavours to employ 
and train local staff and to promote any suitable employees 
to high promotions — operations and management.
PRIORITY FOR CONSUMPTION IN MALAYSIA
In the petroleum agreement under sect. 5^(l) the 
government requested the oil companies to give priority to 
Malaysia1s internal requirements. Each oil company was 
obligated to supply Malaysia’s internal requirements in 
proportion to its total production. In addition Sect. 52.(2) 
of an oil company agreement, crude oil sold for internal 
consumption would be at part with export price or lower in the 
case of government purchases.
REFINING OBLIGATIONS
Sect. 35 of the petroleum agreement required the oil 
companies to "consider with the government the economic 
feasibility of erecting a 'refinery or extending any refinery 
it already owned to a capacity capable of processing shares of 
predicted local consumption proportionate to its share of 
local crude production". This was to be carried out when 
total demand in Malaya appeared to exceed refining capacity 
for local consumption.
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THE DISPOSAL OF PETROLEUM NATURAL GAS AND CASINGHEAD 
PETROLEUM SPIRIT
This was explicitly defined in sect. 19B (l) of the
Petroleum Agreement which gave tlie companies right to export 
petroleum and natural gas and casinghead petroleum spirit 
produced in excess of Malaysia's internal requirements.
However, priority was given to the use of petroleum and natural 
gas for conservation purposes in the oilfields. This also 
applied to products manufactured for export and consumption 
outside Malaysia. Moreover, Sect, 19B (2) guaranteed to the
oil companies the right to fully export, without duty, all 
petroleum produced in excess of the country* s internal 
requirements.
‘ II THE PETROLEUM (INCOME TAX) ACT, 1967
The Petroleum (income Tax) Act of I 967 was passed by 
the Malaysian Parliament on the 28th September 1 9 6 7 . The 
objective of the Act was "... to impose income taxes from the 
winning of petroleum in Malaysia, to provide for the assessment 
and collection thereof and for purposes connected therewith".
The provisions of calculating the oil companies® 
annual profit and loss accounts were laid down in Section 6 
of the Petroleum (income Tax) Act, I 9 6 7 . The items in the Act 
used in the assessment of the Oil companies' profits can be 
summarised in the following:
XU
5Q7
Proceeds
Gross income from sales of all chargeable 
petroleum (natural gas or casinghead 
petroleum spirit, crude oil sold and refined 
in Malaysia) by the company.
Gross proceeds of sales from crude oil sold 
and exported by the company.
Proceeds from crude oil exported otherwise 
than on sale by the company.
Proceeds from crude oil delivered to refinery 
by or on behalf of the company.
Crude oil delivered to government in lieu of 
royalty by the company.
Casinghead petroleum spirit injected into 
crude oil by the company.
All receipts of revenues other than 7» 9» 10,
11 & 12 by the company.
Sums recovered on account of debts and debts 
released,
Gross Income of the company in the Accounting 
period.
Deductions
The adjusted income of a petroleum company for the 
period was the deduction made from the gross income of the 
company for that period all outgoings and expenses incurred by 
the company during that period in the production of the gross 
income.
10 3 & 15(l) (a.) Any monies payable in interest on capital
employed in petroleum operations.
11 3 & 15(1) (t>) Any rents payable for the period by the
company in respect of any land or building
occupied.
12 3 & 15(l)(c) Expenses incurred for repairs or alterations
1 2 &  6
2 2 & 7
3 2 & 9
k 2 & 10
5 2 & 11
6 2 & 12
7 2 & 13
8 2 & Ik
9
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or renewals of premises , plant, machinery 
or fixtures employed for carrying out 
petroleum operations.
13 3 & 15(l) (d.) Assessment rates payable by the company.
14 3 & 15(l) (e ) Other deduction prescribed by the Authority.
15 3 & 16(1)&(2) Deductions in respect of irrecoverable
debt, bad or doubtful.
1 6 3 & 1 6 (3 ) Contributions to approved scheme such as
pension, provident fund or any other 
society schemes or funds.
17 3 '& l6(4) Expenditures for drilling appraisal and
development wells.
18 3 & 3-6 (5 ) Capital expenditures allowed according to
Schedule I
19 3 & 16(6) Royalties payable by the Company (royalty
did not include the value of any crude 
oil which was delivered to the Government).
20 3 & 17(1) The differences in the value of stock-in-
trade at the beginning and at the end.
21 Ad.justed Income
22 Amount of any loss incurred during any
previous accounting period.
23 Assessable Income
24 22(l) Gift of money made by the company to the
government, a state government or any 
approval institution or organisation.
25 Chargeable Income
Basically under the Systems of Profits and Loss 
Accounts in the Petroleum (income Tax) Act 1 9 6 7 , there were 
3 main categories of items to be considered in arriving at 
the chargeable profit. They were firstly, the earnings of 
the oil companies as a basis for Establishing Profits;
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secondly, items deductible from Proceeds as provided by 
the Law; and thirdly items which might be deducted from the 
Chargeable Tax, and are summarised below as;
PROCEEDS - DEDUCTIONS = ADJUSTED INCOME
ADJUSTED INCOME - LOSS = ASSESSABLE INCOME
ASSESSABLE INCOME - GIFTS = CHARGEABLE INCOME
Under the category of proceeds, the earnings from 
the oil company operations included the actual income 
received from the petroleum operation during the accounting 
period and the miscellaneous receipts accrued to the oil 
company during the same period. Prior to I9 6 6 , the value 
of crude oil produced from the Miri oilfields in Sarawak 
was calculated for the Royalty and income tax purposes on 
two completely different bases in the case of Royalty. The 
basis of calculation was to relate the value of the two 
main grades of Miri crude oils -* Miri Light and Miri Heavy - 
to the market values of the products produced from the 
crude oils. These values were in turn related to the prices 
of refined products at the US Gulf (without allowing for 
transport differential),
Two further deductions were mad e , US 35^ per barrel 
for Light crude and US 30^ a barrel for Heavy crude, to 
allow for the cost of transport of the crude oils from the 
field to the refinery and the cost of processing it into 
products. A further US 15^ per barrel was deducted from the 
net value in case of Light crude and US 5^ per barrel in the 
case of Heavy crude to compensate for the quality deficiencies
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of the products deemed to be yielded.
There was no tax value as sucb. attached, to both 
the Miri Light and Heavy crudes as all these crudes were 
refined in Shell Sarawak Lutong refinery. Profits were 
calculated, for income tax purposes, on the prices actually 
received by Lutong Refinery for the refined products 
exported from Sarawak.
From the above arguments, it appeared that not only 
from an administrative point of view but also on economic 
grounds that a simpler and more direct method of valuation 
was adopted. In general, the Middle Eastern countries with 
whose oil the crude oil of Malaysia competed at that time 
was valued for royalty purposes at posted prices and in some 
other countries, the sales proceed were at the 2 different 
markets namely the same posted prices from the starting 
point for the calculation of the tax value of the crude oil. 
While for the theoretically calculated sales process the 
crude oil sold was assessed from the internationally fixed 
posted prices, the actual income of companies were the basis 
for assessing operational profits from realised proceeds.
Due to the surplus of crude in the middle of i 960 in the 
world market, and since the oil companies were forced to 
give rebates on the list prices, the realised proceeds were 
something lower than the sales proceeds calculated from 
posted prices .
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APPENDIX 1QB
MANAGEMENT SHARING AND THE PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT ACT
The Petroleum Development Act had the provision 
regarding the-issue of Management shares to PETRONAS by 
companies carrying out the business of processing, manufac­
turing, refining, marketing'and distributing of petroleum 
and petro— chemical products.
The spin-off of the management sharing concept was 
the realisation of the importance of the petroleum and 
petrochemicals as a fact and essential items for the proper 
development of the Malaysian community and therefore it was 
intended that the country should introduce measures to 
control and regulate the distribution of essential items. 
This was summed up by the then PETRONAS Chairman himself, 
Tengku Razaleigh:
" .., . the corporation* s purchasing of management
shares in the oil and petrochemical industries
was to regulate and control the industries. It is
through this device that it would ensure that
companies selected would meet the needs and
1
requirements of the country."
From the objectives of the Management share 
concept enunciated above, there were two main underlying
1 Speech by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, Chairman and
Chief Executive of PETRONAS as appeared in MALAYSIAN DIGEST 
in 1975.
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reasons for sucli need. Firstly, although. Malaysia is an 
oil producing country, the petroleum industry did not 
shelter the economy during the oil excises in 1973 f’om the 
vagaries of world market and from the activities of 
speculators and manipulators. Therefore, something had to 
he done to ensure that the Malaysian community would at all 
times obtain sufficient supplies of these essential items at 
reasonable prices. Secondly, through this device the 
Government and the people in Malaysia could be assured of 
some form of participation in the exploitation, distribution 
of petroleum and its products.
Under the new section 6a of the Petroleum 
Development A c t , any company which carried on business of
(a) processing or refining of petroleum ox1 (b) manufacturing 
of petro-chemical products from petroleum or (c) marketing 
or distributing of petroleum or petro-chemical products, was 
required to provde two classes of shares, called the 
Management shares and the Ordinary shares. The company 
concerned can only issue Management shares to PETRONAS and 
the pi’ice of such Management shares was equivalent to the 
market price of the Ordinary shares, as quoted in the Stock 
Exchange in Malaysia or elsewhere, or if not quoted at all 
in the Stock Exchange at such fair and reasonable price as 
might be determined by the Prime Minister.
2
The Management sharing in the Petroleum Development
2 See the PETRONAS Act in PETRONAS, a booklet published
by Petroliam Nasional Berhad, p. 18.
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Act of 197^ spelt out in Section 6a was originally as 
follows:
"Section 6a (1) Any company which carries on any
business referred to subsection
(l) and (3) of Section 6 (herein­
after referred to as ’the relevant 
company') shall:
(a) have two classes of shares, 
called the Management shares and 
“the Ordinary shares, and (b) issue 
no Management shares except to the 
Corporation,
(2 ) As soon as practicable after the 
commencement of this section,
'(a) every relevant company the 
shares of which are quoted on a 
Stock Exchange in Malaysia or 
elsewhere shall issue for cash at a 
price which is equivalent to the 
market price of the ordinary shares 
prevailing at the <hfce of the issue; 
and (b) every relevant company the 
shares of which are not quoted on 
the Stock Exchange in Malaysia or 
elsewhere shall issue for cash at 
such fair and reasonable price as 
may be determined by the Prime 
Minister, such number of management 
shares as is equal to the percentum 
or more of its issued and paid-up 
capital and whatever subsequent issue 
of shares is made by the relevant 
company on percentum of every such 
issue shall consist of management 
shares,
(3) A relevant company to which paragraph
(b) of Subsection (2) applies shall
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issue the management shares 
required to be issued under sub­
sections (2) at the fair and 
reasonable price determined by the 
Prime Minister as soon as practicable 
after the Prime Minister has so 
determined.
(^) The directors of a relevant company 
shall, on the requisition of the 
holders of its issued management 
shares, forthwith convene an 
extraordinary general meeting of 
the company, but in any case, not 
later than two months after the 
receipt by the company of the 
requisition and the provisions of 
"Section Xkk of the Company's Act 
I 965 except Subsection (l) thereof 
shall have effect in relation to 
such requisition.
(5 ) The holders of both the management 
and ordinary shares of the relevant 
company shall rank 1parri passu':
(a) in respect of the dividents 
declared by the company (same for 
both declared for the financial 
year of the relevant company which 
is current at the date of the 
commencement of this section);
(*>) in respect of bonuses and rights 
of issue made by the company;
(c) in the right to return of 
capital; and
(d) in the right to participation 
in all surplus assets of the 
company in liquidation.
(6) The holder of the management shares 
of a relevant company shall be
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entitled either on a poll or by 
a show of hands to 500 votes for 
each management shares held by him 
upon any resolution relating to 
the appointment or dismissal of a 
director or any member of the staff 
of the relevant company but shall 
in all other respects have the same 
voting rights as the holder of its 
ordinary shares.
(7 ) Voting on appointment of dismissal 
of a director of a relevant company 
shall be by means of a poll only.
(8) The provisions of this section shall 
have effect notwithstanding the 
provisions of any other written law 
or of the Memorandum or Articles of 
Association of a relevant company.
(9) For the purpose of this section, 
"Surplus assets” means all the 
assets of a relevant company 
remaining after the liabilities of 
the relevant company have been 
discharged and after the costs of 
winding up have been paid or provided 
for but before any capital has been 
paid or pi’ofits distributed to the 
holders of its ordinary shares.
(10) The Prime Minister may exempt any 
relevant company or any class of 
relevant companies from the provi­
sion of this section.
(11) Subject to sub-section (l0) any 
relevant company which contravenes 
or fails to comply with any of the 
provisions of this section shall be 
guilty of an. offence and shall, on 
conviction, be liable to a fine
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not exceeding one million 
dollars or to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding five years 
or to both, and in the case of 
continuing offence it shall be 
liable to a further fine not 
exceeding one hundred thousand 
dollars for each day or part of 
a day during which the offence 
continues after the,first day 
in respect of which the conviction 
•is recorded,"
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APPENDIX 11,1
MALAYSIA: PETROLEUM INDUSTRY EXPENDITURE BY CATEG-ORY
CATEGORY EXPLORATION
^ Min.
DEVELOPMENT 
$ Min.
OPERATING 
jg Min.
TOTAL
Min.
Drilling Contractors 63.8 163.3 0 . 0 227. 1
Fabrication and. Cons­
truction 0.0 398.7 6.0 404.7
Transport Services 47. 6 149„ 4 89.2 2 8 6 . 2
Engineering and Surface
Production Facilities 1 0 o2 107.5 166.7 274. 4
Data Aquisition 1 1 . 4 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 1 . 4
Supply Bases and Shore 
Support 4. 2 19.3 9.6 33.1
Specialised Sub-Surface
Activiti es 37.1 O * O 21.1 145.2
Sub-Sea Engineering 1 2. 8 33.3 1 2 . 1 58.2
Cat ering , 10.7 27.9 16.9 55.5
Communi cati ons 0.9 2.1 4,8 7.8
Specifications and 
Inspections 0 . 5 1 . 1 4.8 6.4
¥ orlcovers 0.0 0 . 0 48.2 48.2
Company Expense 33.0 84.9 233.3 351.2
Total 2 3 2 . 2 1074.5 6 0 2. 7 1909.4
Source: Carr ¥ I FAR EAST RESEARCH. ¥ I Carr Sons and Co
(Overseas) 19 '7 6 . 
contained in the 
they believed to 
guarantee for its
According to them the 
table was drawn from s 
be reliable,, However1 
accuracy.
information 
ources which 
they did not
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